Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
DILSHOD SIDIKOV, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. 26-3041-JWL
)
C. CARTER, Warden, FCI-Leavenworth; )
TODD LYONS, Acting Director, )
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; )
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, )
Department of Homeland Security; and )
PAM BONDI, Attorney General, )
)
Respondents. )
)
____________________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Petitioner, acting pro se, filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
by which he challenges his detention by immigration officials. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court denies the petition.
Petitioner, a native of Russia, entered the United States in June 2023, although
removal proceedings were initiated at that time. On June 24, 2025, immigration officials
took petitioner into custody, and on September 2, 2025, an immigration judge ordered
petitioner’s removal to Russia. Petitioner is presently detained within this judicial district.
On March 5, 2026, petitioner filed the instant petition. Respondents filed an answer and a
supplemental answer to the petition, the deadline for a reply brief has expired, and the
matter is therefore ripe for ruling.
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Petitioner claims that his continued detention by immigration authorities is
improper. To obtain habeas corpus relief, petitioner must demonstrate that he is “in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). This Court has habeas corpus jurisdiction to consider the statutory
and constitutional grounds for immigration detention that are unrelated to a final order of
removal. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517–18 (2003). Specifically, petitioner claims
that his detention for more than six months has now become unreasonably indefinite, and
that his release is therefore required under the framework set forth by the Supreme Court
in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court noted that an alien must be detained during the 90-
day removal period and that the Government may continue to detain an alien after that
period or release the alien under supervision. See id. at 683 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2),
(6)). In this case, petitioner’s removal period began on October 2, 2025, when petitioner’s
appeal deadline expired and the removal order thus became administratively final. See 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i) (removal period begins when removal order becomes final); 8
C.F.R. § 1241.1(c) (removal order becomes final upon expiration of the time allotted for
an appeal). The Supreme Court held in Zadvydas, however, that “once removal is no longer
reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by the statute.” See id.
at 699. The Court elaborated on that standard as follows:
In answering that basic question, the habeas court must ask whether
the detention in question exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure
removal. It should measure reasonableness primarily in terms of the statute’s
basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of
removal. Thus, if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should
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hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.
In that case, of course, the alien’s release may and should be conditioned on
any of the various forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the
circumstances, and the alien may no doubt be returned to custody upon a
violation of those conditions. . . .
We recognize, as the Government points out, that review must take
appropriate account of the greater immigration-related expertise of the
Executive Branch, of the serious administrative needs and concerns inherent
in the necessarily extensive INS efforts to enforce this complex statute, and
the Nation’s need to “speak with one voice” in immigration matters. But we
believe that courts can take appropriate account of such matters without
abdicating their legal responsibility to review the lawfulness of an alien’s
continued detention.
See id. at 699-700 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court then established a
presumptively-reasonable detention period of six months in which to accomplish removal,
after which the reasonableness of an alien’s detention should be determined as follows:
After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that
showing. And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior
postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the “reasonably foreseeable
future” conversely would have to shrink. This 6-month presumption, of
course, does not mean that every alien not removed must be released after
six months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has
been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.
See id. at 701; see also, e.g., Anyimu v. Department of Homeland Security, 2017 WL
193180, at *2-3 (D. Kan. Jan. 18, 2017) (Lungstrum, J.) (applying this framework); Kaliku
v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2024 WL 4854523, at *2-3 (D.
Kan. Nov. 21, 2024) (Lungstrum, J.) (same); Vargas v. Noem, 2025 WL 2770679, at *2-3
(D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2025) (Lungstrum, J.) (same).
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The Court finds in this case that petitioner is not entitled to relief under this
framework. Only seven months have passed since the start of the removal period,
petitioner holds a valid Russian passport, and Russia has now confirmed petitioner’s
citizenship. Therefore, the Court finds that petitioner has not provided good reason to
believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future. Moreover, even if petitioner had made the requisite showing, the Government has
submitted sufficient evidence in rebuttal, including evidence that Russia issued a travel
document for petitioner, which expired when petitioner’s removal flight was canceled; that
a new travel document will be issued once petitioner has another interview with Russian
officials; and that petitioner will then be removed as soon as the new travel document is
issued.
The Court also rejects petitioner’s due process claim in which he alleges that he is
not being detained for the proper purpose of effecting his removal. Petitioner has cited no
authority suggesting that his detention during this period is unconstitutional. Nor has he
shown that his detention is for an improper purpose.
Finally, the Court rejects petitioner’s claim based on a violation of regulations.
Petitioner claims that he has not been “provided with any interview opportunity” during
his detention, but respondents have submitted evidence that petitioner has in fact been
interviewed as part of a custody review. Petitioner has not established any violation of an
applicable regulation, and the petition is therefore denied in its entirety.
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT the petition for habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is hereby denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 4th day of May, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas.
/s/ John W. Lungstrum
Hon. John W. Lungstrum
United States District Judge
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