Roman v. Miller et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
SAMUEL ROMAN,
Plaintiff,
v. 	CASE NO. 26-3011-JWL
JEFFERY MILLER, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Plaintiff Samuel Roman is hereby required to show good cause, in writing to the
undersigned, why this action should not be dismissed due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s
Complaint that are discussed herein.
I. Nature of the Matter before the Court
Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	Plaintiff is in
custody at the Sumner County Jail in Wellington, Kansas. Plaintniff has paid the filing fee.
Plaintiff’s claims relate to his state court criminal proceedings. 	Plaintiff alleges that on
September 	23, 	2022, 	Sumner 	County 	Sheriff’s 	officials 	arrived 	at 	Plaintiff’s 	house 	and
conducted a warrantless search and seizure. (Doc. 1, at 2.) Plaintniff alleges that the state court
judge allowed this miscarriage of justice and fruit from the poisonous tree. 	Id. at 3. Plaintiff
alleges that he should not be in jail. 	Id. 	He claims he was wrongly arrested, prosecuted, and
sentenced “by a concerted sham of due process.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff claims that he was criminally
charged for something that should have been pursued through administrative means because he
holds a license as a kennel owner/operator. Id. at 6–7. Plaintiff seeks restoration of his property
and pets, and compensatory damages for lost wages and pain and suffering. Id. at 9.
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II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). 	The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised
claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2).
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)
(citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). 	A court
liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts
all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th
Cir. 2006). 	On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not
raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are
insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” 	Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to
relief’ requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action.” 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 	The complaint’s “factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a
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claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court,
a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant
did it; how the defendant’s action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the
plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” 	Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d
1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). 	The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round
out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” 	Whitney v. New
Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and
Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. 	See Kay v.
Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States,
561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the
complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at
1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the
line from conceivable to plausible.’” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in
this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in
a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it
innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S.
Ct. at 1974).
III. DISCUSSION
1. Prior Case
Plaintiff filed a prior case in this Court alleging similar claims regarding his state criminal
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proceedings. 	See Roman v. Miller, Case No. 23-1208-KHV-BGS (D. Kan.) (filed Sept. 26,
2023). 	In that case, the Court dismissed “plaintiff’s claims because (1) such claims are barred
under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) and (2) under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1991), the Court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims.” 	Roman v.
Miller, Case No. 23-1208-KHV-BGS, Doc. 20 (D. Kan. March 14, 2024). Despite the Court’s
ruling in Case No. 23-1208, Plaintiff has raised the same claims in his current case despite his
pending state court proceedings. 	The same rationale for the Court’s dismissal in Case No. 23-
1208 applies to Plaintiff’s current case.
2. Younger Abstention
To the extent Plaintiff’s claims relate to his state criminal proceedings in Sumner County,
Kansas, the Court would be prohibited from hearing Plaintiff’s claims regarding his state court
proceedings under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971). “The Younger doctrine requires a
federal court to abstain from hearing a case where . . . (1) state judicial proceedings are ongoing;
(2) [that] implicate an important state interest; and (3) the state proceedings offer an adequate
opportunity to litigate federal constitutional issues.” Buck v. Myers, 244 F. App’x 193, 197 (10th
Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (citing Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Stovall, 341 F.3d 1202, 1204 (10th
Cir. 2003); see also Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432
(1982)). 	“Once these three conditions are met, Younger abstention is non-discretionary and,
absent extraordinary circumstances, a district court is required to abstain.” 	Buck, 244 F. App’x
at 197 (citing Crown Point I, LLC v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n, 319 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th
Cir. 2003)).
Online records show that Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings are pending. 	See State v.
Roman, Case No. SU-2022-CR-000252 (District Court of Sumner County, Kansas). 	Plaintiff
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appealed the District Court’s judgment, and the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
on May 9, 2025. 	See Appellate Court No. 24-127188-A. 	On September 19, 2025, the Kansas
Supreme Court denied the petition for review. Id. On October 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Notice of
Intent to File Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
It appears that Plaintiff’s state court criminal proceedings are pending and therefore the
first and second conditions for Younger abstention would be met because Kansas undoubtedly
has an important interest in enforcing its criminal laws through criminal proceedings in the
state’s courts. In re Troff, 488 F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[S]tate control over criminal
justice [is] a lynchpin in the unique balance of interests” described as “Our Federalism.”) (citing
Younger, 401 U.S. at 44). 	Likewise, the third condition would be met because Kansas courts
provide Plaintiff with an adequate forum to litigate his constitutional claims by way of pretrial
proceedings, trial, and direct appeal after conviction and sentence, as well as post-conviction
remedies. See Capps v. Sullivan, 13 F.3d 350, 354 n.2 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[F]ederal courts should
abstain from the exercise of . . . jurisdiction if the issues raised . . . may be resolved either by trial
on the merits in the state court or by other [available] state procedures.”) (quotation omitted); see
Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1984) (state courts have obligation ‘to guard, enforce, and
protect every right granted or secured by the constitution of the United States . . . .’”); Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1974) (pendant state proceeding, in all but unusual cases,
would provide federal plaintiff with necessary vehicle for vindicating constitutional rights).
“[T]he Younger doctrine extends to federal claims for monetary relief when a judgment
for the plaintiff would have preclusive effects on a pending state-court proceeding.” 	D.L. v.
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2004). 	Plaintiff’s claims may be
stayed pending the resolution of the pending criminal case. See Garza v. Burnett, 672 F.3d 1217,
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1220 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007)); Myers v. Garff, 876
F.2d 79, 81 (10th Cir. 1989) (directing district court to stay claim for damages).
Plaintiff should show good cause why the Court should not abstain from hearing his
claims regarding his state court proceedings in the District Court of Sumner County, Kansas.
Plaintiff should indicate the status of any petition for writ of certiorari that he filed and should
indicate if he is seeking a stay pending resolution of that petition.
3. Heck Bar and Habeas Nature of Claim
To the extent Plaintiff challenges the validity of his sentence in his state criminal case, his
federal claim must be presented in habeas corpus. 	“[A] § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a
state prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but
not to the fact or length of his custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973)
(emphasis added). When the legality of a confinement is challenged so that the remedy would be
release or a speedier release, the case must be filed as a habeas corpus proceeding rather than
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the plaintiff must comply with the exhaustion of state court
remedies requirement. 	Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 482 (1994); see also Montez v.
McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 2000) (exhaustion of state court remedies is required by
prisoner seeking habeas corpus relief); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (requiring exhaustion of
available state court remedies). 	“Before a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state
prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court. In other words, the state prisoner
must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a
federal court in a habeas petition.” 	O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); see
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518–19 (1982);
Therefore, any claim challenging his state sentence is not cognizable in a § 1983 action. Plaintiff
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should show cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed as not properly brought in a
§ 1983 action.
Likewise, before Plaintiff may proceed in a federal civil action for monetary damages
based upon an invalid conviction or sentence, he must show that his conviction or sentence has
been overturned, reversed, or otherwise called into question. 	Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994). 	If Plaintiff has been convicted and a judgment on Plaintiff’s claim in this case would
necessarily imply the invalidity of that conviction, the claim may be barred by Heck. In Heck v.
Humphrey, the United States Supreme Court held that when a state prisoner seeks damages in a
§ 1983 action, the district court must consider the following:
whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity
of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless
the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated.
Id. at 487. 	In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a § 1983 damages claim that necessarily
implicates the validity of the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence is not cognizable unless and until
the conviction or sentence is overturned, either on appeal, in a collateral proceeding, or by
executive order. Id. at 486–87. Plaintiff has not alleged that the conviction or sentence has been
invalidated.
IV. Response Required
Plaintiff is required to show good cause why Plaintiff’s Complaint should not be
dismissed for the reasons stated herein. Failure to respond by the Court’s deadline may result in
dismissal of this case without further notice.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted until February 17, 2026, in
which to show good cause, in writing to the undersigned, why Plaintiff’s Complaint should not
be dismissed or stayed for the reasons stated herein.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated January 16, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas.
S/ John W. Lungstrum
JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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