Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
MAYOM POUL BOJ, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 26-3009-JWL
)
SAMUEL OLSON, ICE Field Office Director; 	)
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of Homeland Security; 	)
TODD LYONS, Acting Director, ICE; 	)
PAM BONDI, Attorney General; and 	)
C. CARTER, Warden, FCI-Leavenworth, 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
)
____________________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Petitioner, through counsel, filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241, by which he challenges his detention by immigration officials. For the reasons set
forth below, the petition is granted in part and denied in part. 	The petition is granted
with respect to petitioner’s request for release; respondents shall release petitioner from
custody, subject to an appropriate order of supervision, by March 9, 2026, and shall
provide notice to this Court when that release is effected. The motion is denied with respect
to any other relief requested.
Petitioner is a native of Sudan. Petitioner was admitted to the United States in 2002
as a refugee, and he became a lawful permanent resident in 2005. Petitioner was convicted
of crimes in Indiana state court in 2011 and 2013, and in 2015 immigration officials
detained petitioner and initiated removal proceedings. 	On July 6, 2015, an immigration
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judge ordered petitioner’s removal but granted his application for deferral of removal, with
the result that petitioner could not be removed to Sudan but may only be removed to an
alternative third country. Petitioner was released on an Order of Supervision (OSUP) the
following day. 	Petitioner was convicted of additional crimes in 2021 and 2023, and
immigration officials took petitioner into custody on May 20, 2024. 	Officials moved to
reopen removal proceedings, arguing that petitioner was no longer eligible for the relief he
had received, and in November 2024, the immigration judge granted the motion. Petitioner
filed a new application for relief, and on May 16, 2025, the immigration judge ordered
removal but granted deferral of removal to Sudan. Petitioner is presently detained within
this judicial district. 	On January 15, 2026, petitioner filed the instant habeas action;
respondents have filed a response to the petition, petitioner has filed a reply brief, 1 and the
matter is therefore ripe for ruling.
Petitioner first claims that his continued detention by immigration authorities is
improper. 	To obtain habeas corpus relief, petitioner must demonstrate that he is “in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 	See 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 	This Court has habeas corpus jurisdiction to consider the statutory
1 The petition conveys a sense of urgency in seeking relief, given petitioner’s long
detention, as shown by its request for expedited briefing and for a hearing “at the earliest
practicable opportunity.” The Court is therefore surprised and somewhat dismayed at the
fact that petitioner’s counsel did not file a traverse until after business hours on the date of
the reply deadline, three weeks after respondents filed their answer – especially given this
Court’s demonstrated willingness (as noted in the traverse) to order release in cases
involving similar facts.
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and constitutional grounds for immigration detention that are unrelated to a final order of
removal. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517–18 (2003).
Generally, when an alien is ordered removed, the removal is to occur within a period
of 90 days, referred to as the “removal period.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). Petitioner’s
removal period began on May 16, 2025, the date his removal order was issued and became
final (as all parties had waived appeal). See id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i). Specifically, petitioner
claims that, after more than six months since the beginning of the removal period, his
detention has become unreasonably indefinite, and that his release is therefore required
under the framework set forth by the Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678
(2001).
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court noted that an alien must be detained during the 90-
day removal period and that the Government may continue to detain an alien after that
period or release the alien under supervision. See id. at 683 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2),
(6)). 	The Court held, however, that “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable,
continued detention is no longer authorized by the statute.” 	See id. at 699. 	The Court
elaborated on that standard as follows:
In answering that basic question, the habeas court must ask whether
the detention in question exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure
removal. It should measure reasonableness primarily in terms of the statute’s
basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of
removal. 	Thus, if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should
hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.
In that case, of course, the alien’s release may and should be conditioned on
any of the various forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the
circumstances, and the alien may no doubt be returned to custody upon a
violation of those conditions. 	. . .
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We recognize, as the Government points out, that review must take
appropriate account of the greater immigration-related expertise of the
Executive Branch, of the serious administrative needs and concerns inherent
in the necessarily extensive INS efforts to enforce this complex statute, and
the Nation’s need to “speak with one voice” in immigration matters. But we
believe that courts can take appropriate account of such matters without
abdicating their legal responsibility to review the lawfulness of an alien’s
continued detention.
See id. at 699-700 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court then established a presumptively
reasonable detention period of six months in which to accomplish removal, after which the
reasonableness of an alien’s detention should be determined as follows:
After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that
showing. 	And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior
postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the “reasonably foreseeable
future” conversely would have to shrink. 	This 6-month presumption, of
course, does not mean that every alien not removed must be released after
six months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has
been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.
See id. at 701; see also, e.g., Anyimu v. Department of Homeland Security, 2017 WL
193180, at *2-3 (D. Kan. Jan. 18, 2017) (Lungstrum, J.) (applying this framework); Kaliku
v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2024 WL 4854523, at *2-3 (D.
Kan. Nov. 21, 2024) (Lungstrum, J.) (same); Vargas v. Noem, 2025 WL 2770679, at *2-3
(D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2025) (Lungstrum, J.) (same).
The Court finds that petitioner has met his burden to provide “good reason to believe
that there is no significant likelihood of [his] removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
More than nine months have passed since the start of the removal period, a significant
period of time beyond the six-month period deemed presumptively reasonable by the
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Supreme Court. Moreover, officials failed in their initial attempts to remove petitioner to
an alternative third country, as neither Guatemala nor El Salvador agreed to accept
petitioner after being contacted in May 2025. 	Officials have more recently indicated an
intent to seek removal to South Sudan, but petitioner asserts that he will oppose such
removal based on a credible fear of persecution in that country.
The Court further finds that respondents have not rebutted that showing. According
to a declaration submitted by respondents, on November 22, 2025, a local official
determined that a travel document request could be submitted to South Sudan because
petitioner’s parents were born in that country’s territory. 	The declarant does not explain
why that determination had not been made previously in the 18 months since petitioner
was taken into custody, however, or why local officials did not submit a request for review
by national officials until petitioner filed this case nearly two months later. 	The request
had still not been sent to South Sudan as of the date of the declaration, which has not been
supplemented (and the declarant has not explained that delay or indicated when the request
will be made). 2 Neither respondents nor the declarant has offered any analysis or basis to
believe that South Sudan will respond in the near future and accept petitioner’s removal
there. In addition, respondents have failed to address petitioner’s claim that officials have
not responded to petitioner’s request (through counsel) for a reasonable-fear interview with
respect to South Sudan; thus, respondents have not shown that, even if South Sudan agrees
2 The declarant states that national officials approved the request within one day of
its submission by local officials.
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to accept petitioner, petitioner will not succeed in his application for relief from removal
to that country. 3
In sum, respondents have not shown a significant likelihood that, even though
officials have failed to remove petitioner to a third country in over nine months since the
removal order became final, petitioner will nonetheless be removed to a third country in
the reasonably foreseeable future. 	Petitioner’s detention has become unreasonably
indefinite, and the Court therefore concludes that petitioner must be released, subject to
appropriate terms of supervision. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700. The petition is granted
to that extent, and respondents are ordered to effect petitioner’s release by March 9, 2026.
Petitioner also asserts a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief requiring certain
process before petitioner is removed to a third country. 	The Court declines to order any
such relief, and it therefore denies the petition to the extent that petitioner seeks relief other
than his release from custody. As the Court has explained in other cases (which petitioner
has failed to address), the Court declines to impose or recognize requirements for third-
country removal in light of petitioner’s membership in a class certified in another case in
which similar relief has been requested. See Manago v. Carter, 2025 WL 2576755, at *2-
3 (D. Kan. Sept. 5, 2025) (Lungstrum, J.) (citing D.V.D. v. United States Dept. of Homeland
Sec., 778 F. Supp. 3d 355 (D. Mass.), appeal filed (1st Cir. Apr. 22, 2025), stay granted,
145 S. Ct. 2153 (June 23, 2025)); Rustami v. Noem, 2025 WL 3760744, at *3 (D. Kan.
3 In recent cases, this Court has decried the absence of such analysis or explanation
despite the Court’s repeated complaints to that effect. 	See, e.g., Hassan v. Welsh, 2026
WL 21234, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 5, 2026) (Lungstrum, J.).
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Dec. 30, 2025) (Lungstrum, J.) (citing Manago). 	In addition, the Court is not persuaded
that petitioner has been and will be unable to challenge removal to South Sudan.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT the petition for habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is hereby granted in part and denied in part. The
petition is granted with respect to petitioner’s request for release; respondents shall release
petitioner from custody, subject to an appropriate order of supervision, by March 9, 2026,
and shall provide notice to this Court when that release is effected. The motion is denied
with respect to any other relief requested.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 27th day of February, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas.
/s/ John W. Lungstrum
Hon. John W. Lungstrum
United States District Judge
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