Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
RIMON KAZZOO, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. 25-3262-JWL
)
C. CARTER, Warden, FCI Leavenworth; )
F/N/U WENDLER, Deportation Officer, ICE; )
TODD LYONS, Acting Director, ICE; )
PAM BONDI, Attorney General; and )
Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, )
)
Respondents. )
)
_______________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Petitioner, acting pro se, filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
by which he challenges his detention by immigration officials. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court grants the petition. Respondents shall release petitioner from custody,
subject to an appropriate order of supervision, by January 26, 2026, and shall provide
notice to this Court when that release is effected.
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Iraq. Petitioner was admitted to the United States
in 2014 as a lawful permanent resident. In 2021, petitioner was convicted of assault in
Illinois state court, and on January 2, 2025, upon his release by state authorities, he was
taken into custody by immigration officials, who initiated removal proceedings. On May
21, 2025, an immigration judge ordered petitioner’s removal but granted his application
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for relief, with the result that petitioner may not be removed to Iraq but may only be
removed to an alternative third country. Petitioner is presently detained within this judicial
district. On December 4, 2025, petitioner filed the instant habeas action; respondents have
filed a response to the petition, petitioner has filed a reply brief, and the matter is therefore
ripe for ruling.
Petitioner claims that his continued detention by immigration authorities is
improper. To obtain habeas corpus relief, petitioner must demonstrate that he is “in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). This Court has habeas corpus jurisdiction to consider the statutory
and constitutional grounds for immigration detention that are unrelated to a final order of
removal. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517–18 (2003).
Generally, when an alien is ordered removed, the removal is to occur within a period
of 90 days, referred to as the “removal period.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). Petitioner’s
removal period began, at the latest, on June 20, 2025, the date of his removal order became
final after the expiration of the 30-day appeal period. See id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i).1
Specifically, petitioner claims that, after more than six months since the beginning of the
1 Petitioner claims in his petition that his order became final and his removal period
began on May 21, 2025, but in his traverse he does not contest respondents’ argument that
the order became final 30 days later. Neither side has provided the Court with a copy of
the removal order, and therefore the Court cannot determine whether the parties had waived
any appeal from the order, which waivers would have made the order final upon issuance.
Accordingly, because petitioner has not established that an earlier date should be used, the
Court has used the date of June 20, 2025, in its analysis. In any event, more than six months
have elapsed since the start of the removal period, and the Zadvydas framework is therefore
triggered.
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removal period, his detention has become unreasonably indefinite, and that his release is
therefore required under the framework set forth by the Supreme Court in Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court noted that an alien must be detained during the 90-
day removal period and that the Government may continue to detain an alien after that
period or release the alien under supervision. See id. at 683 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2),
(6)). The Court held, however, that “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable,
continued detention is no longer authorized by the statute.” See id. at 699. The Court
elaborated on that standard as follows:
In answering that basic question, the habeas court must ask whether
the detention in question exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure
removal. It should measure reasonableness primarily in terms of the statute’s
basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of
removal. Thus, if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should
hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.
In that case, of course, the alien’s release may and should be conditioned on
any of the various forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the
circumstances, and the alien may no doubt be returned to custody upon a
violation of those conditions. . . .
We recognize, as the Government points out, that review must take
appropriate account of the greater immigration-related expertise of the
Executive Branch, of the serious administrative needs and concerns inherent
in the necessarily extensive INS efforts to enforce this complex statute, and
the Nation’s need to “speak with one voice” in immigration matters. But we
believe that courts can take appropriate account of such matters without
abdicating their legal responsibility to review the lawfulness of an alien’s
continued detention.
See id. at 699-700 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court then established a presumptively
reasonable detention period of six months in which to accomplish removal, after which the
reasonableness of an alien’s detention should be determined as follows:
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After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that
showing. And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior
postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the “reasonably foreseeable
future” conversely would have to shrink. This 6-month presumption, of
course, does not mean that every alien not removed must be released after
six months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has
been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.
See id. at 701; see also, e.g., Anyimu v. Department of Homeland Security, 2017 WL
193180, at *2-3 (D. Kan. Jan. 18, 2017) (Lungstrum, J.) (applying this framework); Kaliku
v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2024 WL 4854523, at *2-3 (D.
Kan. Nov. 21, 2024) (Lungstrum, J.) (same); Vargas v. Noem, 2025 WL 2770679, at *2-3
(D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2025) (Lungstrum, J.) (same).
The Court finds that petitioner has met his burden to provide “good reason to believe
that there is no significant likelihood of [his] removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
It is true, as respondents note, that the six-month presumptively-reasonable period has not
been exceeded by a great amount in this case, as almost seven months have elapsed since
the start of the removal period. Nevertheless, because more than six months have passed,
the Zadvydas analysis is triggered; and the Court finds in this case that petitioner has
provided the necessary “good reason.” Respondents argue that officials have made
inquiries to three alternative countries for petitioner’s removal and that those requests
remain pending; but those early attempts, in May 2025, have proved unsuccessful, as none
of the three countries has even responded to the request, and there is no evidence that
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officials have made any additional efforts in the last seven months to remove petitioner.2
Thus, because attempts have failed with respect to officials’ first three choices for an
alternative country, and because no additional inquiries have been made in the last seven
months, there is at least good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of
petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.
The Court further finds that respondents have not rebutted that showing. Again,
according to a declaration from an immigration official, no response has been received
from the three alternative countries to which requests were made in May 2025. Neither
respondents nor the declarant have offered any reasons for the lack of any response, and
thus there is no reasonable basis to believe that one of those countries will respond
positively in the reasonably foreseeable future. Most significantly, there is no evidence
that officials have made inquiries to any other countries in the last seven months or even
done anything at all with respect to petitioner’s removal during that time, except to wait
and hope for a positive response to one of the initial inquiries. Respondents have not even
identified another alternative country to which they believe petitioner might be removed in
the future. See, e.g, Manago v. Carter, 2025 WL 2841209, at *2-3 (D. Kan. Oct. 7, 2025)
(citing similar facts in concluding that the respondents failed to rebut the petitioner’s
showing under Zadvydas). This failure is especially disheartening in light of this Court’s
repeated complaints about the lack of such explanations in the Government’s submissions.
2 In similar habeas cases, the declaration submitted by the respondents often notes
that officials have made inquiries within the agency for help identifying an alternative
country for removal, but it does not appear that any such inquiries have been made in
petitioner’s case.
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See, e.g., Gonzalez Gutierrez, __ F. Supp. 3d at __, 2025 WL 3454295, at *2-3. Most
significantly, there is no analysis or explanation specific to petitioner’s case, as, again,
respondents have not attempted to explain why previous efforts to find a removal country
for petitioner have been unsuccessful or why efforts are likely to be successful in the
reasonably foreseeable future.
In sum, respondents have not been able to provide evidence or even point to any
specific fact that creates a significant likelihood that, even though officials failed in their
first attempts to remove petitioner to a third country, and even though they have seemingly
made no additional efforts regarding other countries in the last seven months, petitioner
will nonetheless be removed to a third country in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Petitioner’s detention has become unreasonably indefinite, and the Court therefore
concludes that petitioner must be released, subject to appropriate terms of supervision. See
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700.
Accordingly, the Court grants the petition for habeas relief, and respondents are
ordered to effect petitioner’s release by January 26, 2026.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT the petition for habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is hereby granted. Respondents shall release
petitioner from custody, subject to an appropriate order of supervision, by January 26,
2026, and shall provide notice to this Court when that release is effected.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 15th day of January, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas.
/s/ John W. Lungstrum
Hon. John W. Lungstrum
United States District Judge
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