Tell et al v. Lawrence Board of Education et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
JACK TELL, NATASHA TORKZABAN, )
MORGAN SALISBURY, OPAL MORRIS, )
HENRY FARTHING, SUZANA KENNEDY, )
NAOMI SUI PANG, ASHLYN TELL, and )
P.M., a minor, by and through )
her parents MARGARET WEISBROD )
MORRIS and JOHNATHAN MORRIS, )
)
Plaintiffs, ) CIVIL ACTION
)
v. ) No. 25-2428-KHV
)
LAWRENCE BOARD OF EDUCATION, a )
political subdivision of the State of Kansas, )
LAWRENCE USD 497, a political subdivision )
of the State of Kansas, GREG FARLEY, in his )
individual capacity, and QUENTIN RIALS, in )
his individual capacity, )
)
)
Defendants. )
____________________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On November 17, 2025, Jack Tell, Natasha Torkzaban, Morgan Salisbury, Opal Morris,
Henry Farthing, Suzana Kennedy, Naomi Sui Pang, Ashlyn Tell and P.M by and through her
parents Margaret Weisbrod Morris and Johnathan Morris filed their first amended complaint
against Greg Farley, Lawrence Board of Education, Lawrence Unified School District 497 and
Quentin Rials. Plaintiffs allege violation of the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendment, First Amendment retaliation and violation of the Kansas Open Records
Act (“KORA”), K.S.A. § 45-215 et seq. This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion
To Partially Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (Doc. #34) filed December 19, 2025
and Plaintiffs Ashlyn Tell And P.M.’s Motion For Partial Judgment On The Pleadings On KORA
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Violations And For Declaratory And Compliance Order (Doc. #41) filed January 20, 2026.1 For
reasons stated below, the Court sustains defendants’ motion in part and plaintiffs’ motion in full.
Legal Standards
Defendants seek to partially dismiss plaintiff’s complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiffs seek partial judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Court reviews a Rule 12(c) motion under the same standard that governs a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Ward v. Utah, 321 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 2003).
I. Rule 12(b)(1)—Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Marcus v. Kan. Dep’t of Revenue, 170
F.3d 1305, 1309 (10th Cir. 1999). Therefore, the law imposes a presumption against jurisdiction.
Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974). The Court may exercise
jurisdiction only when specifically authorized to do so, see Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1580
(10th Cir. 1994), and must dismiss a claim if it becomes apparent at any stage of the proceedings
that it lacks jurisdiction. Basso, 495 F.2d at 909; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Plaintiffs bear the
burden of showing that jurisdiction is proper and must demonstrate that the case should not be
dismissed. See Basso, 495 F.2d at 909. Conclusory allegations of jurisdiction are not enough.
United States v. Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc., 190 F.3d 1156, 1160 (10th Cir. 1999).
Rule 12(b)(1) motions generally take the form of facial attacks on the complaint or factual
attacks on the accuracy of its allegations. Laufer v. Looper, 22 F.4th 871, 875 (10th Cir. 2022).
1 Plaintiffs request that the Court set these motions for oral argument. See Plaintiffs’
Request For In-Person Oral Argument On Defendants’ Motion To Partially Dismiss And
Plaintiffs’ Motion For Partial Judgment On The Pleadings (Doc. #45) filed February 25, 2026.
Because oral argument would not materially assist the Court, it declines to do so.
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A facial attack assumes that the allegations in the complaint are true and argues that they fail to
establish jurisdiction. Baker v. USD 229 Blue Valley, 979 F.3d 866, 872 (10th Cir. 2020). A
factual attack goes beyond the allegations in the complaint and adduces evidence to contest
jurisdiction. Id. On a factual attack to subject matter jurisdiction, the Court may refer to evidence
outside the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
II. Rule 12(b)(6)—Failure To State A Claim; Rule 12(c)—Judgment On The Pleadings
As mentioned above, a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is governed
by the same standards as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm
Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1160 (10th Cir. 2000). In ruling on a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court assumes as true all well-pleaded factual
allegations and determines whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter to state a claim which is plausible—and not merely conceivable—on its
face. Id. at 679–80; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In determining
whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief, the Court draws on its judicial experience
and common sense. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
The Court need not accept as true those allegations which state only legal conclusions. See
id.; United States v. Herring, 935 F.3d 1102, 1110 (10th Cir. 2019). Plaintiffs bear the burden of
framing their claims with enough factual matter to suggest that they are entitled to relief; it is not
enough to make threadbare recitals of a cause of action accompanied by conclusory statements.
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Plaintiffs make a facially plausible claim by pleading factual
content from which the Court can reasonably infer that defendants are liable for the alleged
misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiffs must show more than a sheer possibility that
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defendants have acted unlawfully—it is not enough to plead facts that are “merely consistent” with
defendants’ liability. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). A pleading which offers labels and
conclusions, a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action or naked assertions devoid
of further factual enhancement will not stand. Id. Similarly, where the well-pleaded facts do not
permit the Court to infer more than mere possibility of misconduct, the pleading has alleged—but
has not “shown”—that the pleaders are entitled to relief. Id. at 679. The degree of specificity
necessary to establish plausibility and fair notice depends on context, because what constitutes fair
notice under Rule 8(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., depends on the type of case. Robbins v. Okla., 519 F.3d
1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008).
Factual Background
Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint is summarized as follows:
On August 1, 2023, the Lawrence Unified School District and Gaggle.Net, Inc. executed a
Contract for Services. The Contract has a three-year term, from August 1, 2023 to July 31, 2026,
and provides that “Gaggle shall monitor email, message communications, documents, and other
file types subject to certain file size limitations within third-party services.” The Board publishes
meeting agendas and materials on its public BoardDocs site. On August 28, 2023, the Board
published an agenda item titled “Purchase of Gaggle Software.” The agenda describes Gaggle as
“a digital surveillance tool that helps school districts manage student safety on school-provided
devices and platforms by monitoring student accounts to identify and flag those who may be
struggling and need help. Gaggle Safety Management uses trained safety experts and an algorithm
to provide real-time analysis and review of students’ use of collaboration platforms for email and
schoolwork. Safety experts evaluate flagged content and notify school officials about references
to self-harm, depression, drug use, and violent threats.”
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In November of 2023, the District began using Gaggle to monitor student activities.
Around the same time, the District published a webpage titled “Gaggle Frequently Asked
Questions” (the “Gaggle FAQs”). In relevant part, the Gaggle FAQs state, “Gaggle cannot and
does not monitor personal devices or any personal accounts, including but not limited to internet
usage and web browsing, calls, texts, emails, and social media posts on personal devices or
accounts. Gaggle also does not monitor teacher and staff accounts.” Contrary to these assurances,
students reported that Gaggle flagged email communications accessed though personal devices,
including messages sent from personal phones through school-issued Gmail accounts. Students
also reported that Gaggle flagged content stored in Google Drive folders not intended for school
assignments, such as personal writings and draft editorials. Students also experienced Gaggle
monitoring teachers’ emails and communications. Gaggle would scan, seize and remove emails
between teachers and students based on their content. Gaggle did so for journalism advisor
Barbara Tholen and others.
On May 31, 2024, counsel for plaintiffs sent a demand letter to the District, detailing
constitutional concerns and demanding that it stop using Gaggle. On June 17, 2024, counsel for
the District responded, asserting that the District’s use of Gaggle was lawful and that the District
would not alter its use of Gaggle. Despite this notice and opportunity to cure, on July 8, 2024 the
Board voted to renew its Gaggle contract for the 2024–25 school year.
In late summer or early fall of 2025, the District purportedly canceled the Gaggle contract
and adopted ManagedMethods, a substantially similar AI-driven surveillance product that
continues to scan student content. Defendants’ practice is to present technology procurements and
renewals for public Board approval on the consent agenda, supported by staff memoranda and
quotes, followed by public votes. In July of 2025 alone, the Board approved multiple technology
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renewals and subscriptions by motion and vote. No agenda from July of 2025 to the present has
publicly presented any ManagedMethods procurement or configuration item, and no minutes
reflect a Board vote authorizing a vendor substitution for AI-student monitoring surveillance. No
public Board agenda disclosed the vendor switch, and no public Board vote authorized the
ManagedMethods procurement. The District omitted the replacement platform from
contemporaneous court filings seeking partial dismissal and failed to disclose a material
continuation of the challenged monitoring under a different vendor.
ManagedMethods maintains a website that includes a “how it works” page and “frequently
asked questions.” The District was fully aware of the information contained in the
ManagedMethods FAQs when it adopted the use of ManagedMethods. In relevant part, the
ManagedMethods FAQs provide, that ManagedMethods (1) scans data and detects risks within the
District’s Google Workspace and/or Microsoft 365 environment to report on and remediate data
security, student safety and compliance risks within the District’s cloud environment; (2) scans
content based on specific parameters that are set up using keywords, regex text, numerical strings
and AI; (3) within seconds, detects and removes, revokes access or quarantines risks (based on
policy configurations), often before any human realizes that the email or file share has come across;
(4) works in the same way no matter the device and/or network from which a student, teacher or
staff member is accessing the District’s domain; (5) scans files shared outside the District’s
domain; (6) removes and quarantines files from the owner’s Drive and moves quarantined emails
to the user’s trash or spam folder; (7) flags false positives; and (8) focuses on monitoring and
providing total control over the District’s Google Workspace and/or Microsoft 365 environment.
The District configured ManagedMethods’ Cloud Monitor to scan student content, apply
automated “risk” detections using keywords and AI and take automated remediation actions—
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including quarantine, deletion, breaking shares and revoking access—without individualized
suspicion, notice to students or a meaningful opportunity to contest. The District did not publish
any narrowing standards, due process protections or opt-out mechanisms accompanying the switch
to ManagedMethods, and it did not revise Board policies or the Student Handbook to disclose
Cloud Monitor’s automated quarantine and seizure functions.
The ManagedMethods substitution does not cure the constitutional infirmities of the
District’s surveillance regime. The core practice continues: suspicionless scanning, automated
flagging and seizure of students’ digital speech and effects in the District’s Google Workspace.
Plaintiffs continue to suffer ongoing harm and face a real and immediate threat of future injury
because ManagedMethods operates on the same student accounts and content, applies automated
“student safety” policies using AI and removes, quarantines and interferes with student
communications and files—often before any human review and without student notice or process.
Plaintiffs argue that the District’s vendor substitution does not moot their claims and, instead,
underscores the need for injunctive relief.
ManagedMethods’ Cloud Monitor—by its own terms—scans the District’s Google
Workspace domain regardless of device or network. These platforms are tied to each student’s
unique District-managed account and are subject to continuous monitoring and scanning. Content
created or stored within these accounts—regardless of the device used—is monitored in real time
by AI-surveillance monitoring and remains accessible to the District through its administrative
control over the Google Workspace for Education environment.
While students of the District, Jack Tell, Torkzaban, Salisbury, Morris, Farthing, Kennedy
and Sui Pang were required—and Ashlyn Tell and P.M. are currently required—to use District-
managed accounts, platforms and servers. Each is governed by the District’s no-privacy policies
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in order to obtain educational services from the District, including required assignments, teacher
feedback, class participation and peer collaboration. An enrolled student who declines a District-
issued device must still access District-managed platforms such as Google Docs, Google
Classroom and District email to complete required assignments, receive teacher feedback,
participate in class and collaborate with peers. Thus, enrolled students using personal devices are
still subject to AI surveillance monitoring because they must access District-managed platforms.
Plaintiffs cannot/could not refuse or decline the privacy terms imposed by the District without
forfeiting access to the basic tools of their public education, including access to the District-
managed platforms. Plaintiffs cannot/could not withhold consent to the District’s surveillance
practices without jeopardizing their education.
The Handbook includes a section titled “Intellectual Property,” which links to the
“Complete Board Policy JT.” It states that “[p]ublications, articles, materials, models, and other
items produced by students will be owned by the student unless the work is produced at the
district’s request for its use.” Because Complete Board Policy JT recognizes student ownership
of publications and other work product, the District’s automated quarantine, deletion and
share‑breaking of student files meaningfully interferes with students’ possessory interests in their
own work and deprives them of access to their intellectual property.
The Handbook includes a section titled “Investigation and Interrogation (Student Rights to
have parents present),” which provides, in relevant part:
Administrators, other school staff, and school resource officers (SROs) may at
times need to interview students to gather facts about something that occurred, such
as a policy violation. An interview is an informal procedure to obtain information.
Interrogation is when a law enforcement officer is formally questioning a suspect
alleged to have been involved in a crime, such as to garner a confession. If an SRO
is speaking with a student about involvement in a suspected or alleged crime, a
parent/guardian will be notified to be present.
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The Investigation and Interrogation section links to the “Complete Board Policy JCAC.”
The Complete Board Policy JCAC provides, in relevant part:
Principals (or a designee) or others designated by the superintendent, may conduct
investigations and question students about infractions of school rules or the student
conduct code . . .
At Lawrence High School and Lawrence Free State High School, student journalists are
(and at all relevant times were) required to house their research, writing and other journalistic
materials on school-issued accounts, thereby subjecting them to AI surveillance monitoring
searches and seizures. Shortly after the District implemented Gaggle, plaintiff-student journalists
working for Lawrence High School’s student publication, The Budget, noticed that Gaggle was
seizing various materials, such that materials disappeared from their school-issued accounts and
were unavailable. Gaggle’s seizure of plaintiffs’ journalistic materials extended to materials that
were not inappropriate or otherwise in violation of any District policy.
The repeated seizures of journalistic materials interfered with student journalist work for
The Budget. Student journalists were obstructed to the point that the journalism teacher and adviser
of The Budget, Barbara Tholen, interceded with District officials on their behalf. Tholen devoted
significant time and effort to bringing Gaggle’s repeated flagging and seizure of student materials
to the attention of District officials, advising District officials that such seizures were
impermissible and were adversely impacting The Budget. She pleaded with District officials to
limit or discontinue the use of Gaggle with respect to student journalism.
To continue The Budget’s work, Tell and Torkzaban, as editors-in-chief of The Budget,
moved all journalistic materials and endeavors to Tholen’s school-issued account to eliminate
interference from Gaggle. The student journalists at The Budget could continue drafting and
publishing newspapers only by having Tholen provide access to her personal account to all student
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journalists and conducting all work only on that account. Notwithstanding these efforts, Tell,
Torkzaban, Salisbury and Kennedy were unable to publish at least four editions of The Budget due
to Gaggle’s interference. Because Tholen’s time and attention were diverted by Gaggle-related
disruptions and her efforts to advocate for her students’ rights, she was unable to timely review
several articles submitted for publication. As a result, The Budget was unable to publish work that
otherwise would have run, directly impairing plaintiff-student journalists’ ability to report and
share news.
In early 2024, District administrators summoned art, journalism and photography students
to the front office at Lawrence High School for questioning. Opal Morris and Henry Farthing were
among those summoned. Farthing was attending an Advanced Placement United States history
course at Lawrence High School when two security officers approached and instructed him to
accompany them to the front office. The security guards refused to provide an explanation for
Farthing’s removal from class. Morris was attending a videography class when two security
officers entered the classroom and instructed her to accompany them to the front office. The
security guards refused to provide an explanation for Morris’s removal from class. Upon
independently arriving at the front office, Morris and Farthing observed several classmates from
their photography course already present and waiting, in addition to student journalists and art
students. Notably, one student in the front office was not an art, journalism or photography student.
Morris and Farthing later determined that the student was the model for an art student’s painting
which Gaggle had flagged and seized. Neither Morris nor Farthing felt free to leave during the
encounter.
Assistant Principal Farley asked, “Who wants to go first?” Morris volunteered, and she
was ordered into a private meeting room with Farley and other administrators. Once her private
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meeting with Farley and other administrators commenced, Morris asked why they pulled her out
of class and summoned her to the front office. Farley informed Morris that it was due to “some
images on your device.” Farley then accused Morris of having photos or documents on her
computer that constituted indecent exposure or child pornography. The production of or
possession of child pornography is a crime under K.S.A. § 22-5510. When Morris responded that
she did not have any such materials, Farley asked whether she had uploaded anything to her device
that day. Morris responded that she had uploaded a photography assignment that included a picture
of one of her friends who was fully clothed and wearing a spaghetti-strap tank top. Spaghetti-strap
tank tops are permitted under the District’s dress code.
Morris then asked if she could pull up the images to prove that she had not uploaded any
documents that constituted indecent exposure or child pornography. Farley told Morris that she
could not do so but proceeded to interrogate Morris regarding the photographs. Farley required
Morris to recall and explain from memory minute details regarding the photographs she had taken,
but he did not allow her to view or display those photos. Morris is not aware of any effort by
District officials to contact her parents regarding her detention and interrogation. No District
official or faculty attempted to notify or involve Morris’s parents before or during the investigative
meeting in which she was accused of uploading inappropriate images.
Meanwhile, in the room where the remaining students were still waiting, administrators
told the group that Gaggle had flagged their images for indecent exposure and child pornography.
As with Morris, administrators did not show students the flagged content or explain what rule, if
any, had been violated. No one contacted the students’ parents, and no parents were present at the
meetings. Administrators, including Farley, admitted they had not seen the content at issue, but
rather, that Gaggle had informed them that the content had been flagged. As with Morris,
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administrators asked Farthing and other students whether they had uploaded anything to their
District Google Drives that might have triggered an alert. Administrators did not give students
notice of discipline or tell them what specific file(s) had been flagged. Administrators called
Farthing and the other students individually into meetings and questioned them further regarding
their conduct. The administrators eventually sent the students back to class.
By investigating Morris and Farthing for protected speech and accusing them of possessing
child pornography, Farley demonstrated reckless and callous indifference to plaintiffs’
constitutional rights, which a reasonable official would have known. Farley’s actions would chill
a person of ordinary firmness from engaging or continuing to engage in activity protected by the
U.S. Constitution. Farley’s actions were substantially motivated by plaintiffs engaging in activity
protected by the U.S. Constitution. As a direct and proximate result of Farley’s unlawful actions,
Morris and Farthing were deprived of their First Amendment rights.
After the incident, Morris and Farthing discovered that multiple digital photographs had
been removed from their school accounts. Morris determined that the flagged content consisted
of original artistic photographs taken and uploaded for class assignments. The photographs had
been stored on District-managed platforms and were no longer accessible through their school-
issued accounts. Morris, Farthing and other students later confirmed the seizures by comparing
their school accounts to independent backup drives. At no point did anyone notify students that
their files had been removed or offer an opportunity to contest the action.
District staff later required Morris to meet with them and explain each image in her
photography portfolio. This compelled review of her work made Morris concerned that future
assignments involving protected expression would trigger additional scrutiny, interrogations,
deletions and/or discipline. Only after months of student advocacy did the District restore the
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removed images.
No individualized suspicion existed that Morris or Farthing had violated the law or school
rules, and the District refused to review the images at issue even as it compelled the students to
describe them from memory. Such conduct contravenes clearly established standards governing
student searches in the school context.
In the weeks following the summoning of students to the front office, and in light of the
District’s and Gaggle’s ongoing obstruction of student journalism, Tell, Torkzaban and Salisbury
requested a meeting with District Director of Technology David Vignery. Vignery refused to meet
with the students until March of 2024, citing personal scheduling conflicts. On or about March 6,
Tell, Torkzaban and Salisbury met with Vignery, Superintendent Anthony Lewis and other senior
District administrators to voice their concerns about Gaggle surveillance. David Cunningham, an
attorney with the Kansas Association of School Boards, was present at the meeting. Cunningham
introduced himself at the outset of the meeting by stating: “I’m David Cunningham, I’m an
attorney with the Kansas Association of School Boards and provide legal services to the District.”
Tell, Torkzaban and Salisbury did not expect the presence of the District’s legal counsel at the
meeting. Had defendants informed plaintiffs that defendants’ counsel would be present, plaintiffs
would have brought legal representation of their own.
At the meeting on March 6, District Mental Health Coordinator Kiley Luckett told Tell,
Torkzaban and Salisbury that plaintiffs were “valuing their constitutional rights above the mental
health of their peers.” At the meeting, Tell, Torkzaban and Salisbury asked for a resolution to the
ongoing surveillance. District spokesperson Julie Boyle told Tell, Torkzaban and Salisbury at the
meeting that she had only recently learned of the issue, but internal correspondence produced under
KORA revealed that Boyle had been informed about the matter months earlier.
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On or about March 29, 2024, Tell, Torkzaban and Salisbury again met with District
officials. Prior to the meeting, plaintiffs informed the District that they were arranging to bring
their own counsel, to which District spokesperson Julie Boyle responded, “there will be no need.”
Plaintiffs understood Boyle’s comment to mean that the District would not bring its counsel to the
meeting. David Cunningham, the District’s attorney, was present at the meeting alongside senior
District administrators.
The District brought an experienced school attorney to the meetings on March 6 and
March 29 to advance its institutional interests and protect itself from legal exposure, including in
response to plaintiffs’ ongoing constitutional injuries. The District failed to provide advance
notice of Cunningham’s attendance at either meeting, depriving plaintiffs of a meaningful
opportunity to secure counsel or otherwise prepare for what became an adversarial dialogue
concerning plaintiffs’ ongoing constitutional injuries. By positioning legal counsel against
unrepresented student journalists in closed-door meetings about protected speech, the District
created a fundamental imbalance that chilled plaintiffs’ expression and discouraged further
advocacy concerning plaintiffs’ ongoing constitutional injuries.
The District’s decision to involve legal counsel in these meetings—without warning and
in the presence of unrepresented students—was undertaken in retaliation for plaintiffs’
constitutionally protected activity and intended to deter plaintiffs’ opposition to the Gaggle
surveillance regime.
One week after the meeting on March 29, the District informed the student journalists that
their files would be exempted from Gaggle scanning. In April of 2024, the District purported to
remove Gaggle scanning from approximately 160 accounts used by journalism students at
Lawrence High School. The District did not actually remove Gaggle surveillance from those
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devices.
The District did not reinstate or honor any journalism “exemption” when it deployed
ManagedMethods. The District configured or made available ManagedMethods’ Content Filter
in conjunction with Cloud Monitor, further extending monitoring to students’ browsing behavior
when using District‑managed accounts and devices. ManagedMethods’ Cloud Monitor operates
on student Google Workspace accounts regardless of device or network, and its automated
quarantine and deletion features apply to student emails and files—the very locations where
student journalists’ work is drafted, stored, exchanged and published. ManagedMethods’ own
documentation acknowledges that false positives are “part of the territory” and provides no
guarantee regarding the false positive rate. The combination of keyword/regex matching and AI
in ManagedMethods’ “risk” detections, together with automated remediation, creates a substantial
risk that constitutionally protected journalism and art will be flagged, quarantined, unshared or
deleted without individualized suspicion, context sensitive review, notice or a meaningful
opportunity to contest.
The District did not publish any narrowing standards, notice procedures, appeal processes
or opt out mechanisms contemporaneous with the switch to ManagedMethods. Despite having
previously promised to remove scanning from journalism accounts, the District did not revise any
policy or Student Handbook to disclose Cloud Monitor’s automated quarantine and seizure
functions.
On April 19, 2024, Tell, Torkzaban and Salisbury met with District Board President Jones
and Board members serving on the District’s policy committee. At the meeting, plaintiffs
discussed their concerns related to Gaggle’s effect on First Amendment speech and press
protections and Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.
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Plaintiffs who are existing District students remain subject to 24-hour AI-surveillance monitoring
of their District-managed accounts with no opportunity to opt out or limit the surveillance’s scope.
On August 1, 2025, plaintiffs filed their Verified Complaint For Civil Rights Violations
(Doc. #1) commencing this litigation. On the morning of August 14, 2025, The Budget’s
journalism adviser, Abbi Epperson-Ladd, told Tell that several weeks earlier, Lawrence High
School Principal Quentin Rials issued a directive that neither The Budget nor its student reporters
may report on this lawsuit and directed her to consult the District’s lawyer. Epperson-Ladd further
told Tell that after Principal Rials issued the directive, a person Epperson-Ladd understood to be
a District administrator reiterated to her by telephone that neither The Budget nor its student
reporters may report on this lawsuit. When Tell stated that The Budget intended to report on the
lawsuit and related Gaggle coverage, Epperson-Ladd directed Tell not to report because “the
District told me ‘no,’ and I don’t want to go against that.” That same morning, Tell asked to meet
with Principal Rials to verify the prohibition and to request the name of the District’s attorney.
Rials’ secretary directed Tell to Assistant Principal Mike Gillman. Assistant Principal Gillman
told Tell that he could not discuss anything related to the lawsuit or Gaggle reporting and doubted
that Principal Rials would do so either. Tell overheard Principal Rials’ secretary informing Rials
of the nature of Tell’s meeting request; Principal Rials declined to meet with Tell.
On the afternoon of August 14, 2025, attorney Bradley R. Finkeldei, communicating on
the District’s behalf, confirmed by telephone to plaintiffs’ attorney Harrison M. Rosenthal that
(1) Principal Rials issued a directive prohibiting The Budget and its student reporters from
reporting on this lawsuit; (2) Epperson-Ladd enforced that directive in a face-to-face discussion
with Tell; and (3) the restriction was later lifted such that The Budget and Tell are free to report on
Gaggle and this lawsuit without restriction. By issuing the directive that neither The Budget nor
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its student reporters could report on this lawsuit, Principal Rials demonstrated reckless and callous
indifference to Tell’s constitutional rights, which a reasonable official would have known.
Principal Rials’s actions would chill a person of ordinary firmness from engaging or continuing to
engage in activity protected by the U.S. Constitution. Principal Rials’s actions were substantially
motivated by Tell engaging in activity protected by the U.S. Constitution. As a direct and
proximate result of Principal Rials’s unlawful actions as alleged herein, Tell was deprived of her
First Amendment rights.
On the evening of August 14, 2025, Tell drafted an initial story on the lawsuit and Gaggle
surveillance that she intended to publish the next day. The next morning, not even three hours
after Mr. Finkeldei confirmed in writing that neither the District nor any District official “will
prohibit, delay, condition, or otherwise restrain any student journalist or journalism adviser from
reporting on” this lawsuit, a District teacher, Jeff Plinsky, met with Tell and pressured her not to
publish an article regarding the lawsuit, citing potential adverse consequences to her adviser.
Specifically, on the morning of August 15, 2025, when Tell arrived for journalism class, Epperson-
Ladd told Tell that Epperson-Ladd had unilaterally set a meeting for Tell with a teachers-union
representative. Epperson-Ladd stated that the purpose of the meeting was “to suggest other options
besides publishing” and to “offer some other courses of action, like reaching out to other
reporters,” and that she wanted Tell to “hear out the representative” before publishing. Tell
observed that Epperson-Ladd was visibly worried. Epperson-Ladd stated that she was “very
concerned,” had already been called for a meeting with administration and wanted to be careful.
Tell understood this to mean that administration was pressuring Epperson-Ladd to quash the story
or face adverse consequences. As a direct and proximate result, Tell’s speech and reporting were
chilled.
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After speaking with Epperson-Ladd, Tell met with teacher Jeff Plinsky, who identified
himself as representing the teachers’ union. Plinsky told Tell that she has “constitutional rights to
do what you want to do,” but urged Tell to “keep in mind that a young teacher with no due process
protections . . . could [be] fire[d] . . . tomorrow for no reason,” explaining that “for the first three
years of a teacher’s contract, they do not have to give a reason to fire a teacher.” When Tell asked
whether Epperson-Ladd is protected by K.S.A. § 72-7209 et seq., Plinsky responded that while
she is protected by statute, “that just means they can’t say that they are firing her for these press
problems . . . they can just say we’re firing her because we don’t like her.” Tell understood this
interaction to mean the District is substantially likely to terminate Epperson-Ladd’s employment
because of Tell’s reporting, using a pretext to justify adverse action. Plinsky further stated that
Epperson-Ladd is “in a really tough place,” expressed fear that the District could “fire her, not
replace her, and let The Budget die,” and that “her being able to find a job after that is pretty tough.”
Plinsky suggested that Tell send materials to a reporter at The Lawrence Times so that Epperson-
Ladd could tell administration, “I have done what the admin has asked me to do.”
Plinsky acknowledged that the administration had rescinded the prior restraint the day
before, but he remained concerned for Epperson-Ladd’s continued employment. Plinsky warned
Tell that administrators might say to Epperson-Ladd, “if you can’t control your editors, we want
you out of the building,” and told Tell to “understand there are consequences to other people’s
lives” if she exercised her constitutional rights. Plinsky acted at the direction of the District, the
Board and/or Principal Rials when he met with Tell. By pressuring Tell not to exercise her
constitutionally protected rights, Plinsky demonstrated reckless and callous indifference to Tell’s
constitutional rights, which a reasonable school official would have known.
Plinsky’s actions would chill a person of ordinary firmness from engaging or continuing to
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engage in activity protected by the U.S. Constitution. Plinsky’s actions were substantially
motivated by Tell engaging in activity protected by the U.S. Constitution. As a direct and
proximate result of Plinsky’s unlawful actions, Tell was deprived of her First Amendment rights.
Tell left the interaction with Plinsky upset and felt her right to publish was chilled.
Consequently, the same day, plaintiffs filed Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, bringing the foregoing facts to the Court’s attention
and seeking an order enjoining the District from (i) enforcing or reimposing the prior restraint
forbidding The Budget and Tell from reporting on this lawsuit or related District conduct; and
(ii) taking or threatening adverse employment action against The Budget’s faculty adviser,
Epperson-Ladd, because of such reporting. Further, on that same day, the District issued a
Clarification Memorandum to Epperson-Ladd stating that the District would not restrict lawful
reporting. Notwithstanding the issuance of the Clarification Memo, Tell’s right to publish
remained chilled, given that synonymous representations by the District in the Finkeldei-Rosenthal
emails had already proven insufficient to protect lawful reporting within three hours after such
representations were made.
On August 19, 2025, the Court entered its Memorandum and Order. The Order deferred
consideration of plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction, but, among other things, affirmed
that “K.S.A. § 72-7211 protects Epperson-Ladd by stating that ‘[n]o [student publication] advisor
or employee shall be terminated from employment, transferred, or relieved from duties imposed
under this subsection for refusal to abridge or infringe upon the right to freedom of expression
conferred by this act.’” Based on the foregoing assurances from the Court that Epperson-Ladd
would not be terminated or otherwise relieved from her duties for assisting with lawful reporting
on this lawsuit, on August 19, 2025, Tell published an article regarding the instant lawsuit.
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Nevertheless, Tell’s right to publish was chilled for no less than five days in the interim.
Since filing the initial complaint, absent any solicitation, counsel for plaintiffs have
received significant supportive correspondence and additional information volunteered by parents,
faculty and other interested parties affected by Gaggle. In relevant part, plaintiffs were contacted
by the parent of a student at Lawrence Free State High School who undertook significant, but
ultimately futile, efforts to opt his son out of Gaggle surveillance. The parent’s experience
demonstrates that it is not possible for parents or students to opt out of the challenged surveillance.
October 30, 2025, P.M., acting in her capacity as News Managing Editor of Lawrence Free
State High School’s student publication, the Free Press, submitted five requests to the District
under KORA. These requests sought records concerning the District’s substitution of
ManagedMethods for Gaggle and associated procurement, configuration and data-disposition
activities. Specifically, P.M. requested the fully executed ManagedMethods contract(s) and
attachments; all ManagedMethods invoices, payments, purchase orders and cost analyses;
procurement RFP/RFQ materials, proposals, evaluation and scoring records, award memoranda
and related protests or resolutions; District communications with ManagedMethods and internal
communications concerning selection, implementation, configuration, scope, efficacy and public
messaging; and Gaggle wind-down/off-boarding and data-disposition records, including notices
of termination or non-renewal, off-boarding checklists, certifications of data deletion or return and
correspondence regarding student and staff data disposition. Each of P.M.’s requests specified
production in the electronic formats in which the records are maintained, including text-searchable
PDFs for executed agreements, native CSV/XLSX for spreadsheets and MSG/EML with headers
and attachments preserved for emails and messages, and required that any withholdings identify
specific subsections of K.S.A. § 45-221, with production of all reasonably segregable non-exempt
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material. Each of P.M.’s requests asked for an itemized estimate limited to actual costs under
K.S.A. § 45-219, requested the use of the lowest-cost staff reasonably necessary to fulfill the
request, invoked K.S.A. § 45-218(d)’s three-business-day action requirement and invited rolling
production and forwarding to any other custodian holding responsive records.
Also on October 30, 2025, Ashlyn Tell, acting in her capacity as Online Editor-in-Chief of
The Budget, submitted five substantively identical KORA requests seeking the same categories of
records and specifying the same production formats, exemption-identification requirements,
itemized cost estimates limited to actual costs, use of lowest-cost staff and K.S.A. § 45-218(d)’s
three-business-day mandate. Plaintiffs sent their requests to the District’s records custodian and
copied Superintendent Dr. Jeanice Kerr Swift, Deputy Superintendent Dr. Larry Englebrick, Board
President GR Gordon-Ross and Board Vice President Bob Byers, thereby ensuring agencywide
notice to senior officials most likely to maintain or direct access to responsive records. On
October 31, the District acknowledged receipt of each request by email, stating only that the
requests were “under review to determine the availability of the records and the time and resources
required to compile and produce them,” that the “district will provide you with an estimated cost .
. . along with an estimated timeframe for completion” and that “no work to gather or produce
records will begin until the estimated charges, if any, are communicated and approved.”
The acknowledgments did not identify any custodian holding responsive records, describe
any search methodology or repositories to be searched, forward the requests to other offices or
personnel despite plaintiffs’ invitation to do so, provide any records or furnish a compliant delay
notice stating the earliest date and time the records would be available for inspection and the place
of inspection. The acknowledgments did not issue any written denial identifying specific statutory
bases under K.S.A. § 45-221 for withholding records, produce reasonably segregable non-exempt
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material or provide an itemized estimate limited to actual costs under K.S.A. § 45-219.
As of November 4—the third business day following receipt—defendants had not provided
any responsive records, had not provided a compliant delay notice stating the earliest availability
date and place of inspection and had not issued a written denial identifying specific statutory
exemptions. Despite senior officials being copied and the existence of readily identifiable
responsive records, including the District’s October of 2025 check register presented at the
October Board meeting reflecting a payment to “MANAGED METHODS INC,” defendants did
not produce records responsive to plaintiffs’ requests. Defendants did not provide any itemized
fee estimate limited to actual costs, identify staff roles or hourly rates to be used or cite any specific
subsection of K.S.A. § 45-221 for any withholding. Defendants did not produce any reasonably
segregable non-exempt material.
As of the date of this filing, defendants have not produced records responsive to plaintiffs’
KORA requests of October 30, 2025, have not provided a lawful production schedule or earliest
availability date, have not identified specific exemptions under K.S.A. § 45-221 and have not
furnished an itemized actual-cost estimate using the lowest-cost staff reasonably necessary.
Defendants intentionally withheld disclosure of the District’s switch to ManagedMethods and
delayed the production of public records concerning that switch to impede public oversight and
frustrate plaintiffs’ reporting and preparation of the first amended complaint. The timing and
pattern of noncompliance—generic “under review” acknowledgments on October 31, 2025; no
records or compliant delay notices by November 4, 2025; no itemized actual-cost estimates; no
identification of specific exemptions; and continued non-production through the filing deadline—
evidence bad faith and an intent to delay or frustrate inspection.
Defendants’ refusal to timely produce records and failure to conduct a reasonable search
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across known repositories and custodians impeded plaintiffs’ ability to report to the public about
the vendor substitution, procurement process, configuration, data-disposition and costs associated
with ManagedMethods and Gaggle, causing harm to plaintiffs and undermining KORA’s policy
of openness.
Defendants’ implementation and use of the District’s surveillance regime subjected
plaintiffs to searches and seizures without individualized suspicion or reasonable grounds to
believe any plaintiff had violated the law or school rules. Defendants’ implementation and use of
Gaggle and the District’s adoption of ManagedMethods chilled their expression. District policy
and practice suppress student speech, and ManagedMethods’ automated “risk” policies and
quarantine/deletion features operate without notice or process. Defendants failed to articulate clear
standards regarding what content would be flagged, reviewed, seized, or otherwise declared
impermissible, and plaintiffs refrained from engaging in protected expression, including
journalism and creative work, to avoid investigation or discipline.
Ashlyn Tell and P.M. are current students in the District. Defendants continue to conduct
suspicionless searches and seizures of their digital effects through round the clock surveillance by
Gaggle and ManagedMethods’ Cloud Monitor and Content Filter of their District managed
accounts, including emails, documents and cloud stored files. ManagedMethods operates
regardless of device or network when students access District managed accounts. As a direct and
proximate result of the surveillance regime, these plaintiffs have self-censored by refraining from
creating and saving lawful, non-disruptive expressive content—such as original photography,
creative writing, academic writing and journalistic drafts—to their District issued devices and
accounts, resulting in missed publication cycles, delayed stories and changes to coursework and
portfolios.
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Ashlyn Tell and P.M. know from experience that their protected expression has triggered
investigations, deletions and ostensible justifications. ManagedMethods’ own documentation
acknowledges false positives and describes automated remediation “within seconds” before any
human review, which compounds deterrence. The lack of clear standards and notice further
heightens the deterrent effect, as plaintiffs cannot reasonably predict what speech will result in
review, removal or discipline. But for defendants’ implementation and maintenance of the
surveillance regime, Tell and P.M. would continue to engage in protected speech on District
managed platforms without fear of investigation or loss of their work product. The District’s
surveillance exposes Tell and P.M. to a credible and imminent threat of future investigation,
discipline and deletion of their work. It also inflicts present harm by forcing students to choose
between self-censorship and risking loss of access to education. Defendants’ policy subjects
current students and their private communications, expressive works and academic materials, to
real time review, removal and scrutiny by unknown third-party contractors and District
personnel—all without judicial oversight or procedural safeguards.
Principal Rials retaliated against Tell by pressuring her not to publish, chilling her speech
for at least five days and altering her editorial decisions. Tell and P.M. remain subject to
ManagedMethods’ automated scanning, flagging and quarantine of content, without
individualized suspicion, advance notice or a meaningful opportunity to contest.
Claims
Plaintiffs bring 12 claims for relief:
Count One seeks declaratory relief and alleges that all defendants violated all plaintiffs’
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizure by (1) approving,
renewing and implementing Gaggle and ManagedMethods, (2) using Gaggle and
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ManagedMethods to scan contents of Student Google Drive and Googleworkspace, (3) using AI-
surveillance monitoring to scan and seize the contents of the Student Google Drive and Google
Workspace including drafts, communications, pending publications and artistic photographs,
(4) quarantining and deleting student files and emails and (5) searching the belongings of and
interrogating Morris and Farthing.
Count Two seeks injunctive relief and alleges that the Board and District violated and
continues to violate the Fourth Amendment right of Ashlyn Tell and P.M to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure by (1) conducting surveillance and AI-surveillance including
Gaggle and ManagedMethods and (2) impermissibly monitoring, scanning and seizing their files,
communications and digital content housed on the Student Google Drive and Google Workspace.
Plaintiffs seek an order enjoining the District and Board from operating suspicionless surveillance
that scans, flags and quarantines or deletes student content in Gmail, Drive, Shared Drive, Docs,
Sheets, Slides, Chat, Meet and Classroom absent individualized suspicion, notice and
constitutionally adequate process; and from imposing prior restraints or retaliating against student
journalists.
Count Three seeks damages and alleges that all defendants violated all plaintiffs’ Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. As a result of defendants’
surveillance regime, plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer injury, including
suspicionless scanning, automated flagging and quarantine or deletion of their files and
communications through Gaggle and ManagedMethods, damage to their reputations, mental
anguish, emotional distress, humiliation and public embarrassment. Plaintiffs seek actual, nominal
and compensatory damages in addition to attorney fees and costs.
Count Four seeks declaratory relief and alleges that all defendants violated all plaintiffs’
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First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of press by using the District’s
surveillance regime to flag and remove plaintiffs’ protected content including photography, artistic
expression and journalism materials without any forecast or determination that the speech would
disrupt classwork, involve substantial disorder or invade the rights of others.
Count Five seeks injunctive relief and alleges that the District and the Board violated
Ashlyn Tell and P.M.’s First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of press because
plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable injury from defendants’ AI-
surveillance monitoring to limit protected First Amendment expression, which continues to restrict
and chill their speech so long as suspicionless monitoring, automated flagging and
quarantine/deletion continue. Plaintiffs seek an order enjoining the District and Board from
operating suspicionless surveillance that scans, flags and quarantines or deletes student content in
Gmail, Drive, Shared Drive, Docs, Sheets, Slides, Chat, Meet and Classroom absent individualized
suspicion, notice and constitutionally adequate process; and from imposing prior restraints or
retaliating against student journalists.
Count Six seeks damages and alleges that all defendants violated all plaintiffs’ First
Amendment rights of freedom of speech and freedom of press by implementing the surveillance
regime to limit protected First Amendment expression, which continues to restrict and chill their
speech so long as suspicionless monitoring, automated flagging and quarantine/deletion continue.
Plaintiffs suffered injury including damage to their reputations, mental anguish, emotional distress,
humiliation and public embarrassment. Plaintiffs seek actual, nominal and compensatory damages
in addition to attorney fees and costs in an amount to be determined at trial.
Count Seven seeks declaratory relief and alleges that the District and Board violated
plaintiffs’ First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights because the policies and practices—
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implemented through Gaggle and ManagedMethods—are vague because they fail to provide
parents and students with sufficient information to know what is restricted or required so that they
may act accordingly.
Count Eight seeks declaratory relief and alleges that the District and Board violated
plaintiffs’ First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights because the surveillance regime—
implemented through Gaggle and ManagedMethods—is substantially overbroad because it
reaches and regulates a significant amount of protected First Amendment speech and expressive
conduct, including non-harmful, non-disruptive and non-invasive speech that is of no legitimate
concern.
Count Nine seeks damages, declaratory relief and injunctive relief and alleges that Rials,
the District and the Board violated Ashlyn Tell’s right to be free from retaliation for exercising her
First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of press by chilling her protected
activity and causing her to refrain from reporting on this lawsuit for no less than five days.
Count Ten seeks injunctive and declaratory relief and alleges that the District and the Board
violated the rights of Ashlyn Tell and P.M. under KORA by failing to conduct adequate search for
responsive records.
Count Eleven seeks injunctive and declaratory relief and alleges that the District and Board
violated the rights of Ashlyn Tell and P.M. under KORA by failing to disclose responsive records.
Count Twelve seeks injunctive and declaratory relief and alleges that the District and Board
violated the rights of Ashlyn Tell and P.M. under KORA by failing to respond within the required
time.
Analysis
Defendants argue that the Court should partially dismiss plaintiffs’ first amended complaint
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because it largely fails to establish subject matter jurisdiction and state a claim on which relief can
be granted. Specifically, defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
some claims because (1) several plaintiffs have already graduated, (2) the District has decided to
stop using Gaggle to monitor students and (3) plaintiffs acknowledge that the alleged restrictions
and retaliations based on student publication about this lawsuit have ended. Defendants argue that
some of plaintiffs’ claims also fail because (1) Farley and Rials are entitled to qualified immunity,
(2) plaintiffs’ claims against the Board duplicate claims against the District, (3) plaintiffs’ requests
for declaratory relief and injunctive relief are not separate claims, (4) plaintiffs’ KORA claims are
improper and (5) plaintiffs have not alleged facts necessary to support a First Amendment
retaliation claim.
Ashlyn Tell and P.M. argue that the Court should (1) grant them partial judgment on the
pleadings against the District and Board on their KORA claims and (2) enter a declaratory and
compliance order under K.S.A. § 45-222.
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over some of plaintiffs’
claims because they are moot. Specifically, defendants argue that (1) plaintiffs who have already
graduated (Jack Tell, Torkzaban, Salisbury, Morris, Kenney and Sui Pang) cannot being claims
for injunctive and declaratory relief, (2) the District has decided to stop using Gaggle to monitor
students and (3) plaintiffs acknowledge that the alleged restrictions and retaliations based on
student publication about this lawsuit have ended.
A. Graduated Plaintiffs
Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss the claims of plaintiffs who have graduated,
because graduation moots their claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. Plaintiffs do not
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contest defendants’ argument that graduation moots claims for prospective relief. Accordingly,
the Court dismisses the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief by those students. See Lane v.
Simon, 495 F.3d 1182, 1186–87 (10th Cir. 2007) (plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief moot because of graduation). Their claims for damages for completed injuries (detentions
and accusatory questioning premised on algorithmic flags, refusal to permit a student to retrieve
and display alleged content and seizure or quarantine of student materials) remain.
B. Gaggle
Defendants argue that because the District has decided to stop using Gaggle to monitor
students, the Court should dismiss for mootness and lack of standing all plaintiffs’ claims for
injunctive relief and declaratory relief based on Gaggle usage. Plaintiffs respond that a live
controversy exists because the District transitioned from Gaggle to ManagedMethods, which
continues to monitor students.
An exception to the doctrine of mootness arises when defendant voluntarily ceases the
challenged practice or action. This exception “traces to the principle that a party should not be
able to evade judicial review, or to defeat a judgment, by temporarily altering questionable
behavior.” Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Tidwell, 572 F.3d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting
City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278, 284 n. 1 (2001)). If defendant
voluntarily ceases a challenged act, a claim will be moot only if it is “absolutely clear that the
allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 222 (2000) (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export
Assn., Inc., 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)). The party asserting mootness bears a “heavy burden” of
persuading the Court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up again.
Adarand Constructors, 528 U.S. at 222 (quoting Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env. Servs., Inc.,
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528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)).
Here, the first amended complaint alleges that the District continues to employ a program
which scans and monitors student content on District‑provided Google accounts using keywords
and machine‑learning models and generates alerts to designated personnel who review and decide
whether and how to intervene. In other words, other than switching from Gaggle to
ManagedMethods, defendants have not ceased or altered their challenged behavior. Defendants
also have not shown that they will not switch back to Gaggle in the future.
Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claims based on Gaggle usage are not moot.
C. Student Publication
Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Count Nine, which
seeks damages, declaratory relief and injunctive relief from alleged restrictions and retaliations
based on student publication about this lawsuit because defendant has ceased such activity.
Specifically, defendants argue that the claim is moot because (1) the District’s attorney rescinded
any prohibition on publication, (2) the District issued a clarification memo which stated that it
would not restrict lawful reporting and (3) on August 29, 2025, Ashlyn Tell published an article
about the instant lawsuit and suffered no retaliatory response. Plaintiffs respond that ad hoc
communications that do not bind the District do not meet defendants’ burden of demonstrating that
the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to recur.
When a party challenges allegations supporting subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court can
consider affidavits outside the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss to a motion for
summary judgment. Davis ex rel. Davis v. United States, 343 F.3d 1282, 1296 (10th Cir. 2003).
To carry its burden to defeat the voluntary cessation exception to mootness, defendant must
undertake “changes that are permanent in nature” and “foreclose a reasonable chance of recurrence
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of the challenged conduct.” Prison Legal News v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 944 F.3d 868, 881 (10th
Cir. 2019) (quoting Tandy v. City of Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277, 1291 (10th Cir. 2004)). Such
changes could include withdrawing or altering administrative policies through a formal process or
making a declaration under penalty of perjury. Prison Legal News, 944 F.3d at 881. The Court
may afford more solicitude to a government official’s claims (than to the claims of other
defendants) that their voluntary conduct moots a case. Id. Most cases that deny mootness
following a government official’s voluntary cessation rely on clear showings of reluctant
submission and a desire to return to the old ways. Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151, 1167 (10th
Cir. 2016). Absent evidence that the voluntary cessation is a sham, the mere possibility that a
successor official may return to the old ways does not necessarily keep a case alive. Prison Legal
News, 944 F.3d at 881.
Here, the District sent a formal memorandum and email stating that no further restrictions
on publication would occur, and defendants have filed two declarations under penalty of perjury
stating that no such restrictions on publication about this lawsuit will recur. In the six months
since Ashlyn Tell published her article, defendants have not taken any adverse action against her.
The record contains no evidence that defendants’ voluntary cessation was a sham or that
defendants have any desire to reinstate the restrictions on student publication about this lawsuit.
Thus, defendants have shown that their allegedly wrongful behavior cannot be reasonably expected
to recur.
Accordingly, the portion of Count Nine which seeks declaratory and injunctive relief based
on restrictions on student publication is moot, and the Court dismisses it for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The portion of Count Nine which seeks damages for Tell’s deprivation of
constitutional rights, emotional distress and lost or delayed publication opportunities is not moot.
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II. Qualified Immunity
Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss plaintiffs’ claims against Farley and Rials
because they are entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that the first amended
complaint alleges violations of the First and Fourth Amendments such as detentions, accusatory
questioning premised on automated flags, refusal to allow a student to retrieve content and seizure
or quarantine of student expressive work.2
Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for performing
discretionary functions if “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Defendants who assert qualified immunity—including in a motion to
dismiss—are presumptively immune from suit. Cuervo v. Sorenson, 112 F.4th 1307, 1314 (10th
Cir. 2024). On a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs can overcome the presumption if they establish that
the complaint alleges factual content from which the Court can reasonably infer that
(1) defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right and (2) that right was clearly established at
the time of the alleged violation. Id.; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Whether a right is “clearly established” is an objective test. A right is clearly established
“when a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision is on point, or if the clearly established weight
of authority from other courts shows that the right must be as the plaintiff maintains.” Thomas v.
Kaven, 765 F.3d 1183, 1194 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting PJ ex rel. Jensen v. Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182,
1196–97 (10th Cir. 2010)). A constitutional right is clearly established when it is “sufficiently
2 Plaintiffs also argue that if the Court contemplates addressing qualified immunity
now, it should allow targeted discovery limited to personal participation and the circumstances of
the detentions, accusations and quarantines to resolve any factual disputes. Defendants’ qualified
immunity arguments, however, rely on the first amended complaint, not contested facts.
Therefore, targeted discovery on these issues is unnecessary.
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clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”
Heard v. Dulayev, 29 F.4th 1195, 1203 (10th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). Under this demanding
standard, the alleged violation “must have a sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing
precedent” either with “controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive
authority.” Id. (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court has warned against defining a clearly established right “at a high level
of generality” and emphasized that the law must be “particularized to the facts of the case,” but
this does not mean that a right is only clearly established if a case exists that is factually identical.
Est. of Ceballos v. Husk, 919 F.3d 1204, 1215 (10th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). This makes
good sense: if a right is clearly established only when a prior case presents identical facts, qualified
immunity would apply under every different fact pattern. Under this standard, officials would
always be entitled to qualified immunity so long as their actions—no matter how outrageous or
harmful—were sufficiently novel. While the case need not be directly on point, the “existing
precedent must place the lawfulness of the defendant’s conduct beyond debate.” Heard, 29 F.4th
at 1203 (citations and brackets omitted).
A. Greg Farley
The first amended complaint alleges that Farley violated plaintiffs’ First and Fourth
Amendment rights.
i. First Amendment
The First Amended complaint alleges that Farley (1) questioned Morris and
Farthing after Gaggle flagged their photography assignments, (2) accused Morris and Farthing of
uploading images containing indecent exposure or child pornography to their school accounts,
(3) refused to permit Morris to pull up the images at issue but questioned her about the details of
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the photos, (4) did not contact Morris’s parents about her questioning and (5) had not seen the
offending images, but based his accusations on Gaggle’s flagging. It further alleges that, due to
the Farley’s accusations and questioning, students have “self-censored” by refraining from
creating and saving lawful, non-disruptive expressive content such as photography, creative
writing, academic writing and journalistic drafts, as to not trigger further investigation, thereby
chilling the exercise of First Amendment rights.
Defendants argue that Farley did not violate plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights because
(1) under the First Amendment, child pornography is not “speech,” and (2) Farley did not restrict
plaintiffs’ speech because he did not delete or command anyone to delete any images—he merely
questioned plaintiffs. Defendants also argue that even if the images were speech, the First
Amendment allows schools to ban vulgar, lewd, indecent and sexually explicit material, and Farley
could restrict the speech under the Supreme Court standard in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). Defendants argue that no law clearly establishes that a school
official who questions students about images that have been flagged as child pornography violates
their First Amendment right to free speech.
Defendants’ arguments that plaintiffs’ material was not “speech” because it was child
pornography (or vulgar, lewd, indecent or sexually explicit material) are unpersuasive. The first
amended complaint alleges that the images did not violate the law or school policy. Defendants’
argument that Farley did not restrict plaintiffs’ speech is similarly unpersuasive because the first
amended complaint alleges that students “self-censored” and thus their speech was restricted due
to Farley’s actions. The law does not clearly establish, however, that Farley could not restrict such
speech.
Hazelwood governs school-sponsored speech, such as student newspapers. Hazelwood,
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484 U.S. 260. School-sponsored speech includes “school-sponsored publications, theatrical
productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school,” including “activities [which] may fairly
be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional
classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart
particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences.” Id. at 271. Under
Hazelwood, educators may restrict the content of school-sponsored speech so long as their actions
are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. Id. at 273.
Here, plaintiffs allege that Farley restricted their First Amendment right to free speech by
questioning them about flagged photography assignments and accusing them of creating indecent
exposure or child pornography in the assignments. The student photography assignments qualify
as school-sponsored speech, and preventing indecent exposure and child pornography are
legitimate pedagogical concerns. Thus, the first amended complaint does not plausibly allege that
Farley violated plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to free speech by questioning them about
photography assignments which Gaggle had flagged as pornographic.
Accordingly, Farley is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs’ First Amendment
claims against him.
ii. Fourth Amendment
The first amended complaint alleges that Gaggle searched, flagged and seized
student materials, and Farley questioned students about photography assignments which Gaggle
had flagged as indecent exposure or child pornography. Defendants argue that the first amended
complaint does not allege that Farley engaged in a search or seizure of student materials (he never
asked plaintiffs to show him materials, inspected their devices or platforms or seized any of their
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work). Defendants also argue that by questioning them, Farley did not impermissibly seize the
students themselves, because Gaggle flagging justified his “seizure” for questioning, and he did
not prevent plaintiffs from contacting parents or attorneys, threaten them or detain them for an
unreasonable period of time or under unreasonable conditions.
Indeed, courts have found that questioning students in difficult circumstances does not
violate clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. See Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 503–
04 (5th Cir. 2013) (school coach entitled to qualified immunity on Fourth Amendment seizure
claim based on coach’s questioning of student athlete inside locked locker room even though coach
allegedly shouted and used “intimidating gestures”); Foley v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch., No. 1:09-CV-
01147-RB-GBW, 2011 WL 13286401, at *7 (D.N.M. Jan. 24, 2011) (school officials’ threatening
and coercive questioning of minor student about possible marijuana distribution, detaining her for
more than two hours and not allowing her to contact her parents did not violate clearly established
Fourth Amendment rights).
A search or seizure in a public school is appropriate if it is “justified at its inception” and
“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”
Couture v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 535 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008).
“Justified at its inception” means that “there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search
will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the
school.” A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1158 (10th Cir. 2016). A search is permissible in scope
if it is “reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive.” Id. at
1160 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985)).
The first amended complaint alleges that Gaggle, not Farley, searched student material and
seized content. The first amended complaint alleges that Farley seized the students by calling them
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to the front office and questioning them individually without contacting their parents.3 The
question is whether Gaggle’s flagging the material as indecent exposure or child pornography
justified Farley’s “seizing” the students for questioning. Plaintiffs have not cited (and the Court
has not found) any law that when AI surveillance flags student material as potentially criminal, a
school official cannot reasonably rely on that information to call in a student for questioning.
Thus, existing precedent has not placed “beyond debate” the statutory or constitutional question
whether Farley lacked justification for questioning the students. Shaw v. Schulte, 36 F.4th 1006,
1013 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)). Also, Farley’s reliance
on Gaggle flagging does not constitute that “rare obvious case” where the unlawfulness of his
conduct would have been sufficiently clear even though existing precedent did not address similar
circumstances. Id. (quoting Est. of Ceballos, 919 F.3d at 1218). The first amended complaint does
not factually allege that Farley’s questioning was unreasonable or excessively intrusive given the
objective of the search. Therefore, the law did not clearly establish that Farley’s questioning
violated plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights, and he is entitled to dismissal of that claim based
on qualified immunity.
B. Quentin Rials
The first amended complaint alleges that Rials issued a directive forbidding The Budget
and its student reporters from reporting on this lawsuit and caused a District teacher to meet with
and pressure Ashlyn Tell not to report on this lawsuit. Defendants argue that the first amended
complaint fails to allege that Rials violated plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights by restricting
3 As to the allegations that Farley did not view the content or allow plaintiffs to pull
up the content, the first amended complaint alleges that Gaggle seized and quarantined flagged
material, so it is not clear that Farley (or anyone else) could have accessed the material once Gaggle
flagged it.
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student reporting on the lawsuit because (1) educators may make viewpoint-based decisions on
school-sponsored speech, (2) courts give substantial deference to educators’ stated pedagogical
concerns such as the need to impart values like discipline, courtesy and respect for authority or the
desire to avoid controversy within school environment and (3) it does not allege that Rials was
behind any third-party threat not to publish.
Plaintiffs’ response does not address these arguments about Rials. Under District of
Kansas Rule 7.1, if a party does not timely respond to a motion to dismiss, the Court ordinarily
will grant the motion as uncontested without further notice. See D. Kan. R. 7.1(c). Likewise,
under District of Kansas Rule 7.1 and basic litigation principles, when a party files a response to a
motion but does not address all arguments which the motion raises, the party has effectively
conceded the arguments which it does not address and abandoned any claims which depend on
response to such arguments. C1.G ex rel. C.G. v. Siegfried, 38 F.4th 1270, 1282 (10th Cir. 2022)
(district court correctly dismissed plaintiff’s facial challenge because he abandoned it by not
addressing it in response to defendants’ motion to dismiss); see Brown v. Nationwide Ins. Co.,
No. 21-4122, 2023 WL 4174064, at *8–9 (10th Cir. June 26, 2023) (district court properly
concluded that plaintiff abandoned bad faith claim because she responded to motion to dismiss but
ignored arguments on that claim); Lancaster v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 670 F. App’x 984, 984–
85 (10th Cir. 2016) (plaintiff waived retaliation claim because she did not respond to defendant’s
argument on claim).
Accordingly, Rials is entitled to qualified immunity, and the Court dismisses plaintiffs’
claims against him.
III. Claims Against School Board
The first amended complaint alleges that the Board (1) violated plaintiffs’ Fourth
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Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, (2) violated plaintiffs’ First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of press and (3) retaliated against Ashlyn
Tell for exercising her First Amendment rights. Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss
plaintiffs’ claims against the Board, because they duplicate plaintiffs’ claims against the District.
Plaintiffs respond that Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978),
requires plaintiffs to plausibly allege that an official policy or custom was the moving force behind
a constitutional violation, and the Board adopts and clarifies the rules and the District implements
and enforces them. Plaintiffs argue that they included both the District and the Board to capture
the policy adoption and operational implementation, and that at this stage, pruning parties risks
confusion about where the authority for the challenged practices lies.
Plaintiffs do not challenge or distinguish defendants’ arguments and this Court’s findings
in Rubio v. Turner Unified Sch. Dist. No. 202, 453 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1300 (D. Kan. 2006), that
“the board of education is merely the governing body of the school district and is not a separate
legal entity, any judgment against the board necessarily is against the school district” and “a claim
against a sub-unit of a school district is the equivalent of a suit against the school district itself,”
so “[a]suit against both entities is duplicative.” 453 F. Supp. 2d at 1300.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses plaintiffs’ claims against the Board.
IV. Requests For Declaratory And Injunctive Relief
Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss Counts One, Two, Four and Five of the
first amended complaint, because they merely seek injunctive and declaratory relief for claims
which plaintiffs plead separately. Defendants argue that declaratory and injunctive relief are
remedies, not separate causes of action. Plaintiff responds that “[t]he Court can, as a matter of
pleading hygiene, construe any standalone counts for injunctive or declaratory relief as prayers for
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relief attached to Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims without dismissing anything on the merits.”
Plaintiffs’ Opposition To Defendants’ Motion To Partially Dismiss (Doc. #40) filed January 20,
2026 at 1.
The Court construes Counts One, Two, Four and Five as prayers for relief as opposed to
standalone claims, and declines to dismiss them.
V. Kansas Open Records Act
On October 27, 2025, defendants filed a motion to partially dismiss plaintiffs’ original
complaint. The motion included a qualified immunity argument. On October 29, Magistrate Judge
Gwynne E. Birzer explained to the parties by letter that unless they agreed to proceed with
scheduling, she would postpone scheduling under Rules 16(b) and 26(f) until the Court’s decision
regarding defendants’ motion to dismiss the original complaint.
On October 30, Ashlyn Tell and P.M., acting in their journalistic capacities, submitted
KORA requests to defendants seeking contracts, invoices, procurement, configuration and policy
records for Gaggle and ManagedMethods. Their requests invoked the three-business-day action
requirement of K.S.A. § 45-218(d), requested itemized estimates limited to actual costs and asked
that non-exempt material be segregated and produced. On October 31, defendants acknowledged
the requests and stated that their attorneys were reviewing it. As of November 4, defendants had
not (1) identified any custodian holding responsive records, (2) described any search methodology
or repositories to be searched, (3) forwarded the request to any other offices or personnel,
(4) provided any records, (5) provided a list of costs or (6) provided the earlies date and place of
inspection.
On November 13, the Court entered an order deferring scheduling until the Court’s ruling
on defendants’ motion to dismiss the original complaint. On November 17, plaintiffs filed their
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first amended complaint alleging violations of KORA. Defendants seek to dismiss plaintiffs’
KORA claims, and plaintiffs seek judgment on the pleadings that defendants violated KORA.
A. Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs’ KORA Claims
Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ KORA claims (Counts Ten, Eleven and Twelve) are
improper because the KORA requests sought information related to this case despite a court order
which effectively stayed discovery. They argue that (1) plaintiffs cannot use KORA requests to
evade discovery restrictions and (2) qualified immunity protects defendants from the burdens of
discovery until the Court resolves that defense.
Plaintiffs respond that defendants admit noncompliance with baseline KORA requirements
of timeliness and adequacy. Plaintiffs further respond that no stay was in place on October 30
when plaintiffs filed their KORA requests—only Judge Birzer’s letter expressing intent to
postpone scheduling absent party input, which did not impose a stay on discovery.
Defendants’ argument is that Judge Birzer’s letter imposed a stay on discovery. It did not,
and defendants filed no motion to stay discovery. No local rule prohibited discovery before a
scheduling conference and order. Even if a general discovery stay had been in place, defendants
could have sought a protective order or issued a timely KORA denial which cited their legal basis
for withholding. Furthermore, the qualified immunity of individual defendants would not protect
the District (or its appointed record custodian) from a duty to comply with KORA. Plaintiffs’
KORA claims do not seek relief from the individual defendants, so qualified immunity has no
bearing on this issue.
Accordingly, plaintiffs have stated a claim for a violation of KORA by the District, and the
Court overrules defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts Ten, Eleven and Twelve.
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B. Plaintiffs’ Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings
Plaintiffs request that the Court (1) grant judgment on the pleadings against the District on
Counts Ten, Eleven and Twelve, declaring that defendant violated K.S.A. § 45-218(d) with respect
to the requests of October 30, 2025; (2) enter a compliance order under K.S.A. § 45-222 directing
defendant within 14 days to issue a KORA-compliant response to each request that (a) describes
the searches conducted and repositories consulted; (b) specifies the earliest date and place for
inspection or production; (c) for any record withheld in whole or in part, cites the specific K.S.A.
§ 45-221(a) subsection; and (d) produces all reasonably segregable non-exempt material as
required by K.S.A. § 45-221(d); (3) reserve plaintiffs’ right to seek attorney’s fees and costs under
K.S.A. § 45-222 upon the requisite showing on a fuller record, with any fee determination deferred
until after compliance; and (4) award any further relief the Court deems just and proper.
Defendants respond that (1) plaintiffs’ requests violated a discovery stay; (2) even if no
discovery stay was in place, its absence was a mere technicality, and the Court later issued a stay
of discovery; (3) a compliance order is not yet appropriate because the parties are still negotiating
the scope of plaintiffs’ KORA requests and (4) plaintiffs are not entitled to any remedies because
defendants acted in good faith and had a reasonable basis in fact and law in believing that a
discovery stay was in place.
Section 45-218(d) imposes mandatory, time-defined obligations. The agency must act “as
soon as possible, but not later than the end of the third business day” after receipt of requests.
K.S.A. § 45-218(d). If the agency does not immediately grant access, “the custodian shall give a
detailed explanation of the cause for further delay and the place and earliest time and date that the
record will be available for inspection.” Id. If the agency denies access, “the custodian shall
provide, upon request, a written statement of the grounds for denial,” which “shall cite the specific
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provision of law” and be furnished within three business days of the request. Id. The agency must
produce reasonably segregable non-exempt material. K.S.A. § 45-221(d).
As established above, no discovery stay existed on October 30, 2025 when plaintiffs
submitted KORA requests, and defendants admit violations of Section 45-218(d). By
November 4—the third business day—defendants had not denied the requests, produced any
records or provided the earliest available date and place of inspection. The Court therefore declares
that defendants violated Section 45-218(d) with respect to the KORA requests of Ashlyn Tell and
P.M. dated October 30, 2025.
Defendants argue that a compliance order is not yet appropriate because the parties are still
negotiating the scope of plaintiffs’ requests. To comply with KORA, defendants do not necessarily
need to produce all of plaintiffs’ requests—they must, however, (1) give a detailed explanation of
the cause for further delay and the place and earliest time and date that the record will be available
for inspection, (2) if the request for access is denied, provide, upon request, a written statement of
the grounds for denial which cites the specific provision of law under which access is denied and
(3) produce reasonably segregable, non-exempt material. The Court therefore orders that, within
five days, no later than 5:00 P.M. on April 13, 2026, defendants issue a KORA-compliant response
for each request which (a) describes the searches conducted and repositories consulted;
(b) specifies the earliest date and place for inspection or production; and (c) for any record withheld
in whole or in part, cites the specific K.S.A. § 45-221(a) subsection and (d) produces all reasonably
segregable non-exempt material as required by K.S.A. § 45-221(d).
Under Section 45-222, if the Court finds that the agency’s denial of access to the public
record was not in good faith and without a reasonable basis in fact or law, it shall award costs and
attorney fees for services rendered in such action. K.S.A. § 45-222. On this record, the Court
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cannot determine whether defendants acted in good faith. No discovery stay absolves them of
culpability for failure to comply. The individual defendants are not parties to Counts Ten, Eleven
and Twelve, so their claim of qualified immunity is irrelevant to the question of KORA
compliance. Plaintiffs may seek attorney fees and costs under Section 45-222 upon the requisite
showing on a fuller record. The Court schedules a hearing on those issues for 3:00 P.M. on
Thursday, April 23, 2026.
VI. First Amendment Retaliation Claim
Plaintiffs allege that in retaliation for Ashlyn Tell’s exercise of her First Amendment rights
to free speech and press by seeking to report on this lawsuit, the District chilled her activity for no
less than five days. Defendants argue that plaintiff fails to allege facts to support her First
Amendment retaliation claim because (1) vicarious liability under respondeat superior does not
exist in Section 1983 cases, (2) to prevail against an institution, plaintiff must establish official
policy or custom, causation and state of mind and (3) plaintiff must make clear who has allegedly
done what and may not merely assert that defendants violated her rights. Defendants argue that
plaintiff failed to (1) adequately plead that the District’s actions gave rise to her claim for First
Amendment retaliation, (2) plead facts identifying a particular District policy, custom or other
action that caused her alleged constitutional injuries and (3) plead facts that support her
conclusions that defendants caused her injuries, acted with a retaliatory motive or acted with
deliberate indifference. Plaintiff does not address defendants’ assertion that the first amended
complaint does not satisfy the pleading standards applicable to a First Amendment retaliation claim
against the District.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses the First Amendment retaliation claim of Ashlyn Tell.
See Siegfried, 38 F.4th at 1282 (district court correctly dismissed plaintiff’s facial challenge
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because he abandoned it by not addressing it in response to defendants’ motion to dismiss); see
Brown, 2023 WL 4174064, at *8–9 (district court properly concluded that plaintiff abandoned bad
faith claim because she responded to motion to dismiss but ignored arguments on that claim);
Lancaster, 670 F. App’x at 984–85 (plaintiff waived retaliation claim because she did not respond
to defendant’s argument on claim).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion To Partially Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (Doc. #34) filed December 19, 2025 is SUSTAINED in part.
The Court dismisses the First Amendment retaliation claim of Ashlyn Tell, the claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief of the graduated students, the claims against the School
Board and, based on qualified immunity, all claims against Greg Farley and Quentin Rials.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Ashlyn Tell And P.M.’s Motion For Partial
Judgment On The Pleadings On KORA Violations And For Declaratory And Compliance Order
(Doc. #41) filed January 20, 2026, is SUSTAINED. On the issue of attorney costs and fees, the
Court sets a hearing for 3:00 P.M. on April 23, 2026 to determine whether defendants acted
in good faith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, no later than 5:00 P.M. on April 13, 2026,
defendants issue a KORA-compliant response for each request which (a) describes the
searches conducted and repositories consulted; (b) specifies the earliest date and place for
inspection or production; and (c) for any record withheld in whole or in part, cites the
specific K.S.A. § 45-221(a) subsection and (d) produces all reasonably segregable non-exempt
material as required by K.S.A. § 45-221(d).
Dated this 8th day of April, 2026 at Kansas City, Kansas.
s/ Kathryn H. Vratil
KATHRYN H. VRATIL
United States District Judge
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