Tanner v. C.D.L. Electric Company, LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
STEVEN TANNER,
Plaintiff,
v.
C.D.L. ELECTRIC COMPANY, LLC, F/K/A
C.D.L. ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC., C.D.L.
ELECTRIC AND SIGNALS, INC. AND
DALTON LYON
Defendants.
Case No. 25-2056-EFM-BGS
MEMORANDUM & ORDER ON
SECOND MOTION TO COMPEL NEUROPHYSICAL EXAMINATION
NOW BEFORE THE COURT is Defendants’ “Second Motion to Compel Neuro-
psychological Examination Pursuant to Rule 35.” (Doc. 72.) For the reasons set forth below,
Defendants’ motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Also before the Court is
Plaintiff’s motion to seal or redact (Doc. 82). For the reasons set forth below, that motion is
DENIED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This is a personal injury lawsuit resulting from a motor vehicle collision occurring on
February 9, 2023, in Greenwood County, Kansas. Plaintiff contends the collision is the result of
Defendants’ negligence. He also alleges claims for vicarious liability and loss of consortium.
Defendants generally deny Plaintiff’s allegations.
Defendants bring the present motion seeking an Order compelling Plaintiff’s attendance at a
neuropsychological independent medical examination (“IME”) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 35. 1
1 Defendants’ first motion on this issue (Doc. 58) was stricken by the Court for noncompliance with D. Kan. Rules 37.1
and 37.2. (See text Order, 1/23/26, Doc. 63.)
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Plaintiff does not oppose submitting to the IME itself (see Doc. 79, at 1)2 , but the parties disagree as
to two issues regarding the examination: 1) whether audio or video recording of the IME should be
prohibited; and 2) and whether raw neuropsychological test data can be shared with or disclosed to
“unqualified individuals, including Plaintiff’s counsel.” (Doc. 72, at 1.) These issues were the
subject of the Court’s pre-motion telephone conference with the parties on February 9, 2026, after
which Defendants filed the present motion.
ANALYSIS
As mentioned above, the parties disagree as to two issues regarding the IME – whether it
may be recorded and with whom the resulting raw data may be shared. Each issue will be discussed
in turn.
I. 	Recording of an IME.
As to the issue of recording the IME, Defendants argue that “recording undermines test
integrity and interferes with accepted professional practice.” (Doc. 72, at 3.) The issue has been
addressed numerous times by courts in this District. “The general rule...seems to be that courts will
permit the presence of court reporters or recording devices only if the examinee can show good
cause why the court reporter or recording device is especially necessary to the particular case.”
Rowan v. Sunflower Elec. Power Corp., No. 15-9227-JWL-TJJ, 2016 WL 5109946, at *2 (quoting William
Scott Wyatt, Richard A. Bales, The Presence of Third Parties at Rule 35 Examinations, 71 Temp. L.
Rev. 103, 114 (1998)). It has been noted that “[c]ases from this district and elsewhere yield different
results” because “the Rule 35 standard, when applied to the facts of each case, produces a decision
that is case-specific.” Id.
2 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s brief in opposition and Defendants’ reply do not comply with the page limitations of D.
Kan. Rule 7.1. The Court will not strike these filings for their noncompliance, but instructs the parties that they are
required to comply with Rule 7.1, and all other relevant local rules, going forward.
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In Oxford v. Riddle, the parties were in disagreement as to the plaintiff submitting to a Rule 35
IME with a board certified orthopedic surgeon. No. 18-1163-JWB-KGG, 2019 WL 315019, (D.
Kan. Jan. 24. 2019). Therein, the plaintiff requested the court “allow either an observer to be
present at the examination or for the examination to be video recorded.” Id., at 4. The plaintiff
argued the reasons the exam needed to be recorded were “readily apparent”:
The independent medical examination is adversarial in nature. The
defendant consults with a doctor of choice. The defendant unilaterally
hires the doctor. The doctor meets with the plaintiff for a few minutes,
conducting a cursory examination. The doctor subsequently opines
that the treating physician made mistakes in the treatment or that the
treatment was unnecessary. And the doctor testifies in deposition or at
trial against the plaintiff.
Id. (citation to the plaintiff’s briefing omitted). The plaintiff also noted that the doctors conducting
these types of examinations are inherently biased. Id.
While acknowledging the plaintiff’s concerns about the “the inherently adversarial nature of
these examinations, the court in Oxford noted that the adversarial “situation occurs in every case in
which a Rule 35 examination is allowed.” Id. The court thus found that there was “nothing ‘special’
about the circumstances” in which that plaintiff found herself and denied the request to have the
examination recorded. Id.
The issue was also raised in this District in Jones v. Greyhound Lines, No. 08-1185-MLB-DWB,
2009 WL 1650264 (D. Kan. June 12, 2009). Therein, the plaintiff argued that videotaping the IME
would ensure accuracy of the questions, answers, and scope of the exam. The Jones court noted the
plaintiff’s failure to cite federal circuit or district court cases “because federal courts have not
inclined to allow taping of Rule 35 examinations.” Id., at *6.
In holding that the plaintiff “failed to provide the Court with any special circumstances or
concerns that would provide adequate justification for videotaping” the exam, the Jones decision
cited with approval Favale v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Bridgeport, in which the United States District
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Court in Connecticut was faced with a plaintiff's request to have a Rule 35 mental examination
videotaped. 235 F.R.D. 553 (D. Conn. 2006). The Favale court held:
Rule 35 does not address whether the examination should be recorded.
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 35(a). ‘Most courts analyze a request for recording in
the same way that they evaluate a motion to permit the presence of an
attorney.’ Indeed, ‘Courts have generally permitted the tape recording
of examinations only where they have held that there is a right to have
an attorney present at an examination, or where special circumstances
have been shown.’ Further, a recording device, like an observer, could
‘constitute a distraction during the examination and work to diminish
the accuracy of the process.’
...
Further, the court finds that in this case, recording the examination
would run contrary to Rule 35’s purpose of providing a ‘level playing
field,’ because the record does not show that the defendant received a
tape recording of plaintiff's treatment session. Accordingly, plaintiff
has not established good cause to have the examination recorded
because she has not provided the court with special circumstances that
differentiate her case from others in which Rule 35 examinations are
sought.
Id., at 557 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); Jones, 2009 WL 1650264, at *7.
This District has, however, found circumstances in which it allowed an IME to be recorded.
Audio recording of an IME was allowed in Greenhorn v. Marriott Intern., Inc., but only upon a showing
that the plaintiff enumerated legitimate concerns, supported by credible evidence, regarding the
typical conduct of the psychiatrist in question during similar, prior examinations. 216 F.R.D. 649,
654 (D. Kan. 2003). Therein, the Court acknowledged the plaintiff’s concerns “(and, more
specifically, in light of evidence in the record suggesting that plaintiff's concerns are legitimate) about
[defendant’s chosen psychiatrist’s] conduct during such examinations.” Id. More specifically,
plaintiff pointed to
(… court records from other cases) establishing that [this psychiatrist]
is abusive and has a ‘predilection for ignoring court orders imposing
conditions upon his examination of plaintiffs.’ 	Plaintiff directs the
court to cases in which [he] has been disqualified from further
participation. She further contends that [the psychiatrist] is ‘the most
biased, defense-oriented expert currently in use by defense firms in St.
Louis.’
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Id., at 652.3
In Schaeffer v. Sequoyah Trading & Transp., a case cited by Plaintiff, Magistrate Judge Karen
Humphreys granted a plaintiff’s request to record an IME. 273 F.R.D. 662, 664 (D. Kan. 2011). In
that case, however, Judge Humphreys was persuaded by several unique circumstances. First, Judge
Humphreys noted defendants’ concern that the plaintiff would attempt to “manipulate the
examination by stalling his responses” and found that video of the examination would “provide the
court with the best evidence of whether plaintiff engaged in misconduct during the examination.”
Id. Even more persuasive, however, was the fact that counsel for both parties agreed that the
plaintiff had “a lengthy history of serious mental issues that kept him institutionalized for a
significant portion of his life” with evidence that he had “difficulty remembering everyday events
and interactions with medical providers.” Id. The Schaeffer court also noted the plaintiff’s “low
average” IQ and limited reading and vocabulary skills. Id. The court thus found that video
recording of the IME would “provide the best evidence of whether defendants’ retained expert
conducted a fair examination and will also show whether plaintiff engaged in any delay or
misconduct.” Id.
Plaintiff herein argues that similar “special circumstances” are present in the matter before
the Court.
There is ample evidence in the case of Plaintiff’s headaches, light
sensitivity, blurry vision, brain fog, and trouble concentrating. All of
those symptoms will make this examination more taxing on Plaintiff
than on the average person. The testing room lights may aggravate his
light sensitivity. The stress and effort of the test may cause a headache.
His vision may be taxed by reading any written materials. And certainly,
3 The Court did, however, deny plaintiff’s request that the exam “be conducted by an independent examiner,” noting
that “while a defendant ‘may not have an absolute right to choose its examining doctor, the defendant's choice should be
respected in the absence of a valid objection.’ ” Id. (quoting Chrissafis v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 1997 WL 534874, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Aug.21, 1997) (citation omitted)).
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brain fog and trouble concentrating will make the exam itself harder
than it would for the average person. All these symptoms are likely to
compound Plaintiff’s memory issues and make it even harder for him
to recount the exam to counsel.
(Doc. 79, at 9.)
Defendants reply that while Plaintiff has complained of “headaches, light sensitivity, and
difficulty concentrating,” there is nothing in his medical records to establish that these things “would
prevent him from communicating with counsel about the examination or otherwise justify recording
the IME.” (Doc. 83, at 3.) Rather, Defendants argue that Plaintiff relies on mere “speculation
regarding how the testing process might affect him.” (Id.)
Simply stated, Plaintiff has not established the requisite good cause, via the existence of
sufficiently special circumstances, to show that recording is necessary in this instance. See Rowan,
2016 WL 5109946, at *2. As Defendants argue, Plaintiff’s “generalized allegations that the testing
process may be difficult or uncomfortable do not constitute the ‘special circumstances’ necessary to
justify recording a neuropsychological IME.” (Id.)
The Court acknowledges that Plaintiff has provided evidence that he suffers from
headaches, light sensitivity, and/or trouble concentrating. That stated, these reasons to request
recording of the IME are largely based on speculation that Plaintiff “may” get a headache or that
“testing room lights may aggravate his light sensitivity.” (Doc. 79, at 9.) Plaintiff has provided no
actual medical evidence or opinion that this will in fact occur or even that is more likely than not to
occur.4 Further, he has provided no evidence or medical opinion as to the severity of these
4 As an additional matter, there is no indication by Plaintiff that he had difficulty sitting through his deposition or that it
caused him headaches or that his light sensitivity was aggravated. To the contrary, in Defendants’ reply brief, they indicate
Plaintiff “demonstrated the ability during his deposition to recall events and details – including when doing so supported
his claims.” (Doc. 83, at 4.) While a portion of Plaintiff’s deposition transcript was attached as an exhibit to the briefing
(Doc. 80-2), the Court is unable to glean from the transcript whether Plaintiff encountered such issues. Regardless, it was
not mentioned by Plaintiff in opposition to this motion. Further, Plaintiff’s counsel indicated to the Court during the pre-
motion telephone conference that they made no effort, or saw no reason, to record Plaintiff’s examinations with his own
expert(s).
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symptoms should they in fact occur or what the resulting impact would be on the IME. 	Thus, the
circumstances set forth by Plaintiff herein are clearly distinguishable from those existing in cases
such as Greenhorn, supra (wherein credible evidence, including court orders, was offered to establish
the prior bad conduct of the psychiatrist in question) or Schaeffer, supra (wherein objective evidence
was presented as to the plaintiff’s low IQ, limited reading and vocabulary skills, and history of
serious mental health issues resulting in institutionalization).
In balancing the concerns of the parties, the Court finds the presence of a recording device
is not justified herein. The presence of such a recording device
may invalidate the results of the examination, as it may consciously or
unconsciously influence plaintiff ‘to exaggerate or diminish h[er]
reactions’ to the examination. See Holland v. United States, 182 F.R.D.
493, 496 (D.S.C.1998). 	Plaintiff could perceive the recording as
‘critical to h[er] case and fail to respond in a forthright manner.’ 	Id.
The concerns of plaintiff … do not outweigh the occasion for a
reasonable examination by defendant.
Hertenstein v. Kimberly Home Health Care, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 620, 631 (D. Kan. 1999). 	The Court thus
GRANTS this portion of Defendants’ motion and Orders that recording of the IME is prohibited.
II. 	Sharing of Raw Data.
The second issue raised is that Plaintiff has asked that the raw neuropsychological testing
data from the IME be directly disclosed to counsel. The Court notes that it has “broad authority”
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) to limit or control discovery, including Rule 35
psychological examinations. Greenhorn, 216 F.R.D. at 653. (citing Stoner v. New York City Ballet Co.,
2002 WL 31875404, at * 3 (S.D. N.Y. Dec. 24, 2002)).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s request to disclose the raw neuropsychological testing data
to counsel “conflicts with professional standards, Kansas law, and established discovery practice.”
(Doc. 72, at 4.) They continue that interpretation of the data requires “specialized training and
expertise” and that “[d]isclosure of such materials to unqualified individuals creates a substantial risk
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of misinterpretation, misuse, and compromise of test validity.” (Id., at 5 (citations to supporting
affidavit omitted).) According to Defendants, the “disclosure of raw data directly to Plaintiff’s
counsel is neither necessary nor appropriate” and doing so “offers no meaningful discovery value
while simultaneously creating significant and irreversible risks to test security, validity, and future
reliability.” (Id., at 5 (citations to supporting affidavit omitted).)
Defendants also point to Kansas statutory and regulatory law, which they contend “strictly
regulates the disclosure of raw psychological test materials.” (Id.) The Court acknowledges that
pursuant to K.S.A. 74-5324(a)(9), a psychologist’s license may be suspended, revoked, or restricted
for “unprofessional conduct.” Such “unprofessional conduct” is defined to include “releasing raw
test results or raw data either to persons who are not qualified by virtue of education, training, or
supervision to use that information” or “allowing, endorsing, or supporting persons who are not
qualified by virtue of education, training, or supervision to administer or interpret psychological
assessment techniques.” K.A.R. 102-1-10a(j)(6), (j)(7). Thus, Defendants argue that this raw
psychological test data “may not ethically or legally be disclosed to unqualified individuals, including
attorneys who lack specialized neuropsychological training.” (Doc. 72, at 5.)
This issue of disclosing such raw testing data was also addressed in Greenhorn, supra, albeit
under less restrictive means. Therein, the plaintiff asked the court to “limit the disclosure of
plaintiff’s test results” from a licensed psychiatrist “to the lawyers in this case and to preclude
anyone from disseminating those results to defendants.” 216 F.R.D. at 653. The court agreed to
limit disclosure “to the attorneys and experts in this case until further court order.” Id., at 654 (citing
Lahr v. Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P., 164 F.R.D. 196, 202 (N.D. Tex. 1995)). Thus, in that case,
neither party asked the Court to prohibit disclosure of the information to counsel.
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In fact, the Court’s research did not find District of Kansas cases that addressed the specific
issue of disclosing raw data from a Rule 35 neuropsychological examination directly to counsel.
Further, neither party herein has cited any District of Kansas cases that directly address the issue.5
That stated, other District Courts in the Tenth Circuit have analyzed this issue on a broader
scale. In Wright v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., a Magistrate Judge from the District of Colorado rejected
the argument that the data should not be disclosed to counsel and held that
Defendant’s desire to produce the raw data only to a ‘board certified
neuropsychologist’ does not work in the litigation context. 	Plaintiff
may or may not hire her own expert neuropsychologist, but that does
not mean that Plaintiff's counsel should not be entitled to review the
raw test data, potentially for use in cross examination of Defendant's
expert. Lawyers without formal medical or other specialized training
are known to consult learned treatises or textbooks to educate
themselves about special areas of expertise for the purpose of cross-
examination. Under the Rules, Plaintiff’s counsel should have access
to the raw test data. 	The raw data is no more sensitive than an
individual’s 	personal 	medical 	records, 	private 	financial
documents, or confidential corporate trade secrets, all of which
is routinely exchanged in lawsuits through use of a court-ordered
protective order. 	The Court finds no reason why a protective
order cannot safeguard the exchange of confidential test data in
this case.
344 F. R.D. 538, 542 (D. Colo. 2023) (emphasis added).
The District of New Mexico faced this issue in Sellars v. Foldy, No. 08-1097-MCA-RLP, 2009
WL 10706752 (D. N.M. Nov. 24, 2009). Therein, the Magistrate Judge noted the American
Psychological Association’s Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct “prohibit
production of test materials to anyone not a psychologist or neuropsychologist.” Id., at *1 (citing
Taylor v. Erna, No. 08-10534-DPW, 2009 WL 2425839 (D. Mass. 2009)). While the Sellars court
recognized the “tension between the disclosure requirements of F. R. Civ. P. 26 and the APA ethical
5 The Court does not find Defendants’ reliance on State v. Hamilton, 435 P.3d 597 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019), an unpublished
opinion from the Kansas Court of Appeals to be instructive. 2019 WL 986302 (Kan. Ct. App. March 1, 2019). As Plaintiff
explains, the Hamilton decision is distinguishable because it is “based on the breadth of reciprocal discovery in criminal
cases permissible under Kansas law.” (Doc. 79, at 11.)
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guidelines,” that court ordered disclosure of the raw data and noted that this “ethical dilemma … is
resolved by the issuance of a court order compelling production.” Id., at *2 (citing APA Ethical
Standard 9.11 (other citations omitted)).
Defendants argue that both of these cases are distinguishable.6 Defendants dispute the
Wright court’s assertion that this raw data “is no more sensitive than an individual’s personal medical
records, private financial documents, or confidential corporate trade secrets,” which are routinely
covered by court-ordered protective orders. (Doc. 72, at 7.) Without saying how the Sellars decision
is distinguishable, Defendants simply reference that the opinion addresses the “tension between the
disclosure requirements of F. R. Civ. P. 26 and the APA ethical guidelines,” while concluding “that
the ethical dilemma could be addressed through the issuance of a court order compelling
production.” (Id.)
In the context of Wright and Sellars, Defendants’ expert, Dr. Paul, opines that
“neuropsychological testing materials are fundamentally different from ordinary confidential
records” and that disclosure thereof to unqualified individuals “creates significant and irreversible
risks to test security, scientific validity, and reliability – and these risks are not mitigated by the
existence of a court order or protective order. (Id., at 7-8 (citing to Doc. 72-1, at ¶¶ 23-31).) While
Defendants (and their expert Dr. Paul) may disagree with the legal conclusions in Wright and Sellars,
they have not actually distinguished the present situation from the circumstances presented by either
of those cases.
6 Defendants also argue that as decisions from other Districts, Wright and Sellars “are neither controlling nor persuasive
authority in this District.” (Doc. 72, at 7.) Defendants have overstated this concept, however, because a District Court is
free to find reasoning from opinions from other courts to be persuasive or “to be influenced by an accumulation of
authority.” Accord School Employees Credit Union v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 839 F. Supp. 1447, 1480 (D. Kan. 1993)
(citation omitted) (in context of cases from other courts of appeals). Given the lack of case law from the District of
Kansas, the Court finds the analysis contained in these two decisions to be persuasive and applicable to the issues
presented.
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The Court, however, finds both cases to be relevant and persuasive. The Wright decision is
particularly applicable as it comes in the context of a neuropsychological IME that was to be
conducted on a plaintiff in a personal injury case, which is clearly analogous to the present situation.
While the facts in Sellars are sparse, the opinion relates to the disclosure of the raw testing data
generated by the defendant’s psychological expert. Regardless, the undersigned Magistrate Judge
finds the legal analysis of the courts of the District of Colorado and the District of New Mexico to
be more persuasive than the legal conclusions of Plaintiff’s medical expert.
The raw testing data at issue, which the Court finds akin to an individual’s personal medical
records, can be adequately safeguarded by an applicable protective order. Further, disclosure of the
raw testing data in accordance with an applicable court order accords with the very APA Ethics
Code relied upon by Defendants. Section 9.04 of that Code specifically provides: “[p]ursuant to a
client/patient release, psychologists provide test data to the client/patient or other persons identified
in the release” and “[i]n the absence of a client/patient release, psychologists must provide test
data as required by law or court order.” (Emphasis added.)
As such, the Court finds that the raw neuropsychological data from the IME should be
disclosed to counsel in this case.7 Due to the alleged sensitivity of the information, the Court
instructs Defendant to produce this information marked as “attorneys eyes only.” This portion of
Defendants’ motion is, therefore, DENIED.
III. 	Motion to Seal or Redact.
7 Defendants also assert that their expert Dr. Paul has “confirmed that he would be ethically unable to conduct the
examination if recording were permitted.” (Doc. 72, at 4 (citing Doc. 72-1, at ¶ 14).) While acknowledging that this might
cause difficulty for Defendants, the Court’s legal analysis cannot be based upon or influenced by the personal decisions of
one particular health care professional.
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Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to seal (Doc. 82) exhibits 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7
(Docs. 80-1, 80-3, 80-4, 80-5, 80-6, and 80-7) to Plaintiff’s response in opposition to Defendants’
second motion to compel. The motion is brought pursuant to D. Kan. Rule 5.4.2.
Upon inspection by this Court, these exhibits at issue exclusively include Plaintiff’s medical
records. Plaintiff moves the Court to seal these exhibits because they contain “personal medical
information, that is not relevant ECF 80 or the issues in the case.” (Doc. 82, at 1.) Plaintiff notes
that his response to Defendant’s motion to compel includes citations to evidence of Plaintiff’s
cognitive deficits stemming from the car crash that is the subject of this suit in the form of medical
records that he argues contain “additional information, such as prescription medications, detailed
test results, medical history, and demographics, that are not pertinent to the issues before the
Court.” (Doc. 82, at 1.) Plaintiff argues that the public has no “valid interest in access to Plaintiff’s
private medical information that has no relevance to the issues before the Court.” (Id.) He also
references the “recognized privacy interest in private health information, codified by Congress.”
(Id., at 2.)
Federal courts “recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents,
including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597
(1978). Further, “the court’s inherent supervisory authority over its own files and records” provides
authority to seal documents before it. United States v. Pickard, 733 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2013).
As the party seeking to seal the documents, Plaintiff must articulate “a real and substantial interest
that justifies depriving the public of access to the records that inform our decision-making process.”
Williams v. FedEx Corp. Servs., 849 F.3d 889, 905 (10th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). While the Court
notes that Defendants have not opposed Plaintiff’s motion, the Court must still address the issue of
sealing on the substantive merits.
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Plaintiff has failed to establish in his motion to seal any substantial interest in depriving the
public access to the records at issue. Rather, Plaintiff merely argues that because the documents are
his medical records, they should be sealed from public view. (Doc. 82.)
Where the central claim in a case involves medical issues and/or injuries, accompanying
medical records are central to the claim and this court has denied motions to seal such documents.
See e.g. Chadwell v. United States, No. 20-1372-JWB, 2024 WL 4298677, at *1-2 (D. Kan. Sept. 26,
2024) (“[T]hese medical records are central to the claims. In such cases, this court has denied
motions to seal . . .”).
THEREFORE, Plaintiff’s motion to seal exhibits 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 (Doc. 82) is DENIED.
The Court notes that personal identifying information has been appropriately redacted from these
documents pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a). The clerk’s office is directed to unseal all documents
at docket entries 80-1, 80-3, 80-4, 80-5, 80-6, and 80-7.
CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 72) is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part as set forth herein. Plaintiff is to attend a Rule 35 neuropsychological examination.
Any video or audio recording of this IME is prohibited. 	Further, the raw neuropsychological data
from the IME is to be disclosed to counsel for Plaintiff and Defendants who have entered their
appearance in this case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal (Doc. 82) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated March 20, 2026, at Wichita, Kansas.
/S /BROOKS G. S EVERSON
Brooks G. Severson
United States Magistrate Judge
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