USA v. Collins

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
KEENO D. COLLINS (01),
Defendant.
Case No. 25-20065-DDC
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On August 27, 2025, a grand jury charged defendant Keeno D. Collins with one count of
felon in possession of a firearm, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Doc. 1 at 1. Defendant now
seeks a subpoena duces tecum under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c). Doc. 23.
According to defendant’s motion, law enforcement recovered a Glock 19 pistol near the
intersection of East 850 Road and North 1800 Road, in Douglas County, Kansas on May 21,
2025. Id. at 2. Three days earlier, near that same intersection, law enforcement had recovered
defendant’s vehicle and apprehended defendant. Id. The government thus alleges defendant
possessed the recovered firearm on May 18, 2025, as charged in the Indictment. Id. at 3; Doc. 1
at 1.
But defense counsel recently identified a separate high-speed law enforcement chase near
the same location two days before the events involving defendant. Doc. 23 at 3. And so,
defendant seeks to serve a subpoena on the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office to secure records
and objects related to that separate, high-speed pursuit. Id. at 2–3. The government has advised
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that it does not oppose defendant’s motion. The court grants defendant’s Motion to Produce
Documents Pursuant to Rule 17 (Doc. 23) for the reasons explained, below.
I. 	Rule 17(c) Subpoena Standard
The Tenth Circuit summarized the legal principles governing a request for a Rule 17(c)
subpoena in United States v. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d 458 (10th Cir. 2006). Distilling the
requirements established in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699–700 (1974), our Circuit
explained that a party seeking such a subpoena must establish that the subpoenaed material is
“‘relevant, admissible, and specific.’” Id. at 467 (quoting United States v. Gonzalez–Acosta, 989
F.2d 384, 389 (10th Cir. 1993). The court elaborates on each Nixon requirement and applies
each requirement to defendant’s motion, below, starting with specificity.
A. 	Specificity
Our court views the last Nixon requirement—limiting Rule 17(c) subpoenas to “specific”
requests—as “the most difficult hurdle to overcome.” United States v. Wittig, 250 F.R.D. 548,
552 (D. Kan. 2008) (citing United States v. Anderson, 31 F. Supp. 2d 933, 944 (D. Kan. 1998)).
The Tenth Circuit has defined the contours of the specificity requirement this way: “Nixon
mandates that the party requesting the information identify the item sought and what the item
contains, among other things.” United States v. Morris, 287 F.3d 985, 991 (10th Cir. 2002). The
Circuit has enforced compliance with this requirement stringently. For example, in Morris,
defendant sought a subpoena demanding pretrial production of “all records, documents, reports,
telephone logs, etc., surrounding the investigation into the FBI undercover agent’s shooting of
[defendant] and the agent’s entire personnel file.” Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court’s decision quashing the subpoena because it wasn’t sufficiently specific. The Circuit
emphasized “that requests for an entire file are evidence of an impermissible fishing expedition.”
Id. The Circuit called the “all” request described above an “attempt[] to use the Rule 17(c)
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subpoena for impermissible discovery purposes.” Id. And so, the Circuit held that the
“subpoena did not overcome the hurdle of specificity as required by Nixon.” Id.
At the opposite end of the specificity spectrum, courts have allowed narrower requests.
In United States v. Romero, for instance, defendant requested “records about only one vehicle
from only one day.” No. 21-cr-00559-JCH, 2023 WL 2614472, at *3 (D.N.M. Mar. 23, 2023).
The district court viewed this request as sufficiently specific because defendant had, “in other
words, identified the item sought and what the item contains.” Id. (quotation cleaned up). It thus
ruled that the proposed subpoena complied with the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in Morris, denying the
government’s motion to quash.
Here, defendant requests a subpoena seeking “[a]ll incident reports, investigative reports,
arrest reports, body camera footage, dash camera footage, dispatch narratives, and dispatch audio
recordings related to the vehicle pursuit on May 16, 2025, beginning in the area of East 700
Road and North 1800 Road in Douglas County and continuing East on Interstate 70.” Doc. 23 at
2. His request thus includes the offending “all” language the Circuit found impermissible in
Morris. 287 F.3d at 991. But, in Morris, defendant sought all records stemming from an entire
investigation and an entire personnel file. Id. Here, Mr. Collins requests materials related to a
singular vehicle pursuit on a specific day. Doc. 23 at 2. The court thus concludes this request
aligns substantially with the sufficiently specific request approved by our court in Romero. 	It
essentially also seeks “records about only one vehicle from only one day.” Romero, 2023 WL
2614472, at *3. And so, defendant’s motion clears the first—and most difficult—17(c) hurdle.
B. 	Relevance & Admissibility
Aside from specificity, to “hold that the issuance of a subpoena is proper, the Court need
only find a ‘rational inference’ of relevancy and a ‘sufficient preliminary showing’ of
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admissibility.” Romero, 2023 WL 2614472, at *2 (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 700). On the
“evidentiary and relevant” prong, commentators consistently emphasize that a “subpoena duces
tecum is not a discovery device[.]” 25 Moore’s Federal Practice § 617.08[2] (3d. ed. 2024).
But though “Rule 17 is limited to the production of evidentiary materials, a party need not
actually use those materials in evidence.” Id. Instead, a “good faith effort” to secure “evidence
is sufficient for a subpoena’s demands to fall within the ambit of the Rule.” Id. It is thus
“axiomatic that the relevance criterion can be fulfilled if the documents sought would tend to
prove a material issue of the prosecution or defense.” Id. § 617.08[3][b] (citing, among others,
decisions by district courts within Tenth Circuit). On the admissibility requirement, generally
speaking, “impeachment evidence does not meet the admissibility test and may not be the sole
support for a party’s demand.” Id.
Here, defendant’s motion recites that the information the subpoena seeks “could provide
evidence that the Glock 19 firearm recovered was discarded by an occupant of the vehicle
involved in the May 16th police pursuit, rather than Mr. Collins on May 18th.” Doc. 23 at 3–4.
Because the charged conduct requires the government to prove defendant “knowingly possessed
a firearm[,]” Doc. 1 at 1, the sought-after information could “tend to prove a material issue of the
defense,” 25 Moore’s Federal Practice § 617.08[3][b]. And there’s no indication that defendant
intends to use the sought-after information as impeachment evidence. Nor are any other evident
admissibility issues. This suffices as a “preliminary showing of admissibility.” Romero, 2023
WL 2614472, at *2 (quotation cleaned up).
The court thus concludes that defendant’s request satisfies all three Nixon requirements
for issuance of a subpoena duces tecum under Rule 17(c).
C. 	Payment
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Finally, defendant’s motion also requests “payment of any costs and fees ‘in the same
manner as those paid for witnesses the government subpoenas.’” Doc. 23 at 4 (quoting Fed. R.
Crim. P. 17(b)). And it recites that defendant “is unable to pay the costs and fees associated with
a subpoena.” Id. at 5. The court’s review of defendant’s financial affidavit on the docket
confirms this assertion. See Doc. 5. So, the court finds that the accused is financially unable to
pay the costs and fees associated with the subpoena.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT defendant Keeno D.
Collins’s Motion to Produce Documents Pursuant to Rule 17 (Doc. 23) is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the clerk shall issue the subpoena detailed below.
The United States shall pay the costs and fees associated with the subpoena. The United States
Marshal for the District of Kansas (or a duly appointed deputy) is ordered to serve the subpoena
or arrange for service, at the defense’s request, and authorized to disburse the necessary funds to
pay the costs and fees associated with the subpoena.
Name of person or entity to be subpoenaed:
Douglas County Sheriff’s Office
Records Department
111 East 11th Street
Lawrence, KS 66044
Documents and objects to be produced:
All incident reports, investigative reports, arrest reports, body camera footage, dash
camera footage, dispatch narratives, and dispatch audio recordings related to the
vehicle pursuit on May 16, 2025, beginning in the area of East 700 Road and North
1800 Road in Douglas County and continuing East on Interstate 70.
Deadline and place for production:
On or before 1/15/26, to the Federal Public Defender’s Office, 201 U.S.
Courthouse, 500 State Avenue, Kansas City, Kansas, 66101.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated this 9th day of January, 2026, at Kansas City, Kansas.
s/ Daniel D. Crabtree______
Daniel D. Crabtree
United States District Judge
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