USA v. Jones et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 24-20070-DDC
NEWTON JONES (01),
WILLIAM CREEDEN (02),
KATERYNA JONES (03),
LAWRENCE MCMANAMON (05),
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The government seeks to admit co-conspirator statements at defendants Newton Jones,
William Creeden, Kateryna Jones, and Lawrence McManamon’s trial under Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2)(E). But they haven’t provided the court with those statements yet. Instead, the
government’s Amended Motion for Admission of Coconspirator Statements (Doc. 288)
identified categories of co-conspirator statements that the government anticipated could come up
at trial. Doc. 288 at 11. Before the James1 hearing, the court announced that it didn’t intend to
rule on the admissibility of co-conspirator statements by category, as the government’s motion
requested. Instead, the court clarified, it would hear evidence to establish the macro-level of the
James analysis—i.e., whether the government could demonstrate that a conspiracy existed and
that defendants were members of that conspiracy. But the court would reserve any ruling on the
1 	The court conducted a James hearing on April 10, 2026. “A James hearing is an evidentiary
hearing to establish the existence of a predicate conspiracy for purposes of Rule 801(d)(2)(E).” United
States v. Otuonye, 995 F.3d 1191, 1204 n.14 (10th Cir. 2021) (referencing United States v. James, 590
F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1979)). A James hearing is our Circuit’s preferred procedure for making Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2)(E)’s required preliminary findings. United States v. Stein, 985 F.3d 1254, 1269 (10th Cir.
2021).
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micro-level James analysis—i.e., whether particular statements were made in the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy—until the government had provided the specific statements to the
court. Once proffered, the court will rule on a statement-by-statement basis. So, this Order
addresses just the so-called macro level James analysis—the purported existence of and
membership in the conspiracy.
A further consequence of the government’s decision to supply the court with categories
of statements—and not the individual statements themselves—is that it limits the court’s ability
to engage in a full analysis even on these macro prongs. Tenth Circuit precedent provides that
the court should examine both the specific hearsay statements and “some independent
evidence”—that “need not be substantial”—to make a preliminary factual determination under
Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Otuonye, 995 F.3d at 1204. Pairing the statements and the independent
evidence together, the court then “must determine by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) a
conspiracy existed, (2) the declarant and the defendant were both members of the conspiracy,
and (3) the statements were made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” United
States v. Alcorta, 853 F.3d 1123, 1137 (10th Cir. 2017). All the government has provided to the
court—so far—is some independent evidence. They haven’t produced any statements. So, all
the court can do now is determine, preliminarily, whether the proffered independent evidence—
in isolation—meets the some-but-not-substantial standard to demonstrate that a conspiracy
existed and that defendants were members of the conspiracy.
Based on evidence presented at the James hearing, the court preliminarily finds that the
government has presented some independent evidence demonstrating the existence of a
conspiracy involving defendants Newton Jones and William Creeden. The proffered
independent evidence doesn’t suffice, however, to demonstrate as much for Lawrence
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McManamon and Kateryna Jones. The court explains this preliminary finding, below. But first,
it reiterates the governing standard.
I. 	Legal Standard
Under Fed. R. Evid. 802, hearsay statements generally are inadmissible. But Fed. R.
Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) excludes a statement from the general hearsay rule where it “was made by the
party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Rule 801(d)(2) also clarifies
that the statement doesn’t “by itself establish . . . the existence of the conspiracy or participation
in it[.]” Instead, before “admitting statements into evidence under the coconspirator exception to
the hearsay rule, the district court must determine by a preponderance of the evidence that
(1) a conspiracy existed,
(2) the declarant and the defendant were both members of the conspiracy, and
(3) the statements were made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”
Alcorta, 853 F.3d at 1137. “A district court’s preliminary conclusion that the predicate
conspiracy existed at most must be supported by some ‘independent evidence’ of the conspiracy
other than the proffered coconspirator statements themselves, although such evidence need not
be substantial.” Stein, 985 F.3d at 1269 (quoting United States v. Lopez-Gutierrez, 83 F.3d 1235,
1242 (10th Cir. 1996)). “Testimony of a government agent regarding his interactions or
conversations with coconspirators is adequate independent evidence.” Id.
II. 	Analysis
Here, the government charged defendants with engaging in a conspiracy to embezzle
union and other funds in various ways and commit wire fraud. One of the government’s theories
includes embezzlement by extravagance—i.e., misusing funds belonging to the International
Brotherhood of Boilermakers (IBB) for personal rather than IBB’s benefit. As the government
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describes it, defendants engaged in a criminal enterprise “to enrich the members of the
conspiracy, embezzle union funds, commit wire fraud, and embezzle from pension and welfare
funds.” Doc. 288 at 8.
At the James hearing, the government elicited testimony from Jeremy Newman and Paula
Musil. Mr. Newman is a senior investigator with U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Labor and
Management Standards in the Kansas City, Missouri office. Doc. 293 at 5 (Hr’g Tr. 5:7–13).
And he served as the lead investigator in this case. Id. at 7 (Hr’g Tr. 7:5–7). Ms. Musil is a
senior investigator with the Employee Benefits Security Administration, a part of the Department
of Labor. The government also introduced into evidence four plea agreements—admitted
without objection for the purposes of the James hearing. Gov’t Ex. 810 (defendant Cullen
Jones’s plea agreement) (also on the docket at Doc. 259) ; Gov’t Ex. 811 (defendant Warren
Fairley’s plea agreement) (also on the docket at Doc. 257); Gov’t Ex. 812 (defendant Kathy
Stapp’s plea agreement) (also on the docket at Doc. 79); Gov’t Ex. 813 (Tyler Brown’s plea
agreement from a separate criminal case premised on similar allegations) (also docketed at
United States v. Brown, 24-20047-DDC-1 (D. Kan. May 23, 2024), ECF 13).
At the end of the hearing, the court indicated that it would entertain supplemental briefs.
Defendants Newton Jones, William Creeden, Kateryna Jones, and Lawrence McManamon filed a
joint brief arguing that the government had failed to establish the existence of a conspiracy or
defendants’ membership in it. Doc. 296. Defendants Lawrence McManamon and Kateryna
Jones also filed individual supplemental briefs. Doc. 297; Doc. 298. Defendant McManamon
argued that the government had presented “no evidence whatsoever” that he had “agreed with
anyone to enter into a conspiracy to commit a pattern of racketeering activity.” Doc. 297 at 1.
Defendant K. Jones similarly argued that the government’s witnesses had failed to provide any
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evidence that Ms. Jones had entered any agreement—beyond her marriage to Mr. Jones. Doc.
298 at 3.
Defendants’ joint brief devotes most of its pages to the first requisite under Rule
801(d)(2)(E)—determining that a conspiracy existed. The court thus starts there and—like
defendants—expends most of its efforts on this existence essential. Then, near the end of this
Order, the court briefly addresses defendants’ membership in the conspiracy.
A. 	Existence of a Conspiracy
Defendants argue that the government has failed to demonstrate the existence of a
conspiracy.
To prove a conspiracy, the government must demonstrate: “(1) that two or more
persons agreed to violate the law, (2) that the defendant knew at least the essential
objectives of the conspiracy, (3) that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily
became a part of it, and (4) that the alleged coconspirators were interdependent.”
United States v. Caldwell, 589 F.3d 1323, 1329 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Sells,
477 F.3d 1226, 1235 (10th Cir. 2007)). The government can shoulder its burden with either
direct or circumstantial evidence. Sells, 477 F.3d at 1235. Defendants’ joint brief contends the
government flunked all four conspiracy prongs at the James hearing. Doc. 296 at 4. They
elaborate, identifying deficiencies in Mr. Newman’s testimony for each required element. Id. at
4–9. Defendants McManamon and K. Jones’s individual supplemental briefs focus primarily on
the first requisite element—agreeing to violate the law. The court takes up each conspiracy
element, in turn, below.
i. 	Agreed to Violate the Law
Start with the first element—an agreement to violate the law. Mr. Newman’s testimony
as lead-investigator witness on this first prong was uninspired. He couldn’t identify when the
conspiracy started. Doc. 293 at 49 (Hr’g Tr. 49:23–24) (“I guess I don’t really know when the
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conspiracy started.”). And when he tried to pin down a date, he suggested two alleged
coconspirators—Tyler Brown and Kathy Stapp—had agreed to a conspiracy to overspend IBB
funds before either Brown or Stapp even began working at IBB. Id. at 65–66, 76–77 (Hr’g Tr.
65:9–66:20, 76:24–77:16); Doc. 296 at 7. Also, Mr. Newman never identified where or how the
alleged co-conspirators had reached an agreement—or even specifically with whom they had
reached the agreement. See, e.g., Doc. 293 at 78–81 (Hr’g Tr. 78:16–81:2) (Mr. Newman
testifying that he couldn’t identify with whom specifically Ms. Stapp formed an agreement, or
when, or how, but testifying simply that Ms. Stapp reached an agreement with all the people in
the conspiracy). And sometimes, when listing individuals allegedly participating in the Jones
enterprise, Mr. Newman left out one defendant or another. See, e.g., id. at 29–30 (Hr’g Tr.
29:22–30:4) (failing to list Kateryna Jones as member of Jones enterprise); id. at 62 (Hr’g Tr.
62:3–6) (failing to list Lawrence McManamon when enumerating those who had agreed to
commit predicate acts of conspiracy).
The question then is: Does Mr. Newman’s subpar testimony as the government’s lead-
investigator witness mean that the government has failed to establish the first prong under Tenth
Circuit precedent?
“To prove the existence of an agreement, the government does not have to prove an
express or formal agreement was made. It merely has to show the coconspirators tacitly came to
a mutual understanding.” United States v. Rutland, 705 F.3d 1238, 1250 (10th Cir. 2013)
(quotation cleaned up). Indeed, an “agreement may be inferred from the facts and circumstances
of the case, including frequent contacts among the defendants and from their joint appearances at
transactions and negotiations.” Sells, 477 F.3d at 1236 (quotation cleaned up).
The shortcomings of Mr. Newman’s testimony aside, the government’s evidence at the
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James hearing demonstrated transactions involving N. Jones, William Creeden, and K. Jones that
suffice to infer a tacit mutual understanding and thus an agreement to violate the law. Based on
the James hearing evidence discussed below, the court concludes that the government has
shouldered its burden to present “some ‘independent evidence’”—even if it’s not substantial—of
the first conspiracy element for N. Jones, Creeden, and K. Jones. Stein, 985 F.3d at 1269
(quoting Lopez-Gutierrez, 83 F.3d at 1242).
First, Mr. Newman identified allegedly offending transactions involving these three
defendants. He testified that Newton Jones ordered Kathy Stapp and Tyler Brown to pay
Kateryna Jones two years’ worth of back wages in 2015—though the investigation never
unearthed any work actually performed by K. Jones from 2013 to 2015. Doc. 293 at 26–27
(Hr’g Tr. 26:15–27:1). Mr. Newman then confirmed that Mr. Brown’s plea agreement indicated
that K. Jones received $2 million in cumulative salary, reimbursed expenses, and benefit
contributions made on her behalf—all directed by N. Jones and authorized by Creeden.2 Id. at
2 	The court considers the admitted plea agreements when evaluating the government’s James
evidence. Defendants’ joint brief never mentions the plea agreements—at all. See generally Doc. 296.
Defendants McManamon and K. Jones’s individual briefs each imply that these plea agreements are
unreliable. Defendant McManamon asserts that the defendants who pled “accepted” the plea agreement’s
factual basis “as true in exchange for leniency from the government[.]” Doc. 297 at 5. Defendant K.
Jones likewise avers that “a primary basis for [the government’s witnesses’] conclusions were guilty plea
agreements of cooperating co-defendants seeking leniency in sentencing.” Doc. 298 at 3. But neither
brief identifies any authority suggesting that the government can’t rely on plea agreements to make its
James proffer. Indeed, the court’s research suggests that it can.
United States District Judge James O. Browning found the existence of a conspiracy—and
defendants’ participation in it—simply by citing findings of fact drawn exclusively from plea agreements.
See United States v. DeLeon (DeLeon I), 287 F. Supp. 3d 1187, 1199–1200, 1250 (D.N.M. 2018) (finding
United States established first two of Rule 801(d)(2)(E)’s prongs with facts located in plea agreements);
see id. at 1224 (“The United States argued that the plea agreements of cooperating defendants, which it
introduced [at the James hearing], establish the existence of a conspiracy.”). What’s more, our Circuit has
upheld a district court’s finding that a predicate conspiracy existed where the government’s James
evidence consisted solely of an FBI special agent’s testimony that summarized “the
information . . . coconspirators provided after entering into plea agreements with the government.”
United States v. Owens, 70 F.3d 1118, 1124 (10th Cir. 1995). Indeed, the Circuit rejected defendant’s
argument that “the government was required to corroborate the information his coconspirators gave [the
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27 (Hr’g Tr. 27:2–8); United States v. Brown, 24-20047-DDC-1 (D. Kan. May 23, 2024), ECF
13 at 3 (Gov’t Ex. 813). And Mr. Newman testified that defendants N. Jones and K. Jones both
held IBB-issued American Express credit cards that they used when going out to dinner as
husband and wife—and expensed IBB for it. Doc. 293 at 39 (Hr’g Tr. 39:19–25).
Second, Ms. Musil—a senior investigator for the U.S. Department of Labor Employee
Benefits Security Administration—also testified. She, too, recited allegedly offending
transactions involving defendants N. Jones, Creeden, and K. Jones. Ms. Musil testified, for
example, that K. Jones didn’t qualify for IBB’s sponsored health plan or pension plan because
she didn’t work the requisite hours per week to qualify. Ms. Musil reached that insufficient-
work conclusion based on witness statements, Ms. Jones’s personnel file, and comparing Ms.
Jones’s work product with other employees’ work product and email traffic. Despite this
ineligibility, Ms. Jones participated in the plans. Ms. Musil also testified that N. Jones and
Creeden appointed another individual, Bryan Daly, to receive health care benefits when Mr. Daly
was terminally ill—and to backdate Mr. Daly’s employment and health plan. Mr. Daly had not,
and would not, perform work for IBB. Nonetheless, defendants N. Jones and Creeden authorized
Daly’s health-plan participation. Finally, Ms. Musil testified that defendants N. Jones and
Creeden cashed out benefits of retirement plans at the Bank of Labor—receiving more than
$500,000 each—despite performing no work for the bank outside their already-established
director duties. Entitlement to retirement benefits at the bank was premised on full-time work.
special agent] with independent evidence, which [defendant] define[d] as evidence from a source other
than his coconspirators.” Id. The Circuit explained that there’s nothing “to suggest the ‘independent
evidence’ must come from some source other than a member of the conspiracy or that it cannot be an out-
of-court statement by a coconspirator to a government agent during an investigation.” Id. at 1125. It
would seem, then, that the government properly can use the factual bases in the four admitted plea
agreements here to support its James proffer. And so, the court considers the plea agreements alongside
witness testimony and other exhibits when evaluating the existence of a conspiracy.
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But the bank employees and others Ms. Musil interviewed in her investigation indicated that
defendants N. Jones and Creeden performed no additional work when they moved from directors
to CEO and executive vice president, respectively.
Recall that the bar for independent evidence to establish a conspiracy is low—as our
Circuit explains, it “need not be substantial.” Stein, 985 F.3d at 1269. The government’s
independent evidence of defendants’ various allegedly offending transactions provides enough—
under that minimal standard—to demonstrate defendants N. Jones, Creeden, and K. Jones’s tacit
agreement. Conspicuously absent from these transactions, however, is defendant Lawrence
McManamon. The sum total of the government’s evidence involving McManamon included (i)
his attendance at allegedly unnecessary and lavish international trips; and (ii) his presence on the
International Executive Council (IEC), which allegedly neglected its duties to review the
offending expenditures.
First, Mr. Newman testified about defendants’ allegedly excessive and costly overseas
travel. Doc. 293 at 15 (Hr’g Tr. 15:2–20). Indeed, government’s Exhibit 108 confirmed the
attendance of defendant McManamon, along with defendants N. Jones and Creeden, at the Paris
2009 IEC meeting. Id. at 117–18 (Hr’g Tr. 117:18–118:4). Further exemplifying defendants’
frequent international travel, Mr. Newman confirmed the contents of various paragraphs from
defendant Warren Fairley’s plea agreement—paragraphs that describe particular overseas trips.
Id. at 15 (Hr’g Tr. 15:2–20). Specifically, Mr. Fairley’s plea agreement placed McManamon on
IBB-funded trips to Italy in June 2018 and June 2019, as well as a trip to England in February
2020. Doc. 257 at 4–5 (Gov’t Ex. 811).
Second, Mr. Newman testified that, as a member of the IEC, McManamon regularly
should have reviewed the officers’ and IBB’s expenses, to authorize and approve them. Doc.
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293 at 16–17 (Hr’g Tr. 16:13–17:12). But Mr. Newman’s investigation revealed that
McManamon rarely did so. Id. Instead, Mr. Newman testified that McManamon and other
members of the executive council acquiesced to Newton Jones’s expenditures, never confronting
or questioning them. Id. at 34 (Hr’g Tr. 34:7–23).
Our Circuit has concluded that “mere presence is not sufficient in and of itself to
establish a conspiracy, nor is it sufficient for the government to show only mere association with
conspirators known to be involved in crime.” Caldwell, 589 F.3d at 1331 (quotation cleaned up).
The evidence the government proffered about defendant McManamon constitutes no more than
mere presence. He attended lavish trips and IEC meetings where the members failed to review
expenditures. But the court can’t infer from his mere presence at work trips and lackadaisical
performance at work meetings that McManamon agreed to violate the law.
So, the government’s proffer of independent evidence at the James hearing clears the first
prong required to prove the existence of a conspiracy for defendants N. Jones, Creeden, and K.
Jones, but not defendant McManamon. The court thus addresses the next two prongs—
together—but just for the three defendants still standing.
ii. & iii. Knowledge of the Essential Conspiracy Objectives & Knowing,
Voluntary Participation in the Conspiracy
Recall that the government also must supply independent evidence that “the defendant
knew at least the essential objectives of the conspiracy” and “that the defendant knowingly and
voluntarily became a part of it[.]” Caldwell, 589 F.3d at 1329 (quotation cleaned up). The court
addresses these two prongs together because the circumstantial evidence evincing these prongs
largely overlaps. Defendants’ joint supplemental brief argues that the government failed to
establish that any defendant knew the criminal objectives of the alleged conspiracy or that any
defendant knowingly and voluntarily became part of the alleged conspiracy, pointing again to
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Mr. Newman’s testimony. Doc. 296 at 5–8. The joint brief neglects to account for any evidence
apart from Mr. Newman’s testimony, however—never mentioning the plea agreements or
engaging with Ms. Musil’s testimony. See generally id.; see also id. at 3 (mentioning Ms. Musil
just once and stating that she served as a witness but never addressing any of her testimony).
And defendant K. Jones’s individual brief makes just a passing reference to her knowledge, or
lack thereof, without developing the argument any further. Doc. 298 at 2 (“[T]he James
hearing . . . provided no evidence that Kateryna Jones . . . knew of the existence of such [a RICO
conspiracy] agreement—if there was one.”).
“[T]he government isn’t required to present direct evidence of the defendant’s knowledge
of the conspiracy’s objective or of the defendant’s knowing and voluntary participation in the
conspiracy. Instead, circumstantial evidence will suffice.” United States v. Arnold, 696 F.
App’x 903, 908 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Small, 423 F.3d 1164, 1182–83 (10th
Cir. 2005)). And, in some cases, the same circumstantial evidence may satisfy conspiracy
prongs two and three. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, No. 07-CR-149 TS, 2008 WL
2048386, at *4 (D. Utah May 12, 2008) (citing same evidence of knowledge and involvement to
satisfy the second and third conspiracy prongs when performing existence-of-conspiracy analysis
under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E)). When evaluating knowledge and participation, “a conspirator
‘need not know of the existence or identity of the other members of the conspiracy or the full
extent of the conspiracy.’” United States v. Leveille, No. 18-CR-2945-WJ, 2023 WL 5835889, at
*11 (D.N.M. Sept. 8, 2023) (quoting United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 669 (10th Cir.
1992)).
The Tenth Circuit evaluation of conspiracy evidence in Arnold proves instructive to the
court’s analysis here. There, our Circuit addressed the sufficiency of the evidence to convict a
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defendant of conspiracy. Arnold, 696 F. App’x at 907–08. The indictment alleged that
defendant and his family members participated in a scheme to secure victims’ financing-
incentive rebates from their new vehicle purchases. Id. at 904. The conspirators promised
victims that a co-op association would invest the victims’ rebate money and then make the
victims’ loan payments using the invested rebate’s interest. Id. The Circuit found the evidence
sufficient to convict defendant of conspiracy by identifying three categories of circumstantial
evidence. First, the Circuit credited defendant’s failure to respond to victims’ inquiries as
circumstantial evidence supporting an inference that defendant understood the rebate scheme
was a fraudulent one. Id. at 908. Second, the Circuit deemed the “highly implausible” nature of
the rebate scheme—where the invested rebates purportedly would generate sufficient income to
satisfy the victims’ loan payments—as additional circumstantial evidence of defendant’s
knowledge. Id. Finally, Arnold determined that evidence of defendant’s “coordination and
concert of action” with coconspirators—such as a coconspirator having defendant handle the
steps of vehicle purchases—sufficed to demonstrate knowing participation. Id. at 908–09.
Similar categories of circumstantial James evidence satisfy the essential-objectives and knowing,
voluntary participation prongs here, as well.
Start with the “highly implausible” scheme category of evidence. Here, the government
presented evidence that defendants N. Jones, Creeden, and K. Jones performed little to no work
but reaped the benefits of full-time employment—a highly implausible scheme. Ms. Musil
testified that defendants N. Jones and Creeden performed little to no additional work when
moving from Bank of Labor directors to CEO and executive vice president, respectively. Yet,
when they left the Bank of Labor’s employ, N. Jones and Creeden submitted for distributions
from a retirement plan for full-time employees of the bank—to the tune of around half a million
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dollars each. Ms. Musil also testified that K. Jones didn’t perform 30 hours a week of work but
nonetheless participated in the IBB-sponsored health plan. K. Jones also participated in IBB’s
pension plan, a plan that requires full-time employment. According to Ms. Musil’s review of
witness statements, as well as K. Jones’s personnel file and work product, K. Jones didn’t work
enough to qualify for the pension plan, either. It’s highly implausible that defendants could
perform little to no work and nonetheless believed they merited full-time employee benefits. As
in Arnold, such a “highly implausible scenario” as receiving substantial employee benefits
without performing the work of an employee supplies circumstantial evidence of defendants N.
Jones, Creeden, and K. Jones’s knowledge of the conspiracy’s essential objectives.
Next consider Arnold’s “coordination and concert of action” category of evidence. N.
Jones and Creeden repeatedly authorized expenditures jointly. For example, Mr. Newman
testified that N. Jones and Creeden approved expenses for Cullen Jones—N. Jones’s son and an
alleged co-conspirator—to attend film school in Vancouver on IBB’s dime. Doc. 293 at 22
(Hr’g Tr. 22:12–22). They allegedly authorized Cullen Jones’s relocation and allowed him to
continue receiving full salary and benefits, as well as paying his tuition and board, along with a
per diem while in school. Id. Cullen Jones’s plea agreement provides the full details about the
expenses IBB covered: $2,000 in relocation expenses; $43,000 in tuition and books; $1,350 in
monthly rent and utilities; $75 in a daily per diem; the use of a rental car; and $63,000 in salary
while he was in residence in Canada as a student. Doc. 259 at 2 (Gov’t Ex. 810). For defendants
to expense such transactions to IBB, N. Jones and Creeden had to act in concert, with both
granting approval. Given the nature of these film-school expenditures—and the unlikelihood
that they benefitted IBB or its members—scrutiny at the approval stage presumably would have
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halted them. Defendants N. Jones and Creeden thus, in a coordinated effort of approval, allowed
such expenditures.
In sum, N. Jones, K. Jones, and Creeden’s “highly implausible” receipt of full-time
benefits for minimal work and the coordination required among N. Jones and Creeden all serve
as independent circumstantial evidence sufficient for this small piece in the James analysis. That
leaves one final conspiracy element: interdependence.
iv. 	Interdependence
Defendants’ joint brief contends that this final element may highlight “the most fatal
flaw” of the government’s conspiracy claim. Doc. 296 at 8. They argue that the government
“was utterly unable to identify any interdependence among Defendants, instead pointing only to
acts that Defendants did as part and parcel of their lawful employment at IBB[.]” Id.
Defendants contend that the government’s evidence demonstrates—at best—“‘similar or parallel
objectives between similarly situated people.’” Id. (quoting United States v. DeLeon (DeLeon
II), 418 F. Supp. 3d 682, 746 (D.N.M. 2019)). And they focus on Mr. Newman’s inability to
identify any “extra-IBB” relationship or communication among defendants. Id. at 8–9. So,
defendants conclude, the government hasn’t pinpointed any acts “outside of [defendants’]
employment with the IBB that would constitute interdependence in the alleged conspiracy.” Id.
at 9. Defendants never provide any authority or explain why the acts demonstrating
interdependence must have occurred outside their employment with the IBB. See generally id.
Interdependence exists where “each alleged coconspirator depends on the operation of
each link in the chain to achieve the common goal. In essence, the defendant’s actions must
facilitate the endeavors of other alleged coconspirators or facilitate the venture as a whole.”
Evans, 970 F.2d at 671 (quotation cleaned up). That is, “‘a single conspiracy does not exist
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solely because many individuals deal with a common central player. What is required is a
shared, single criminal objective, not just similar or parallel objectives between similarly situated
people.’” United States v. Serr, 817 F. App’x 598, 601 (10th Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original)
(quoting Small, 423 F.3d at 1182). “And interdependence gets to this question, asking whether
coconspirators intend to act together for their shared mutual benefit within the scope of the
conspiracy charged.” Id. at 601–02 (quotation cleaned up).
At the James hearing, the government adduced evidence that IBB had used an
expenditure-approval structure that indicates interdependence. It asked Mr. Newman about
article 5.2 of IBB’s constitution. Doc. 293 at 11 (Hr’g Tr. 11:1–9). Mr. Newman testified that
N. Jones and Creeden—given their roles as international president and international secretary-
treasurer—were required by article 5.2 to authorize all nonroutine expenditures. Id. So, any
defendant involved in the expenditure-authorization chain necessarily depended on the others in
the chain. Remember—the government alleges that the conspiracy sought to enrich defendants
personally with funds intended to benefit the IBB and its members. The constitutionally required
structure for expenditure approval suggests defendants N. Jones and Creeden couldn’t act
independently to accomplish that purpose. Each allegedly unnecessary or lavish expenditure
needed joint approval. That structure thus intertwines Newton Jones and William Creeden
because, to accomplish the aims of the alleged conspiracy, they had to act together. The court
thus concludes that the government presented some independent evidence of interdependence for
N. Jones and Creeden. And some is enough. See Stein, 985 F.3d at 1269.
But what about Kateryna Jones? The government never adduced any evidence that she
could approve expenses. Indeed, the government’s evidence suggested that her husband,
Newton Jones, set up much of the alleged scheme on her behalf—never indicating acts taken by
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Ms. Jones herself. For example, Mr. Newman testified that Newton Jones ordered that Kateryna
Jones receive two years’ worth of back wages—allegedly for no work. Doc. 293 at 26–27 (Hr’g
Tr. 26:15–27:1). And Creeden authorized it. Id. at 27 (Hr’g Tr. 27:8). But Ms. Jones had no
role to play in approving that backpay expense. And this exemplifies the type of evidence the
government presented against Ms. Jones. She consistently received benefit from various
expenditures but the government hasn’t demonstrated that she acted to secure any of them.
Recall that interdependence requires that “the defendant’s actions . . . facilitate the endeavors of
other alleged coconspirators or facilitate the venture as a whole.” Evans, 970 F.2d at 671
(quotation cleaned up). Based on the evidence the government proffered at the James hearing,
Kateryna Jones received benefits, but she didn’t facilitate anything. The evidence never revealed
any actions taken by Ms. Jones that paved the way for “the endeavors of other alleged
coconspirators” or that pushed forward “the venture as a whole.” Id. In short, the government’s
evidence demonstrated that Ms. Jones profited from the scheme; the evidence didn’t
demonstrate, however, that she meaningfully contributed to or in any way enabled it. The court
thus concludes that the government has failed to provide the requisite independent evidence—at
least, for now—to demonstrate K. Jones’s interdependence.
Recall that the burden on the government to establish the existence of a predicate
conspiracy at a James hearing is light. The independent evidence needn’t “be substantial.” Id.
The court finds the government’s evidence passes muster at this preliminary stage on all four
conspiracy prongs for N. Jones and Creeden, thus surviving James’s first macro-level
requirement: the conspiracy’s existence. Having so concluded, one other macro-level question
remains: Has the government provided sufficient independent evidence to demonstrate that
defendants N. Jones and Creeden were members of the conspiracy?
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B. 	Members of the Conspiracy
Defendants’ joint brief ends by arguing that the government can’t show each defendant
was a member of the conspiracy.3 Doc. 296 at 9–10.
“Only slight evidence is required to demonstrate the defendant’s participation in the
conspiracy to permit the introduction of a co-conspirator’s statement under rule 801(d)(2)(E).”
United States v. Salas-Aguayo, No. CR 12-3109 JB, 2024 WL 453642, at *13 (D.N.M. Feb. 6,
2024). The court concludes the evidence already reviewed above suffices to clear that slight
evidence hurdle for defendants N. Jones and Creeden. See Mitchell, 2008 WL 2048386, at *5
(referring to its discussion of the existence of a conspiracy to find that the government also
established the conspiracy’s membership). Indeed, even defendants’ joint brief acknowledges the
overlap of these two macro-level analyses. See Doc. 296 at 9 (“For largely the same reasons that
the conspiracy was not established as discussed above, the Government similarly provided no
evidence or testimony supporting that each defendant . . . agreed to the ‘same criminal
objective[.]’”).
Defendants’ only novel argument addressing this portion of the standard contends that the
broad manner in which the government defines the conspiracy means that defendants couldn’t
have agreed on the same criminal objective. Id. Recall that the government defines the
conspiracy to include four components: defendants allegedly sought to “enrich the members of
the conspiracy, embezzle union funds, commit wire fraud, and embezzle pension and welfare
funds.” Doc. 288 at 8. The court isn’t persuaded that this broad description of the conspiracy
3 	Defendants’ joint brief also argues that the government can’t show that each declarant was a
member of the conspiracy. Doc. 296 at 9. But the court saves any declarant-membership issues for the
micro-level James analysis. Because the court doesn’t yet have the statements the government hopes to
admit as Rule 801(d)(2)(E) statements, it can’t determine at this juncture who the declarants of those
undisclosed statements were and whether they were conspiracy members.
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precludes defendants’ agreement on the same objective. All four categories involve a common
thread: acquiring personal benefit from their IBB and Bank of Labor positions through
embezzlement and wire fraud. And the court concludes the evidence already cited in this Order
shows that the government proffered “some independent evidence”—even if
“not . . . substantial”—that Newton Jones and William Creeden were members of the alleged
conspiracy. Stein, 985 F.3d at 1269
III. 	Conclusion
The court concludes the independent evidence the government presented at the James
hearing suffices to demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy and Newton Jones and William
Creeden’s membership in it. The independent evidence doesn’t suffice, however, to loop
Lawrence McManamon or Kateryna Jones into it.
This preliminary conclusion doesn’t do much for the government yet. The court still has
to analyze the forthcoming coconspirator statements to determine whether—adding those
statements to the independent evidence adduced at the James hearing—will enable the
government to reach a preponderance of the evidence standard.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT the government’s
Amended Motion for Admission of Coconspirator Statements (Doc. 288) is granted in part, as set
forth in this Order. The motion remains pending so that the court can assess any coconspirator
statements on an individual basis.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the government’s Motion for Admission of
Coconspirator Statements (Doc. 211) is moot as superseded by Doc. 288.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated this 27th day of April, 2026, at Kansas City, Kansas.
s/ Daniel D. Crabtree
Daniel D. Crabtree
United States District Judge
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