Beerman v. Honeywell International, Inc. et al

1
In the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
_____________
Case No. 23-cv-02427-TC
_____________
KARLYNN BEERMAN, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs
v.
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants
_____________
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Karlynn Beerman and Mike Burgin sued Honeywell In-
ternational, Inc., alleging that Honeywell’s negligence in servicing Mar-
tin Beerman’s airplane flight computer resulted in his wrongful death.
Doc. 137. Honeywell moves for summary judgment, Doc. 141, and
both sides have filed several motions seeking to exclude experts and
strike pleadings, Docs. 138–141, 143–147, 163, and 170. For the fol-
lowing reasons, Honeywell’s motion for summary judgment is granted,
and the other motions are denied as moot.
I
A
Summary judgment is proper under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure when the moving party demonstrates “that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” when it
is necessary to resolve a claim. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d
664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998). And disputes over material facts are “genu-
ine” if the competing evidence would permit a reasonable jury to de-
cide the issue in either party’s favor. Id. Disputes—even hotly con-
tested ones—over facts that are not essential to the claims are irrele-
vant. Brown v. Perez, 835 F.3d 1223, 1233 (10th Cir. 2016). Indeed,
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belaboring such disputes undermines the efficiency that Rule 56 seeks
to promote. Adler, 144 F.3d at 670.
At the summary judgment stage, material facts “must be identified
by reference to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits
incorporated therein.” Adler, 144 F.3d at 671; see also D. Kan. R.
56.1(a)–(c). To determine whether a genuine dispute exists, the court
views all evidence, and draws all reasonable inferences, in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Allen v. Muskogee, Okla.,
119 F.3d 837, 839–40 (10th Cir. 1997). That said, the nonmoving party
cannot create a genuine factual dispute by making allegations that are
purely conclusory, Adler, 144 F.3d at 671–72, 674, or unsupported by
the record. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378–81 (2007).
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence
of any genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a
matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Savant
Homes, Inc. v. Collins, 809 F.3d 1133, 1137 (10th Cir. 2016). Once the
moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving
party to demonstrate that genuine issues as to those dispositive matters
remain for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Savant Homes, 809 F.3d at 1137.
B
This is a case about an airplane crash that killed Martin Beerman.
Plaintiffs allege that Honeywell’s negligent repair work caused the fatal
crash. The following facts are uncontroverted or, if controverted, are
viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs.
1. On August 20, 2021, Martin Beerman was piloting his Socata
TBM 700A airplane to pick up his son-in-law in Cincinnati, Ohio. Doc.
137 at ¶¶ 2.a.iii, 2.a.ix.1 Beerman departed the Erie Ottaway Airport in
Port Clinton, Ohio, en route to the Cincinnati Municipal Airport. Id.
at ¶ 2.a.ii. After departure, the airplane ascended to roughly 20,000 feet.
Doc. 149 at ¶ 35. Approximately thirty minutes later, air traffic control
gave Beerman clearance to descend to 10,000 feet. Id. at ¶ 36. Roughly
six minutes after that, the airplane entered a sudden and sharp roll to
1 All references to the parties’ briefs are to the page numbers assigned by
CM/ECF.
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the left. Id. at ¶ 37. Beerman was unable to correct the airplane’s tra-
jectory, the airplane crashed, and Beerman died as a result.
The airplane was equipped with a Honeywell KFC 325 autopilot
system. Doc. 137 at ¶ 2.a.x. The autopilot comprised various parts, two
of which are relevant here: a KCP 220 flight computer and a roll servo.
Id. When the autopilot is engaged, the computer sends electrical signals
to the roll servo to turn the airplane left and right. Doc. 142 at ¶ 6.
Honeywell manufactured the roll servo in 1997, and the airplane’s
manufacturer, Socata, purchased the roll servo in 1998. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 8.
The roll servo operated in the airplane for roughly 2,624 flight hours.
Id. at ¶ 12. Neither Honeywell nor any other entity repaired or serviced
the roll servo after it was installed in the airplane. Id. at ¶¶ 13, 14; Doc.
137 at ¶ 2.a.xii. Honeywell did, however, service the flight computer.
Doc. 142 at ¶ 21. Whether Honeywell did so negligently is at the heart
of this dispute.
Plaintiffs’ lone remaining contention is that Honeywell negligently
serviced the flight computer. Doc. 137 at ¶ 4.a.i.2 In particular, they
focus on the work that Honeywell performed in 2016, roughly five
years before Beerman purchased the airplane from its prior owner. Id.
As a result, a description of the previous owner’s experience with the
airplane is necessary to provide context to Plaintiffs’ claim.
In 2016, the airplane’s previous owner, Kevin Scott, had the flight
computer sent to Honeywell for evaluation and service. In particular,
Satnan Avionics—the company in possession of Scott’s airplane at the
time—removed the flight computer and sent it to Honeywell via an-
other company named Capital Avionics. Doc. 142 at ¶¶ 17, 18. Satnan
sent the computer to Capital Avionics, and Capital Avionics then sent
it to a Honeywell repair station in Olathe, Kansas, noting that the cus-
tomer requested “unit evaluation,” that the airplane “rolled to an
2 The only two claims that Plaintiffs preserved in the pretrial order were a
negligence claim (Count I) and a claim for res ipsa loquitur (Count V). Doc.
137 at ¶ 4.a. Honeywell seeks summary judgment as to the res ipsa loquitur
claim because it is not viable under Ohio law. Doc. 142 at 18. Plaintiffs agree:
“Res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary doctrine and not an independent cause of
action.” Doc. 149 at 25; see Jennings Buick, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 406 N.E.2d
1385, 1387 (Ohio 1980); Dobbs’s Law of Torts § 169 (2d ed.) (“Res ipsa lo-
quitur is not a cause of action . . . .”). As a result, Honeywell’s motion for
summary judgment as to Count V is granted.
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excess 45 degree bank before pilot disconnected [autopilot],” and that
the “[u]nit must be returned to factory for repair/modification evalu-
ation.” Doc. 142-12 at 2; Doc. 142 at ¶ 19. There is no dispute that
Honeywell received only the flight computer and not the roll servo.
Doc. 142 at ¶ 20.
Honeywell was unable to duplicate the reported discrepancy in the
flight computer. Doc. 142-12 at 2. It noted that the flight computer’s
“bench test, cold test, hot test, vibe test and final test passed.” Doc.
142-13 at 3. Honeywell returned the flight computer to Satnan, who
then reinstalled it and returned the airplane to Scott. Scott had no is-
sues with either the flight computer or the roll servo after he received
it back from Honeywell, and he made no other service requests to
Honeywell while he owned the airplane. Doc. 142 at ¶ 23.
Scott sold the airplane to Beerman in 2021. Doc. 137 at ¶ 2.a.v.
Nine days later, the fatal accident occurred. Id.
From the time of the flight computer’s inspection in 2016 to the
time of the accident in 2021, the roll servo operated for an additional
570 flight hours without issue. Doc. 142 at ¶ 24. The parties agree that
the flight computer was not defective and did not cause the crash. Id.
at ¶ 22.
2. Beerman’s widow, Karlynn Beerman, and the executor of his
estate, Mike Burgin, filed suit against Honeywell.3 They bring a claim
of wrongful death arising under Ohio law, arguing that Honeywell’s
negligent maintenance of the flight computer caused the accident.
Doc. 137 at ¶ 4.a.i. In particular, Plaintiffs argue that Honeywell, in
January and February of 2016, “failed to inspect and test the complete
autopilot system and was negligent in repairing it.” Id. The specific
negligent act or omission, according to Plaintiffs, is that Honeywell did
not but should have requested, inspected, and serviced the roll servo
when it received the flight computer for its 2016 service.
Honeywell moves for summary judgment. Doc. 141. It argues that
Plaintiffs’ claim is barred by the General Aviation Revitalization Act’s
statute of repose on claims against aircraft manufacturers and by
Ohio’s similar statute. Doc. 142 at 8, 13. It also argues that it did not
3 Plaintiffs initially filed suit against various defendants, but only Honeywell
remains.
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have a duty to request the roll servo and that its alleged breach did not
cause the accident. Id. at 14, 17.
In addition, the parties have filed eight motions to exclude each
other’s experts. Docs. 138–140, 143–147. Honeywell has also filed a
motion to strike the affidavits of three of Plaintiffs’ experts. Doc. 163.
And Plaintiffs have filed a motion to amend two of those affidavits.
Doc. 170.
II
Plaintiffs’ negligence claim fails as a matter of law. For one thing,
it necessarily presumes that the roll servo was defective and is therefore
barred by federal and Ohio statutes of repose. Moreover, Plaintiffs
have failed to raise a genuine dispute of fact regarding the elements of
duty and causation. Accordingly, Honeywell’s motion for summary
judgment is granted.4
A
Honeywell’s first line of defense is that Plaintiffs’ claim is barred
by two different statutes of repose. That contention is correct.
1. Honeywell first argues that the General Aviation Revitalization
Act (GARA), Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552, bars Plaintiffs’
claim. Doc. 142 at 8. Resolution of that argument starts with the stat-
utory text. See Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 583 U.S. 366,
378 (2018) (noting that statutory analysis “begins with the text”).
The relevant section of the Act states as follows:
[N]o civil action for damages for death or injury to per-
sons or damage to property arising out of an accident
involving a general aviation aircraft may be brought
against the manufacturer of the aircraft or the
4 Resolution of Honeywell’s motion for summary judgment does not rest on
any of the expert testimony that the parties challenge. As a result, each mo-
tion to exclude, Docs. 138, 139, 140, 143, 144, 145, 146, and 147, the motion
to strike expert affidavits, Doc. 163, and the motion to amend, Doc. 170, are
denied as moot. See Adhealth, Ltd. v. Portercare Adventist Health Sys., 135 F.4th
1241, 1245 n.3 (10th Cir. 2025) (affirming the district court’s denial of a mo-
tion to exclude testimony as moot).
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manufacturer of any new component, system, subas-
sembly, or other part of the aircraft, in its capacity as a
manufacturer if the accident occurred . . . after [eighteen
years from the date of manufacture].
49 U.S.C. § 40101 Notes, § 2 (emphasis added).
The parties’ dispute is not about how the statute operates. All agree
that if Plaintiffs’ remaining claim is a “civil action . . . against the man-
ufacturer of the aircraft . . . in its capacity as a manufacturer,” it is pre-
cluded.
Honeywell argues that Plaintiffs bring their claim against it in its
capacity as a manufacturer because their theory “sound[s] in product
liability.” Doc. 169 at 5. It contends that the substance of Plaintiffs’
claim is that Honeywell improperly manufactured the roll servo and
because of that should have requested the roll servo be sent along with
the flight computer so that Honeywell could have inspected and re-
paired the roll servo. Doc. 169 at 6–7.
Plaintiffs say otherwise. They initially argued that the roll servo had
a manufacturing defect. Doc. 1-1 at 8. And most of their experts’ opin-
ions depend on that contention. See, e.g., Docs. 143-1, 144-2 at 21, 145-
1. Plaintiffs now contend, however, that they are no longer bringing
such a claim. Doc. 137 at ¶ 4.a.i. & n.1. Instead, they purport to be
pursuing a different source of negligence: Honeywell’s failure to re-
quest an opportunity to evaluate the defective roll servo when it ser-
viced the flight computer in 2016. Doc. 149 at ¶¶ 39, 40, 45; Doc. 137
at ¶ 4.a.i.
GARA does not define the term “capacity as a manufacturer,” and
the Tenth Circuit has not analyzed its meaning. Nor have the parties
identified persuasive authority from other jurisdictions defining that
term. Accordingly, the term is understood to have its “ordinary, con-
temporary, common meaning.” Kientz v. Comm’r, SSA, 954 F.3d 1277,
1281 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42
(1979)).
A contemporary dictionary definition is a helpful source of ordi-
nary, common meaning. See, e.g., In re Wesley, __ F.4th __, 2026 WL
181349, at *5 (10th Cir. Jan. 23, 2026). The term “capacity as a manu-
facturer” comprises two words: “capacity” and “manufacturer.” A
manufacturer is one who is “engaged in producing or assembling new
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products.” Manufacturer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
And “capacity” relates to “[t]he role in which one performs an act.”
Capacity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (11th ed. 2019). Honeywell is un-
questionably a producer of new products, so it follows that GARA
bars claims that seek to hold Honeywell liable for acts that it took in
its role as a producer of new products.
Despite Plaintiffs’ current characterization, their claim is one
against Honeywell in its capacity as a manufacturer because it depends
on an alleged defect in the roll servo that Honeywell manufactured.
Contra Doc. 149 at 11. One need look no further than to how Plaintiffs’
summary judgment brief describes the basis of their claim. Their claim
is a civil action for damages arising out of a defect in an airplane com-
ponent. See Doc. 149 at 15–20 (explaining how a defect in the roll servo
caused the accident). In particular, Plaintiffs argue that the roll servo
had several “specific manufacturing flaws.” Id. at 16. They explain that
these defects were present in 2016 when Honeywell inspected the
flight computer. Id. at 17. They further explain that these defects in the
roll servo caused the crash and that the similarity between Scott’s com-
plaint and the airplane’s uncommanded roll indicate “a connection be-
tween the previously reported issue and the ultimate crash.” Id. at 17–
20. Attaching a negligence label to the claim does not change the sub-
stance of what Plaintiffs are seeking to do. Cf. Kaschak v. Bankers
Healthcare Grp., LLC, No. 23-cv-15452, 2024 WL 1797925, at *6 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 25, 2024) (“If it walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then
it’s probably a duck—even if the duck calls itself a chicken.”); accord
Lake v. Neal, 585 F.3d 1059, 1059 (7th Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs’ claim
against Honeywell, in nature and substance, is a defective product
claim.
Not surprisingly, that view is confirmed by the experts’ opinions
that form the basis of Plaintiffs’ claim. For example, Plaintiffs rely on
Jerry Stooksbury, who opined that Honeywell should have discovered
the defect in the roll servo. Doc. 143-1 at 4. They also point to Federico
Campbell, who opined that the roll servo was defective. Doc. 144-2 at
21. And one of their experts, Jack Goho, goes into detail about how
specifically Honeywell manufactured the roll servo improperly. Doc.
145-1.
More importantly, Plaintiffs argue that Honeywell’s status as the
manufacturer of the roll servo defines its duty. They argue that Hon-
eywell’s “unique position as the [roll servo’s manufacturer]” should be
considered when determining whether Honeywell negligently serviced
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the flight computer. Id. at 14. That is important, according to Plaintiffs,
because there is a causal link between this defect and the crash. See
Doc. 149 at 17.
Plaintiffs’ effort to avoid this conclusion by reframing their claim
as a negligence claim is unpersuasive. Specifically, they argue that theirs
is a claim based only on Honeywell’s negligent inspection, and they
disclaim any intent to claim the roll servo was defective. Doc. 149 at 2.
And, as a result, they contend that their characterization should con-
trol. But federal courts have a duty to look beyond labels to determine
the substance of a claim. Cf. Dodson Int’l Parts, Inc. v. Williams Int’l Co.,
12 F.4th 1212, 1229 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting 5 Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1286 (4th ed. 2023)) (noting that a pleading “will
be judged by the quality of its substance rather than according to its
form or label”). The crux of Plaintiffs’ claim is that the roll servo was
defective and that this defect caused the accident. Doc. 149 at 17. Ac-
cording to Plaintiffs, Honeywell should have requested the roll servo
be sent to it (along with the flight computer) and had it been sent Hon-
eywell should have discovered the defect. Plaintiffs proffer much evi-
dence to prove that theory. See id. at 15 (arguing that the roll servo had
“pre-existing defects”); id. at 17 (establishing a link between the defect
and the crash).
Attempts like Plaintiffs’ to avoid GARA’s reach by reframing the
claim are not unusual. For example, in Crouch v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 720
F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 2013), the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant was
liable not as a manufacturer but for negligently publishing maintenance
manuals. Crouch, 720 F.3d at 337. The Sixth Circuit rejected this theory,
reasoning that the plaintiffs’ claim sought to attach liability to an act
that was intertwined with the defendant’s role as a manufacturer. Id. at
339; see also Mason v. Schweizer Aircraft Corp., 653 N.W.2d 543, 550 (Iowa
2002) (holding that a suit for the alleged negligent publication of a
maintenance manual was against the manufacturer in its capacity as a
manufacturer).
So, too, in the California Court of Appeals, where the court held
that a suit was against the defendant in its capacity as a manufacturer.
In Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 124 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2000), the plaintiff sued an aircraft parts manufacturer that had
purchased a carburetor product line. Burroughs, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 126.
The plaintiff argued that the defendant was negligent because it failed
to warn customers of the carburetor’s defects by not sending out rele-
vant service manual. Id. at 131. The California Court of Appeals
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rejected this argument, finding that the defendant was acting in its ca-
pacity as a manufacturer when it sent the service manuals because fed-
eral law required manufacturers to send service manuals. Id. at 133–34.
* * *
There is no dispute that the accident occurred more than eighteen
years after the roll servo’s manufacture. Doc. 142 at ¶¶ 7, 11. And all
of Plaintiffs’ evidence and arguments focus on the alleged defect in the
roll servo. See generally Doc. 149. As a result, Plaintiffs’ claim is barred
by GARA because it is against Honeywell in its “capacity as a manu-
facturer.”
2. Honeywell also argues that, even if GARA does not bar the
claim, state statutes of repose do. Doc. 142 at 12–14. Honeywell in-
vokes both Kansas and Ohio law and argues that both states’ statutes
of repose bar Plaintiffs’ suit. Id.
The substantive law of Ohio governs this dispute. A Kansas fed-
eral court sitting in diversity must apply Kansas’s choice-of-law rules.
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). For tort
claims, Kansas follows the doctrine of lex loci delicti, under which “the
situs of the injury determines the governing law.” Ling v. Jan’s Liquors,
703 P.2d 731, 735 (Kan. 1985). It is undisputed that Beerman’s death
occurred in Ohio. Doc. 137 at ¶ 2.a.iii. Accordingly, Ohio substantive
law applies.5 See Talavera ex rel. Gonzalez v. Wiley, 725 F.3d 1262, 1268
(10th Cir. 2013) (applying Kansas law where the tort occurred in Kan-
sas); see also Banner Bank v. Smith, 30 F.4th 1232, 1238 (10th Cir. 2022)
5 Honeywell suggests that Kansas substantive law provides the appropriate
statute of repose. Doc. 137 at ¶ 1.d. (claiming that “the case has proceeded
under Kansas law and plaintiffs have waived any argument that a different
law governs”); see also Doc.78 at 6 (assuming without deciding that Kansas
law applied when rejecting Honeywell’s motion to dismiss the claim under
Kansas’s statute of repose because the argument was dependent on facts not
pled in Plaintiffs’ Complaint). But it has failed to offer a reasoned basis for
such a conclusion. See Doc. 142 at 12; see also United States v. Clay, 148 F.4th
1181, 1201 (10th Cir. 2025) (noting that “issues adverted to in a perfunctory
manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation” are not
considered). As noted, Kansas choice-of-law principles dictate that Ohio law
governs this dispute.
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(noting that “[i]n a diversity case . . . the Erie doctrine requires federal
courts to apply federal procedural law and state substantive law”).
Honeywell argues that Ohio’s statute of repose precludes Plain-
tiffs’ negligence claim.6 Doc. 142 at 13. That statute states as follows:
[N]o cause of action based on a product liability claim shall
accrue against the manufacturer or supplier of a prod-
uct later than ten years from the date that the product
was delivered to its first purchaser or first lessee who
was not engaged in a business in which the product was
used as a component in the production, construction,
creation, assembly, or rebuilding of another product.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.10(C)(1) (emphasis added).
The Ohio statute of repose bars Plaintiffs’ claim. Contra Doc. 149
at 24. As noted above, the substance of Plaintiffs’ claim depends on
the roll servo’s defect and Honeywell’s failure to discover it. Under
Ohio law, that qualifies as a product liability claim because it seeks to
hold Honeywell liable for defects in the roll servo. See Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2307.71(A)(13)(a) (defining a product liability claim as one that
seeks damages from a manufacturer on account of a defective prod-
uct); see also Miles v. Raymond Corp., 612 F. Supp. 2d 913, 919 (N.D. Ohio
2009) (finding that a purported negligence claim was a product liability
claim when it sought to hold the defendant liable for, among other
things, negligent “servicing, and/or maintenance”). And there is no
dispute that the roll servo is a product under Ohio law. See Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 2307.71(A)(12)(a).
Plaintiffs’ only argument in opposition is that their claim is a neg-
ligence claim. Doc. 149 at 24–25. But as explained above, Plaintiffs’
attempt to disguise their product liability claim as a negligence claim
fails because it depends on evidence that the roll servo was defective.
6 Because Ohio law governs this dispute, Honeywell’s argument that Kansas
law bars Plaintiffs’ claim is not considered. See Doc. 142 at 12 (arguing that
Plaintiffs’ claim is barred by the Kansas statute of repose).
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B
Honeywell also argues that Plaintiffs’ claim fails on the merits. Res-
olution of that argument is guided by Ohio negligence law.
To prove actionable negligence in Ohio, a plaintiff must establish
the existence of a legal duty, the defendant’s breach of that duty, and
an injury that was proximately caused by the breach. Berkheimer v.
REKM, L.L.C., 253 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ohio 2024). “A defendant’s duty to
a plaintiff depends upon the relationship between the parties and the
foreseeability of injury to someone in the plaintiff’s position.” Snay v.
Burr, 189 N.E.3d 758, 762 (Ohio 2021). Generally speaking, individuals
must exercise a degree of care “that an ordinarily careful and prudent
person would exercise under similar circumstances.” Cromer v. Children’s
Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Akron, 29 N.E.3d 921, 929 (Ohio 2015). And the
proximate cause of an event is “that which in a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any new independent cause, produces that
event and without which that event would not have occurred.” Auto
Recyclers of Middletown, Inc. v. Stein, LLC, 263 N.E.3d 1070, 1081 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2025). Proximate cause contemplates a probable or likely re-
sult, not merely a possible one. Id. It is thus not subject to “speculation
or conjecture.” Id. The plaintiff’s failure to prove any element of a neg-
ligence claim is fatal. Id.
1. Honeywell first argues that there was no legal duty to request
and then inspect the roll servo.7 Doc. 142 at 14–17. Plaintiffs, in turn,
argue that Honeywell had a duty to ask that Scott send the roll servo
to it for inspection alongside the flight computer, and that Honeywell’s
failure to do so was a breach. Doc. 149 at 12–14, 20–21.
“The existence of a duty is a question of law.” Delta Fuels, Inc. v.
Consol. Env’t Servs., Inc., 969 N.E.2d 800, 805 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012).
7 This conduct occurred in 2016, five years before Beerman purchased the
aircraft from Kevin Scott. As a result, it is not immediately clear that Honey-
well’s alleged duty extended to Beerman. See Snay v. Burr, 189 N.E.3d 758,
762 (Ohio 2021) (“A defendant’s duty to a plaintiff depends upon the rela-
tionship between the parties and the foreseeability of injury to someone in
the plaintiff’s position.”). But Honeywell did not make that argument. Nor
did it make any statute of limitations argument. See Norris v. Basden, 238
N.E.3d 946, 956 (noting that negligence claims are subject to a two-year stat-
ute of limitations). As a result, those issues have not been considered.
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And according to the Ohio Supreme Court, a repair shop must exercise
ordinary skill and judgment in performing the services and repairs re-
quested by the customer. Landon v. Lee Motors, Inc., 118 N.E.2d 147,
158 (Ohio 1954). The scope of a repair shop’s duty is defined by the
specific service or repair requested by the customer. See, e.g., Gerber v.
Jim’s Goodyear, 1998 WL 142404, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1998)
(concluding that a repair shop did not breach its duty to replace the
timing belt because the customer only requested the shop to replace
the water pump). A repair shop does not have a duty to search for and
discover a latent defect unless it specifically undertook to do so. Lan-
don, 118 N.E.2d at 158; accord Romans v. Tex. Instruments, Inc., 2013 WL
6094299, at *14 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2013).
Under Ohio law, Honeywell was under no legal duty to request and
inspect the roll servo. Scott sent the flight computer to Honeywell for
service; he did not send the roll servo. Doc. 142-12 at 2; Doc. 142 at
¶¶ 19, 20. Based on that request, Honeywell evaluated and tested the
flight computer that it received. Doc. 142-13 at 3. There is no evidence
or argument that Honeywell undertook a duty to inspect parts other
than the flight computer. To the contrary, Honeywell only undertook
to inspect the flight computer in response to Scott’s request. Doc. 142-
12 at 2; Doc. 142 at ¶ 19. It did so and noted that it was unable to
recreate the reported issue. Doc. 142-12 at 2.
Ohio caselaw confirms this conclusion. In Landon v. Lee Motors, the
plaintiff was in a car accident that he asserted was caused by a defect
in the car’s steering column. Landon, 118 N.E.2d at 156. He argued that
the defendant, who had serviced the car, negligently failed to inspect
the car’s steering column. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed, con-
cluding that, even assuming the steering column was defective when
the defendant serviced the car, the defendant was not negligent be-
cause the plaintiff had not ordered the defendant to thoroughly inspect
the steering column. Id. at 158–59. The duty under Ohio law had been
satisfied because the repair shop had exercised its best judgment when
it inspected the car and noticed no issue. There being no evidence that
the plaintiff had requested a detailed inspection, the Ohio Supreme
Court held that the defendant had not breached its duty of care. Id. at
159. “At best, a verdict for plaintiff could only be based on conjecture,
guess, random judgment, or supposition and could not thereby be up-
held.” Landon, 118 N.E.2d at 157.
Plaintiffs’ claim against Honeywell is less compelling than the claim
rejected in Landon. Even if the roll servo had been defective in 2016, it
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would not matter because Scott only asked Honeywell to service the
flight computer. At no point did Scott (or those acting on his behalf)
ask Honeywell to service or inspect the roll servo. Landon shows that,
because Honeywell was never asked to evaluate the roll servo and did
not undertake the obligation do so, it cannot be found liable for failing
to inspect the roll servo. See Landon, 118 N.E.2d at 158 (“No liability
can be imposed upon defendant for its alleged failure to discover a
latent defect, unless the evidence shows that it undertook to do so and
negligently failed to discover the defect.”).
A more recent case, Risk v. Woeste Eastside Motors, Inc., 696 N.E.2d
283 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997), confirms the vitality of the principle recog-
nized in Landon. In Risk, the plaintiff’s daughter took his car to the
defendant’s shop for a 90,000-mile service. Risk, 696 N.E.2d at 283.
The car’s timing belt subsequently malfunctioned and damaged the en-
gine. Id. The plaintiff argued that the defendant was negligent in failing
to inform him that the manufacturer recommended replacing the tim-
ing belt given the car’s mileage. Id. at 283, 285. Applying Landon, the
Ohio Court of Appeals found that the defendant did not have a duty
to check the timing belt. Id. at 285. The plaintiff had requested a
90,000-mile service, the defendant performed that service, and there
was no evidence that checking the timing belt was “within the scope
of the services requested.” Id.
Landon and Risk confirm that Plaintiffs’ claim fails. Honeywell
evaluated the flight computer as requested. There is no evidence that
Honeywell’s decision not to obtain or evaluate the roll servo breached
its duty of care under Ohio law.
Honeywell’s Repair Station Manual does not support Plaintiffs’
claim. Contra Doc. 149 at 12–13. The Manual “outlines the specific
duties and responsibilities incumbent upon [Honeywell].” Id. at 12. In
particular, it provides that Honeywell is only responsible for servicing
the parts it actually receives. Section 5.3, for instance, notes that “all
articles to be serviced by Honeywell” would be inspected “upon re-
ceipt” to determine necessary repairs. Doc. 149-7 at 21. The same is
true of section 5.5, which notes that “[b]efore this repair station starts
work, all units and components known or suspected to have been in-
volved in an accident . . . will be evaluated for the necessity of a thor-
ough inspection for possible hidden damage.” Id. at 24. Finally, section
5.6 notes that a Honeywell inspector will “inspect the article and the
work order to determine whether the work was accomplished.” Id. at
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25. These sections show that the scope of Honeywell’s work was lim-
ited to the unit it received: the flight computer.
Plaintiffs’ counterarguments are unpersuasive. They maintain that
it is “important to consider Honeywell’s unique position as the [man-
ufacturer] of both the KCP 220 [flight computer] and the roll servo.”
Doc. 149 at 14. In Plaintiffs’ view, Honeywell had “unique, intimate
knowledge of the interplay between the computer and the roll servo.”
Id. at 21. Given this knowledge, Plaintiffs posit, Honeywell should
have known that if the flight computer was not causing Scott’s com-
plaint, then the roll servo must have been the culprit.
This argument fails. For one thing, it runs headlong into seeking
to impose liability on Honeywell because it is a manufacturer, some-
thing the parties agree GARA precludes. And for another, it contra-
dicts the framing that Plaintiffs are merely asserting that Honeywell
breached an ordinary duty to repair or inspect, which they made to
avoid the reach of GARA. Plaintiffs fail to identify any law that re-
quired Honeywell to inspect the flight computer with anything other
ordinary skill and judgment. See Landon, 118 N.E.2d at 158 (explaining
what the duty owed by a repair shop).
2. Honeywell also argues that Plaintiffs’ claim fails on causation.
Doc.142 at 17. Ohio law holds a defendant negligent when its breach
of a duty causes a plaintiff’s injury. Berkheimer, 253 N.E.3d at 4. Proxi-
mate cause is “that which in a natural and continuous sequence, un-
broken by any new independent cause, produces [an injury] and with-
out which [the injury] would not have occurred.” Auto Recyclers, 263
N.E.3d at 1081. It contemplates a probable or likely result, not merely
a possible one. Id. It is thus not subject to “speculation or conjecture.”
Id. At the summary judgment stage, the issue of proximate cause may
be determined as a matter of law if the record demonstrates no genuine
issue of material fact that remains to be litigated. Davis v. Royal Paper
Stock Co., 201 N.E.3d 506, 521 (Ohio Ct. App. 2022).
Plaintiffs’ theory of causation precludes relief. Even if Honeywell
had a duty under Ohio law to request and inspect the roll servo, there
is no evidence that this breach in 2016 proximately caused the crash in
2021. There is no evidence, and Plaintiffs make no argument, that
Honeywell should have anticipated that its failure to request the roll
servo would result in Beerman’s death five years later. See Moshi v. Kia
Am., Inc., 155 F.4th 652, 656 (6th Cir. 2025) (“[A] defendant is liable
for harms that a reasonably prudent person in the defendant’s position
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15
should have anticipated.”). Plaintiffs note that their experts’ testimony
“yielded direct support for Plaintiffs’ causation theory.” Doc. 149 at
18. Not so. The expert testimony that Plaintiffs champion is concerned
with whether the alleged defect in the roll servo caused the accident
and whether an inspection of the roll servo in 2016 would have uncov-
ered the defect. See Doc. 149 at 18–20. Again, that is not the theory of
liability set forth in the Pretrial Order. See Doc. 137 at ¶ 4.a.i (arguing
that Honeywell negligently serviced the flight computer).
Plaintiffs’ theory of liability—that Honeywell’s failure to request
the roll servo caused the accident—is devoid of evidence. Plaintiffs
offer no evidence that the airplane crash was the natural and probable
consequence of Honeywell’s failure to request the roll servo. See Bethel
Oil & Gas, LLC v. Redbird Dev., LLC, 258 N.E.3d 470, 495 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2024) (“An act is a proximate cause of an injury when the injury
sustained is the natural and probable consequence of the act.”). Nei-
ther is there any evidence in the record nor argument from Plaintiffs
that Honeywell’s failure to request the roll servo was a substantial fac-
tor in Beerman’s crash. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 (1965)
(noting that a breach is a legal cause of a harm if it is “a substantial
factor in bringing about the harm”). After all, the crash happened five
years after the alleged breach and, in the intervening years, the aircraft
performed as expected.
Plaintiffs’ theory of causation depends on a chain of assumptions
and speculation. They contend that the roll servo was defective and
Honeywell should have suspected that and preemptively asked Scott to
send the roll servo to Honeywell (along with any other part that might
have caused an excess 45 degree roll). Doc. 149 at ¶ 47 (noting that
there were many factors that could have caused an excess 45 degree
roll). And had Honeywell done so, the theory continues, Scott would
have sent the roll servo (and all other parts) to Honeywell, Honeywell
would have found the alleged defect and reported it back to Scott, and
then Scott would have agreed to have the work performed on the roll
servo. See Doc. 142-12 at 4 (noting that Scott required a quote “before
any work is performed”). Continuing with their chain of causation,
Plaintiffs surmise that the roll servo would then have been repaired
and would have suffered no subsequent damage or malfunction. Had
all this occurred, Plaintiffs contend, Beerman thus would not have
crashed five years later.
This theory fails as a matter of Ohio law. Where the evidence of
proximate cause is “too meager and inconclusive,” Rieger, 138 N.E.3d
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at 1126, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment. Proximate
cause contemplates a “probable or likely result, not merely a possible
one.” Auto Recyclers, 263 N.E.3d at 1082. But Plaintiffs’ theory is a five-
year daisy chain of supposition devoid of evidence supporting it; the
facts that do exist actually undermine believing that events would have
unfolded as Plaintiffs posit. This type of unsupported supposition is
insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Est. of Hurtado
by & through Hurtado v. Smith, 119 F.4th 1233, 1238 (10th Cir. 2024)
(quoting Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227, 1235 (10th Cir. 2006)) (“Summary
judgment requires more than mere speculation.”). Although it is met-
aphysically possible to imagine this chain of events unfolding, Plaintiffs
have offered no record evidence to support it in this case. As a result,
Honeywell is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Geometwatch
Corp. v. Behunin, 38 F.4th 1183, 1205 (10th Cir. 2022) (“A non-moving
party may evade summary judgment on the issue of causation by point-
ing to record evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer a
causal nexus between the movant’s conduct and the nonmovant’s in-
jury; but the nonmovant may not evade summary judgment by specu-
lating about possibilities or hypotheticals that have de minimis to no
support in the record.”).
* * *
Beerman’s death was an indisputable tragedy. But Honeywell is not
liable for it under Ohio law.
III
For the foregoing reasons, Honeywell’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, Doc. 141, is GRANTED, its Motions to Exclude Experts,
Docs. 143, 144, 145, 146, and 147, are DENIED AS MOOT, and its
Motion to Strike, Doc. 163, is DENIED AS MOOT. Plaintiffs’ Mo-
tions to Exclude Experts, Docs. 138, 139, and 140, are DENIED AS
MOOT, and its Motion to Amend, Doc. 170, is DENIED AS MOOT.
It is so ordered.
Date: January 30, 2026 s/ Toby Crouse
Toby Crouse
United States District Judge
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