Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
EVANSVILLE DIVISION
DEANDRA B.,1 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 3:25-cv-00106-RLY-CSW
)
FRANK BISIGNANO, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
R EPORT AND R ECOMMENDATION ON J UDICIAL R EVIEW
OF THE C OMMISSIONER’S DENIAL OF B ENEFITS
This matter is before the Honorable Crystal S. Wildeman, United States
Magistrate Judge, pursuant to an Entry Referring Matter to Magistrate Judge, to
conduct and issue a report and recommendation regarding the appropriate
disposition of this matter. (Dkt. 15). Claimant, Deandra B., seeks judicial review of
the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) decision denying his Title II
application for a Period of Disability and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”).
(Dkt. 1). He argues the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) committed reversible
error because (1) Claimant informs he has recently been diagnosed with spinal
stenosis, limiting his ability “to stand for a period of hours or sit,” and therefore his
ability to perform work duties is limited; (2) his conditions amount to disabilities;
(3) his magnesium levels impact his ability to concentrate and hear; and (4) Dr.
Mahboob’s letter supports finding Claimant cannot perform work duties due to
Claimant’s breathing conditions. (Dkt. 12)
For the following reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends the
Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED.
1 To protect the privacy interests of Claimant’s application for Social Security benefits, consistent
with the recommendation of the Court Administration and Case Management Committee of the
Administrative Office of United States Courts, the Southern District of Indiana has opted to use only
the first name and last initial of non-governmental parties in its Social Security judicial review
opinions.
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I. 	B ACKGROUND
On September 15, 2022, Claimant filed his application for DIB, alleging
disability beginning June 17, 2022. (Dkt. 9-3 at 115). Claimant’s application was
denied on March 22, 2023, and again on reconsideration on September 25, 2023.
(Id.). Claimant requested a hearing, received on October 3, 2023. (Id.). The
hearing was held by telephone on May 28, 2024. (Id.). In attendance were
Claimant, Claimant’s counsel, a vocational expert, and Administrative Law Judge
Stuart Janney (the “ALJ”). (Id.). On June 26, 2024, the ALJ rendered an
unfavorable decision. (Id. at 112). In reaching his decision, the ALJ found:
• 	At Step One, “[C]laimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since June 17, 2022, the alleged onset date.” (Id. at 117).
• 	At Step Two, “[C]laimant has the following severe impairments: reversal
of cervical lordosis; lumbar spine degenerative disc disease with left S1
nerve root contact; hip osteoarthritis; chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease and/or emphysema with lung nodules; asthma; nocturnal
hypoxemia; grade II diastolic dysfunction; cardiomegaly; cor pulmonale;
hypertension; tachycardia; dyslipidemia; type 2 diabetes mellitus; and
obesity.” (Id.).
• 	At Step Three, “[C]laimant does not have an impairment or combination
of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the
listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (Id. at
119).
• 	After Step Three but before Step Four, “[C]laimant has the residual
functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567(b) except he can walk for four hours total in an eight-hour
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workday. He can carry less than ten pounds frequently and 20 pounds
occasionally. He can tolerate occasional exposure to atmospheric
conditions and hazards such as proximity to moving mechanical parts and
working in high, exposed places.” (Id. at 121).
• 	At Step Four, “[C]laimant has no past relevant work.” (Id. at 132).
• 	At Step Five, “Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience,
and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.” (Id. at
134).
Ultimately, the ALJ concluded Claimant was not disabled as defined in the
Social Security Act. (Id. at 133). Claimant sought review by the Appeals Council,
which was denied on April 18, 2025. (Dkt. 9-2 at 2). On May 9, 2025, Claimant
commenced this action, seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision. (Dkt. 1).
On September 11, 2025, Claimant filed a document titled Order for Briefing
Schedule which included his positions regarding his opposition of the ALJ’s
decision. (Dkt. 12). The Court, acknowledging the filing, clarified it would construe
the document as Claimant’s brief in support of his Complaint if Claimant did not
file a supplemental document. (Dkt. 13). No such supplement was filed and the
Court therefore construes Claimant’s filing at (Dkt. 12) as his brief in support.
On December 22, 2025, the Commissioner filed his brief in support of the
ALJ’s decision. (Dkt. 14). He argues Claimant was not disabled, and the decision
was supported by substantial evidence. (Id.).
Claimant was permitted until January 19, 2026, to file his reply but has not
done so. (Dkt. 11). Therefore, this matter is now ripe for review.
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II. 	S TANDARD OF R EVIEW
“The Social Security Administration (SSA) provides benefits to individuals
who cannot obtain work because of a physical or mental disability.” Biestek v.
Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 98 (2019). Disability is the inability “to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.”
Stephens v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A)).
When an applicant appeals an adverse benefits decision, this Court’s role is
limited to ensuring the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and that substantial
evidence exists for the ALJ’s decision. Stephens, 888 F.3d at 327. “[S]ubstantial
evidence” is such relevant “evidence that ‘a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’” Zoch v. Saul, 981 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154); see also Bakke v. Kijakazi, 62 F.4th 1061, 1068
(7th Cir. 2023). This standard is light and deferential, requiring “only the most
minimal of articulation.” Warnell v. O’Malley, 97 F.4th 1050, 1051, 1053 (7th Cir.
2024); Pavlicek v. Saul, 994 F.3d 777, 783 (7th Cir. 2021).
“Although this Court reviews the record as a whole, it cannot substitute its
own judgment for that of the SSA by reevaluating the facts, or reweighing the
evidence to decide whether a claimant is in fact disabled.” Stephens, 888 F.3d at
327. Reviewing courts also “do not decide questions of credibility, deferring instead
to the ALJ’s conclusions unless ‘patently wrong.’” Zoch, 981 F.3d at 601 (quoting
Summers v. Berryhill, 864 F.3d 523, 528 (7th Cir. 2017)). The Court does
“determine whether the ALJ built an ‘accurate and logical bridge’ between the
evidence and the conclusion.” Peeters v. Saul, 975 F.3d 639, 641 (7th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 837 (7th Cir. 2014)).
The SSA applies a five-step evaluation to determine whether the claimant is
disabled. Stephens, 888 F.3d at 327 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)(4)). The ALJ must evaluate the following, in sequence:
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(1) whether the claimant is currently [un]employed; (2) whether the
claimant 	has 	a 	severe 	impairment; 	(3) 	whether 	the 	claimant’s
impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed by the
[Commissioner]; (4) whether the claimant can perform her past work;
and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing work in the
national economy.
Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000), as amended (Dec. 13, 2000)
(citations omitted).2 “If a claimant satisfies steps one, two, and three, he will
automatically be found disabled. If a claimant satisfies steps one and two, but not
three, then he must satisfy step four. Once step four is satisfied, the burden shifts
to the SSA to establish that the claimant is capable of performing work in the
national economy.” Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995).
After Step Three, but before Step Four, the ALJ must determine a claimant’s
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) by evaluating “all limitations that arise from
medically determinable impairments, even those that are not severe.” Villano v.
Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009). In doing so, the ALJ “may not dismiss a
line of evidence contrary to the ruling.” Id. The ALJ uses the RFC at Step Four to
determine whether the claimant can perform her past relevant work and, if not, at
Step Five to determine whether the claimant can perform other work. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920.
If the ALJ committed no legal error and substantial evidence exists to
support the ALJ’s decision, the Court must affirm the denial of benefits. Stephens,
888 F.3d at 327. When an ALJ’s decision does not apply the correct legal standard,
a remand for further proceedings is usually the appropriate remedy. Karr v. Saul,
989 F.3d 508, 513 (7th Cir. 2021). Typically, a remand is also appropriate when the
decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v.
2 The Code of Federal Regulations contains separate, parallel sections concerning SSI and disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”), which are identical in most respects. Cases may reference the section
pertaining to DIB, such as in Clifford, which cites 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. 227 F.3d at 868. Generally,
a verbatim section exists establishing the same legal point with both types of benefits. See, e.g., 20
C.F.R. § 416.920. The Court will usually not reference the parallel section but will take care to detail
any substantive differences applicable to the case.
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Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2005). “An award of benefits is appropriate
only where all factual issues have been resolved and the ‘record can yield but one
supportable conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Campbell v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 741, 744 (7th
Cir. 1993)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, the Court must ascertain Claimant’s arguments
from the Motion at (Dkt. 12). “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).3 Therefore, the Court discerns that Claimant’s arguments are as follows:
First, Claimant informs he has recently been diagnosed with spinal stenosis,
limiting his ability “to stand for a period of hours or sit,” and therefore limiting his
ability to perform work duties. (Dkt. 12). Second, Claimant argues his conditions
amount to disabilities. (Id.). Third, Claimant informs his abilities to concentrate
and hear are limited at times due to low magnesium levels. (Id.). Fourth, Claimant
contends Dr. Mahboob’s letter supports finding Claimant cannot perform work
duties due to Claimant’s breathing conditions.
The Commissioner disagrees, arguing the ALJ properly concluded Claimant
was not disabled and that the decision was supported by substantial evidence.
(Dkt. 14).
The Court takes up each of Claimant’s contentions in turn.
a. R ECENT S PINAL S TENOSIS DIAGNOSIS
Claimant first challenges the ALJ’s decision for failing to account for his
recent diagnosis of spinal stenosis requiring emergency surgery. (Dkt. 12).
Claimant’s brief appears to suggest that this condition has recently developed. See
3 While Claimant proceeds pro se in this action, Claimant was represented by counsel at the
administrative level. (Dkt. 9-3 at 115). Therefore, the ALJ was “entitled to assume” Claimant
“ma[de] his strongest case for benefits,” and was not under a heightened obligation to assist
Claimant in developing the record. See (id.); Glenn v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 814 F.2d 387,
391 (7th Cir. 1987); Bertaud v. O’Malley, 88 F.4th 1242, 1245 (7th Cir. 2023).
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(id.). To the extent Claimant argues that a new diagnosis or symptoms arising
since his application for benefits should be addressed, the appropriate course of
action is not judicial review of the ALJ’s decision but instead to submit a new
application. See Getch v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 473, 484 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Kapusta
v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 94, 97 (7th Cir. 1989).
To the extent Claimant challenges the ALJ’s decision relating to then-
existing evidence regarding Claimant’s spinal stenosis, the Undersigned finds the
ALJ did not fail to consider the condition. In formulating the RFC, the ALJ noted
“magnetic resonance imaging of the lumbar spine . . . showed . . . left neural
foraminal stenosis.” (Dkt. 9-3 at 125). More broadly, the ALJ considered
Claimant’s “lumbar spine impairments” with the medical evidence showing
Claimant “has generally been noted to have a normal gait, to ambulate without an
assistive device, and to generally have normal strength and muscle bulk and tone.”
(Id. at 129). Nevertheless, the ALJ found “a reduction to light work with a further
limitation to walking for four hours in and eight-hour workday is supported.” (Id.
at 130). Therefore, the Undersigned concludes the ALJ’s decision regarding
Claimant’s spinal stenosis was not legally erroneous and was supported by
substantial evidence.
b. WHETHER C LAIMANT IS DISABLED
Next, Claimant disagrees with the ALJ’s determination Claimant was not
under a disability during the relevant period. (Dkt. 12). The appropriate inquiry is
whether the ALJ’s finding was supported by substantial evidence and without legal
error. Schmitz v. Colvin, 124 F.4th 1029 (7th Cir. 2024) (affirming the ALJ’s
decision finding a claimant was not disabled under the substantial evidence
standard). Morales is instructive:
It is not enough to nitpick the ALJ’s order. To warrant reversal, [a
claimant] must show that the ALJ’s determination was not supported
by substantial evidence. See Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 900 (7th
Cir. 2021). And there is no way to satisfy that burden without
grappling with the evidence: [a Claimant] must demonstrate with
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references to evidence why the ALJ’s determinations lack substantial
support in the administrative record. We cannot do that work for her.
Indeed, time and again we have underscored that our role as a court
of 	review 	is 	not 	to 	“reweigh 	the 	evidence, 	resolve 	debatable
evidentiary 	conflicts, 	determine 	credibility, 	or 	substitute 	our
judgment for the ALJ’s determination.” Id.
Morales v. O’Malley, 103 F.4th 469, 471 (7th Cir. 2024).
Claimant contends “I believe I have such disabilit[ies],” but offers little to
develop this argument beyond those claims the Court has addressed in Subparts
III(a), (c), and (d). Thus, to the extent Claimant makes a distinct challenge to the
ALJ’s determination that he is not disabled under the regulations, the Undersigned
does not find Claimant offered sufficient evidence to show the decision was
unsupported.
c. 	C ONCENTRATION AND HEARING
Third, Claimant challenges the ALJ’s decision based on his limitations in
concentration and hearing which he describes is attributable to low magnesium.
(Dkt. 14). In his decision, the ALJ does not discuss either limitation. (Dkt. 9-3 at
115–34).
An ALJ must evaluate all relevant evidence when determining an
applicant’s RFC, including evidence of impairments that are not
severe . . . . Although an ALJ need not mention every snippet of
evidence in the record, the ALJ must connect the evidence to the
conclusion; in so doing, he may not ignore entire lines of contrary
evidence.
Arnett v. Astrue, 676 F.3d 586, 591–92 (7th Cir. 2012). “[A]n ALJ . . . ‘need not
provide a complete written evaluation of every piece of testimony and evidence.’”
Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 362 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Schmidt v. Barnhart,
395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005).
Claimant was represented by counsel at the hearing and thus, “is presumed
to have made his best case before the ALJ.” See (Dkt. 9-4 at 56–89); Skinner v.
Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 842 (7th Cir. 2007). Yet, neither the pre-hearing brief nor the
hearing transcript raise any limitations on Claimant’s concentration or hearing.
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(Dkts. 9-4 at 56–89; 9-11 at 145–49). Further, in the Function Report, Claimant
indicated the following:
(Dkt. 9-11 at 92).
Claimant selected several limitations in the Function Report but notably, did
not select “hearing” or “concentration.” (Id.). Only occasional instances of
concentration challenges in the record were indicated; see e.g., (Dkt. 9-7 at 179 (self-
reporting concentration difficulties)); but see, (Dkts. 9-6 at 162, 9-12 at 2823 (self-
reporting no concentration difficulties); and Claimant consistently presented with
no hearing impairments; see e.g., (Dkts. 9-14 at 77 and 9-16 at 5591 (self-reporting
no hearing impairments to his provider); Dkts. 9-12 at 2653 and 9-16 at 5592
(provider reporting no hearing impairments). As such, Claimant does not present
“entire lines of . . . evidence” to support his contentions. See (Dkt. 12); Arnett, 676
F.3d at 591–92.
Thus, the Undersigned finds Claimant failed to satisfy his burden of showing
the ALJ erred in failing to address any limitations in concentration and hearing.
d. B REATHING LIMITATIONS S UPPORTED BY DR. MAHBOOB’S LETTER
Lastly, Claimant contends Dr. Mahboob’s letter supports finding Claimant
cannot perform work due to his breathing conditions. (Dkt. 12). Upon review, Dr.
Mahboob’s letter provides the following substantive information: “[Claimant] is
going through multiple respiratory problems and is not able to work at this point.”
(Dkt. 9-16 at 649–650). Dr. Mahboob’s letter does not provide any additional
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information regarding Claimant’s breathing conditions. The ALJ considered this
statement and specifically found “[t]hese statements regarding the claimant’s
ability to work are on issues reserved to the Commissioner and are inherently
neither valuable nor persuasive (20 CFR 404. 1520b(c)).” (Dkt. 9-3 at 130).
The regulations clarify “[s]tatements that [Claimants] are or are not disabled,
. . . able to work, or able to perform regular or continuing work” is considered
“evidence [that] is neither valuable nor persuasive to the issue of whether
[Claimants] are disabled.” Therefore, the ALJ was not required to provide any
analysis about how he considered such evidence in our determination or decision.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c)(3)(i). The Seventh Circuit has applied this regulation and
found “a medical opinion that offered a judgment on the ultimate question of
whether [the claimant] is disabled” need not be evaluated. Jones v. Dudek, 134
F.4th 991, 998 (7th Cir. 2025) (affirming an ALJ’s decision challenged for failing to
rely on a doctor’s statement that claimant could not work more than 20 hours per
week due to weight bearing difficulties).
In the Decision, the ALJ addressed Dr. Mahboob’s letter and found it fit
squarely within 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c). (Dkt. 9-3 at 130). The Undersigned finds
this determination supported by substantial evidence, authority, and analysis.
IV. 	C ONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS the ALJ’s
decision be AFFIRMED. Claimant failed to show reversible error in the ALJ’s
findings.
The parties are hereby notified the District Judge may reconsider any
pretrial matter assigned to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B). Any party shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service to
//
//
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file written objections to this Report and Recommendation.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED this 4 th day of February 2026.
Distribution:
All ECF-registered counsel of record via email
DEANDRA BRYANT
717 Cherry Street
Apt. 412
Evansville, IN 47713
PRO SE
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