JONES v. GRAY et al

1:26-cv-01767Insd13 oct. 2026

Texte intégral

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
MARIO T. JONES, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:26-cv-01767-JRO-MJD
)
GRAY, 	)
WILSON, 	)
ANDERSON, 	)
HOPPS, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff Mario T. Jones is a prisoner currently incarcerated at Pendleton
Correctional Facility ("Pendleton"). He filed this civil action complaining of the
conditions of his cell in G-Cellhouse at Pendleton. Because the plaintiff is a
"prisoner," 	this 	Court 	must 	screen 	the 	complaint 	before 	service 	on 	the
defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c).
I. SCREENING STANDARD
When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To
determine whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same
standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2020).
Under that standard, a complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to
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relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The
Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a "less stringent
standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers." Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720
(7th Cir. 2017).
II. THE COMPLAINT
Jones's 	factual 	allegations 	are 	accepted 	as 	true 	at 	the 	pleading
stage. See Lisby v. Henderson, 74 F.4th 470, 472 (7th Cir. 2023). He sues four
defendants: Sergeant Gray, Officer Wilson, Officer Anderson, and Officer Hopps.
Jones alleges that around 4:00 p.m. on January 30, 2026, he was moved
to a segregation cell in Pendleton's G-Cellhouse. Dkt. 1 at 2. Jones showed
Officer Wilson that there was blood on the cell's floor, walls, sink, and toilet and
there were feces "caked around the toilet." Id. Jones also told Officer Wilson that
he needed to use the toilet, but there was no toilet paper. Id. Officer Wilson said
he would see what he could be done because there were no "chemicals" in the
cellhouse. Id. As to the toilet paper, Officer Wilson acknowledged that there was
no toilet paper in the cellhouse, and when Jones asked what he was supposed
to do if he needed the restroom, Officer Wilson said, "I don't know what to tell
you." Id.
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Around 6:30 p.m., Jones showed Officer Anderson the blood and feces in
his cell. Id. She said that she would notify non-party Sergeant Harmon so he
could have the bio-hazard team clean the cell. 	Id. Jones 	also told Officer
Anderson that he lacked toilet paper, and she said she would try to find some,
but she had not "seen any around." Id. Officer Anderson returned later that
evening with paper towels that had a chemical on them. Id. She did not provide
rubber gloves or toilet paper, or otherwise aid Jones in removing the blood and
feces. Id. at 2–3.
Around 10:00 a.m. on January 31, Jones asked Officer Wilson when the
bio-hazard team was coming. Id. at 3. Officer Wilson said that Jones would have
to clean the cell himself on the following day. Id. Jones again asked for toilet
paper but received none. Id. Officer Wilson did not provide any assistance to
Jones regarding the blood and feces. Id.
Jones was taken to the shower around 3:00 p.m. that same day. Id. At
that time, he spoke with Sergeant Gray about the blood and feces in his cell. Id.
Sergeant Gray said he had "just sent the detail in for the day" but would see
about having night shift take care of cleaning the cell, but that did not happen.
Id. Sergeant Gray provided no assistance to Jones regarding the blood and feces.
Id.
Around 1:00 p.m. on February 1, Officer Hopps provided a broom and
germicide to Jones. Id. Jones cleaned his cell but was unable to remove the blood
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and feces. Id. Despite being aware of these matters, Officer Hopps provided no
further help. Id.
Jones either developed a rash or was "bitten by something," and the bio-
hazard team never cleaned Jones's cell while he was in G-Cellhouse. Id.
Jones seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 4.
III. DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS
Applying 	the 	screening 	standard 	to 	the 	factual 	allegations 	in 	the
complaint, the complaint shall proceed as submitted on Eighth Amendment
conditions of confinement claims against all four defendants.
“In cases involving the conditions of confinement in a prison, two elements
are 	required 	to 	establish 	a 	violation 	of 	the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment: first, an objective showing that the
conditions are sufficiently serious—i.e., that they deny the inmate the minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities, creating an excessive risk to the inmate's
health and safety—and second, a subjective showing of a defendant's culpable
state of mind. ” Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 521 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal
citations and quotation omitted).
Inmates have the right “not to be forced to live surrounded by their own
and others’ excrement.” Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2019);
see also DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974–75 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that
“[e]xposure to human waste, like few other conditions of confinement, evokes
both the health concerns emphasized in Farmer [v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825
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(1994),] and the more general standards of dignity embodied in the Eighth
Amendment”) (cited favorably in Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 821; Norfleet v. Stroger,
297 F. App’x 538, 540 (7th Cir. 2008)).1
This summary of claims includes all of the viable claims identified by the
Court. 	All 	other 	claims 	have 	been 	dismissed. 	If 	the 	plaintiff 	believes 	that
additional claims were alleged in the complaint, but not identified by the Court,
he shall have through 	November 	14, 	2026, 	in which to file a motion to
reconsider the screening order.
IV. CONCLUSION AND SERVICE OF PROCESS
This action is proceeding on Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement
claims against Defendants Gray, Wilson, Anderson, and Hopps. All other claims
have been dismissed.
The clerk is directed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) to issue process
to defendants Gray, Wilson, Anderson, and Hopps in the manner specified by
Rule 4(d). Process shall consist of the complaint filed on August 24, 2026, dkt.
1 As to the toilet paper claims, the Court notes that the Seventh Circuit has held that "a
prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights were not violated when he was not supplied with
toilet paper for a short period of time." Dye v. Lomen, 40 F. App'x 993, 996 (7th Cir.
2002). Accord Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1234–36 (7th Cir. 1988) (lack of toilet
paper for five days not cruel and unusual); Johnson v. Dunahay, No. 17-CV-941-WMC,
2020 WL 4053972, at *5 (W.D. Wis. July 20, 2020) (distinguishing Harris but noting as
a general matter of Seventh Circuit law that "the Seventh Circuit has held on multiple
occasions that the lack of toilet paper for multiple days does not amount to a
constitutional violation"). Whether or not this claim or the others survive summary
judgment is for a later date. Jones has alleged enough to proceed with his claims at this
time.
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[1], applicable forms (Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of
Summons and Waiver of Service of Summons), and this Order.
The clerk is directed to serve the Indiana Department of Correction
employees electronically.
Nothing in this Order prohibits the filing of a proper motion pursuant to
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 10/13/2026
Distribution:
MARIO T. JONES
106644
PENDLETON - CF
PENDLETON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Electronic Service Participant – Court Only
Electronic service to Indiana Department of Correction:
Sergeant Gray
Officer Wilson
Officer Anderson
Officer Hopps
(All at Pendleton Correctional Facility)
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