Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
MARK G., 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:25-cv-02414-TAB-TWP
)
FRANK BISIGNANO Commissioner of Social
Security,
)
)
)
Defendant. 	)
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR REMAND
I. 	Introduction
Plaintiff Mark G. appeals the Social Security Administration's denial of his application
for disability benefits. [Filing No. 11.] The Administrative Law Judge found that Plaintiff had
severe impairments but could perform work with restrictions. [Filing No. 9-2, at ECF p. 30-58.]
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to build a logical bridge between her assessment of the
evidence, including medical opinions, and the RFC. The Commissioner opposes those
arguments. [Filing No. 15.] The record shows that the ALJ's decision is internally inconsistent
and fails to explain departures from medical opinions deemed persuasive. Therefore, Plaintiff's
request for remand [Filing No. 11] is granted.
II. 	Background
Plaintiff applied for Social Security benefits alleging that he has been disabled since
December 26, 2022. 	The SSA denied Plaintiff's claims initially and upon reconsideration.
Following a hearing, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled under the SSA's five-step
method.
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At step one, the ALJ concluded that, since his alleged onset date, Plaintiff had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity. [Filing No. 9-2, at ECF p. 30.] At step two, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: seizures, lumbar
degenerative disc disease, pancreatitis, diabetes mellitus, migraines, headaches, and a history of
alcohol abuse disorder. [Filing No. 9-2, at ECF p. 31.] At step three, the ALJ concluded that
Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. 404,
Subpart P, App'x. 1. [Filing No. 9-2, at ECF p. 35-37.] Before step four, the ALJ determined
Plaintiff's residual functional capacity, or his remaining ability to work. The ALJ assessed the
following RFC:
[Plaintiff can] perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b), 	with 	the 	following 	limitations: 	occasional 	balancing, 	stooping,
kneeling, crouching, and climbing of ramps and stairs; no climbing of ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds; no exposure to extreme heat, extreme cold, humidity, wetness,
vibrations, or to hazards, such as unprotected heights or dangerous machinery; no
requirements for driving.
[Filing No. 9-2, at ECF p. 37.]
At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was unable to perform past relevant work as
an industrial-truck operator and bus driver. [Filing No. 9-2, at ECF p. 55-56.] At step five, the
ALJ concluded that, given Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, jobs existed in
significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, including an
inspector/hand packager, office helper, and mail clerk. [Filing No. 9-2, at ECF p. 56-57.]
Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled.
III. 	Discussion
The Court reviews the ALJ's decision to determine whether the factual findings are
supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g., Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019).
Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
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support a conclusion." Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). However, "[t]he court is not to reweigh evidence, resolve
conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner." Burmester v. Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir. 2019) (internal citation,
quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Rather, "it is the role of the Court to ensure that the ALJ
builds a logical bridge between the evidence and her conclusions, and that the ALJ meaningfully
confronts and explains departure from evidence in the record that would support additional
limitations." Sabrina P. v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-cv-02814-TAB-TWP, 2021 WL 6061749, at *3
(S.D. Ind. Nov. 24, 2021).
A. Opinion evidence
In the present case, the ALJ failed to build a logical bridge between her assessment of
medical opinions and the RFC. State agency physicians J. V. Corcoran and Shayne Small
reviewed Plaintiff's medical records. They both opined that, along with postural and
environmental limitations, Plaintiff could lift 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally
and sit and/or stand for four hours in an eight-hour workday. [Filing No. 9-3, at ECF p. 8, 20-
21.] Dr. Small also opined that Plaintiff could perform only frequent handling in one or both
hands.1 [Filing No. 9-3, at ECF p. 21.]
The ALJ's decision claims to "adopt" the RFC opinions of these agency doctors with
added "seizure safeguards." [Filing No. 9-2, at ECF p. 55.] Specifically, the ALJ concluded that
1 Dr. Small's report was vague as to whether the handling limitation applied to both hands or just
the left hand. [Filing No. 9-3, at ECF p. 21.] Her report limits Plaintiff to frequent gripping, but
it does not specify whether this limitation applies to the right or left hand or bilaterally. In support
of this limitation, the report only identifies left-sided limitations. However, as Plaintiff points out,
the record contains evidence that, arguably, supports bilateral limitations. [Filing No. 16, at ECF
p. 6.]
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Drs. Corcoran and Small's opinions are "persuasive in part; however, given the claimant's
degenerative disc disease, seizures, neuropathy, and asthma, [the ALJ] also included
[environmental and driving limitations in the RFC.]" [Filing No. 9-2, at ECF p. 55.] The
decision never expressly rejects any portion of their opinions. Rather, the ALJ's discussion
suggests that the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's impairments warranted an RFC slightly more
restrictive than that assessed by Drs. Corcoran and Small.
Yet, inexplicably, the ALJ's RFC contains less restrictive exertional and manipulative
limitations. It does not account for the four-hour walking/standing limitation contained in the
reports of both agency doctors or the handling restriction contained in Dr. Small's report. The
ALJ's decision mentions that Dr. Small limited Plaintiff to "frequent handling or gross
manipulation with the left upper extremity" but fails to explain the RFC's omission of any
handling limitation. Moreover, the ALJ's decision never acknowledges that both agency doctors
assessed four-hour walking/standing limitations or explain any departure from that significant
exertional limitation. The decision suggests that the exertional limitation of "light work" is
consistent with these opinions. It is not. "[T]he full range of light work requires standing or
walking, off and on, for a total of approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday." SSR 83-10,
1983 WL 31251, at *6 (Jan. 1, 1983). Thus, the RFC indicates that Plaintiff can walk or stand
two more hours a day than Drs. Corcoran and Small opined Plaintiff could do. Other than
expressing a need for additional environmental limitations, the ALJ does not explain any
divergence from their opinions or state any basis for discounting them. Therefore, the ALJ has
failed to build a logical bridge between the RFC and the opinions on which the ALJ purportedly
based the RFC.
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The Commissioner argues that this error is harmless because the vocational expert
testified that an individual who could only walk and/or stand for four hours and handle with the
left hand frequently, and who was otherwise limited as described in the ALJ's RFC, could still
work as an inspector/hand packager, office helper, and mail clerk. [Filing No. 15, at ECF p. 7
(citing Filing No. 9-2, at ECF p. 88).] "But the fact that the [ALJ], had she considered the entire
record, might have reached the same result does not prove that her failure to consider the
evidence was harmless." Spiva v. Astrue, 628 F.3d 346, 353 (7th Cir. 2010) (remanding where
careful consideration of all evidence might have resulted differently). An error is harmless only
if a court is "convinced" that the ALJ would reach the same result on remand. See McKinzey v.
Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 892 (7th Cir. 2011).
As Plaintiff aptly notes, "[the Commissioner's] argument assumes no harm on the basis
that he can predict how the ALJ would have interpreted the evidence and what limits the ALJ
would have assessed, had the ALJ engaged in the proper analysis." [Filing No. 16, at ECF p. 6.]
The ALJ appears to have misunderstood the exertional opinions and inexplicably disregarded Dr.
Small's opinion as to the need for manipulative limitations. Proper consideration of this evidence
could have altered the ALJ’s interpretation of other evidence, such as the persuasiveness of
Plaintiff's subjective reports and the opinions of agency examiners. For instance, the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff's statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of
his impairments were "not entirely consistent" with the evidence. However, realization of the
additional exertional restrictions may have bolstered Plaintiff's subjective reports. Likewise, the
ALJ found the opinions of two agency examining physicians to be unpersuasive. One examiner
limited Plaintiff to occasional standing, walking, and handling. [Filing No. 9-2, at ECF p. 52-
53.] The other limited Plaintiff to standing and walking "on a frequent basis or on an occasional
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basis." [Id.] No one can predict how the ALJ may have weighed those opinions and altered the
RFC if she had realized the full scope of limitations contained in the competing medical opinions
of Drs. Corcoran and Small. The Court is not convinced that the ALJ would have reached the
same conclusion had she considered all limitations contained in the agency doctors' reports. See
McKinzey, 641 F.3d at 892. Therefore, reversal is warranted.
B. Duty to recontact consultative examiners
In his reply brief, Plaintiff briefly argues that the ALJ erred by discounting agency
consultative examiner Dr. Sharle Newman's opinion as vague without attempting to recontact her
for clarification. [Filing No. 16, at ECF p. 5.] Typically, underdeveloped arguments and
arguments raised for the first time in the reply are waived. Wonsey v. City of Chicago, 940 F.3d
394, 398-99 (7th Cir. 2019); Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 557 (7th Cir. 2010). However, in the
interest of avoiding a subsequent remand, the Court will address the ALJ's inadequate handling
of the opinion evidence from agency examiners.
SSA regulations require an ALJ to recontact an agency examiner for more information if
the examiner's report is inadequate or incomplete. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.919p, 404.1519p. "[I]f an
ALJ considers the consultative examiner's report to be 'vague,' or otherwise 'deficient,' the ALJ
should seek 'additional clarification before discounting it outright.'" La'Toya R. v. Bisignano, No.
1:24-cv-01564-JMS-TAB, 2025 WL 1413807, at *5 (S.D. Ind. May 15, 2025) (quoting Paul v.
Berryhill, 760 F. App'x 460, 463-64 (7th Cir. 2019)); see also Cieszynski v. Kijakazi, No. 22-
2024, 2023 WL 2523499, at *5 (7th Cir. Mar. 15, 2023) (finding that an ALJ had a "regulatory
duty" to recontact a consulting examiner if the ALJ was concerned that the examiner's report did
not provide specific limitations or adequately explain his conclusions); Joshua R. v. Bisignano,
No. 1:25-cv-02300-TAB-JRS, 2026 WL 2329609, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 12, 2026) ("[I]f the ALJ
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found the report inadequate for its intended purpose—to help the ALJ determine disability—then
she should have recontacted [the agency examiner] under § 416.919p.").
During the course of this claim, the SSA required Plaintiff to attend three consultative
exams—two physical exams and a psychological exam. The ALJ discounted the opinions of all
three agency examiners based on vagueness or similar deficiencies that could potentially have
been cured by recontacting the examiner. [Filing No. 9-2, at ECF p. 52-54.] On remand, the
ALJ should consider recontacting agency examiners before discounting their opinions as
inadequate or incomplete.
C. Remaining arguments
Having concluded that remand is required for the errors previously discussed, the Court
declines to address Plaintiff's additional arguments for remand. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ
failed to adequately account for all limitations associated with his seizures, headaches, and non-
severe psychological impairments. Upon remand, the ALJ may wish to further consider these
issues and ensure that substantial evidence supports the RFC.
IV. 	Conclusion
The ALJ failed to construct a logical bridge between the opinion evidence and the RFC.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for remand [Filing No. 11] is granted. The Commissioner’s
decision is remanded for further proceedings.
Date: 10/8/2026
Tim A. Baker
United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of Indiana
Distribution:
All ECF-registered counsel of record via email
_______________________________
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