CLAY et al v. THORUP et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
LUCRETIA CLAY, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:25-cv-00018-JPH-TAB
)
ANDREW THORUP in his individual and official
capacity, et al.,
)
)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS
Plaintiff Lucretia Clay seeks leave to file a fourth amended complaint and seeks a
protective order related to her deposition. 	[Filing Nos. 156, 160.] 	Defendants oppose those
motions and ask the Court to summarily rule on their pending motions to dismiss. [Filing Nos.
157, 161.] Plaintiff asks the Court to strike Defendant's request for a summary ruling. [Filing No.
163]. Plaintiff also seeks to seal an exhibit. [Filing No. 165.] The Court addresses those motions
in detail below.
I. 	Motion for Leave to File Fourth Amended Complaint [Filing No. 156]
When granting Plaintiff's prior motion for leave to amend in December 2025, the district
judge stated: "The deadline for seeking leave to amend has now passed, so granting Ms. Clay's
motion for leave to file a third amended complaint will bring finality to the operative complaint[.]"
[Filing No. 129, at p. 2-3.] Plaintiff now seeks leave to file a fourth amended complaint that would
add several additional parties and claims. 	[Filing Nos. 156, 163.] 	Defendants oppose the
amendment and argue that Plaintiff's motion to amend is untimely, futile, and unduly prejudicial
and does not comply with the rules governing amendment and the Court's prior orders. 	[Filing
No. 157.] The Court agrees.
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Plaintiff filed her motion to amend on January 30, 2026—over five months after the August
11, 2025, deadline for amending pleadings.1 [Filing No. 50, at ECF p. 4.] Thus, the requested
amendment requires good cause for its untimeliness. See Allen v. Brown Advisory, LLC, 41 F.4th
843, 852-53 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4)) (emphasizing the importance of "the
diligence of the party seeking to amend" when assessing good cause and finding no good cause
where a plaintiff possessed the documents that inspired the late amendment prior to the deadline).
Plaintiff argues that the deadline was "unrealistic" due to the time needed to review discovery
received in late June 2025. [Filing No. 156, at ECF p. 2.] However, Plaintiff had the discovery
that inspired the proposed fourth amended complaint more than a month before the deadline and
at the time she moved for leave to file her third amended complaint. [Filing No. 101.] Plaintiff
has not shown that she acted diligently in pursuing the amendment. Thus, the motion to amend
[Filing No. 156] is denied for lack of good cause for the late amendment.
Moreover, the amendment is futile and inconsistent with rules and prior orders. The Court
previously warned that all amended complaints must comply with the "short and plain" pleading
standard. 	[Filing No. 51, at ECF p. 7-8.] 	Yet, Plaintiff's proposed fourth amended complaint
[Filing No. 156-5] is unwieldy. It is single spaced with extremely narrow margins, violating S.D.
Ind. Local Rule 5-1 (requiring filings to have 1-inch margins and double spacing). The proposed
fourth amended complaint contains 589 paragraphs, excluding the prayer for relief, and 32 causes
of action—21 more causes of action than the operative complaint. It seeks to pursue claims on
behalf of Plaintiff's minor children, which cannot be done without the assistance of counsel. See
1 The Court previously denied Plaintiff's request to extend this deadline. [Filing No. 155.] Like
the most recent motion to amend, Plaintiff's motion seeking to enlarge the amendment deadline
[Filing No. 150] was filed months after the expiration of that deadline. While all extensions require
good cause, extensions of expired deadlines are disfavored. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b) (requiring a party
to show "excusable neglect" when seeking an enlargement of an expired deadline).
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Elustra v. Mineo, 595 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 2010) ("[A] next friend may not, without the
assistance of counsel, bring suit on behalf of a minor party."). 	Moreover, the proposed fourth
amended complaint attempts to add 11 new Defendants, despite prior Court orders holding that
claims against new Defendants are time barred. [Filing Nos. 51, at ECF p. 4-6; 71, at ECF p. 3-
4.] 	Indeed, the fourth amended complaint includes untimely claims against the same six police
officers that the Court previously rejected. [Filing No. 51, at ECF p. 4-6.] For the reasons stated
in the Court's prior orders [Filing Nos. 51, 71], these claims are futile. A motion for leave to amend
a complaint should not attempt to revive claims that the Court previously found to be futile or
attempt to rehash arguments the Court previously rejected. 	See Chi. Gun Club, LLC v. Vill. of
Willowbrook, No. 1:17-cv-6057, 2019 WL 8895215, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2019) (citing O'Boyle
v. Real Time Resolutions, Inc., 910 F.3d 338 (7th Cir. 2018)) ("[A] proposed amended complaint
is futile where it merely re-asserts rejected arguments[.])"; Vakharia v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp. &
Health Care Ctrs., 62 Fed. App'x. 122, 124 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming a denial of leave to amend
where the proposed amended complaint asserted a cause of action that was "plainly duplicative"
of a claim previously rejected by the court).
Additionally, the proposed amendment is unduly prejudicial. 	See Allen, 41 F.4th at 853
(stating that late amendments are more likely to cause prejudice). As the Court explained in its
order denying an extension of the deadline to amend pleadings:
The Court already—on two occasions—granted Plaintiff leave to
amend her complaint, which mooted pending motions to dismiss.
[Filing Nos. 51, 129.] Motions to dismiss are pending once again,
and now Plaintiff seeks another opportunity to amend her complaint.
The Court declines Plaintiff's most recent request to have history
repeat itself.
[Filing No. 155.] Defendants would be prejudiced if the Court, once again, mooted their motions
to dismiss. 	Moreover, the new parties and causes of action in the proposed fourth amended
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complaint would vastly widen the issues presented in this case and warrant significant additional
discovery as discovery is set to close. 	[Filing No. 148 (continuing the liability and non-expert
discovery deadline to April 1, 2026).] The requested amendment would be unduly prejudicial at
this stage in the litigation. See Allen, 41 F.4th at 853.
Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a fourth amended
complaint. 	[Filing No. 156.] 	Defendants request the Court summarily rule on the motions to
dismiss, and Plaintiff asks the Court to strike that request. 	[Filing Nos. 157; 163.] 	Plaintiff's
motion to strike [Filing No. 163] is denied. 	However, the Court will allow Plaintiff a final
opportunity to respond to Defendants arguments for dismissal. Plaintiff shall have until April 3,
2026, to file a brief in opposition to the pending motions to dismiss. Under no circumstance shall
Plaintiff respond to the motions to dismiss with yet another motion for leave to amend the operative
complaint, nor shall Plaintiff request an extension of this deadline. 	Plaintiff's third amended
complaint [Filing No. 130] remains the operative complaint.
II. 	Motion for Protective Order [Filing No. 160]
On January 28, 2026, Defendants City of Lawrence, Andrew Thorup, and Khalid Brooks
(collectively, the Lawrence Defendants) noticed Plaintiff's deposition, to take place at the office of
the Lawrence Defendants' counsel on March 9, 2026.2 [Filing No. 161-1.] 	On March 2, 2026,
Plaintiff filed a motion seeking a protective order and accommodations related to her deposition.
[Filing No. 160.] 	Plaintiff requests the following accommodations: remote handling of the
deposition; mandatory breaks; a 3.5-hour durational limit; restrictions as to the scope of
2 In light of Plaintiff's March 11 reply brief [Filing No. 166], the Court presumes that the parties
did not complete Plaintiff's deposition on March 9 as noticed.
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questioning; advance production of all exhibits; and discretionary authority to suspend the
deposition. Plaintiff's motion [Filing No. 160] is granted in part and denied in part.
A party seeking a protective order must show good cause that an order is necessary "to
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). "[T]he court may on motion order . . . that a deposition be taken
by . . . remote means," such as video conferencing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4). Plaintiff has provided
medical reasons to support her request for a video conference deposition with breaks. Defendants
argue that Plaintiff should be deposed in person to better visualize Plaintiff as needed to assess her
credibility; to film the deposition; and to avoid the improper use of Artificial Intelligence tools by
the deponent. However, these concerns can be mitigated. Plaintiff shall communicate with counsel
for the Lawrence Defendants to ensure that she has access to equipment necessary to participate
fully in a video conference deposition. 	Plaintiff shall remain visible on camera during the
deposition. The video conference deposition may be recorded. Most court reporting companies
offer such recording services. Plaintiff shall not utilize AI programs during the deposition. As is
true for all deponents, Plaintiff's deposition testimony should be based on her own personal
knowledge, not external sources such as AI. Additionally, Plaintiff has shown good cause to justify
a 10-minute break every hour of the deposition.
Plaintiff has not shown good cause to limit the duration or scope of the deposition; for
advance production of exhibits; or for permission to terminate the deposition at her discretion.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(d)(1) limits depositions to seven hours. Plaintiff has not shown
that 	her 	health 	prevents 	her 	from 	attending 	a 	multi-hour 	deposition 	given 	the 	other
accommodations approved in this order. Moreover, the parties must participate in the deposition
in good faith. There is no reason to presume that Defendants will ask improper questions or act in
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bad faith or in a manner that unreasonably annoys, embarrasses, or oppresses any party. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 30(d)(3). Plaintiff has not shown good cause to limit the topics of the deposition or to
allow for its early termination. The parties may ask questions "regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (defining the scope of discovery). During the deposition, parties may respectfully
object to questions, "but the examination still proceeds; the testimony is taken subject to any
objection." Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(2).
Additionally, Plaintiff also objects to the "unilateral" scheduling of her deposition. Under
S.D. Ind. Local Rule 30-1(d), parties must "make a good faith effort to schedule depositions in a
manner that avoids scheduling conflicts," and depositions cannot be scheduled "on less than 14
days notice." 	The Lawrence Defendants complied with Rule 30-1 by reaching out to Plaintiff
regarding her availability and noticing the deposition more than a month in advance. [Filing Nos.
161, at ECF p. 1; 166-3; 166-4.] It is the responsibility of the party whose deposition has been
requested to respond to scheduling communications and raise accommodation requests in a timely
manner. Plaintiff failed to do so. The parties shall cooperate when rescheduling the deposition at
their earliest convenience.
III. 	Motion to Seal or Redact [Filing No. 165]
Plaintiff also filed a motion seeking to seal or redact bodycam footage submitted as an
exhibit to her reply in support of her motion to amend. [Filing No. 165.] Plaintiff argues that the
footage is entitled to secrecy because it depicts her minor children. However, as explained in the
Clerk's notice of noncompliant manual filing, the video file was not in an approved format. [Filing
No. 168.] Thus, the footage has not been made part of the public record, and since Plaintiff does
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not have leave to amend her complaint further, she need not re-file it. Accordingly, the motion to
seal or redact [Filing No. 165] is denied as moot.3
IV. 	Conclusion
Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint [Filing No. 156] and motion
to seal [Filing No. 165] are denied. 	Plaintiff's motion to strike [Filing No. 163] is also denied.
However, Plaintiff shall have until April 3, 2026, to file her response to Defendants' motions to
dismiss. Plaintiff's motion for protective order [Filing No. 160] is granted to the extent that her
deposition shall be conducted via video conference and with breaks as discussed above. Plaintiff's
motion for protective order [Filing No. 160] is denied to the extent it seeks additional
accommodations.
Date: 3/20/2025
Tim A. Baker
United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of Indiana
Distribution:
All ECF-registered counsel of record via email
LUCRETIA CLAY
10242 John Jay Drive
Indianapolis, IN 46235
3 	Court 	filings 	are 	presumptively 	public, 	"unless 	a 	statute, 	rule, 	or 	privilege 	justifies
confidentiality." In re Specht, 622 F.3d 697, 701 (7th Cir. 2010). Filing a motion to seal does not
guarantee that the Court will find good cause to overcome that presumption. By filing a document,
a litigant risks its public disclosure. 	Additionally, the onus is on the filing party to make any
proposed redactions, not the Court. See S.D. Ind. L.R. 5-11(c).
_______________________________
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