CLAY et al v. THORUP et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
LUCRETIA CLAY, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:25-cv-00018-JPH-TAB
)
ANDREW THORUP in his individual and
official capacity, et al.
)
)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO FILE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff, Lucretia Clay, brought this action in Indiana state court on
behalf of herself and three of her minor children, raising claims related to an
interaction with City of Lawrence police officers and her subsequent arrest.
Dkt. 1-2. 	Defendants removed the case to this Court on January 3, 2025.
Dkt. 1; see dkt. 52 (denying Ms. Clay's motion to remand). 	Ms. Clay filed a
second amended complaint on May 20, 2025. 	Dkt. 53-1.
Defendants responded to Ms. Clay's second amended complaint by filing
three motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 	Dkt. 55; dkt. 58; dkt. 60.
In August 2025, after the motions to dismiss were briefed, Ms. Clay filed a
motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. 	Dkt. 101. 	She argues that
leave to amend should be granted because her proposed third amended
complaint is "a good-faith effort to refine the pleadings in light of the legal
arguments and alleged deficiencies raised by the Defendants." 	Id. at 1–2.
Defendant Axon Enterprise opposes the motion for leave to amend, arguing
Case 1:25-cv-00018-JPH-TAB Document 129 Filed 12/02/25 Page 1 of 5 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
that it would be futile as to Axon. 	Dkt. 102. 	The remaining defendants have
not opposed the motion.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), the "court should freely give
leave [to amend] when justice so requires." See Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater
Chi. & Nw. Ind., 786 F.3d 510, 519 (7th Cir. 2015). A plaintiff should
therefore "be given every opportunity to cure a formal defect in his pleading . . .
even [if] the court doubts that plaintiff will be able to overcome the defects." Id.
If "it is clear that the defect cannot be corrected so that amendment is futile, it
might do no harm to deny leave to amend." 	Id. But "[s]uch cases of clear
futility at the outset of a case are rare" and "[a]mendment should be refused
only if it appears to a certainty that plaintiff cannot state a claim." 	Id.
Moreover, Axon's motion to dismiss the second amended complaint and
its opposition to the third amended complaint based on futility would each have
to be reviewed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3). See Nowlin v.
Prtizker, 34 F.4th 629, 635 (7th Cir. 2022). Addressing parallel briefing on
those issues "in piecemeal fashion" would thus "force the court" to essentially
resolve two "motions to dismiss instead of one." O'Boyle v. Real Time
Resolutions, 910 F.3d 338, 348 (7th Cir. 2018). Granting leave to amend, by
contrast, would allow all Defendants to respond to one set of allegations.
Last, Ms. Clay sought leave to amend by the deadline for doing so, see
dkt. 50 at 4, instead of risking a finding of "undue delay and unfair prejudice"
by waiting for a ruling on the motions to dismiss. O'Boyle, 910 F.3d at 348; see
Fosnight v. Jones, 41 F.4th 916, 924–25 (7th Cir. 2022). 	The deadline for
Case 1:25-cv-00018-JPH-TAB Document 129 Filed 12/02/25 Page 2 of 5 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
seeking leave to amend has now passed, so granting Ms. Clay's motion for leave
to file a third amended complaint will bring finality to the operative complaint
in this case. 	See dkt. 50 at 4. 	For these reasons, "applying the liberal
standard for amending pleadings, especially in the early stages of a lawsuit, is
the best way to ensure" that this case "will be decided justly." Runnion, 786
F.3d at 520; see Saint Anthony Hosp. v. Eagleson, 40 F.4th 492, 517–18 (7th
Cir. 2022).
Ms. Clay's motion for leave to amend is therefore GRANTED under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2). 	Dkt. [101]. 	The Clerk is directed to
docket Ms. Clay's third amended complaint as a separate docket entry. 	Dkt.
[101-1]. 	The Clerk is directed to terminate all Plaintiffs other than Lucretia
Clay from the docket because she is the only plaintiff named in the third
amended complaint. 	See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a); Beal v. Beller, 847 F.3d 897,
901 (7th Cir. 2017) ("For pleading purposes, once an amended complaint is
filed, the original complaint drops out of the picture.").
Because Defendants' motions to dismiss addressed a prior complaint,
they are DENIED without prejudice as moot. Dkt. [55]; dkt. [58]; dkt. [60].
Ms. Clay's motion in opposition to the State of Indiana's motion to dismiss is
DENIED without prejudice as moot for the same reason. 	Dkt. [66]. 	Ms.
Clay's motions attempting to add additional defendants to a prior complaint are
also DENIED without prejudice as moot because that complaint has been
superseded and her more recent third amended complaint is now the operative
complaint. 	Dkt. [105]; dkt. [109]; dkt. [113]; see Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v.
Case 1:25-cv-00018-JPH-TAB Document 129 Filed 12/02/25 Page 3 of 5 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 35 (2025) ("And the plaintiff's control over those
matters extends beyond the time her first complaint is filed. 	If a plaintiff
amends her complaint, the new pleading supersedes the old one: 	The original
pleading no longer performs any function in the case."). 	Defendants' motions
to strike Ms. Clay's briefs related to these motions are similarly DENIED as
moot. 	Dkt. [75]; dkt. [89]; dkt. [112].
Ms. Clay's motion to correct errors regarding the Court's order denying
her motion to remand is DENIED. 	Dkt. [65]. 	While Ms. Clay alleges that the
City of Lawrence's exhibits "show strong evidence of perjury, obstruction,
forgery, and fraud," she has provided no support other than her speculation
based on font size and formatting. 	Id. 	She also has not explained how the
exhibits would affect the order denying remand even if they were not authentic.
See id.; dkt. 52. 	Ms. Clay next continues to argue that the removal was
untimely because Officer Brooks received the complaint more than thirty days
before the removal. 	Dkt. 65 at 4. 	But, as explained in the order denying
remand, she has not shown that Officer Brooks was properly served at his
place of employment under Indiana Trial Rule 4.1. 	Dkt. 52 at 2; see Claus v.
Mize, 317 F.3d 725, 727–28 (7th Cir. 2003). 	If Ms. Clay has concerns about
the discovery provided to her in this case, she can address those concerns with
Magistrate Judge Baker.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 12/2/2025
Case 1:25-cv-00018-JPH-TAB Document 129 Filed 12/02/25 Page 4 of 5 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
Distribution:
LUCRETIA CLAY
10242 John Jay Drive
Indianapolis, IN 46235
All electronically registered counsel
Case 1:25-cv-00018-JPH-TAB Document 129 Filed 12/02/25 Page 5 of 5 PageID #:
<pageID>