MAXWELL v. MICHAEL et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
WILLIAM C. MAXWELL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 1:24-cv-01365-JRS-TAB
)
DAKOTA MICHAEL Officer, )
CHELSEY SMITH Officer, )
)
Defendants. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND COSTS
I. Introduction
Defendants Dakota Michael and Chelsey Smith have filed a motion for sanctions and
costs, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 30(d)(2) and 37(b)(2)(A), as well as the Court's
inherent authority. Defendants request that the Court dismiss Plaintiff William C. Maxwell's
cause of action with prejudice and award Defendants their costs as sanctions for Plaintiff's
refusal to participate in his deposition in this action. [Filing No. 128.] Plaintiff claims that he
appeared for his deposition as ordered and invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination in good faith. He also argues that the deposition itself was procedurally defective.
As set forth below, the Court overruled Plaintiff's procedural and self-incrimination concerns
ahead of the deposition. While Plaintiff showed up for his deposition, he refused to cooperate,
despite multiple instructions from the Court to do so. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for
sanctions and costs should be granted in part to allow Defendants to receive an award of their
reasonable deposition costs and fees.
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II. Background
On August 10, 2022, Plaintiff was pulled over after driving with improper headlights and
arrested on suspicion of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. He was subsequently charged
with operating a vehicle while intoxicated, possession of paraphernalia, and operating a motor
vehicle with improper headlights. [Filing No. 117-1.] However, the charges against Plaintiff
were dismissed in December 2023 after a May 2023 toxicology screening returned negative for
substances. In August 2024, Plaintiff initiated this civil cause of action against Defendants—
troopers for the Indiana State Police—alleging false arrest and malicious prosecution in relation
to his arrest following the traffic stop on August 10, 2022. On August 22, 2025, Plaintiff moved
for summary judgment on all claims. That motion remains pending. [Filing No. 83.]
In October 2025, counsel for Defendants informed Plaintiff that Defendants wished to
depose him and requested dates he would be available for a deposition. Plaintiff refused to
cooperate in scheduling his deposition, citing various reasons, including that he believed his
pending summary judgment motion would be granted. Defendants ultimately noticed Plaintiff's
deposition for November 19, 2025. Plaintiff informed Defendants that he was unavailable for a
deposition on that date, or at all in November or December 2025. After Plaintiff suggested a
deposition date in February or March 2026, defense counsel requested a discovery conference
with the undersigned magistrate judge to address the issue of scheduling Plaintiff's deposition.
In addition, on October 31, 2025, Plaintiff moved to stay discovery in this case pending a ruling
on his motion for summary judgment. [Filing No. 105.]
On November 5, 2025, the Court held a telephonic status conference to address the
discovery dispute. At that conference, the parties and the undersigned magistrate judge
discussed scheduling Plaintiff's deposition. The undersigned denied Plaintiff's motion to stay
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discovery and ordered Plaintiff to make himself available for a deposition on December 3, 2025.
[Filing No. 108.] Plaintiff objected to the undersigned magistrate judge's order. [Filing No.
114.]1 Plaintiff also filed an objection to Defendants' amended notice of deposition and moved
for a protective order limiting his December 3, 2025, deposition. [Filing No. 118.] One of
Plaintiff's objections to being deposed was that a deposition would expose him to "criminal
jeopardy" by forcing him to provide incriminating statements in violation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. [Filing No. 118.]
The undersigned denied Plaintiff's objection to the deposition notice and reiterated: "The
Court previously held a status conference, discussed Plaintiff's deposition, and ordered Plaintiff
to make himself available for a deposition on December 3, 2025. That order stands." [Filing No.
119, at ECF p. 1.] Plaintiff objected to that order, too. [Filing No. 123.] Moreover, on
December 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, seeking an emergency order that, among other relief, would bar the deposition. One
day later, on December 2, 2025, the Seventh Circuit denied Plaintiff's emergency petition.
[Filing No. 126.]
That same day, Chief Judge Sweeney denied all of Plaintiff's pending objections to the
magistrate judge's orders. [Filing No. 124.] In relation to the deposition, Judge Sweeney
addressed Plaintiff's claim that the deposition notice was overly vague, noting that Plaintiff
"surely should know what testimony he expects to give in this lawsuit" and that "while the work
product privilege may protect some documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable. . .
[he] has not shown that any question put to him would require an answer that constitutes
privileged work product." [Filing No. 124, at ECF p. 5-6 (emphasis in original).]
1 Plaintiff re-filed his objection a few days later with "corrected revisions." [Filing No. 115.]
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Judge Sweeney also addressed Plaintiff's objections to the deposition related to the fact
that the state criminal charges against him were dismissed without prejudice in December 2023,
and Plaintiff's concern regarding whether they could be refiled or "if new charges 'could be
manufactured.'" [Filing No. 124, at ECF p. 6 (quoting Filing No. 118, at ECF p. 4).] Judge
Sweeney concluded that Plaintiff's fears "are unfounded." [Filing No. 124, at ECF p. 6.] Judge
Sweeney's December 2 order explained:
Under Indiana law, the statute of limitations for a misdemeanor is two years. Ind.
Code § 35-41-4-2(a)(2). In Indiana, traffic infraction proceedings are civil rather
than criminal in nature, see Pridemore v. State, 577 N.E.2d 237, 238 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1991), and the statute of limitations for a traffic infraction is also two years,
Ind. Code § 34-28-5-1(c)(2). The statute of limitations for the conduct underlying
the dismissed charges has expired. There is no threat to Maxwell's Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
[Filing No. 124, at ECF p. 6.]
The following day—December 3, 2025—Plaintiff appeared in person for his videotaped
deposition. [Filing No. 129-3.] However, other than stating and spelling his name, Plaintiff
refused to answer substantively any question posed by defense counsel. Plaintiff consistently
responded to any question with an objection, repeatedly claiming he was present under protest
and pleading his Fifth Amendment privilege. [See, e.g., Filing No. 129-3, at ECF p. 6-9.] In
response to Plaintiff's invocation of the Fifth Amendment throughout the deposition, defense
counsel read the portion of Judge Sweeney's December 2 order relating to Plaintiff's Fifth
Amendment concerns into the record. [Filing No. 129-3, at ECF p. 10.] Defense counsel also
gave Plaintiff a copy of that order during the deposition after Plaintiff claimed he had not had
time to read it.
After Plaintiff objected to all preliminary questions about his understanding of the
deposition process, defense counsel attempted to call the undersigned magistrate judge for
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guidance. [Filing No. 129-3, at ECF p. 13.] The undersigned was unable to speak to the parties
at that time but instructed his staff to relay that based on the prior orders in this case, the
deposition should proceed, and Plaintiff should participate in the deposition as previously
directed. Judge Baker also told his staff to instruct Defendants to make a record if Plaintiff
continued to refuse to substantively participate in the deposition and, if necessary, file an
appropriate motion after the deposition.
Plaintiff continued to refuse to participate in his deposition. [See Filing No. 129-3, at
ECF p. 13-27.] Plaintiff reiterated his objections and repeatedly refused to answer any question
substantively. He also refused Defendants' requests to review exhibits in the exhibit binder
placed in front of him and Defendants' attempt to hand him copies of Court orders, including
Judge Sweeney's order. [Filing No. 129-3, at ECF p. 14, 21-22.] Thus, on December 18, 2025,
Defendants filed their motion for sanctions and costs. [Filing No. 129.] In opposing the motion,
Plaintiff claims his Fifth Amendment invocations were made in good faith and continues to argue
that the deposition itself was procedurally defective. [Filing No. 133, at ECF p. 4.] On
December 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion to strike Defendants' deposition-related filings—
including the motion for sanctions. [Filing No. 135.]
III. Discussion
Defendants argue that the Court should impose sanctions, including dismissal of this
action with prejudice, and award Defendants their costs, due to Plaintiff's refusal to participate in
his deposition. Defendants seek sanctions under Rules 30(d) and 37(b)(2) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure as well as the Court's inherent authority. Rule 30(d) provides that the Court
"may impose an appropriate sanction—including the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees
incurred by any party—on a person who impedes, delays, or frustrates the fair examination of the
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deponent." Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2). Under Rule 37(b), the Court has discretion to impose
sanctions against a party for failing to "obey an order to provide or permit discovery." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). Sanctions could include finding that designated facts be taken as established
for purposes of this action, prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing
designated claims or defenses, striking pleadings, or even dismissing the action. Id. Finally,
"sanctions issued under the court's inherent powers are justified if the offender willfully abuses
the judicial process or litigates in bad faith." Donelson v. Hardy, 931 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir.
2019).
As noted above, after Defendants struggled to secure a date that Plaintiff would agree to
be deposed, the undersigned ordered Plaintiff to make himself available for a deposition on
December 3, 2025. The undersigned re-iterated that directive in an entry on November 25, 2025,
and Chief Judge Sweeney overruled Plaintiff's objections to these orders on December 2, 2025,
before the deposition took place. [Filing Nos. 108, 119, and 124.] Judge Sweeney specifically
stated: "There is no threat to [Plaintiff]'s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination."
[Filing No. 124, at ECF p. 6.]
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, highlights the fact that Judge Sweeney's order was entered
only one day before his December 3 deposition. However, Defendants' counsel read the relevant
portions of Judge Sweeney's order to Plaintiff during the deposition. Plaintiff concedes that
defense counsel read the order into the record at his deposition but argues that his due process
rights were violated by the lack of time he had to receive and review Judge Sweeney's order.
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The parties agree that Plaintiff showed up for his deposition on December 3.2 However,
"[t]he problem was a refusal to participate, not a failure to show up." Evans v. Griffin, 932 F.3d
1043, 1046 (7th Cir. 2019). Despite the Court's clear and consistent directive that Plaintiff must
make himself available for a deposition and that he had no good faith basis to rely on an
assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege, Plaintiff baselessly objected to nearly every question
defense counsel posed with this assertion and thwarted Defendants' ability to obtain discovery.
Plaintiff refused to answer any of defense counsel's questions substantively beyond stating and
spelling his name for the record. Instead, he consistently asserted that he was invoking his Fifth
Amendment privilege and refused to answer. Plaintiff continues to proceed under the
misapprehension that the mere act of showing up at his deposition means he complied with the
Court's order to make himself available for a deposition. Plaintiff also doubles down on his
argument that he invoked the Fifth Amendment in good faith.
While Chief Judge Sweeney's order and Plaintiff's deposition were close in time, it is a
stretch of imagination to find that Plaintiff acted in good faith in asserting the Fifth Amendment
privilege throughout nearly his entire deposition. As already noted, Defendants attempted to
rectify any lapse in knowledge by reading Judge Sweeney's order directly to Plaintiff and
offering a copy to him. Plaintiff's mere presence at the deposition did not comply with the
November 5 order to make himself available for a deposition. Plaintiff's "good faith" argument
is further discredited by the undersigned's November 25 order denying a motion for protective
order excusing his participation in the deposition; Chief Judge Sweeney's December 2 order
2 Defendants note in their reply that contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, he did not appear on time for
his deposition. Plaintiff arrived late, causing the deposition to begin at 9:20 a.m., despite being
noticed for 9 a.m. Defendants took no issue with Plaintiff's delay during the deposition, because
he called to advise that he would be late, but they do take issue with the misrepresentation of the
fact of his untimeliness in his response brief. [Filing No. 138, at ECF p. 4.]
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overruling objections to the undersigned magistrate judge's orders; and the Seventh Circuit's
December 2 order denying his petition for a writ of mandamus and emergency motion for
immediate stay of discovery.
In addition, Plaintiff engaged in a pattern of delay, as evidenced by Plaintiff's litany of
alleged reasons why his deposition should not proceed, constant objections to nearly every order
leading up to his deposition, and his continued insistence that he need not testify while at the
deposition. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and may lack familiarity with the rules of procedure,
but he was informed prior to the deposition that his Fifth Amendment concerns were
unwarranted, and "pro se litigants are not excused from compliance with procedural rules."
Pearle Vision, Inc. v. Romm, 541 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff filed this lawsuit.
Defendants' request to depose the party filing a lawsuit against them is the normal practice in a
civil lawsuit. However, Plaintiff's actions hindered Defendants' attempts to discover relevant
facts. Thus, Plaintiff's conduct warrants sanctions under Rule 30(d), Rule 37(b), and the Court's
inherent authority.
Although sanctions are appropriate, dismissal is not. See, e.g., Ebmeyer v. Brock, 11
F.4th 537, 545 (7th Cir. 2021) ("Dismissal is a harsh sanction, and in general, justice is dispensed
by the hearing of cases on their merits." (Internal quotation marks and brackets omitted));
Gregory v. Byrd, No. 20-3204, 2023 WL 2013915, at *3 (7th Cir. Feb. 15, 2023) (holding
dismissal of case with prejudice without any prior warning or progressive sanction was not
proportionate). The undersigned recommends that the Court grant Defendants' request for
reasonable fees and costs incurred in scheduling the deposition.3 The Court recognizes that
3 Defendants did not request another deposition. Defendants should be permitted to file a motion
to seek another deposition of Plaintiff if they wish to do so.
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Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis and has limited funds. However, the Court will not
allow Plaintiff to use his IFP status to shield his sanctionable conduct from any meaningful
consequence.
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, Defendants' motion for sanctions [Filing No. 128] should be granted in
part to allow an award of Defendants' reasonable costs for the scheduling of Plaintiff's
deposition. Any objection to the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation shall be filed
with the Clerk in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure to file timely objections within
14 days shall constitute waiver of subsequent review absent a showing of good cause for such
failure.
Distribution:
All ECF-registered counsel of record via email
WILLIAM C. MAXWELL
201 N. McClure St.
Wingate, IN 47994
Date: 1/23/2026
_______________________________
Tim A. Baker
United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of Indiana
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