WHITE v. DECKER et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
WILLIAM A WHITE, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 1:22-cv-02405-TWP-TAB
)
ROBERT KENNETH DECKER, 	)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND RULING FOLLOWING BENCH TRIAL
This matter was before the Court for a bench trial conducted on June 29, 2026, and July
16, 2026. Plaintiff William A. White ("White"), who is incarcerated in the Federal Bureau of
Prisons ("BOP") and is currently housed at the United States Penitentiary Cumberland FCI in
Cumberland, Maryland, sued inmate Robert K. Decker ("Decker") and the United States of
America ("the United States") under state law and under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2671 et seq. ("FTCA"). White alleges that, while he was housed at the Federal Correctional
Institution in Terre Haute, Indiana ("FCI Terre Haute"), the United States negligently placed him
in the same housing unit as Decker, who subsequently assaulted him. The United States moved for
summary judgment on all of White's claims, and that motion was granted in part and denied in
part. (Dkt. 261). White also moved for summary judgment, and that motion was denied as to his
claims against the United States, and granted as to his claim that Decker committed battery against
him. Id. The claims heard at trial were: (1) assault and battery against Decker related only to the
issue of damages; and (2) negligence against the United States that arises under the FTCA, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2671–80.
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Bothe White and Decker are self-represented. On the first day of the bench trial, White
appeared in person pro se, Decker was present in person pro se, and the United States was present
by counsel Traci Cosby, Assistant United States Attorney. On the second day of the trial, White
and Decker appeared pro se, and all parties appeared virtually. Based on its evaluation of the
evidence, testimony presented at the trial, and the parties' arguments, the Court now issues the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law.1
I. 	FINDINGS OF FACT
The following facts are based on the Court's credibility determinations of the parties'
testimonies and the exhibits admitted into evidence. Factors the Court considered in determining
the credibility of the witnesses were the demeanor and candor of the witness while testifying, the
inherent plausibility of the witness's account, the consistencies and inconsistencies between the
witness's present and prior statements, and the witness's bias, prejudice, or other reason to lie or
slant the testimony.
A. The Parties
This case concerns an assault on White that occurred on February 18, 2022. White has been
a federal prisoner in the BOP for eighteen years, and he has been cited for fighting only five times.
(Dkt. 390 at 50–51). At the time of the assault, White was housed within the FCI Terre Haute
Communications Management Unit ("CMU") in Terre Haute, Indiana. (Dkt. 389 at 40). The CMU
is an intelligence unit within FCI Terre Haute used to house inmates who are involved in political
or religious cases or have misconduct related to communications outside the prison. Id. at 20.
White was held in the CMU for about seven years, and during that time observed and became
1 To the extent that any findings of fact are more properly construed as conclusions of law, or vice versa, they should
be construed as such.
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familiar with the operations, practices, and procedures of the CMU. Id. at 20. Decker was also a
federal inmate categorized to be confined to the CMU. Id. at 117.
At the time of the relevant events, there were only two CMUs in the United States, one in
Terre Haute, Indiana, at FCI Terre Haute, and one at the United States Penitentiary in Marion,
Illinois ("USP Marion"). Id. at 201–14. During the relevant time, the CMU at FCI Terre Haute
housed approximately 60–64 inmates, and the CMU at USP Marion housed approximately 30
inmates. Id. at 211, 252. Quite frequently, this small number of inmates might be transferred
between the two CMU prisons. Id. at 201. In a CMU, the inmates are subject to complete
communications monitoring to include monitoring of the inmates' postal mail, email, and
telephone calls. Id. at 198. Mail is screened not for content, but for potential threats such as threats
to the government, threats to the president or witnesses, possible drug interdictions, as well as
falsification of court documents. Id. at 198–99. Housing assignments, such as an assignment to the
CMU, were made by the Counter-Terrorism Unit at the BOP. Id. at 199–200.
B. Events Prior to the Incident
In 2018, White met Decker at USP Marion, where both inmates were housed together
within the CMU for approximately eight months. Id. at 19–20, 36. While at USP Marion, Decker
attempted to befriend White, and in turn, White assisted Decker with some legal work. Id. at 20–
22. Eventually, White stopped assisting Decker with legal matters because he believed that Decker
had lied under oath and attempted to have White prepare a false declaration for one of Decker's
legal proceedings. Id. at 31–32. White told Decker that he would no longer assist him with his
legal work, and White wrote to the Assistant United States Attorney who was representing the
United States in Decker's civil case, and explained that he would no longer assist Decker because
he believed that Decker was setting him up to commit a crime. (Dkt. 405 at 13). The two remained
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in the same housing population in the USP Marion CMU until February 2019 when Decker was
transferred to another institution. (Dkt. 389 at 19–20).
On October 13, 2021, White was involved in an altercation with another inmate in the USP
Marion's general population CMU, which resulted in White being placed in the USP Marion
CMU's Special Housing Unit ("SHU"). Id. at 39. Inmates could be transferred from one CMU to
another for various reasons including fighting. Id. at 201–02. Shortly thereafter, in January of 2022,
White was transferred to the CMU at FCI Terre Haute. Id. at 236.
C. Transfer to the Terre Haute CMU
Upon his arrival in the CMU at FCI Terre Haute, White was housed in the SHU for initial
intake and screening. Id. at 229–30. White knew upon his arrival at FCI Terre Haute that Decker
was housed in the FCI Terre Haute CMU general population. Id. at 65.
Todd Royer, Camp Administrator at FCI Terre Haute, was the unit manager for the CMU
in early 2022. (Dkt. 390 at 15–16). He testified that to his knowledge, when White was transferred
from USP Marion CMU to FCI Terre Haute CMU in January 2022, no one at FCI Terre Haute
CMU was made aware of any potential conflicts between White and Decker. Id. at 24.
Jamie Wheeler ("Wheeler") was serving as the Acting Intelligence Research Specialist at
the FCI Terre Haute CMU. (Dkt. 389 at 197). Wheeler would prepare for a prisoner's arrival by
reviewing the individual's previous charges or what got him incarcerated, his conduct while in
prison, and then the current conduct that landed him in a position in the CMU. Id. at 200. She
would also look into SENTRY, which is a database that would state whether an inmate had a
separation at FCI Terre Haute prison or any other prison. Id. at 200–01. In January 2022, Wheeler
conducted White's intake assessment. Id. at 197, 237. During White's assessment, Wheeler asked
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him if he had any safety concerns about being released to the CMU general population. Id. at 230.
White expressed no specific fears or concerns. Id. at 237. 2
Shortly after, White also received an intake for psychological services by a BOP
psychiatrist, Dr. Sheridan, to determine the appropriate level of care, and in that intake, he also
failed to express any concerns about his safety. Id. at 323. Dr. Sheridan did not review White's
clinical intervention clinical contact documents, but she did engage in a prolonged discussion with
White. Id. at 332–33. White's intake report references the fact that he has previously been
diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder. Id. at 333. Following the assessment, White was
released to the CMU general population on February 8, 2022. (Trial Exhibit 202 at USA00143).
From February 8, 2022, until the assault, Wheeler did not observe any issues or unusual behavior
between Decker and White. (Dkt. 389 at 240–41). White never told Wheeler or Dr. Sheridan that
he should not be housed with Decker. Id. at 97–98.
While at USP Marion, Decker never made any threats to harm White. Id. at 178–79. Prior
to White's arrival at the FCI Terre Haute CMU, Decker told Lt. Sherman that there "would be a
problem" if the two were housed together. Id. at 149. Decker testified that by this statement, he
meant that he believed White would sabotage Decker's character. Id. He does not recall ever
speaking to Wheeler about any issues with White. Id. at 149–50. Further, Decker never told
Wheeler or BOP Officer Lt. Sherman that he would harm White if both of them were to be
transferred to FCI Terre Haute. Id. at 177–78.
Most inmates housed within the two CMUs were familiar with each other because they
were sequestered with each other "24/7." Id. at 230–31. Given their constant and close proximity
2 Although White contends that Wheeler never conducted his intake interview and that instead, Rebekka Eisele
conducted his intake, he admits that whether his intake interview was with Wheeler or Eisele is immaterial because
"I also didn't express concern[s regarding Decker] to Eisele." Id.
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to one another, inmates within the CMU frequently expressed displeasure with other CMU inmates
and had heated arguments with each other. Id.
Before the assault, Decker and White did not have any sort of separatee designation3 in
their files that would prohibit the two from being housed in the same unit. Id. 221–38. White and
Decker had never previously been involved in any sort of physical altercation at USP Marion or at
FCI Terre Haute prior to February 18, 2022. Id. at 98.
D. The Assault
On February 18, 2022, at approximately 9:00 PM, White was sitting in his cell reading a
book. Id. at 69. Decker opened his cell door and stated, "[y]ou better get . . . my name out of your
mouth." Id. In response. White stood up and told Decker that if he was not going to fight him, then
he should "get the fuck out of [his] cell." Id. at 70. Decker began to back out of the cell and
continued to shout at White. Id. at 71. Once outside of White's cell, the two continued shouting
back and forth in the hallway. (Trial Exhibit 7 at 18:35). Decker then struck White on the left side
of White's face with his right fist. (Dkt. 389 at 71–72).
When Decker hit White, he knocked White's glasses askew, and White began laughing. Id.
at 72. White was not physically injured by Decker striking him. Id. White testified that he barely
felt that Decker had punched him because Decker was "not strong enough" to harm him. Id. After
punching White, Decker ran away from White's cell. Id. at 171. White followed after Decker,
laughing and saying, "What are you doing? Come over here." Id. at 73. White walked after Decker
because "he was acting ridiculous. And at this point, he--I mean--I wasn't in any danger, so I was
just having some fun with him." Id. Decker then ran at White with all his might and attempted to
3 A separate or separatee designation in the Federal Bureau of Prisons typically refers to an administrative or security
classification—such as a Central Inmate Monitoring (CIM) assignment or a "keep separate" / separation need—used
to 	isolate 	specific 	inmates 	from 	one 	another 	for 	safety, 	protection, 	or 	case 	management.
https://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody_and_care/designations.jsp
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push White over, and White and Decker continued pushing each other in the hallway with open
hands. Id. at 73–74. Eventually, Decker again attempted to run away, and White followed after him
while continuing to laugh. Id. at 74–75. When they got to the end of the hall, Decker turned towards
White like he was going to lunge at White again, but Decker ran away for a third time. Id. at 75.
Correctional Officer Emerson approached while White and Decker were shoving each
other and instructed the two men to "break it up." Id. at 171. White did not hear the command. Id.
at 73. When the two did not comply, Officer Calloway dispersed oleoresin capsicum spray ("OC
spray") towards both men. Id. at 172–73. White testified that while he was standing there confused,
he turned his head towards Officer Calloway, and Officer Calloway unloaded a can of OC spray
in White's face Id. at 75. White was hit directly in the face by the spray, but Decker had run farther
down the tier and was not hit by the spray. Id. at 75, 173.
White was then handcuffed and taken to be decontaminated from the OC spray. Id. at 76–
77. After decontamination, he was immediately reassigned to the CMU SHU. (Dkt. 390 at 411).
White remained in the CMU SHU until July 22, 2022, when he was transferred to the Federal
Correctional Institution in Cumberland, Maryland. Id. at 88.
Following the assault, Decker was also transferred to the CMU SHU; however, the two had
no further direct contact with each other while housed in FCI Terre Haute. Id. at 81–82, 100.
E. Decker's Testimony
Decker does not dispute that he entered White's cell and assaulted White. He admits that
he told Lt. Sherman that there would be a "problem" if they moved White to Terre Haute. Id. at
149. But Decker never told Lt. Sherman that he was going to hurt White if White moved to Terre
Haute. Id. at 177. February 18, 2022, was the first time that Decker was involved in a physical
altercation with White. Id. Decker testified that he never directly threatened to physically hurt
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White before the February 18 assault. Id. at 178–79. And even while they were at USP Marion,
Decker never made any threats to physically harm White. Id. at 178.
II. 	CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
White's claims at trial were: (1) an Indiana state-law assault and battery claim against
Decker on the issue of damages; and (2) a negligence claim against the United States that arises
under the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2671–80. He seeks damages for the physical injury
caused by the OC spray, and for his mental or emotional injury "without a prior showing of physical
injury." (Dkt. 405 at 36). White cites 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(2) and points out that the Seventh Circuit
has found that, as long as the underlying tort causes a physical injury, mental and emotional injury
proceeding from the tort and not directly from the physical injury fall within the scope of
permissible damages. See, e.g., Rasho v Elyea, 856 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2017).
White argues the Court should find the United States responsible for Decker's battery upon
him, and thus the United States is also 40% responsible for Calloway's use of OC spray against
him and his subsequent SHU confinement. (Dkt. 405 at 36). He asserts that Calloway's use of OC
spray against him caused him $2,000.00 in compensatory damages, of which the United States is
liable for $800.00. Id. He seeks $50,000.00 in compensatory damages for the SHU confinement
from February 18, 2022 to July 22, 2022, of which the United States is liable for $20,000.00. Id.
White does not request a specific dollar amount in damages from Decker for the February 18, 2022
assault.
A. Damages Related to the Assault with Decker
Under Indiana law, a defendant commits battery when "(a) he acts intending to cause a
harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or third person, or an imminent
apprehension of such contact, and (b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or
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indirectly results." Singh v. Lyday, 889 N.E.2d 342, 360 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Mullins v.
Parkview Hosp., Inc., 865 N.E.2d 608, 610 (Ind. 2007)). An assault occurs "when one acts
intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or an imminent
apprehension of such contact." Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27, 30 (Ind. 1991) (citing
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21 (1965)).
Because assault and battery are intentional torts, the defendant is only liable if he acted
recklessly or with reckless disregard of the consequences. Turner v. Sheriff of Marion Cnty., 94 F.
Supp. 2d 966, 994 (S.D. Ind. 2000). A plaintiff must prove the elements by a preponderance of the
evidence. United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 930 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that the
preponderance of the evidence standard is "the normal standard in civil cases").
As the Court previously noted at summary judgment, there was no genuine issue for trial
as to Decker's liability as to White for assault and battery, and the Court only heard testimony at
the trial regarding damages. Jenkins v. E. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 863 F. Supp. 2d 785, 793 (S.D. Ill.
2012). At trial, White testified at length that after the argument within his cell, he continued to
pursue Decker until Decker struck him a single time with a closed fist, and even after the strike,
White followed after Decker through the hall. Id. at 69–75. White testified that he was completely
unharmed after the assault because Decker was not strong enough to truly harm him. Id. at 72. As
noted above, White does not request a dollar amount for any physical damages caused by Decker's
assault; rather, he seeks to recover emotional distress damages related to the officer's use of OC
spray and his time in the SHU. (Dkt. 405 at 35–36).
Under Indiana's Comparative Fault Act, a plaintiff is barred from recovery if their
contributory fault is greater than the fault of the defendant. Ind. Code § 34-51-2-5. Under Indiana
law, "[c]ontributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff, contributing as a legal cause
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to the harm the plaintiff has suffered, which falls below the standard to which the plaintiff is
required to conform for his or her own protection." Faulk v. Nw. Radiologists, P.C., 751 N.E.2d
233, 239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
Had White been hurt by Decker's initial strike, he could have recovered damages from him.
But White admits that punch caused him no harm. Thus, the Court must decide whether Decker
bore any responsibility for the actions that happened once White pursued Decker down the hall
and continued to fight with him. When assessing causation, the Court turns to general causation
principals from tort law. Hunter v. Mueske, 73 F.4th 561, 568 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing Whitlock v.
Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 582–83 (7th Cir. 2012)). In order to constitute a bar to recovery,
contributory fault must be a proximate cause of the injury. Harris v. Cacdac, 512 N.E.2d 1138,
1139–40 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). The contributory fault must unite in producing the injury and, thus,
be "simultaneous and co-operating with the fault of the defendant . . . (and) enter into the creation
of the cause of action." Id.
That is the case here. White's continued laughter, taunts, and pursuit of Decker down the
hall where the two engaged in a shoving match were all contributory to the eventual harm he
suffered: emotional damages from OC spray and segregation within the SHU. White's participation
in the fight breaks the causal chain that would have allowed any recovery of damages from Decker.
Tole v. Sanchez, No. 25-CV-02578, 2026 WL 2096541, at *3 (S.D. Ind. July 21, 2026); Hunter, 73
F.4th at 569 (noting that plaintiff's "injury was caused . . . by his own decision to place himself in
harm's way"). The Court finds that White is not entitled to damages against Decker.
B. Negligence Claim Against the United States
The FTCA is a limited waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity. The FTCA applies
to federal inmates' claims alleging personal injuries sustained while incarcerated because of
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negligence of government employees. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963). The FTCA
authorizes suits against the United States for money damages "for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of
the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). For a claim
proceeding under the FTCA, Indiana substantive law applies. Id. § 1346(b)(1); see also Midwest
Knitting Mills, Inc. v. United States, 950 F.2d 1295, 1297 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he FTCA
incorporates the substantive law of the state where the tortious act or omission occurred.").
To state a claim for negligence under Indiana law, White must allege that the United States
owed a duty to him, it breached that duty, and the breach caused White's injuries. Looney v. Nestle
Waters N. Am., Inc., 187 N.E.3d 867, 872 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). The parties agree that the United
States owed a duty to White, so the Court proceeds to the second and third elements. White must
show a breach by showing that BOP staff knew or reasonably should have known of a potential
problem between him and Decker. Parrott v. United States, 536 F.3d 629, 636–37 (7th Cir. 2008).
White bases his negligence claim against the United States on two alleged negligent acts:
(1) the United States had or should have had knowledge of potential tension between White and
Decker because of a letter penned by White involving Decker, which was read by the CMU unit
staff as part of their security measures, and (2) Decker had previously stated to BOP staff there
would be "problems" if the two were housed together at FCI Terre Haute. (Dkt. 405 at 34–36).
White has not shown that the United States breached any such duty to him. Although White
and Decker had had a falling out while they were both housed at USP Marion, Decker testified
that he never directly threatened to physically hurt White before the February 18 attack. (Dkt. 389
at 178–79). White admits that the two never physically fought at USP Marion, and Wheeler
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testified that BOP did not have any separatee designation in their files that would require separation
between the two inmates. Id. at 95, 221, 238. White argues that his letter to an AUSA should have
triggered a threat assessment to create a separatee designation prior to White's arrival at the FCI
Terre Haute CMU.
The Court credits both Todd Royer and Jamie Wheeler's testimony that no one at FCI Terre
Haute had any reason to believe that there were any potential conflicts between White and Decker
when White was transferred from USP Marion to FCI Terre Haute in January 2022. (Dkt. 390 at
24, Dkt. 389 at 216–17). The Court further credits White's own testimony that during two separate
intakes after his transfer, he never requested separation from Decker despite specific inquiries from
BOP staff regarding concerns about his safety. (Dkt. 389 at 273, 285).
As to White's second argument, the Court finds credible Decker's testimony that he told Lt.
Sherman that there would be a "problem" if the two were housed together but never threatened
assault. White admits that Decker never directly threatened to physically hurt him while they were
housed together at USP Marion CMU, and never threatened to physically hurt him after he arrived
at FCI Terre Haute before he was released into the CMU general population. During the relevant
time, the CMU at FCI Terre Haute housed approximately 60–64 inmates, and the CMU at USP
Marion housed approximately 30 inmates. Due to the small number of inmates within the CMU,
the frequency of conflicts among this group of inmates, and the absence of any explicit requests
from either inmate for reassignment, the Court finds that BOP staff did not breach any duty by not
ordering a threat assessment or taking other proactive measures to separate the two inmates.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the United States was not negligent in the decision to place White
with Decker in the CMU general population.
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III. 	RULING
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court concludes that
White incurred no injury from the assault, so he recovers no damages for the assault from Decker.
White was contributorily at fault for the altercation with Decker following the assault, and
therefore he is not entitled to damages on his assault and battery claim.
The Court finds that the United States was not negligent in placing White and Decker
together in the CMU general population prior to the assault by Decker. The United States is entitled
to judgment on this FTCA negligence claim. Because White has failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was subjected to negligence, the Court need not consider
the issue of damages on this claim.
Judgment consistent with this Order shall now issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 9/29/2026
Distribution:
WILLIAM A WHITE
13888-084
CUMBERLAND - FCI
CUMBERLAND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION
Inmate Mail/Parcels
P.O. BOX 1000
CUMBERLAND, MD 21501
ROBERT KENNETH DECKER
51719-074
CUMBERLAND - FCI
CUMBERLAND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION
Inmate Mail/Parcels
P.O. BOX 1000
CUMBERLAND, MD 21501
All Electronically Registered Counsel
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