Offutt v. USA

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
TYRON OFFUTT,
Petitioner,
v. 	Case No. 25-CV-02143-SPM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
McGLYNN, District Judge:
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Tyron Offutt’s, a federal inmate at FCI
Victorville Medium I, Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. 1). After conducting its preliminary review, the Court
dismissed Claims One through Three and directed the United States to respond to
Claims Four through Eight. (Doc. 2). The United States filed its Response on July 15,
2026. (Doc. 16). For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner Tyron Offutt’s Motion is
DENIED.
R ELEVANT FACTS AND P ROCEDURE
On February 3, 2021, following an investigation by the FBI’s Southern Illinois
Transnational 	Organized 	Crime 	Task 	Force, 	and 	two 	controlled 	purchases 	of
methamphetamine using a confidential source (“CS”), investigators executed a search
warrant at Petitioner’s residence. (USA v. Offutt, No. 21-CR-30029-SPM, Docs. 1,
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96).1 When the officers arrived at Petitioner’s residence to execute the search
warrant, they observed Petitioner leaving the residence, and Petitioner was arrested
following a brief pursuit. (CR Doc. 96, p. 6). Officers recovered approximately an
ounce of methamphetamine, two loaded firearms, marijuana, United States currency,
and drug paraphernalia during the search. (Id., p. 1).
February 4, 2021, Petitioner was charged by Criminal Complaint. (CR Doc. 1,
p. 1). 	The Court appointed Dan Cronin of the Federal Public Defender’s Office to
represent 	Petitioner. 	(Id., 	p.2). 	Mr. Cronin 	represented 	Petitioner 	through 	his
detention hearing and the waiver of his preliminary hearing. (CR Docs. 17, 19, 20).
On February 24, 2021, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Petitioner with
possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm
in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. (CR Doc. 23). Due to a conflict of interest
and a breakdown in communication, the Court granted Mr. Cronin’s motion to
withdraw as counsel on September 17, 2021. (CR Docs. 45, 46). The Court then
appointed Rebecca Grosser as Petitioner’s counsel. (CR Doc. 46). On September 22,
2021, a superseding indictment charged Petitioner with: Count 1, Possession with
Intent to Distribute Controlled Substance, Methamphetamine; Count 2, Felon in
Possession of a Firearm; and Counts 3 and 4, Distribution of Controlled Substance:
Methamphetamine. (CR Doc. 48).
Ms. Grosser represented Petitioner through several bond modifications, a
motion to suppress physical evidence, and a competency evaluation and hearing. (CR
1 Subsequent references to the underlying criminal case are cited as “CR Doc.” All other docket
citations refer to the above-captioned civil case.
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Docs. 53, 60, 69, 84, 100, 101, 104, 105). On September 30, 2022, Ms. Grosser moved
to withdraw, citing an unwaivable conflict of interest. (CR. Doc. 128). The Court
granted Ms. Grosser’s motion on October 5, 2022, and appointed Bobby Bailey to
represent Petitioner. (CR Doc. 130). Mr. Bailey filed two motions to suppress; one
directed at the search warrant evidence and one at the video recordings made by the
CS during the controlled purchases. (CR Docs. 144, 145). Both were denied. (CR Docs.
148, 150). Following a three-day jury trial, the jury deadlocked on Count 1 but
convicted Petitioner on Counts 2 through 4. (CR Doc. 158).
In the months following his trial, Petitioner wrote the Court expressing
dissatisfaction with Ms. Grosser’s and Mr. Bailey’s representation. (CR Docs. 164,
165). On April 10, 2023, Mr. Bailey moved to withdraw at Petitioner’s request. (CR
Doc. 169). At an April 24, 2023, hearing, the Court informed Petitioner that
Mr. Bailey, his third appointed counsel, would be the last counsel the Court would
appoint, and that Petitioner’s options were to retain private counsel or proceed pro se
at sentencing. (CR Docs. 174, 212). Petitioner elected to proceed pro se. See (CR Docs.
190, 	191, 	192). 	On 	June 	6, 	2023, 	Petitioner 	was 	sentenced 	to 	300 	months’
imprisonment followed by four years of supervised release. (CR Doc. 194).
Petitioner timely appealed his conviction. (CR Doc. 198). The US Court of
Appeal for the Seventh Circuit appointed the Office of the Federal Public Defender
for the Central District of Illinois, and Johanna Christiansen represented Petitioner
from July 11, 2023, through February 13, 2025. (Doc. 16-1, ¶ 3). The Seventh Circuit
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denied Petitioner’s appeal and affirmed his conviction. United States v. Offutt, 122
F.4th 268 (7th Cir. 2024).
On December 3, 2025, Petitioner filed the instant Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255. (Doc. 1). Following preliminary review, the Court dismissed Claims One
through Three and directed the United States to respond to Claims Four through
Eight. (Doc. 2). On July 6, 2026, Petitioner filed an Amended Motion alleging claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”). (Doc. 15). The United States filed its
Response in Opposition on July 15, 2026. (Doc. 16) The Response included the
Declaration of Ms. Christiansen, (Doc. 16-1), and the Affidavit of Mr. Bailey. (Doc. 16-
2). Petitioner filed a Reply on July 28, 2026. (Doc. 18). On July 31, 2026, the United
States moved to strike portions of Petitioner’s Reply. (Doc. 20).
LEGAL S TANDARD
A court must vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence of a prisoner in custody
if it finds that “the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence,
or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise
subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. However, relief under § 2255 is limited.
Unlike a direct appeal, in which a defendant may complain of nearly any error, relief
under § 2255 is “available only in extraordinary situations, such as an error of
constitutional 	or 	jurisdictional 	magnitude 	or 	where 	a 	fundamental 	defect 	has
occurred which results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Blake v. United States,
726 F.3d 870, 878–79 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Prewitt v. United States, 83 F.3d 812, 816
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(7th Cir. 1996)). Section 2255 cannot be used as a substitute for a direct appeal or to
relitigate issues decided on direct appeal. See Sandoval v. United States, 574 F.3d
847, 850 (7th Cir. 2009); White v. United States, 371 F.3d 900, 902 (7th Cir.
2004); Coleman v. United States, 318 F.3d 754, 760 (7th Cir. 2003). “[R]elief under §
2255 is an extraordinary remedy because it asks the district court to essentially
reopen the criminal process to a person who already has had an opportunity for full
process.” Almonacid v. United States, 476 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 2007).
A NALYSIS
I. 	Petitioner’s Claims for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
“The Sixth Amendment right of effective assistance of counsel applies to a
criminal 	defendant’s 	trial, 	sentencing, 	and 	the 	first 	appeal 	of 	right.” Jones 	v.
Welborn, 877 F. Supp. 1214, 1219 (S.D. Ill. 1994) (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481
U.S. 551 (1987)). Petitioner’s IAC claims may be brought for the first time in a § 2255
motion. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003); United States v. James,
635 F.3d 909, 916 (7th Cir. 2011). However, Petitioner “bears a heavy burden in
making out a winning claim based on ineffective assistance of counsel.” United States
v. Trevino, 60 F.3d 333, 338 (7th Cir. 1995).
Claims 	of 	IAC 	are evaluated 	under 	a 	two-prong 	test. 	Strickland 	v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 690, 694 (1984); McDowell v. Kingston, 497 F.3d 757, 761
(7th Cir. 2007). A petitioner must establish (1) “that counsel’s performance was
deficient,” and (2) “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687; Thompson v. Vanihel, 998 F.3d 762, 767 (7th Cir. 2021). To satisfy
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the performance prong, the petitioner must overcome “a strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. To prove prejudice, the petitioner must establish that
“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. If the court finds that
the movant fails to establish deficient performance or prejudice, the claim fails. See
United States v. Slaughter, 900 F.2d 1119, 1124 (7th Cir. 1990).
A. 	Claim Four – Felon in Possession of a Firearm
Petitioner alleges that: (A) he was arrested without the firearm on his person;
(B) he was unaware of his felon status because his prior conviction was sealed; (C)
the government failed to prove he knew he was a felon; and (D) Bruen renders 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied to him. (Doc. 15-1, p. 4). Petitioner’s
attributes the conduct generally to “all prior counsel” rather than any specific
attorney. (Id.).
Petitioner’s allegation in that he was not arrested holding the firearm in sub-
claim (A) does not, by itself, identify any attorney error, and it is not a cognizable
basis for relief.
In sub-claims (B) and (C), Petitioner again does not identify any specific
attorney or omission. Even so, Petitioner’s allegation that his prior conviction was
expunged is incorrect. Petitioner’s prior conviction was sealed from the general
public, but not law enforcement, and this was detailed at Petitioner’s trial. (CR Doc.
188, pp. 77, 83–84). The jury was made aware of this fact and was instructed on the
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legal difference between expunged and sealed. (CR Doc. 155, pp. 27–28). While we
construe pro se Petitioner’s claim liberally, his failure to allege any specific attorney
error is detrimental to this claim. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Therefore, Petitioner’s unsupported conclusory claims do not provide a basis for relief.
Aleman v. United States, 878 F.2d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 1989).
On sub-claim (D), Petitioner develops no legal argument for why Bruen applies
to his conviction and “undeveloped arguments” are waived, “even where those
arguments raise constitutional issues.” United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 775 (7th
Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Therefore, Petitioner’s Claim Four is denied.
B. 	Claim Five – Mr. Cronin
Petitioner alleges Mr. Cronin was ineffective for: (A) causing him to waive his
preliminary 	hearing 	without 	adequate 	explanation; 	(B) 	failing 	to 	file 	pretrial
suppression or dismissal motions; (C) failing to raise an entrapment defense; and (D)
withdrawing without a colloquy. (Doc. 15-1, p. 6).
A preliminary hearing’s function, testing whether probable cause exists to
proceed, was thus performed by the grand jury regardless of what occurred at the
waiver hearing. The Court need not resolve whether that Mr. Cronin’s advisement to
Petitioner was sufficiently thorough, because any deficiency would not be prejudicial.
The preliminary hearing waiver form, signed by both Petitioner and Mr. Cronin,
specifically recites that Petitioner knew of his right to a preliminary hearing and
chose to waive it. (CR Doc. 19). Additionally, five days after Petitioner waived his
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right to a preliminary hearing a grand jury independently found probable cause and
indicted Petitioner on February 24, 2021. (CR Doc. 23).
The record reflects that Mr. Cronin did not file any motions for dismissal or
suppression during his representation of Petitioner. However, the Court need not
decide whether that omission was itself objectively unreasonable, because Petitioner
cannot establish prejudice. Petitioner alleges that Mr. Cronin should have filed for
suppression based on “deficient warrant and lack of probable cause” as to the search
warrant and the vehicle search. (CR Doc. 15-1, p. 9). However, after Mr. Cronin
withdrew, Petitioner’s successor counsel made this argument in a motion to suppress,
which this Court considered on the merits and rejected. (CR Doc. 96, pp. 3–8).
Because the same argument was later made, on a complete record, and failed, there
is no reasonable probability that an earlier filing by Mr. Cronin would have produced
a different result.
An entrapment theory requires the defendant to come forward with evidence
of a lack of predisposition and government inducement. United States v. Anderson,
55 F.4th 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2022). Petitioner offers no such evidence, only the
assertion that Mr. Cronin once remarked the case “sounds like” entrapment. Counsel
is not ineffective for declining to pursue a defense unsupported by any evidentiary
showing. See United States v. Boyd, 86 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that
the choice of which defenses to pursue is a tactical decision committed to counsel).
While the record confirms that Mr. Cronin’s motion to withdraw was granted
without any hearing. Mr. Cronin cited a conflict of interest and a breakdown in
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communication as the reason for his withdrawal. (CR Doc. 45). Accordingly, Mr.
Cronin’s withdrawal was not an unreasonable act or omission. See Washington v.
Sherwin Real Estate, Inc., 649 F.2d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding that it is
reasonable for an attorney to withdraw based on deteriorated communications with
their client). Therefore, Petitioner’s Claim Five for IAC based on Mr. Cronin’s
representation is denied.
C. 	Claim Six – Ms. Grosser
In Claim Six, Petitioner alleges that Ms. Grosser (A) filed a suppression motion
without a memorandum of law as required by Local Rule 7.1; (B) failed to raise a
defense 	based 	on 	Fourth 	Amendment 	grounds; 	(C) 	failed 	to 	respond 	to 	the
government’s motions in limine; and (D) failed to raise a Rule 12 defense. (Doc. 15-1,
p. 10).
While Ms. Grosser did not file a memorandum of law in support of her motion
to suppress, this did not prejudice Petitioner because the Court expressly declined to
deny the motion on that basis alone. Instead, the Court rejected the motion on its
merits, addressing both the address-particularity issue, and the vehicle search. (CR
Doc. 96, p. 3) (“The Court is constrained to note that Offutt did not file a memorandum
of law… In any event, the Motion lacks merit.”). Because the Court reviewed the
motion 	on 	its 	merits, 	there 	is 	no 	reasonable 	probability 	that 	a 	supporting
memorandum would have changed the result.
Petitioner’s allegation that Ms. Grosser failed to raise a Fourth Amendment
defense is factually incorrect. Ms. Grosser’s motion to suppress, filed March 24, 2022,
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argued that the search warrant lacked probable cause and that no exception to the
warrant requirement applied. (CR Doc. 84). The Court addressed both the warrant’s
particularity 	and 	the 	vehicle 	search 	under 	the 	search-incident-to-arrest 	and
automobile-exception doctrines. (CR Doc. 96, pp. 3–8).
Petitioner does not identify which motions in limine Ms. Grosser failed to
respond to or which Rule 12 defense she should have raised. Ms. Grosser filed
suppression motions, and as previously discussed, Petitioner’s conclusory allegations
that fail to identify a specific omission cannot sustain relief. Aleman, 878 F.2d at
1012. Therefore, Petitioner’s Claim Six for IAC based on Ms. Grosser’s representation
is denied.
D. 	Claim Seven – Mr. Bailey
Petitioner alleges Mr. Bailey was ineffective for (A) allowing the government
to introduce evidence despite pending suppression motions; (B) failing to impeach
FBI Agents Parker and Herzing regarding the arrest and search warrants; (C) failing
to call certain witnesses, specifically April Smith, Deputy U.S. Marshal Lauren
Patterson, and Officer James Ramsey; and (D) failing to raise sentencing objections,
including to Petitioner’s career-offender designation. (Doc. 15-1, p. 14).
Petitioner alleges that Mr. Bailey allowed the Government to introduce
evidence from a wiretap, but the trial exhibit list contains no such references. The
government’s trial Exhibits One and Two were video recordings of the controlled
purchases, which is consistent with the government’s account that their CS wore a
recording device during these transactions. Mr. Bailey cannot be ineffective for
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“allowing” 	evidence 	that 	never 	existed, 	and 	Petitioner’s 	speculation 	that 	an
investigation would have shown the CS never called him does not address the
government’s video evidence or establish a reasonable probability of a different
outcome. See Brown v. Finnan, 598 F.3d 416, 424–25 (7th Cir. 2010).
Petitioner separately argues that Mr. Bailey should have sought a Franks
hearing based on Agent Parker’s trial testimony that he did not recall participating
in the search warrant application. Petitioner’s argument fails both on timing and on
the merits. Mr. Bailey’s suppression motions were filed on December 4, 2022, three
days before Agent Parker’s testimony was given. (CR Docs. 144, 145). Additionally,
Franks requires a substantial preliminary showing of a knowing or reckless falsehood
in the affidavit at the time it was sworn, not a memory lapse in testimony given nearly
two years later. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 170 (1978); United States v. Glover,
755 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2014).
Reviewing courts do not second guess the reasonable strategic decisions of
attorneys. United States v. Brooks, 125 F.3d 484, 496 (7th Cir. 1997). Mr. Bailey’s
decision not to press Agent Parker further on his uncertain recollection was a
reasonable tactical choice which the Court will not second guess.
Petitioner’s claim that Mr. Bailey should have called Ms. Smith, Deputy
Patterson, and Officer Ramsey as trial witnesses each requires separate treatment.
Mr. Bailey’s affidavit confirms he contacted Ms. Smith and was prepared to call her
regarding the search warrant’s address description. (Doc. 16-2, p. 2). However, the
suppression theory that her testimony would have supported had already been raised
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by prior counsel and rejected on the merits. See (CR Doc. 96, pp. 3–8). There is
accordingly no prejudice from any decision not to call her at trial.
The parties dispute whether Petitioner ever asked Mr. Bailey to call Deputy
Patterson and Officer Ramsey as trial witnesses. Mr. Bailey’s affidavit states he was
not informed of any such request, while Petitioner’s motion asserts the opposite. (Doc.
15-1, p. 14; Doc. 16-2, p. 2). However, the Court need not resolve that factual conflict,
because Petitioner has not made the threshold showing required regardless of who is
correct. United States v. Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 1991) (“evidence about
the testimony of a putative witness must generally be presented in the form of actual
testimony by the witness or on affidavit,” and “a defendant cannot simply state that
the testimony would have been favorable”); Brown v. McGinnis, 922 F.2d 425, 428
(7th Cir. 1991) (petitioner “must make a comprehensive showing of what the potential
witness’ testimony would have been and how it would have produced a different
result”). Petitioner offers neither an affidavit from Deputy Patterson or Officer
Ramsey nor any proffer of what either would have said. Petitioner’s own unsupported
assertion that their testimony would have helped him is insufficient. Ashimi, 932
F.2d at 650.
Mr. Bailey was discharged from his representation of Petitioner before the
June 6, 2023, sentencing hearing, at which Petitioner proceeded pro se. Petitioner
cannot fault Mr. Bailey for objections not made at a hearing he did not attend and at
which he no longer represented Petitioner. Therefore, Petitioner’s Claim Seven for
IAC based on Mr. Bailey’s representation is denied.
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E. 	Claim Eight – Ms. Christiansen
Petitioner’s Claim Eight alleges that Ms. Christiansen was ineffective for (A)
failing to appeal the denial of his suppression motions as to the arrest warrant, search
warrant, and CS audio device; (B) failing to argue his “improper” career-offender
enhancement, drug-purity calculation, and criminal-history calculation; (C) failing to
make a Fourth Amendment argument and failing to file a petition for certiorari
regarding the denied motion to suppress; and (D) generally depriving him of
meaningful appellate review. (Doc. 15-1, p. 20–21).
Ms. Christiansen’s declaration, (Doc. 16-1), addresses each point and why she
was not deficient. Ms. Christiansen declined to appeal the trial court’s ruling on the
suppression issue because she reasonably relied on law that supported it lacked
merit. 	Specifically, 	that 	the 	warrant’s 	minor 	address 	discrepancy 	would 	not
invalidate it where officers plainly knew the residence. (Doc. 16-1, ¶ 8); see United
States v. Kelly, 772 F.3d 1072, 1081 (7th Cir. 2014) (explaining that a warrant’s
description is sufficient if an officer can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify
the place intended). Additionally, recording from the CS audio device was lawful
under the one-party-consent exception to Title III, 18 U.S.C. § 2511, leaving no viable
suppression theory to raise on appeal. United States v. Davenpoprt, 986 F.2d 1047,
1049–50 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that it is not ineffective assistance of counsel to
refuse to raise an argument that has no hope of success).
Ms. Christiansen declined to challenge Petitioner’s career-offender status
because Petitioner’s predicate offenses qualified as “controlled substance offenses,”
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which reaches state offenses broader than federal law,2 and because the “separate
occasions” 	requirement 	Petitioner relies on 	applies 	only to the 	Armed Career
Criminal Act. United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642, 651–54 (7th Cir. 2020). Any
potential recalculations based on criminal history or drug purity would not have
mattered as career offenders receive Criminal History Category VI regardless of point
total. Additionally, the career-offender offense level (34) already exceeded the drug-
quantity level (30), and the higher one controls. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b). Additionally,
Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment argument fails because the warrant was not invalid.
Finally, because none of the arguments Petitioner wanted raised on appeal are
shown to be “obvious” and “clearly stronger” than the two Ms. Christiansen raised,
there is no independent basis for the broader claim that her performance deprived
him of meaningful appellate review. Brown, 598 F.3d at 425; Lee v. Davis, 328 F.3d
896, 900–01 (7th Cir. 2003). Therefore, Petitioner’s Claim Eight for IAC based Ms.
Christiansen’s representation is denied.
II. 	Government’s Motion to Strike Portions of Petitioner’s Reply
After the United States filed its Response, (Doc. 16), Petitioner filed a Reply.
(Doc. 18). The United States filed a Motion to Strike, (Doc. 20), arguing that
Petitioner’s Reply improperly raises new claims not presented in the Amended
Motion, and that Petitioner improperly renews arguments on Claims One through
Three which were dismissed at preliminary review. (Doc. 20).
2 The same Illinois definition Petitioner cites for the opposite conclusion.
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Petitioner’s Reply advances two theories that were not presented in his
Amended Motion: first, that Grosser and Bailey failed to conduct a “thorough and
creative investigation”; and second, that Cronin, Grosser, and Bailey were separately
ineffective for not challenging the grand jury indictment or obtaining its transcripts.
(Doc. 18, pp. 2–3). Neither theory appears in the Amended Motion. (Doc. 15-1).
A Petitioner may not bring arguments “for the first time in a reply brief.” U.S.
v. Diaz, 533 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 2008). However, material raised for the first time
in a § 2255 reply is not a categorically barred. See Harris v. United States, 13 F.4th
623, 627–28 (7th Cir. 2021). New material may be considered if the government is not
meaningfully prejudiced by the timing — particularly when a response to the reply
would have required developing new facts, rather than addressing a purely legal
question already implicit in claims before the court. Id.
The Reply also revisits Petitioner’s criminal-history category, which was
previously dismissed because sentencing-guideline calculation errors of this kind are
not cognizable under § 2255 absent a constitutional or jurisdictional defect. Hawkins
v. United States, 706 F.3d 820, 823 (7th Cir. 2013); Blake, 723 F.3d at 878–79. That
defect is not cured by re-raising the argument in a reply.
Applying that standard, neither new theory survives. Both are entirely new
grounds for relief, unconnected to any claim in Petitioner’s Amended Motion, and the
government has had no opportunity to respond to either. Therefore, the United
States’ Motion to Strike, (Doc. 20), is GRANTED.
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C ONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Tyron Offutt’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or
Correct Sentence filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 1) is DENIED. This action
is 	DISMISSED with 	prejudice. 	The 	Clerk 	of 	Court 	shall 	enter 	judgment
accordingly and close this case on the Court’s docket.
C ERTIFICATE OF A PPEALABILITY
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings in United States District
Courts instructs the district court to “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when
it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” A certificate of appealability may be
issued “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
To meet this standard, the petitioner “must have a constitutional claim (or an
underlying procedural argument on which a constitutional claim depends), and he
must ‘demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment
of his constitutional claims debatable or wrong.’” United States v. Fleming, 676 F.3d
621, 625 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 281 (2004)); see
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
As for Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner has not
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Having thoroughly
reviewed the record before the Court, the undersigned concludes that reasonable
jurists would not find the disposition of that claim debatable or wrong. Accordingly,
this Court DENIES issuance of a certificate of appealability.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: October 8, 2026
__________________________
STEPHEN P. McGLYNN
U.S. District Judge
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