Jenkins v. Phillips et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
KEJUAN JENKINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
HUNTER HOUSE, VINCENT KIEFER,
JARED PHILLIPS, THOMAS QUINN,
and JOSHUA SCHOENBECK,
Defendants.
Case No. 24-cv-2413-NJR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff Kejuan Jenkins, who at the time he filed his Complaint was an inmate of
the Illinois Department of Corrections, brought this action for deprivations of his
constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment on the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies (Docs. 39, 40). Jenkins
was given notice of the motion (Doc. 41), but, as of this date, has failed to file a response.
B ACKGROUND
On October 31, 2024, Jenkins’s claims in this case were severed from his claims in
Jenkins v. Wills, et al., Case No. 24-cv-00476-SPM (Doc. 1). His allegations in this case relate
to an incident with correctional officers that allegedly occurred on October 12, 2023
(Doc. 15, p. 2). Jenkins and other inmates were escorted to their cells with their hands
cuffed behind their backs (Id.). Jared Phillips directed Jenkins to pull up his sagging pants,
but Jenkins informed Phillips that he could not perform the task due to his hands being
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behind his back and having a previous shoulder injury (Id.). Phillips threatened him with
segregation, Jenkins requested help in pulling up his pants, and Phillips escorted him to
segregation (Id.).
Four days later, on October 16, 2023, Jenkins was escorted from segregation to the
healthcare bullpen where Hunter House, Vincent Kiefer, and Thomas Quinn allegedly
beat and maced him at the direction of Phillips and Joshua Schoenbeck (Id.). Jenkins was
returned to his cell. An officer sprayed his mattress with mace. Quinn instructed House
to turn off the water to Jenkins’s cell.
After a review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Jenkins was
allowed to proceed on the following counts:
Count 1: 	Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Phillips,
House, Quinn, Kiefer, and Schoenbeck for spraying Jenkins
with mace and physically assaulting him.
Count 2: 	Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim
against Quinn and House for spraying Jenkins’s mattress
with mace and turning off the water to his cell.
(Doc. 15, p. 2).
A. Summary Judgment Motion
Defendants argue that Jenkins failed to submit any grievances regarding the use
of force or conditions of his segregation cell prior to filing his lawsuit. They offered the
grievance records from Menard Correctional Center and the Administrative Review
Board (“ARB”). They also offered the affidavit of grievance officer Jacob Guetersloh
(Doc. 40-5) 	who 	attested 	that 	grievances 	received 	from 	inmates 	at 	Menard 	are
documented and tracked on documents called Grievance Logs (Id. at p. 3). Each grievance
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is assigned a number when received and that number is documented in both the
Grievance Logs and an inmate’s CHAMPS notes (“Comprehensive Housing And
Management Placement System”) (Id. at pp. 3-4). Further, each level of the grievance
process is documented in both the Grievance Logs and CHAMPS notes (Id. at p. 4).
Guetersloh indicated that he was asked to review the grievance records for grievances
filed by Jenkins from April 2022 through December 2024, specifically looking for
grievances related to the events of October 12, 2023, and October 16, 2023 (Id. at p. 5).
He was unable to locate any grievances regarding an assault by officers or Jenkins’s
placement in a cell sprayed with mace and lacking access to water (Id.).
Defendants also offered the affidavit of Ryan Nothnagle, the chairperson of the
ARB who reviews grievances submitted by inmates (Doc. 40-3). Nothnagle noted that
grievances received by the ARB are maintained in a log, labeled IGRV, which documents
all grievances received by the ARB from a particular inmate (Id. at p. 3). The ARB also
maintains 	paper 	copies 	of 	all 	appeals 	consisting 	of 	the 	grievances and 	attached
correspondence (Id. at p. 4). Nothnagle also reviewed Jenkins’s IGRV logs for grievances
regarding the incidents alleged in Jenkins’s Complaint (Id.). Nothnagle identified only
one grievance, dated March 4, 2024, which Nothnagle noted mentioned an incident where
Jenkins was punished for sagging his pants in October 2023 (Id.).
March 4, 2024 Grievance: Jenkins’s grievance indicates that it is related to
a disciplinary report issued October 12, 2023 (Doc. 40-2, p. 13). Jenkins notes
that on February 15 he spoke to Lieutenant Dye about threats to his safety
from people who approached him with knives and instructed him to
transfer from the East cellhouse (Id.). Dye told Jenkins he would have to
request protective custody. Jenkins checked into protective custody and
was informed by staff that a new memo prohibited inmates from having
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their property with them in protective custody (Id.). Jenkins inquired as to
whether he could keep his mail, pictures, and books but was informed that
he could only have the items that were specifically allowed by the new
policy (Id. at p. 14). Jenkins also noted that the prison was cold and he
believed the temperature was intended to encourage inmates to check out
of protective custody (Id.). Jenkins alleged that the conditions and lack of
access to property and commissary constituted unconstitutional conditions
of confinement (Id.).
Jenkins’s grievance also noted that he received a “bogus ticket” for sagging
his pants while he was handcuffed (Doc. 40-2, p. 14). He alleges the ticket
affected his aggression level. Jenkins alleged that he should not have been
placed in the East cellhouse and that internal affairs acknowledged that
gangs threatened to jump him, but he remains in protective custody intake
instead of actual protective custody (Id.). Jenkins requested a transfer to
another prison where he could receive good time, noting that he only had
12 months left on his sentence (Id.).
Jenkins marked his grievance as an emergency (Doc. 40-2, p. 13). On March
7, 2024, the ARB received the grievance (Id.). On March 21, 2024, Nothnagle
returned the grievance because it lacked a counselor and grievance officer
response (Id. at p. 12). There is no other record of this grievance in Menard’s
grievance files (Do. 40-6; 40-4).
The ARB did receive a grievance officer’s report from Jenkins that is dated
during the relevant time period. On September 26, 2024, the ARB received a
grievance officer’s report from October 24, 2023 (Doc. 40-2, p. 3). The report notes
that Jenkins submitted a grievance dated October 19, 2023, complaining that he
had not been able to obtain medical care after multiple sick calls for throwing up
blood (Doc. 40-2, p. 3). The ARB returned the grievance for Jenkins’s failure to
provide a copy of the actual grievance (Id. at p. 2). Further, the grievance does not
appear to relate to any of the issues in Jenkins’s Complaint.
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LEGAL STANDARDS
“Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, discovery materials, disclosures,
and affidavits demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact such that [the defendant] is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Wragg v. Village of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 467
(7th Cir. 2010). Lawsuits filed by inmates are governed by the provisions of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). That statute states, in pertinent part,
that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”
Id. The Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.
Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that “[t]his circuit has taken a
strict compliance approach to exhaustion”). Exhaustion must occur before the suit is filed.
Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff cannot file suit and then
exhaust his administrative remedies while the suit is pending. Id. Moreover, “[t]o exhaust
remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the
prison administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir.
2002). Consequently, if a prisoner fails to properly utilize a prison’s grievance process,
“the prison administrative authority can refuse to hear the case, and the prisoner’s claim
can be indefinitely unexhausted.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809.
In Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740-41(7th Cir. 2008), the Seventh Circuit held that
“debatable factual issues relating to the defense of failure to exhaust administrative
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remedies” are not required to be decided by a jury but are to be determined by the judge. 1
Thus, where failure to exhaust administrative remedies is raised as an affirmative
defense, the Seventh Circuit set forth the following recommendations:
The sequence to be followed in a case in which exhaustion is contested is
therefore as follows: (1) The district judge conducts a hearing on exhaustion
and 	permits 	whatever 	discovery 	relating 	to 	exhaustion 	he 	deems
appropriate. (2) If the judge determines that the prisoner did not exhaust
his administrative remedies, the judge will then determine whether (a) the
plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and so he must
go back and exhaust; (b) or, although he has no unexhausted administrative
remedies, the failure to exhaust was innocent (as where prison officials
prevent a prisoner from exhausting his remedies), and so he must be given
another chance to exhaust (provided that there exist remedies that he will
be permitted by the prison authorities to exhaust, so that he’s not just being
given a runaround); or (c) the failure to exhaust was the prisoner’s fault, in
which event the case is over. (3) If and when the judge determines that the
prisoner has properly exhausted his administrative remedies, the case will
proceed to pretrial discovery, and if necessary a trial, on the merits; and if
there is a jury trial, the jury will make all necessary findings of fact without
being bound by (or even informed of) any of the findings made by the
district 	judge 	in 	determining 	that 	the 	prisoner 	had 	exhausted 	his
administrative remedies.
Id. at 742.
A. Illinois Exhaustion Requirements
As an IDOC inmate, Jenkins was required to follow the regulations contained in
IDOC’s Grievance Procedures for Offenders (“grievance procedures”) to properly
exhaust his claim. 20 Ill. Administrative Code §504.800 et seq. The grievance procedures
1 Recently the Supreme Court partially overruled Pavey in Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460 (2025).
Specifically, the Supreme Court held that “parties are entitled to a jury trial on PLRA exhaustion
when that issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim protected by the Seventh Amendment.”
Id. at 479. Here, the issue of exhaustion is not intertwined with the merits of Jenkins’s underlying
claims. Thus, Perrtu is not applicable.
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first require inmates to file their grievance with the counselor within 60 days of the
discovery of an incident. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.810(a). The grievance form must:
contain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint,
including what happened, when, where and the name of each person who
is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint. This
provision does not preclude an offender from filing a grievance when the
names of individuals are not known, but the offender must include as much
descriptive information about the individual as possible.
20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.810(c). Grievances that are unable to be resolved through
routine channels are then sent to the grievance officer. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.820(a).
The Grievance Officer will review the grievance and provide a written response to the
inmate. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.830(a). “The Grievance Officer shall consider the
grievance and report his or her findings and recommendations in writing to the Chief
Administrative Officer [“CAO”] within two months after receipt of the written grievance,
when reasonably feasible under the circumstances.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.830(e). “The
[CAO] shall review the findings and recommendation and advise the offender of his or
her decision in writing.” Id.
If the inmate is not satisfied with the CAO’s response, he or she can file an appeal
with the Director through the ARB. The grievance procedures specifically state, “[i]f, after
receiving the response of the Chief Administrative Officer, the offender still believes that
the problem, complaint or grievance has not been resolved to his or her satisfaction, he
or she may appeal in writing to the Director. The appeal must be received by the [ARB]
within 30 days after the date of the decision.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.850(a). The inmate
shall attach copies of the Grievance Officer’s report and the CAO’s decision to his appeal.
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Id. “The Administrative Review Board shall submit to the Director a written report of its
findings and recommendations.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.850(d). “The Director shall
review the findings and recommendations of the Board and make a final determination
of the grievance within six months after receipt of the appealed grievance, when
reasonably feasible under the circumstances. The offender shall be sent a copy of the
Director’s decision.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.850(e).
The grievance procedures allow for an inmate to file an emergency grievance. In
order to file an emergency grievance, the inmate must forward the grievance directly to
the CAO who may determine that “there is a substantial risk of imminent personal injury
or other serious or irreparable harm to the offender” and thus the grievance should be
handled on an emergency basis. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.840(a). If the CAO determines
the grievance should be handled on an emergency basis, then the CAO “shall expedite
processing of the grievance and respond to the offender” indicating to him what action
shall be taken. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.840(b). If the CAO determines the grievances
“should not be handled on an emergency basis, the offender shall be notified in writing
that he or she may resubmit the grievance as non-emergent, in accordance with the
standard grievance process.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.840(c). When an inmate appeals a
grievance deemed by the CAO to be an emergency, “the Administrative Review Board
shall expedite processing of the grievance.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.850(f).
A NALYSIS
After filing their summary judgment motion, Defendants certified that they
provided notice of their motion to Jenkins by mailing the motion to his designated
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address. 2 Despite receiving notice of the motion, Jenkins failed to file a response. Because
Jenkins failed to respond to Defendants’ statement of facts, the Court accepts the
statement of facts as true. Parra v. Neal, 614 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Cracco v.
Vitran Exp. Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009); Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir.
2003)). See also SDIL Local Rule 56.1(g) (“All material facts…shall be deemed admitted
for purposes of summary judgment unless specifically disputed.”). The admission of the
material facts, however, does not automatically grant Defendants summary judgment;
they must still demonstrate that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Carroll
v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012).
Here, Jenkins failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to any defendant.
Jenkins failed to file any grievances related to the alleged incident of excessive force or
the conditions of his cell while in segregation. There are simply no grievances on the
docket related to his claims. Only one grievance on the record even mentions issues with
his sagging pants. In his Complaint, Jenkins alleged that an issue with his sagging pants
on October 12, 2023, led to his placement in segregation and preceded the use of force
incident on October 16, 2023. Jenkins’s March 2024 grievance detailed above mentions
the ticket issued for sagging pants on October 12, 2023, but the grievance lacks any
allegations regarding the defendants’ use of force or his conditions in segregation. He
only mentions the disciplinary ticket in passing, and his grievance focuses mostly on his
conditions in protective custody, particularly focusing on his access to his personal
2 Because he expressed safety concerns, Jenkins’s address remains under seal.
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property and temperature in the unit during his stay in February 2024. The grievance also
fails to mention any of the defendants by name. The grievance simply fails to exhaust
Jenkins’s claims in this case.
Even if the grievance included the claims from this case, Jenkins failed to properly
exhaust the March 2024 grievance. It appears that he submitted the grievance directly to
the ARB. The grievance is dated March 4, 2024, and it was received by the ARB on March
7, 2024 (Doc. 40-2, p. 13). The grievance lacks any response from either a counselor or
grievance officer. Although some grievances may be submitted directly to the ARB if they
contain issues dealing with protective custody placement (among other issues not
relevant to this case), Jenkins’s grievance only complained about the conditions he
experienced in protective custody. 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.870(a)(1). The ARB rejected
the grievance for lacking a response from the counselor and grievance officer (Doc. 40-2,
p. 12). When a grievance is rejected on procedural grounds, and not on the merits of the
complaint, the grievance remains unexhausted. Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 721 (7th Cir.
2011) (quoting Dole, 438 F.3d at 808). Thus, even if Jenkins’s grievance properly included
the claims in this lawsuit, he failed to exhaust the grievance by failing to submit it to
prison grievance officials.
There are no other grievances in the record that could serve to exhaust Jenkins’s
claims, nor has Jenkins pointed to any additional grievances. Nor is there any evidence
to suggest that the grievance process was somehow unavailable to him. Jenkins simply
failed to file any grievances regarding the use of force by House, Kiefer, Phillips, Quinn,
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and Schoenbeck, or regarding his conditions in segregation after the use of force incident.
Thus, Jenkins failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
(Docs. 39, 40) is GRANTED. Jenkins’s claims are DISMISSED without prejudice for his
failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter
judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 12, 2026
___________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
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