Sillas v. Meyers et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
STANTON SILLAS,
Plaintiff,
v.
PERCY MEYERS, TAMMY STEVENS,
LESLI KLUGE, REBECCA ANDERER,
MELISSA OGLE, WEXFORD HEALTH
SOURCES INC., DEBORAH KRAMM,
and LATOYA HUGHES,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:24-cv-01778-NJR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff Stanton Sillas, an inmate in the Illinois Department of Corrections,
brings this action alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs, retaliation, and
medical malpractice during his incarceration. Sillas again seeks recruitment of counsel
because he is not a lawyer, has no formal training in litigation, has not attended any
school of law, and cannot depose Defendants. (Doc. 61). Moreover, Sillas states that he
is now being housed at a different institution without the help of a law library and law
clerk to guide him. Id. at 1. Further, Sillas represents that both he and his wife have
contacted several law firms and attorney offices with 	no success in obtaining
representation. Id. at 1, 3–8.
A district court “may request an attorney to represent any person unable to
afford counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). There is no constitutional or statutory right to
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counsel for a civil litigant, however. Stroe v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 256
F.3d 	498, 	500 	(7th Cir. 2001); 	Zarnes 	v. 	Rhodes, 	64 	F.3d 	285, 	288 	(7th Cir. 1995).
Recruitment of counsel lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Pruitt v.
Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1006
(7th Cir. 2006)).
In determining whether to recruit counsel, the Court is directed to make a
two-fold inquiry: “(1) [H]as the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain
counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty
of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?” Pruitt, 503 F.3d
at 654-55 (citing Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 321-22 (7th Cir. 1993)). The first prong of
the analysis is a threshold question. If a plaintiff has made no attempt to obtain counsel
on his own, the court should deny the request. See Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655.
The Court has denied three of Sillas’s previous requests for recruitment of
counsel. (See Docs. 9, 10, 32, 37, 50, 55). After the second motion, the Court found that
Sillas met his threshold burden of showing a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel on
his own. (Doc. 37). It appears Sillas has since made additional attempts to procure
counsel. (Doc. 61, at 3–6). But in denying the previous motions, the Court deemed Sillas
capable of representing himself given his well-written and easy-to-understand filings
in the litigation thus far. (Docs. 37, 55).
At this time, the Court still finds that recruitment of counsel is unwarranted.
Sillas’s reasons for seeking counsel—that he is not a lawyer, has no formal training in
litigation, and has not attended law school—apply to almost every pro se individual
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seeking to litigate a claim. No doubt, a lawyer would be helpful to him, but it is a
difficult decision as to whether to appoint counsel, “since ‘[a]lmost everyone would
benefit from having a lawyer, but there are too many indigent litigants and too few
lawyers willing and able to volunteer for these cases.’” Dewitt v. Corizon, Inc., 760 F.3d
654, 657 (7th Cir. 2014). In this case, discovery is ongoing and currently slated to end in
March 2026. While Sillas proceeds on eight counts against eight defendants, the claims
all relate to his medical care while incarcerated. (See Doc. 49). Recently, Sillas
successfully amended his complaint to add two claims. (See Docs. 47, 49). And as the
Court has noted before, Sillas’s filings have been straightforward and well drafted.
In its Order denying Sillas’s third motion for recruitment of counsel, this Court
made clear that Sillas needed to attempt to engage in discovery on his own. (Doc. 61).
It stated that if issues arose during discovery, Sillas could notify the Court, file a motion
for an extension of time, or speak with opposing counsel to reach an agreement on an
extended timeline. Id. If he continued to encounter issues with law library access, Sillas
could petition the Court for an extension of time until his access was restored. Id.
Sillas’s fourth motion does not materially differ from his third, and he does not
make any attempt to explain how his situation has changed. He does not state that any
new problems have arisen that would prevent him from conducting discovery on his
own. He has not moved for an extension of time or notified the Court of any discovery
disputes in the months since his previous motion. And he has not explained why the
potential solutions identified by the Court in its previous Order would be futile. In the
absence of any reason Sillas’s fourth motion for appointment of counsel is different
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from his third, the Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion.
Sillas may move for recruited counsel again in the future, if necessary, but his
motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 61) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 14, 2026
___________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
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