Krase v. Williams

3:23-cv-00365Ilsd10 févr. 2026

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
RICHIE LOUIS KRASE,
Petitioner,
v.
ACTING WARDEN OF FCI
GREENVILLE,
Respondent.
Case No. 3:23-cv-00365-NJR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Petitioner Richie Louis Krase filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the computation of the prison credit allocated towards his
federal sentence. (Doc. 1). For the reasons set forth below, Krase’s petition is denied.
RELEVANT F ACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Krase is a federal inmate currently residing at FCI Oakdale in Oakdale, Louisiana.
BOP Inmate Locator, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited on Feb. 9, 2026). At
the time he filed his petition, Krase was housed at FCI Greenville, which is located within
the Southern District of Illinois. Respondent does not contest this Court’s jurisdiction to
adjudicate the petition. (Doc. 14).
The facts of Krase’s case are somewhat complex. He is serving a 250-month
sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
(Doc. 1); United States v. Roddam et al, No. 4:17-cr-00198-P-7 (“Criminal Case”). His
projected release date is July 30, 2034.
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On October 2, 2014, Krase was arrested in Tarrant County, Texas, on state-level
controlled substance charges (Case No. 1387306). (Doc. 14-1 p. 3). He was held in state
custody until January 22, 2015, but the charge was later dismissed. Krase was again
arrested in Tarrant County for multiple controlled substance offenses (Case Nos. 1411987
and 1482364) and was in state custody from April 22, 2015, until December 14, 2015. (Id.).
On November 5, 2016, while out on bond from the pending state cases, Krase was arrested
on yet another state-level controlled substance charge. (Id.). Ultimately, the Texas
authorities elected to proceed only on Case No. 1482364. On February 23, 2017, Krase was
sentenced to a seven-year term, with credit for the period he was in custody from April
2015 to December 2015 and for the period between November 2016 and his February 2017
sentencing. (Id.).
On July 18, 2017, Krase was charged federally for conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute a controlled substance. (Id.) He was in federal custody under the auspices of
the United States Marshals Service (USMS) from August 18, 2017, to June 25, 2018,
pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. (Id.). The Honorable John H.
McBryde sentenced Krase to a 250-month term of incarceration on May 25, 2018. (Id.;
Criminal Case, Doc. 268). Judge McBryde specified that the sentence was to run
concurrent to his state sentence in Case No. 1482364. Krase thereafter remained in state
custody until he was paroled to federal custody on March 14, 2019. (Doc. 14-1 p. 4).
According to Respondent, Krase’s federal sentence began on May 25, 2018, the day
he was sentenced. He received credit for a total of 223 days, including (1) the period
between October 2, 2014, and January 22, 2015, which was time he was in custody for the
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state charge that later was dismissed, and (2) the period between November 5, 2017, and
February 22, 2017, under Willis v. United States, 438 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1971).
Krase 	filed 	a 	grievance 	with 	prison 	administrators 	related 	to 	the 	BOP’s
computation of his sentence on January 21, 2022. (Doc. 14-2 p. 5). His grievance was
denied on February 9, 2022. He appealed his denial to the BOP’s North Central Regional
Office on March 2, 2022, and the appeal was denied on March 17, 2022. (Id.). The BOP
does not have a record of any further appeal of that decision by Krase. (Id.).
On February 3, 2023, Krase filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241 in this district court. (Doc. 1). The Court directed the Respondent to
answer the Petition, and Krase filed a reply.
DISCUSSION
Krase alleges that the BOP’s calculation of his sentence does not properly account
for Judge McBryde’s order that his federal sentence was to run concurrent to his state
sentence. As an initial matter, Krase properly raised this challenge under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
A petition under that section is the appropriate means to contest the BOP’s calculation of
the date on which a prisoner must be released. Von Kahl v. Segal, 19 F.4th 987, 988 (7th
Cir. 2021); 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Respondent, for his part, maintains that Krase failed to
properly exhaust his concern through the BOP’s internal processes and that his claim is
meritless in any event.
Although § 2241 does not contain an express exhaustion requirement, the Seventh
Circuit has held that such petitions are subject to a common-law exhaustion rule.
Richmond v. Scibana, 387 F.3d 602, 604 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Vieth v. Williams, No. 21-170,
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2021 WL 5177567, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2021) (citing Gonzalez v. O’Connell, 355 F.3d 1010,
1016 (7th Cir. 2004)) (listing the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement). “Exhaustion
of administrative remedies requires complete exhaustion, even if the appeals process
results in the denial of the requested relief.” Beam v. Sproul, No. 24-02255, 2025 WL
1359903, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 2025) (citing Greene v. Meese, 875 F.2d 639, 641 (7th Cir.
1989)). Where a petitioner complains that errors have been made with respect to BOP
policies and calculations, “it is the BOP that must be given the first opportunity to correct
any such errors.” Id.
To exhaust administrative remedies, a federal prisoner must first file an informal
complaint with institution staff. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a). If the complaint is not resolved
informally, a prisoner must file an administrative remedy request on a BP-9 form at the
institution where he is incarcerated. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(a). If the prisoner is unsatisfied
with the warden’s response to his BP-9, he may submit an appeal to the Regional Director
on a BP-10 form within 20 days. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). If the prisoner is unsatisfied
with the Regional Director’s response, he may submit an appeal on a BP-11 form to the
BOP’s Office of General Counsel within 30 days. Id. The process is complete once an
inmate receives a response from the General Counsel or the time for doing so has lapsed.
See Id. § 542.18.
Respondent avers that Krase has only partially exhausted his claim by pursuing
review only at the facility and regional levels without further appealing to the BOP’s
Office of General Counsel. Krase does not cogently respond to this point in his reply brief,
nor does he attach any documentation attesting to his efforts to further exhaust his
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petition. His petition therefore may be dismissed for that reason alone. See United States
v. Walker, 917 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2019). Regardless, Krase’s claim fails on the merits
for the reasons Respondent explains in his brief.
Krase believes that he is entitled to credit for the time between April 2015 and
December 2015, when he was in state custody. As he sees it, Judge McBryde ordered his
federal sentence to run concurrent with his state sentence, so any period credited to his
state sentence should also be credited to his federal sentence. Unfortunately for Krase, it
is not that simple.
An inmate’s federal sentence commences once the federal government exercises
primary jurisdiction over him. Pope v. Perdue, 889 F.3d 410, 415 (7th Cir. 2018); see also
18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) (“A sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the
defendant is received in custody . . . .”). A federal court may order that its sentence run
concurrent to a state sentence, see 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), but the sentence only is concurrent
from the date the federal sentence is imposed. See Grigsby v. Bledsoe, 223 F. App’x 486, 489
(7th Cir. 2007). That is because an inmate is only entitled to credit for time in custody
“that has not been credited against another sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).
Krase seeks credit for the period he was in state custody between April and
December 2015. (Doc. 17 p. 6). But the BOP could not have given him credit for that time
because the state already credited that time when imposing its sentence. (Doc. 14-1 pp. 4,
19). Respondent’s records make clear that Krase’s federal sentence began on May 25, 2018,
while he still was serving his state sentence, and he was properly was credited for time
he was detained between October 2014 and January 2015, because that time was not
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credited towards his state sentence, and for the period between November 2016 and
February 2017 under Willis. See Grigsby, F. App’x at 488 (explaining that the BOP
administers the so-called Willis credits under Program Statement 5880.28(2)(c), which
provides that if a prisoner’s federal and state sentences are concurrent, and the federal
sentence is to run longer than the state sentence (not counting any credits), “[p]rior
custody credits shall be given for any time spent in non-federal presentence custody that
begins on or after the date of the federal offense up to the date that the first sentence
begins to run, federal or non-federal.”). The Court finds that the BOP did not err in
calculating Krase’s federal sentence and appropriately considered which credits applied.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Petitioner Richie Krase’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to close
this case and enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 10, 2026
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
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