Davis et al v. Baldwin

Page 1 of 11
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
HENRY DAVIS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
LATOYA HUGHES,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. 3:16-CV-600-MAB
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Protective
Relief and Sanctions (Doc. 613) and Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion to Shorten Time for
Defendant’s Discovery Responses (Doc. 616). For the reasons discussed below, both
motions are DENIED without prejudice (Docs. 613, 616).
BACKGROUND1
This class-action lawsuit proceeded to a bench trial in October 2025 (see generally
Docs. 561-580). During the trial, the Court heard testimony from numerous witnesses,
including testimony from Ray Tate (see Doc. 498), Lamar Hardy (Doc. 505), Anthony
Williams (Doc. 577), and Kevin Norman (Doc. 502), all of whom are inmates at Menard
Correctional Center. On October 23, 2025, trial concluded, and this matter was taken
1 The Court assumes the parties, who have already participated in a Status Conference discussing these
motions (Doc. 619), are familiar with the procedural posture of this case and the facts underlying Plaintiffs’
Motions (Docs. 613, 616; see also Doc. 621) and Defendant’s Responses (Docs. 617, 620). Accordingly, the
Background section of this Order only briefly recollects relevant background information.
Case 3:16-cv-00600-MAB Document 622 Filed 03/09/26 Page 1 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 2 of 11
under advisement by the Court (see Docs. 580, 593). Thereafter, the parties submitted their
respective Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Docs. 611, 612).
On February 4, 2026, Plaintiffs filed an Emergency Motion for Protective Relief and
Sanctions (Docs. 613). That motion alleged that certain Menard inmates who testified at
trial, including Ray Tate, Lamar Hardy, Anthony Williams, and Kevin Norman, were
being subjected to a “violent campaign of harassment and abuse for the stated purpose
of retaliating against the Menard prisoners who testified before this Court at trial.” (Id. at
p. 1). More specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that those inmate witnesses had been subjected
to violent physical assaults, confiscation of legal papers, ransacking of their cells,
deprivation of food, fraudulent disciplinary tickets, deprivation of privileges,
withholding of property, and verbal threats to their safety (Id. at p. 2). The motion further
alleged that after learning of the retaliatory conduct their clients had been subjected to,
Plaintiffs’ counsel sent a letter to the Warden of Menard on January 5, 2026, complaining
of the alleged retaliation against Ray Tate (Id. at pp. 2, 13-14). However, after counsel sent
that letter to Menard, Ray Tate was violently assaulted and forced to sign a form stating
that he had not been subjected to retaliation (Id. at pp. 2-3). Plaintiffs’ motion then
recounted their counsels’ largely unsuccessful attempts to discuss and resolve this matter
with opposing counsel (Id. at pp. 4-5). Finally, Plaintiffs’ motion concluded by discussing
the purported legal authority for judicial intervention and Plaintiffs’ requested relief (Id.
at pp. 5-11).2
2 Specifically, Plaintiffs’ motion requested: (1) an immediate evidentiary hearing; (2) if appropriate, a
Protective Order prohibiting retaliation; (3) mandatory disclosure of disciplinary proceedings against
Case 3:16-cv-00600-MAB Document 622 Filed 03/09/26 Page 2 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 3 of 11
In light of the troubling allegations of retaliation raised by Plaintiffs, the Court
ordered an expedited response from Defendant and expressed an intent to set this matter
for an evidentiary hearing after receiving Defendant’s response (Doc. 614). At that time,
the Court also promptly set this matter for a Status Conference to discuss the logistics of
Plaintiffs’ motion and questions the Court had regarding Plaintiffs’ request for an
evidentiary hearing (Id.). As ordered, Defendant filed a Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Protective Relief and Sanctions on February 11, 2026 (Doc. 617). In her Response,
Defendant generally argued that Plaintiffs had not provided any evidentiary support for
their concerning and inflammatory accusations (see Id. at pp. 1-2). Defendant also asked
the Court to clarify what standard applies to Plaintiffs’ motion and any future evidentiary
hearing (Id. at p. 2). Additionally, Defendant refuted Plaintiffs’ contention that Defense
Counsel had all but ignored Plaintiffs’ prior correspondence alerting Defendant to the
alleged retaliation (Id. at pp. 3-6; see also Docs. 617-1, 617-2).
Meanwhile, on February 9, 2026, Plaintiffs filed an Emergency Motion to Shorten
Time for Defendant’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Rule 34 Requests and for Other Relief (Doc.
616) (hereinafter, Plaintiffs’ “Emergency Motion to Shorten Time”). In that motion,
Plaintiffs first detailed the post-trial discovery related to retaliation that the parties had
already conducted, and then argued that Defendant was improperly “slow roll[ing]” or
withholding other discovery materials (see generally Id.). Defendant did not, however,
have time to respond to Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion to Shorten Time before appearing
testifying witnesses; (4) the Court hold Defendant in contempt for allowing witness retaliation; (5) an award
of attorneys’ fees and costs; and (6) any other relief the Court finds appropriate (see Doc. 613 at pp. 11-12).
Case 3:16-cv-00600-MAB Document 622 Filed 03/09/26 Page 3 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 4 of 11
at the Status Conference held on February 12, 2026 (see Doc. 619). Accordingly, at that
Status Conference, the Court set a deadline for Defendant to respond to Plaintiffs’
Emergency Motion to Shorten Time (Id.). In addition, the Court discussed various
logistical matters with the parties and briefly listened to the parties’ arguments as to the
applicable standards governing these post-trial proceedings (Id.). Defendant filed her
Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion to Shorten Time on February 19,
2026 (Doc. 620). In that response, Defendant contended that: (1) the evidence produced
to date did not support Plaintiffs’ allegations, and (2) Plaintiffs lacked any legal basis to
justify expedited discovery and/or discovery of disputed materials (see generally Id.). One
day later, Plaintiffs filed a Reply in Support (Doc. 621).
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Protective Relief and Sanctions (Doc. 613)
Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Protective Relief and Sanctions argues that
Plaintiffs are entitled to their requested relief and sanctions because at least four of
Plaintiffs’ inmate witnesses have been retaliated against by prison staff for testifying at
trial (see generally Doc. 613). In response, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs have not
provided any threshold evidence to support their troubling assertion that Ray Tate and
other Menard inmates were subjected to retaliation, let alone retaliation specifically due
to their trial testimony (see generally Doc. 617). Defendant also requests that the Court
clarify what standard applies to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Protective Relief and Sanctions (see
Id. at p. 2). Ultimately, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ failure to provide any evidentiary
support for their motion to be dispositive.
Case 3:16-cv-00600-MAB Document 622 Filed 03/09/26 Page 4 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 5 of 11
Significantly, Plaintiffs’ motion is not accompanied by any evidence to support
their allegations of retaliation (see generally Doc. 613). Put simply, without providing at
least some evidence, such as affidavits, to support their contentions, the Court has no
assurances that even one piece of evidence will potentially support Plaintiffs’ allegations
of retaliation. And given the substantial time commitment and resource expenditures
required to conduct a multi-day evidentiary hearing on Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for
Protective Relief and Sanctions (see Doc. 619), the Court does not believe it is
unreasonable to require a threshold evidentiary showing before such a lengthy hearing
is scheduled.
Tellingly, the Court’s review of similar motions in other cases has revealed that in
those situations, the party seeking a protective order and/or emergency relief has
accompanied their request with at least some evidence before a hearing was potentially
held. See, e.g., Adams v. NaphCare, Inc., 2:16-CV-229, 2016 WL 10492102, at *10 (E.D. Va.
July 25, 2016) (the motion was accompanied by letters from inmate witnesses to the
plaintiff’s attorneys describing abuse and seeking relief); Tyner v. Cain, 3:22-CV-257-KHJ-
BWR, 2024 WL 578775, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 13, 2024) (affidavits and “other documentary
evidence” accompanied the plaintiff’s motion for protection); Dockery v. Hall, Case No.
13-cv-326-CWR-RHWR (S.D. Miss. May 30, 2013) (motion for protective order against
retaliation accompanied by numerous signed inmate declarations); Parsons v. Ryan, CV-
12-00601-PHX-DKD, 2017 WL 3575711 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2017) (counsel submitted an
affidavit recounting his conversation with clients about retaliation prior to an evidentiary
hearing being conducted).
Case 3:16-cv-00600-MAB Document 622 Filed 03/09/26 Page 5 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 6 of 11
When this lack of evidence was discussed with Plaintiffs at the Status Conference
on February 12, 2026, Plaintiffs explained that their inmate witnesses were fearful to
provide evidence/testimony in any format other than appearing in person due to their
fears of retaliation (Doc. 619). While that fear is understandable, the Court does not
believe such a concern, without more, justifies proceeding to a multi-day evidentiary
hearing without any evidence whatsoever on record to support Plaintiffs’ position (and
to commit Plaintiffs to that position). Furthermore, even if the Court accepts the inmate
witnesses’ fears of retaliation as the reason why they have not publicly provided an out
of court statement, there are other ways Plaintiffs could have presented at least some
evidence to support their motion. For example, Plaintiffs could have sought to file an
inmate witness’s affidavit under seal, perhaps even designated as attorneys’ eyes only,
thereby alleviating the inmate’s fear of retaliation for publicly speaking out against prison
officials in this proceeding. Alternatively, Plaintiffs’ counsel could have prepared an
affidavit attesting to the retaliatory conduct their clients had relayed to them and
explaining why counsel believed that information was true. Beyond that, Plaintiffs could
have belatedly submitted discovery evidence that supported their allegations, which had
been recently produced to them by Defendant.3 Yet, Plaintiffs did not do any of these
things. See, e.g., Perry v. Cmty. Action Services, 82 F. Supp. 2d 892, 898 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(denying motion for protective order due to alleged witness harassment where the
3 To the extent Plaintiffs contend that they did not provide any evidence to support their motion at the time
it was filed because post-trial discovery had not yet been conducted and Defendant possessed the desired
evidence, this still does not explain why Plaintiffs could not have provided an affidavit to support their
allegations of retaliation.
Case 3:16-cv-00600-MAB Document 622 Filed 03/09/26 Page 6 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 7 of 11
movant did not offer “anything more than conclusory allegations that the action taken by
CASI was in any way related to Ms. Origel’s affidavit.”).
Therefore, while the Court undoubtedly shares the desire to ensure that witnesses
are not retaliated against, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Protective
Relief and Sanctions does not warrant an evidentiary hearing at this time because it lacks
any evidentiary support whatsoever.4 Resultingly, given the complete lack of evidentiary
support, Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Protective Relief and Sanctions is DENIED
without prejudice (Doc. 613).
Should Plaintiffs refile a similar motion in the future, they must accompany that
motion with at least some evidence to support their allegations of retaliatory conduct
before the Court will consider scheduling the motion for an evidentiary hearing.
Furthermore, to avoid future uncertainty, the Court believes its ability to prohibit
retaliation against witnesses after trial has concluded, but before final judgment has been
rendered, predominantly originates from the Court’s inherent equitable powers.5 See
Adams v. NaphCare, Inc., 2:16-CV-229, 2016 WL 10492102, at *10 (E.D. Va. July 25, 2016)
(“Accordingly, based on Disability Rights and Travisono, an order directing jail personnel
4 While the Court acknowledges that it could have allowed for the filing of supplemental briefing and
exhibits instead of denying Plaintiffs’ motion without prejudice, the Court believes that would not have
been the fairest way to address the lack of evidence supporting Plaintiffs’ motion because Defendant’s
Response would have presumably varied substantially if Plaintiffs had accompanied their motion with any
evidence.
5 This is not to say, however, that all such requests for relief from retaliation fall under the purview of the
Court’s inherent powers and will be reviewed under the two-prong test laid out in Travisono. Instead, as
Travisono recognized, the standard to be applied may vary depending on the nature and type of relief
requested. See Ben David v. Travisono, 495 F.2d 562, 564-65 (1st Cir. 1974) (Finding “paragraph 1 to exceed
the court’s authority, both because of its vagueness and because it crosses the line from a limited protective
order, which we hold permissible, to a more expansive preliminary injunction appropriate only upon
express findings that the prohibited conduct is likely.”).
Case 3:16-cv-00600-MAB Document 622 Filed 03/09/26 Page 7 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 8 of 11
to not ‘retaliate’ against the inmate witnesses for their participation in this lawsuit would
likely be available through this Court’s inherent equitable power in the form of a
protective order, should sufficient findings be made that the inmate witnesses reasonably
fear retaliation, and that the court’s fact-finding may be materially impaired unless a
protective order is entered.”). Consequently, in reviewing any future motion for a
protective order against retaliation, “[t]he findings necessary to support such a protective
order are simply that the plaintiffs reasonably fear retaliation and that the court’s fact-
finding may be materially impaired unless there is provided the tangible protection of a
suitable court order.” Ben David v. Travisono, 495 F.2d 562, 564 (1st Cir. 1974). See also Tyner
v. Cain, 3:22-CV-257-KHJ-BWR, 2024 WL 578775, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 13, 2024) (denying
without prejudice Tyner’s motion seeking to be protected from retaliation for
participating in the lawsuit, and indicating that if he re-urges that motion, the standard
to be considered was the two prong standard laid out in Travisono).
II. Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion to Shorten Time (Doc. 616)
Plaintiffs also seek a court order shortening the timeframe for Defendant to
respond to Plaintiffs’ post-trial discovery requests and requiring Defendant to preserve
and produce responsive electronically stored information (“ESI”) (see generally Doc. 616).
In response, Defendant contends that no applicable rule of discovery supports either of
Plaintiffs’ requests (see generally Doc. 620). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES
without prejudice Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion to Shorten Time (Doc. 616).
First and foremost, Plaintiffs’ motion does not identify any discovery rule or other
procedural mechanism that actually entitles Plaintiffs to the post-trial discovery they seek
Case 3:16-cv-00600-MAB Document 622 Filed 03/09/26 Page 8 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 9 of 11
(see generally Doc. 616).6 This is crucial because, in the absence of such an entitlement,
Plaintiffs would only be permitted to conduct additional discovery with the approval of
the Court and/or the modification of a scheduling order. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4) (“A
schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent (emphasis
added). Yet, as was discussed above, Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence to
support their Emergency Motion for Protective Relief and Sanctions (Doc. 613). Without
such a threshold showing, the Court will not order Defendant to devote further resources
and time to conducting post-trial discovery based on Plaintiffs’ unverified allegations.
Therefore, in the absence of either a discovery rule applicable to this case’s unique
procedural posture or a court order permitting additional discovery, there is obviously
no support for Plaintiffs’ request to expedite such discovery and to require Defendant to
produce ESI.
Here, rather than explaining what discovery rule or court order entitles Plaintiffs
to any of the post-trial discovery they now unilaterally seek, Plaintiffs instead frame the
issues as: (1) should Plaintiffs discovery requests be expedited under these circumstances;
and (2) can Defendants categorically exclude ESI from its discovery responses (see Doc.
616 at pp. 4-5). But Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion puts the cart before the horse (Doc. 616).
Both of the issues framed by Plaintiffs presuppose that Plaintiffs are entitled to conduct
post-trial discovery at this time. In that regard, Plaintiffs’ contention that Defendant
6 Indisputably, Plaintiffs’ motion cites to numerous Local and Federal Rules (see Doc. 616 at pp. 4-7) (citing
SDIL LR 26.1(c)(2), FRCP 26, 34, 37). Nevertheless, Plaintiffs’ motion fails to explain why those rules, which
generally speaking, govern the normal course of discovery, should apply here—years after the close of
discovery and in the absence of any court order permitting the parties to conduct additional discovery.
Case 3:16-cv-00600-MAB Document 622 Filed 03/09/26 Page 9 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 10 of 11
“unilaterally refus[ed] to meet and confer” and “unilaterally declar[ed] ESI off limits from
discovery” is equally unavailing (Doc. 616 at p. 4). Discovery closed on September 22,
2023 (see Doc. 340; see also Doc. 357). Thus, regardless of the normal discovery rules related
to meeting and conferring or producing discovery materials such as ESI, Defendant
cannot be said to have unilaterally ignored any applicable discovery rule―particularly
when it was Plaintiff who unilaterally declared that discovery would be reopened years
after it had officially been closed (see Id.).
Finally, Plaintiffs’ motion repeatedly argues that Defendant is not preserving
evidence and cites rules requiring preservation (see, e.g., Doc. 616 at p. 6) (“It is beyond
peradventure that ESI must be preserved and must be produced pursuant to Rules 26,
34, and 37[.]”). However, Defense Counsel’s refusal to produce ESI years after the close
of discovery is readily distinguishable from situations where a party destroys or fails to
preserve ESI. Put simply, a failure to preserve is different than a failure to produce.
Therefore, at this time, the Court will not devote further time to the hypothetical question
of whether Defendant has failed to preserve ESI or other materials. Again, Defense
Counsel is simply declining to produce (or expedite the production of) those materials to
Plaintiffs in a situation where Plaintiffs have not shown that they are entitled to them.
Consequently, Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion to Shorten Time is DENIED without
prejudice (Doc. 616).
Case 3:16-cv-00600-MAB Document 622 Filed 03/09/26 Page 10 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 11 of 11
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, both Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Protective
Relief and Sanctions and Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion to Shorten Time are DENIED
without prejudice (Docs. 613, 616).
Nevertheless, to the extent that it needs to be stated, the Court wishes to reiterate
that Defendant and her agents must follow the law. They may not harass, intimidate, or
retaliate against any inmate witness for providing testimony or other evidence in this
action. Should credible evidence of such retaliation emerge, the Court will not hesitate to
take appropriate measures.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 9, 2026
s/ Mark A. Beatty
MARK A. BEATTY
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 3:16-cv-00600-MAB Document 622 Filed 03/09/26 Page 11 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>