Crazy Pants, LLC v. Estate of Gregory John Daiker

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
In the Matter of the Complaint of
Crazy Pants LLC and the Estate of
Gregory John Daiker for Exoneration
from or Limitation of Liability
DEBORAH ANN BROWN, as
Administrator of the Estate of
GREGORY JOHN DAIKER, and
CRAZY PANTS, LLC,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
v.
SCOTT KOTTMANN and JANE DOE
KOTTMANN, CLIENT MARINE
SERVICES, LLC, a Missouri limited
liability company, GREG KOTTMANN
and JANE DOE KOTTMANN, DEVIN
WOZENCRAFT and JANE DOE
WOZENCRAFT, WOZENCRAFT
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., a
California corporation dba
WOZENCRAFT INSURANCE AND
FINANCE, RANDY SCISM and JANE
DOE SCISM, MARINE
TECHNOLOGY, INC., a Missouri
corporation, MERCURY MARINE, a
division of Brunswick Corporation, a
Delaware corporation; PERFORMANCE
LLC, a Missouri limited liability
company dba PERFORMANCE BOAT
CENTER and JOHN DOES 1 – 10,
Third-Party Defendants.
Case No. 2:23-cv-00023-BLW
Consolidated for discovery with:
2:24-cv-00305-BLW and
2:24-cv-00307-BLW
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
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INTRODUCTION
Before the Court are two motions: (1) Third-Party Defendant1 Performance
LLC’s Consolidated Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 114); and (2) Third-Party Defendants
Marine Technology Inc. (MTI) and Randy Scism’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction (Dkt. 115). Third-Party Defendants Devin Wozencraft
and Wozencraft Insurance Agency (the “Wozencraft Defendants”), as well as
Third-Party Defendant Mercury Marine, join the motions to the extent they argue
the Court lacks admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction. See Dkts. 117, 121.
The Court heard argument on October 27, 2025 and is now prepared to issue
its decision. For the reasons explained below, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction
over Performance LLC and will therefore dismiss it from all complaints filed in
this consolidated matter. The Court will also grant the motions to dismiss
Limitation Plaintiff/Third-Party Plaintiff Crazy Pants’ limitation-of-liability
complaint for lack of admiralty jurisdiction. The Court will not, however, dismiss
Crazy Pants’ amended third-party complaint.
1 Throughout this opinion, for ease of reference and simplicity, the Court will typically
refer to the various parties in accordance with their procedural stance in the limitation-of-liability
action. Thus, Performance LLC is referred to only as a Third-Party Defendant, rather than as a
“Defendant and a Third-Party Defendant.” Additionally, throughout the opinion the Court will
sometimes collectively refer to three litigants—Crazy Pants, LLC, the Estate of Gregory John
Daiker, and Deborah Brown (the administrator of the Daiker Estate)—as “Crazy Pants.”
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BACKGROUND
This case arises from a June 28, 2022 boating accident that claimed the lives
of all four men aboard—Gregory Daiker, Aaron Faulhaber, Jason Maxson and
John Schulte. At the time of the accident, Daiker was allegedly operating the boat
at over 100 miles per hour while intoxicated. See Faulhaber Claim ¶ G, Dkt. 13;
Schulte Claim ¶ F, Dkt. 18.
A. Manufacture and Delivery of the King of the May
The boat involved in the accident was the King of the May, a high-
performance speedboat manufactured by MTI, of Wentzville, Missouri. In 2018,
Daiker, a resident of Laclede, Idaho, purchased the King of the May directly from
MTI. Afterward, he set up a Montana limited liability company—Crazy Pants,
LLC—for the purposes of owning the boat and registering it in Montana. See
Brown Dec. ¶ 26, Dkt. 75. He also established Montana RV Registration, LLC,
another Montana-based entity, as Crazy Pants’ sole manager. Krisher Dec., Ex. 1
thereto, at 2, Dkt. 114-2. As part of the purchase price, MTI delivered the boat to
Idaho. See Brown Dec. ¶ 7, Ex. 3. The delivery took place in LaClede, Idaho in
July 2019. Before delivery, Daiker traveled to Missouri for an inspection and test
drive. Based on text messages between Daiker and an MTI employee, it appears
that Daiker inspected the boat at Performance LLC’s marina in Osage Beach,
Missouri, which is near MTI’s facility. See Dkt. 124, at 4; see also July 2019 Text
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Messages, Ex. 1 to Nicoll Dec., Dkt. 127.2
B. Performance’s Work on the Boat
After taking delivery of the King of the May, Crazy Pants had issues with the
engines overheating and with regulating the boat’s trim. Brown Dec. ¶ 28, Dkt. 75.
Eventually, a decision was made to send the boat back to Missouri for “warranty
work.” Id. An MTI representative met Daiker at Lake Havasu and towed the boat
to Missouri. Id.
In May 2021, after the boat arrived in Missouri, Performance worked on the
boat at its Osage Beach, Missouri facility. Performance is a Missouri limited
liability company with its principal place of business in Osage Beach. Its business
includes servicing pleasure craft, including high-performance boats like the King of
the May. Performance has no facilities or employees in Idaho and performed work
on the King of the May after MTI referred the work to it.
Performance says it helped Crazy Pants solve the overheating issue by fixing
a faulty water line in the engine and that this work “came to Performance based on
a request from MTI for Performance to inspect and service the boat.” Waddington
2 Based on this evidence, Crazy Pants, as well as the Faulhaber and Schulte claimants,
argue that “the clear suggestion is that Performance had some involvement in the construction,
finish work, and/or testing of the boat in June 2019, before its completion . . . .” Crazy Pants
Response, Dkt. 126, at 6; see also Schulte Response, Dkt. 124, at 4; Faulhaber Response, Dkt.
125, at 5. This issue will be discussed further below, in connection with the Court’s discussion of
whether jurisdictional discovery is warranted.
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Supp. Dec. ¶ 2, Dkt. 136. Still, though, Crazy Pants points out that Performance
didn’t simply perform warranty work on the boat for MTI; rather Performance
engaged directly with Daiker to perform other work on the boat, including
installation of a trim-sync device. See Response, Dkt. 126, at 7 (citing Nicoll Dec.
¶ 3, Ex. 2 thereto at “Daiker 000616-619”, Dkt. 127-2); see also Nicoll Dec. ¶ 1,
Ex. 1 thereto at “Performance 000008-000014,” Dkt. 127-1. Performance agrees
that it installed a “Trim-Sync,” but says this device does not alter the boat’s trim.
See Waddington Dec. ¶¶ 13, 15 n.1, Dkt. 114-4. More broadly, Performance’s co-
owner explains that its “servicing of the King of the May was a ‘one-time-thing,’
pursuant to MTI’s request.” Waddington Supp. Dec. ¶¶ 23-24, Dkt. 136.
Performance completed its work on the King of the May in the summer of
2021 and did not touch the boat after it left its Osage Beach facility. Id. ¶ 22. Once
the work was completed, MTI towed the boat to Montana, and Daiker towed it the
rest of the way to Idaho. See Brown Dec. ¶ 28, Dkt. 75.
C. The Location of the Accident
The fatal accident occurred roughly a year later, on June 28, 2022, on the
Pend Oreille River near Old Thama Ferry Road, in Bonner County, Idaho. A key
issue for purposes of the pending motions is whether the accident occurred on
navigable waters of the United States. The parties dispute whether this is so, and
the dispute ultimately centers on whether an old log chute at the Albeni Falls Dam
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renders the Pend Oreille River “navigable.” Relevant facts regarding the Pend
Oreille River system and the Albeni Falls Dam are as follows:
• 	The Pend Oreille River connects to Lake Pend Oreille. The waters flowing
from Montana toward Lake Pend Oreille are dammed on the eastern side of
Idaho by the Cabinet Gorge Dam. And the waters flowing westward from
Lake Pend Oreille to Washinton are dammed by the Albeni Falls Dam.
• 	It is not possible to travel by vessel from Idaho into Washington using the
waters of the Pend Oreille River system because of the Albeni Falls Dam.
• 	The Albeni Falls Dam was built in the early 1950s and remains in place
today. The dam was originally constructed with a log chute, which allowed
passage of timber from Idaho westward into Washington.
• 	The aerial photos shown below depict the dam around 1950 and more
recently, though the exact dates are not known.
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• 	During the period when the log chute was in use in the 1950s, workers
known as “boommen” guided logs through the chute for downstream
transport.
• 	Not long after the dam was completed, companies that had used the log
chute transitioned away from using the chute, opting instead for different
modes of transportation to move logs from Idaho into Washington.
• 	The log chute has not been used to transport logs into Washington for nearly
70 years; the last known use for this purpose was in 1958. Since that time,
the log chute has fallen into disuse and disrepair.
• 	The chute did reopen in 2005—but only in connection with a 50 th
anniversary celebration for the purpose of floating rubber duckies through
the chute.
• 	The log chute is currently inoperable. Although it has a Tainter gate—which
lifts to allow movement of logs downstream—that gate has been
decommissioned and has not been serviced since 2005.
• 	The Dam’s Operating Project Manager, Amanda Smith, indicates that
although there are no current plans to demolish the log chute, it has fallen
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into disrepair and could not be operational absent significant rehabilitative
efforts. In her words, “Inspection, design, analysis and rehabilitative
construction of the log chute would be required prior to the log chute
returning to service. Such an undertaking would be significant, expensive,
and require congressional appropriation.” Smith Dec. ¶ 10, Dkt. 135.
• 	Inspections of the log chute in 2022 and 2023 revealed that portions of the
chute were undermined, with eight feet of the chute’s floor slab unsupported.
Id. ¶ 9.
• 	Since 2021, a boom barrier has blocked access to the chute. The boom
barrier consists of a series of connected buoys designed to create a floating
obstacle across the Pend Oreille River that prevents vessels and other
objects, including logs, from approaching the dam’s spillway. Id. ¶ 8.
D. The Lawsuits
1. The State-Court Wrongful Death Action
Multiple lawsuits were filed after the June 2022 accident. In December
2022, Jenny Faulhaber, widow of passenger Aaron Faulhaber, filed a wrongful-
death suit in the Idaho state court, Bonner County Case CV09-22-1707. Faulhaber
named Crazy Pants, LLC and the Estate of Gregory Daiker as defendants.
2. The Limitation Action
A few weeks later, on January 13, 2023, Crazy Pants commenced this
federal action by filing a Complaint for Exoneration From or Limitation of
Liability under 46 U.S.C. § 30501 et seq. and Supplemental Rule F, invoking this
Court’s admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333. The Court subsequently
granted its motion to stay all claims and proceedings against the plaintiffs. See Jan.
26, 2023 Order, Dkt. 7. Following that order, Jenny Faulhaber, the Faulhaber
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Estate, Alexandra Schulte, and the Schulte Revocable Living Trust filed proofs of
claim in this action. See Dkts. 13, 14, 17, 18. Each claimant seeks several million
dollars in damages.3
3. The Third-Party Complaint
In the summer of 2024—over a year after they had filed their Limitation-of-
Liability Complaint—Crazy Pants and Deborah Brown (as administrator of the
Daiker Estate) filed a third-party complaint against various parties, including MTI,
Performance, Mercury Marine, the Wozencraft Defendants, and others. See Dkt.
54. Crazy Pants alleges product liability, negligence, and gross negligence as to
Mercury Marine and MTI, and negligence as to MTI and Performance. And it
alleges a claim for “Third Party Spoliation” against MTI, Scism, the Wozencraft
Defendants, Scott Kottmann, Greg Kottmann, and Client Marine Services, LLC.
The product liability and negligence claims arise from allegations that the
boat was defectively designed, manufactured, or repaired. The spoliation claims
arise from what happened to the boat in the months after the accident. See
3 See Alexandra Schulte Claim, Dkt. 17 (seeking $1.5 million in economic losses; $3.5
million in noneconomic damages; and $5 million in punitive damages); John Schulte Revocable
Living Trust Claim, Dkt. 18 (seeking $3 million in economic losses; $3.5 million in non-
economic losses; and $5 million in punitive damages); Jenny Faulhaber Claim, Dkt. 13 (seeking
$1.756 million in economic losses; $3 million in noneconomic losses; and $5 million in punitive
damage); Faulhaber Estate Claim, Dkt. 14 (seeking $1.756 in economic losses and $5 million in
punitive damages).
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generally Brown Dec., Dkt. 75. Briefly, Crazy Pants alleges that Third-Party
Defendants Scott Kottmann, Greg Kottmann, Devin Wozencraft, Wozencraft
Insurance Agency, Randy Scism, Client Marine Services, and/or MTI
“individually or in concert with one another”—and with knowledge of the probable
or pending lawsuit—substantially altered or destroyed the boat. Am. Third-Party
Comp. ¶ 7.2, Dkt. 54. The upshot is that the boat is no longer available for
inspection.
4. Faulhaber’s and Schulte’s Federal Complaints
A few months after Crazy Pants filed the third-party complaint, the
Faulhaber and Schulte claimants filed separate complaints in this Court against the
same third-party defendants named in Crazy Pants’ amended third-party complaint.
See Faulhaber v. Kottmann, No. 2:24-cv-305-BLW; Schulte v. Kottmann, 2:24-cv-
307-BLW. These complaints—which have been consolidated with the above-
captioned limitation action for discovery purposes—allege similar claims: (1)
product liability and/or negligence claims as to MTI, Mercury Marine, and
Performance; and (2) spoliation claims as to Kottmanns, Client Marine Services,
the Wozencraft Defendants, and MTI and Scism.
E. The Pending Motions
Performance now moves to dismiss, asserting that the Pend Oreille River is
not a navigable water for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction and, further, that the
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Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it in any event. MTI and Scism, joined by
the Wozencraft Defendants and Mercury Marine, filed a parallel motion
challenging admiralty jurisdiction. (These defendants do not contend that this
Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them.)
DISCUSSION
A. Performance’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
The Court will first address Performance’s motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction and then turn to the motions to dismiss for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction. See generally Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574,
588 (1999) (district courts may resolve straightforward personal jurisdiction issues
before resolving complex subject-matter jurisdictional challenges).
1. Waiver
As a threshold matter, Crazy Pants, as well as the Faulhaber and Schulte
claimants, argue that Performance waived its right to assert a personal-jurisdiction
defense. To support this argument, they rely on the fact that Performance filed an
Answer to Amended Third-Party Complaint and Counterclaim and Crossclaim.
See Dkt. 57. But in this pleading—within the Answer section—Performance
explicitly stated that “[t]his Honorable Court lacks personal jurisdiction over
Performance.” Id. ¶¶ 2.2, 3. Elsewhere in this same pleading, in a section denoted
as a Counterclaim, Performance included this sentence: “The Court has personal
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jurisdiction over the counterclaim defendants [i.e., Crazy Pants and the Daiker
Estate] by virtue of their consent to same by bringing the present action in this
Honorable Court.” Id. ¶ 4, at 13.
Performance did not waive its personal-jurisdiction defense. Under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(1), a party waives a personal-jurisdiction defense
only by (1) failing to include it in the party’s first Rule 12 motion, or (2) failing to
raise it in the party’s first responsive pleading if no Rule 12 motion is made. A
defendant preserves the defense by asserting it in its initial responsive filing—even
if it later files motions, participates in discovery, or pleads counterclaims or cross-
claims. See Argonaut Ins. Co. v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 17 F.4th 1276, 1281 (9th
Cir. 2021); Hillis v. Heineman, 626 F.3d 1014, 1018–19 (9th Cir. 2010); SEC v.
Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007).
Here, in answering the third-party complaint, Performance expressly
asserted lack of personal jurisdiction as an affirmative defense.4 As such,
Performance preserved the defense under Rule 12(h)(1)(B)(ii). The later Rule
12(b)(2) motion simply seeks adjudication of a defense already pled.
Performance’s assertion of counterclaims and participation in pretrial
4 Performance likewise asserted lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense in answering
the separately filed complaints in Faulhaber v. Kottmann, No. 2:24-cv-00305-BLW, and Schulte
v. Kottmann, No. 2:24-cv-00307-BLW.
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coordination do not constitute waiver. The Ninth Circuit has held that “a party’s
assertion of a counterclaim does not waive a previously made jurisdictional
objection,” Ross, 504 F.3d at 1149, and that filing counter- or cross-claims
consistent with Rule 13 is compatible with preserving threshold defenses. See
Argonaut, 17 F.4th at 1281 (“Because the Rules allow threshold defenses such as
lack of personal jurisdiction to be pled by answer, those defenses are preserved
even if coupled with counterclaims.”). Similarly, ordinary participation in
discovery or case-management proceedings, especially when compelled by court
order, does not amount to consent to jurisdiction. Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc.,
140 F.3d 1313, 1318–19 (9th Cir. 1998).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Performance did not waive its
personal-jurisdiction defense and will proceed to the merits of that defense.
2. The Governing Legal Standard
When a defendant moves to dismiss a case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden
of demonstrating the exercise of personal jurisdiction is appropriate. See, e.g.,
Herbal Brands, Inc. v. Photoplaza, Inc., 72 F.4th 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2023).
“Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their
jurisdiction over persons.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014). But
because Idaho’s long-arm statute—Idaho Code § 5-514—would permit broader
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jurisdiction than that authorized under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court need only look to the Due Process Clause to determine
personal jurisdiction. Wells Cargo, Inc. v. Transport Ins. Co., 676 F. Supp. 2d
1114, 1119 (D. Idaho 2009). “Thus, under Idaho law, the jurisdictional analysis
and the federal due process analysis are the same.” Id.
Where a defendant’s motion to dismiss is based on written materials, and “in
the absence of an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie
showing of jurisdictional facts” to avoid dismissal. Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d
1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990). And the Court must take the plaintiff’s uncontroverted
allegations as true and resolve factual disputes in affidavits in plaintiff’s favor. If,
however, the defendants offer evidence supporting their motion to dismiss, the
plaintiff may not simply rest on the bare allegations of its complaint. Rather, the
plaintiff must then “come forward with facts, by affidavit or otherwise, supporting
personal jurisdiction.” Amba Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Jobar Int’l, Inc. 551 F.2d
784, 787 (9th Cir. 1977) (citations omitted).
The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant comports with due
process if the defendant “has ‘certain minimum contacts’ with the relevant forum
such that maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.’” Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et
L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v.
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Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Sufficient minimum contacts can result in
general or specific jurisdiction. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374
F.3d 797, 801-02 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, Crazy Pants concedes that Performance is
not subject to general personal jurisdiction, so the Court considers specific
jurisdiction only. See Response, Dkt. 126, at 16. Broadly speaking, specific
jurisdiction grows out of “‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and
the litigation.’” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014) (quoting Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984)).
The Ninth Circuit uses a three-prong test to determine whether a defendant
has sufficient minimum contacts for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction:
(1) 	The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his
activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or
resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully
avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the
forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws;
(2) 	the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the
defendant’s forum-related activities; and
(3) 	the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and
substantial justice, i.e., it must be reasonable.
Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the
first two prongs of this test. Id. “If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either of these
prongs, personal jurisdiction is not established in the forum state.” Id. “On the
other hand, if the plaintiff succeeds in satisfying both of the first two prongs, the
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burden then shifts to the defendant to present a compelling case that the exercise of
jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Menken v. Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1057 (9th
Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). “All three prongs must be met to exercise personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.” Davis v. Cranfield Aerospace Sols., Ltd., 71 F.4th
1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2023). Finally, although the purposeful-direction test is
typically used for tort cases and purposeful-availment is typically used in contract
cases, the Ninth Circuit has held that personal jurisdiction can be found by either
purposeful direction, purposeful availment, or “‘some combination thereof.’” Id.
(citation omitted).
Here, the parties dispute whether the Court should apply the purposeful-
direction or the purposeful-availment framework, but it doesn’t ultimately matter
because neither test is satisfied. Performance has not purposefully directed is
activities toward Idaho, nor has it purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting business in Idaho.
3. 	Purposeful Availment
The Court will begin with purposeful availment. As noted above, the
purposeful-availment framework typically applies to contract claims, and
Performance has not been sued for breach of contract. Rather, it faces negligence
and product-liability claims in the complaints on file in this consolidated action.
(Specifically, Crazy Pants and Daiker assert a negligence claim; Faulhaber asserts
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negligence and gross negligence claims; and Schulte asserts negligence, gross
negligence, and product-liability claims.) Still, the Court will conduct a purposeful-
availment analysis because Performance contracted directly with Daiker to perform
work on the King of the May.
Purposeful availment requires that the defendant deliberately create
continuing obligations with forum residents or otherwise invoke the benefits and
protections of the forum’s laws. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
475–76 (1985). The analysis focuses on whether the defendant’s contacts are the
result of its own affirmative conduct, not the unilateral actions of the plaintiff. Id.;
Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284–85 (2014). A “one-shot” or isolated
transaction, particularly where the defendant performs all of its obligations outside
the forum, generally does not constitute purposeful availment. Boschetto v.
Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Burger King, 471 U.S.
at 478 (“If the question is whether an individual’s contract with an out-of-state
party alone can automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts in the other
party’s home forum, we believe the answer clearly is that it cannot.”)
Measured against these standards, Performance did not purposefully avail
itself of the privilege of conducting business in Idaho. The undisputed evidence
shows that Performance is a Missouri limited liability company with its principal
place of business in Missouri; it has no offices, employees, property, or business
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operations in Idaho; and all work performed on the King of the May occurred in
Missouri. Performance did not sell the vessel, did not deliver it to Idaho, and did
not advertise or market its services in Idaho. The record also establishes that
although Daiker likely visited Performance’s Osage Beach marina in 2019,
Performance had no involvement with Daiker or the boat until 2021. In sum,
nothing in the record shows that Performance sought to further its business in
Idaho. Rather, its involvement in this case is limited to the fact that it accepted a
referral from MTI to service the boat in connection with an MTI warranty.
Likewise, the fact that Performance communicated directly with Daiker and
performed work beyond the MTI-directed warranty service does not establish
purposeful availment. Any such work was performed in Missouri and arose from a
discrete service engagement, not from an ongoing contractual relationship
deliberately anchored in Idaho. Crazy Pants’ reliance on Daiker’s Idaho residency
and the fact that the vessel would later be operated in Idaho is unavailing; “[t]he
plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum.” Walden,
571 U.S. at 285.
On this record, the Court concludes that Performance did not purposefully
avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Idaho.
4. 	Purposeful Direction
Crazy Pants also contends that Performance purposefully directed its
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conduct toward Idaho. As noted, this framework typically applies in intentional tort
cases, and it asks whether the defendant committed an intentional act that was
expressly aimed at the forum and caused harm that the defendant knew was likely
to be suffered there. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803. Here, the third-party
plaintiffs do not allege that Performance committed intentional torts. (The same is
true with respect to the Faulhaber and Schulte claimants.) Rather, the claims
against Performance sound in negligence, gross negligence, and products liability.
Accordingly, the Calder “effects test”—based on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)—does not govern the jurisdictional analysis.
See Herbal Brands, 72 F.4th at 1090. Instead, the relevant inquiry is as described
in the preceding section—which essentially asks whether Performance deliberately
engaged in forum-directed conduct. Holland Am. Line Inc. v. Wärtsilä N. Am., Inc.,
485 F.3d 450, 460 (9th Cir. 2007). For the reasons already explained, plaintiffs
have not satisfied this standard.
Moreover, this conclusion would not change if the Court applied the Calder
effects test. Performance did not expressly aim any conduct at Idaho, and the mere
fact that injury ultimately occurred in Idaho is insufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction. See generally Walden, 571 U.S. at 290 (“The proper question is not
where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the
defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.”)
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Because the first prong of the three-prong test articulated above has not been
satisfied, the Court need not reach the second or third prongs. Rather, for the
reasons just explained, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Performance.
5. 	Jurisdictional Discovery
Crazy Pants, joined by the Faulhabers and Schultes, request limited
jurisdictional discovery if the Court finds the existing record insufficient to resolve
personal jurisdiction. The Court will deny the requests.
Jurisdictional discovery is appropriate where “jurisdictional facts are
contested or more faces are needed.” Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080,
1093 (9th Cir. 2003). But a request for discovery based on speculation or the mere
hope that additional facts might surface is insufficient. Butcher’s Union Local No.
498 v. SDC Investment, Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 540-41 (9th Cir. 1986).
Here, the jurisdictional deficiency is legal rather than factual. Even
accepting some of the key facts on which Crazy Pants relies—mainly, that Mr.
Daiker engaged directly with Performance during 2021, regarding the warranty and
non-warranty work; and that Performance knew the vessel would ultimately be
operated in Idaho—those facts, even considered alongside the other facts outlined
above, would not add up to purposeful availment or purposeful direction.
And as far as Crazy Pants’ speculation that Performance was involved with
the King of the May in 2019, the parties have already conducted some discovery on
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this issue, and Performance has submitted a declaration flatly denying any such
involvement. Performance’s co-owner, Mark Waddington, has attested to the
following: “Neither I nor my employees knew MTI, Mr. Griffith, Daiker, Crazy
Pants, LLC or anyone else tested the King of the May in 2019. Neither I nor my
employees were involved with testing the vessel at that time. Neither I nor my
employees were involved with any work on the King of the May in 2019.”
Waddington Supp. Dec. ¶ 15, Dkt. 135. Mr. Waddington further explains that
Performance has already produced records regarding Daiker, Crazy Pants, and the
King of the May, and that it has no documents referencing these parties or the boat
prior to May 2021. Id. ¶ 4; see also Performance Reply, Dkt. 134 (explaining that
Performance produced expedited discovery responses to Crazy Pants, including
interrogatory responses.) Under these circumstances, Crazy Pants’ request for
further discovery regarding Performance’s involvement with the boat before May
2021 is based on speculation or hope that additional facts might surface. The Court
will not exercise its discretion to allow such discovery.
6. Dismissal of Performance from All Complaints
For all these reasons, the Court will not permit any additional discovery and
will dismiss Performance, LLC as a defendant from all complaints pending in this
consolidated action. The Court recognizes that this case has been consolidated with
two related actions filed by the Faulhabers and Schultes for discovery purposes
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only. Consolidation under Rule 42(a) does not merge the actions into a single case
or alter their distinct jurisdictional foundations. See Hall v. Hall, 584 U.S. 59, 71
(2018). Here, though, Performance moved to dismiss itself “from this lawsuit.” See
Motion, Dkt. 114. It did not explicitly state that it was seeking dismissal from all
three complaints on file in this consolidated action, though it did so implicitly
when it identified itself as a “defendant,” “third-party defendant” and “claim-
defendant” and “party to this consolidated lawsuit.” Mtn. Mem., Dkt. 114-1, at 1.
Further, the Faulhaber and Schulte plaintiffs separately responded to the motion to
dismiss so the issues related to personal jurisdiction have been fully ventilated
from all plaintiffs’ and claimants’ perspectives. Plus, as a matter of law and logic,
the Court’s conclusion that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Performance as to
Crazy Pants applies equally to the claims asserted by the Faulhaber and Schulte
plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Performance as a defendant in all
complaints on file in this consolidated action.
If Performance were the only defendant, the Court would transfer this matter
to the Western District of Missouri. But no plaintiff requested a transfer, and this is
a complex, multi-defendant case. Accordingly, the Court will simply dismiss all
claims against Performance without prejudice.
B. The Motions to Dismiss the Limitation-of-Liability Complaint for Lack
of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
The Court must next decide whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction over
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the limitation-of-liability complaint, as the moving parties have challenged Crazy
Pants’ invocation of admiralty jurisdiction.
A federal court’s authority to hear admiralty cases is set out in Article III,
§ 2 of the Constitution, which states that federal judicial power extends “to all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; . . . .” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
Consistent with that constitutional grant of power, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333(1), which provides that district courts have original, exclusive jurisdiction
of “[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.”
1. Governing Legal Standard
A jurisdictional attack on subject-matter jurisdiction may be facial or factual.
See White v. Lee, 277 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). “In a facial attack, the
challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on
their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d
1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In contrast, a factual attack “disputes the truth of the
allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id.
Because the moving defendants rely on extrinsic evidence, their attack on
the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is a factual one. To resolve a factual attack
on jurisdiction, “the district court may review evidence beyond the complaint
without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment” so
long as resolving the factual issues relating to the issue of jurisdiction do not go to
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the merits of the action. Id. In resolving a factual attack, the Court need not
presume the truth of the complaint’s jurisdictional allegations. Id.
2. The Location Requirement
Crazy Pants bears the burden of establishing admiralty jurisdiction, which
requires it to satisfy the two-part test articulated in Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v.
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995): First, the tort must
have occurred on “navigable waters” (the location requirement), and second, the
incident must bear a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity (the
connection requirement). See Taghadomi v. United States, 401 F.3d 1080, 1084
(9th Cir. 2005).
Determining whether the location requirement is satisfied turns on whether
the subject waterway is “navigable in fact.” See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563
(1870). Over 150 years ago, the Supreme Court explained that waterways are
“navigable in fact” “when they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or
by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may
be carried on with other States or foreign countries in the customary modes in
which such commerce is conducted by water.” Id.; see also Garrett, 981 F.3d 739,
741 (9th Cir. 2020); Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir.
1975) (“A waterway is navigable provided that it is used or susceptible of being
used as an artery of commerce.”).
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The Ninth Circuit has since clarified that for a waterway to be “navigable in
fact,” it must have the present capability for interstate commercial navigation. In
Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1975), the court held that a
25-mile stretch of the Missouri River impounded between two dams was not
navigable for admiralty purposes. The court explained that “if the damming of a
water-way has the practical effect of eliminating commercial maritime activity, no
federal interest is served by the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction over events
transpiring on that body of water, whether or not it was originally navigable.” Id.
at 440 (emphasis added). In other words, admiralty jurisdiction is not immutable.
Physical changes to a waterway—such as the construction of dams or other
permanent obstructions—may eliminate its capacity to function as an interstate
commercial artery, and with it, the federal interest in applying maritime law.
The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed this principle in Garrett, 981 F.3d 739 (9th Cir.
2020), where it rejected admiralty jurisdiction over a boating accident on Holter
Lake—a Montana reservoir enclosed by dams—because the dams “preclud[ed] it
from serving as an artery of interstate commerce.” Id. at 741. Other circuits follow
the same principle. See, e.g., Tundidor v. Miami–Dade County, 831 F.3d 1328,
1332–34 (11th Cir. 2016); LeBlanc v. Cleveland, 198 F.3d 353, 359–60 (2d Cir.
1999); Livingston v. United States, 627 F.2d 165, 169–70 (8th Cir. 1980).
Here, the Court easily concludes that the Pend Oreille River system is not
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navigable in fact. The Pend Oreille River system is indisputably incapable of
accommodating interstate vessel traffic. And it is likewise incapable of
accommodating interstate log floating. (For purposes of this decision, the Court
assumes, without deciding, that log floating may qualify as a customary mode of
interstate commerce.) Said differently, the Court concludes that the Pend Oreille
River system is not presently being used as an artery of interstate commerce and is
not presently susceptible of being used as an artery of interstate commerce.
Crazy Pants concedes that the log chute at the Albeni Falls Dam has not
been used for interstate commercial log passage since 1958 and that it has since
fallen into a state of disuse and disrepair. As Crazy Pants itself says, “[i]n the
absence of needed rehabilitation and/or repair, the log chute could not currently be
used to float logs from Idaho into Washington. Nor could it have been used on the
day of the accident.” See Response, Dkt. 126, at 10.
The record evidence confirms this. This evidence was detailed above, but
portions of it bear repeating here. Amanda Smith, the Operating Project Manager
at the Albeni Falls Dam, has submitted a declaration explaining that the log chute
was used only between 1955 and 1958 (and then again briefly in 2005 for a
ceremonial rubber-duck event). She explains that the log chute’s Tainter gate—a
gate which lifts to allow passage of timber downstream—“has been
decommissioned since 2005 and has not been serviced since 2005.” Smith Dec. ¶ 7.
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Additionally, “a boom barrier blocks access to the log chute and has been in place
since 2021.” Id. ¶ 8. Periodic inspections of the log chute (in 2022 and 2023)
“revealed that portions of the log chute were undermined, with eight feet of the log
chute’s floor slab unsupported.” Id. ¶ 9. All to say that the log chute is not
currently being used or susceptible of being used as an artery of interstate
commerce. As Ms. Smith notes, restoration of the log chute would require
“[i]nspection, design analysis and rehabilitative construction” and such an
undertaking would be “significant, expensive, and require congressional
appropriation.” Id.¶ 9.
Despite this evidence, Crazy Pants says that the river system is navigable
because the log chute could, “with reasonable improvements,” be returned to
operational status. Response, Dkt. 126, at 4. But that is not the right question. The
relevant inquiry focuses on present physical conditions and capabilities, not
historical conditions or hypothetical future conditions, after restoration. A
waterway is not “navigable in fact” merely because it once supported interstate
commerce or because it could be rendered capable of doing so again through
repair, rehabilitation, or discretionary governmental action.
Crazy Pants’ invocation of navigability concepts drawn from other
contexts—such as cases involving the Commerce Clause—does not alter the
Court’s conclusion. Id. at 30 (citing Davis v. United States, 185 F.2d 938 (9th Cir.
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1950)); id. at 31 (citing Swanson v. United States, 600 F. Supp. 802, 804-805 (D.
Idaho 1985), aff’d 789 F. 2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1986)). As the Ninth Circuit has
explained, definitions of navigability may vary depending on the context. Adams,
528 F.2d at 440. Thus, even if a waterway may be treated as “navigable” in a case
involving the Commerce Clause, that does not answer whether it is navigable for
determining admiralty tort jurisdiction.
Crazy Pants’ reliance on the Second Circuit’s decision in Lockheed Martin
Corp. v. Morganti, 412 F.3d 407 (2d Cir. 2005) is likewise unavailing. The
Morganti Court rejected Lockheed Martin’s convoluted navigability argument,
which proceeded along the following lines: The topography of the lake at issue and
the economic conditions of the surrounding areas rendered commercial shipping
unprofitable, which meant the lake was not susceptible of being used for
commercial shipping, which meant the lake was not navigable. Id. at 412. The
Morganti Court rightly noted that “[t]he question of whether it would be
economically difficult to profitably use Cayuga Lake commercially is a
fundamentally different question that does not affect whether the lake is capable of
being used for commerce.” Id. at 413.
Nothing in Morganti suggests that the Court should disregard the current
physical condition of a waterway in deciding navigability in an admiralty case. See
id. (holding that “where the waterway is not physically obstructed but only
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economically inactive, the federal interest remains”). Here, as noted above, the
undisputed evidence establishes that the log chute at the Albeni Falls Dam has not
been used for decades, is in a state of disrepair, and could not be placed into
service absent substantial inspection, design, and rehabilitative construction. That
is not the sort of “transient” condition (akin to the economic conditions in
Lockheed Martin) that suggests a waterway is navigable; it is current physical
reality inconsistent with concluding that the waterway is presently susceptible of
supporting interstate commerce.
In sum, admiralty jurisdiction is lacking here because Crazy Pants has failed
to satisfy the “location” requirement. The accident did not occur on navigable
waters. The Court thus finds it unnecessary to reach the “connection” requirement.
3. Jurisdictional Discovery
Crazy Pants requests additional jurisdictional discovery, arguing that further
factual development is necessary to resolve purported disputes concerning the
condition and operability of the Albeni Falls Dam log chute. The Court disagrees.
In this case, no amount of discovery could transform the long-defunct, currently
unusable log chute into one that is presently susceptible of being used as an artery
of interstate commerce. The request will be denied.
C. The Motion to Dismiss the Amended Third-Party Complaint
Given the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over the limitation-of-liability
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complaint, the next question is whether the Court must also dismiss Crazy Pants’
amended third-party complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Crazy Pants contends it
may proceed with this third-party complaint—even in the absence of admiralty
jurisdiction—because it asserted diversity of citizenship as an independent basis of
jurisdiction. Defendants MTI, Scism, Mercury Marine, and the Wozencraft
Defendants, on the other hand, say there is a domino effect—that once the Court
determines there is no admiralty jurisdiction over the Limitation Complaint, the
entire case collapses, and the Court has no choice but to dismiss the Amended
Third-Party Complaint. As these parties frame it, “Admiralty jurisdiction does not
exist in this case. It follows that the Court cannot exercise ancillary jurisdiction
over the Amended Third-Party Complaint.” MTI Reply, Dkt. 138, at 9.5 The Court
is not persuaded by this argument and will deny the motion to dismiss the amended
5 The Faulhaber and Schulte claimants take no position regarding the motions to dismiss
for lack of admiralty jurisdiction, although the Schulte claimants say that if the limitation
complaint is dismissed, they are entitled to amend their complaint (i.e., the complaint on file in
Schulte v. Kottmann, No. 2:24-cv-307) “to include claims against Daiker et. al. which are stayed
by the Stay Order associated with the Admiralty Complaint.” Dkt. 124, at 2.The Court agrees
that, with the limitation complaint dismissed and the stay order dissolved, the Schulte claimants
logically should be able to pursue Crazy Pants and the Daiker Estate. But if they were to amend
their complaint in this court, the parties would no longer be diverse. So the more obvious choice
is to file in state court. Although the Court will not reach this issue, presumably, the applicable
limitations period would be tolled, given that this Court’s stay order prevented pursuing the
Schultes from pursuing Crazy Pants and the Daiker Estate in state court. During oral argument,
Crazy Pants’ counsel stated that if there is no admiralty jurisdiction—and the Court has now
concluded there is none—then he believed the statute of limitations would be tolled and that the
Faulhabers and Schultes would have “absolutely every right to proceed” in state court.
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third-party complaint, provided, however, that if Crazy Pants still wishes to pursue
its claims against third-party defendants in federal court, it will be required to file
an amended pleading, styled as a complaint.
In their moving papers, MTI and Scism principally relied on a Third Circuit
case in support of their contention that the Court must dismiss the Amended Third-
Party Complaint: Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. T&D Cottage Auto
Parts & Service, Inc., 705 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1983). See Mtn. Mem., Dkt. 115-1 at
4. But Nationwide—which is non-binding in any event—doesn’t countenance such
a result. In Nationwide, an insurance company filed an interpleader action and one
of the defendants asserted a counterclaim. When the interpleader claim became
moot, the district court dismissed the counterclaim, concluding that it now lacked
jurisdiction over the counterclaim. The Third Circuit disagreed, holding that “the
mooting of Nationwide’s complaint did not divest the court of jurisdiction over any
counterclaims that arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as the
complaint.” Id. at 687. The case was remanded to the district court to determine
whether the counterclaim arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as the
insurer’s complaint. In issuing this ruling, the court noted, in dicta, that “[w]e are
aware that a complaint over which the court did not have jurisdiction at the time it
was filed cannot support the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction.” Id. at 688.
MTI and Scism direct the Court’s attention to this dicta, but the Court does
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not find it instructive here, because unlike in Nationwide—where the
counterclaims depended on ancillary jurisdiction—Crazy Pants asserts an
independent basis for subject-matter jurisdiction over the third-party claims:
diversity of citizenship. It’s also notable that the Nationwide Court invoked policy
concerns such as “conservation of judicial resources and the avoidance of a
multiplicity of litigation . . . .” Id. at 687. In other words, Nationwide took a
pragmatic approach in deciding whether the counterclaim should proceed after the
underlying action had been mooted. This Court will do the same.
On reply, MTI and Scism argued that Crazy Pants’ position is at odds with
Rules 14(a)(1) and 14(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Regarding Rule
14(c), MTI and Scism argue that Crazy Pants—as a limitation plaintiff—didn’t
properly utilize Rule 14(c) in the first place because that rule contemplates a
defendant impleading third parties. See Reply, Dkt. 138, at 9 n.13. The Court is not
persuaded by this argument because even though Crazy Pants was a limitation
plaintiff, the third-party complaint was asserted in a defensive posture, after the
Faulhaber and Schulte claimants filed proofs of claim. See Petition of Klarman,
270 F. Supp. 1001, 1003 (D. Conn. 1967) (concluding that a petitioner in a
limitation proceeding may implead parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
14(c)); Texas Petroleum Inv. Co. v. Taylors Int’l Servs., Inc., No. 24-2344, 2025
WL 1282686, at *3 (E.D. La. May 1, 2025) (observing that even though Rule 14(c)
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permits defendants to implead third-party defendants, allowing limitation plaintiffs
to assert third party claims is a reasonable extension of Rule 14(c)).
Likewise, the Court is not persuaded by MTI and Scism’s Rule 14(a)(1)-
based argument. On this point, MTI and Scism correctly point out that third-party
complaints filed under Rule 14(a)(1) are appropriate only where the third-party
defendant’s liability to the third-party plaintiff is dependent on the outcome of the
“main claim.” Reply, Dkt. 138, at 9-10 (citing Stewart v. Am. Int’l Oil & Gas Co.,
845 F.2d 196, 199-200 (9th Cir. 1988)).
But Rule 14 is a procedural mechanism. It does not confer or withdraw
subject-matter jurisdiction, and the third-party plaintiffs have alleged complete
diversity of citizenship. Plus, Crazy Pants alleged both derivative and direct
liability within its third-party complaint. To provide one example, in the first claim
for relief, Crazy Pants alleged that the “unreasonably dangerous or defective
condition of the Boat proximately caused the Third-Party Plaintiffs harm, including
but not limited to the death of Gregory Daiker, and the potential liability of the
Estate and Crazy Pants LLC to others arising out of the June 28, 2022 accident.”
Am. Third-Party Comp. ¶ 4.6, Dkt. 54 (emphasis added). Perhaps this suggests that
the third-party complaint was attempting to do too much—in that it gestured at
both derivative and direct claims. But at this point—with the limitation complaint
gone—the practical question is whether Crazy Pants may properly pursue the third-
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party defendants. The Court finds that it can. There is no jurisdictional or
procedural impediment to it doing so. None of the cases cited by the moving
defendants holds that a court must dismiss third-party claims that independently
satisfy the requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 simply because they were initially
asserted through impleader and the underlying action has been dismissed.
The Court will therefore deny the motion to dismiss the third-party
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Court does recognize, however, that without
an underlying “main action,” this action logically should be restructured, as an
ordinary (i.e., non-admiralty) civil case based on diversity of citizenship.
Accordingly, if Crazy Pants still wishes to pursue the third-party defendants in
federal court, despite the dismissal of the limitation complaint, it must file an
amended complaint based on diversity jurisdiction.
D. Meet and Confer Obligation
Finally, the Court will turn to case management. Dismissal of the limitation
complaint carries significant practical consequences regarding how and where the
parties’ claims ought to move forward. As an initial matter, dismissal of the
limitation complaint means the stay order—entered by this Court in January
2023—will dissolve. Thus, the Faulhaber state-court action may proceed. And the
Schultes have indicated they intend to pursue Crazy Pants and the Daiker Estate
once the limitation action is dismissed.
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Under these circumstances—with related litigation in federal and state
forums—there is a substantial risk of duplication and unnecessary expenditure of
party and judicial resources. Accordingly, the Court will direct counsel for all
parties to meet and confer in good faith regarding a reasonable path forward. The
parties’ discussion should address, at a minimum: (1) which claims, if any, the
parties intend to pursue following this order; (2) in what forum or forums those
claims may properly be brought; and (3) what procedural steps are appropriate to
avoid overlapping litigation.
The Court does not prescribe the outcome of that discussion, nor does it
limit the topics discussed. Rather, the purpose of this directive is to ensure that the
parties take a coordinated and deliberate approach to the remaining litigation,
rather than proceeding piecemeal through overlapping actions. The Court expects
counsel to engage constructively and to narrow issues where possible.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. 	Third-Party Defendant Performance LLC’s Consolidated Motion to
Dismiss (Dkt. 114) is GRANTED. Accordingly:
a. 	The Limitation-of-Liability Complaint (Dkt. 1) is DISMISSED
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
b. Third Party Defendant Performance LLC is DISMISSED
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WITHOUT PREJUDICE as a defendant in the Amended Third-
Party Complaint on file in this matter (Dkt. 54).
c. 	Defendant Performance LLC is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE as a defendant in the complaints on file in
Faulhaber v. Kottmann, No. 2:24-cv-305-BLW, and Schulte v.
Kottmann, 2:24-cv-307-BLW.
2. 	Third-Party Defendants Marine Technology Inc. and Randy Scism’s
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction (Dkt. 115)
is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, as follows:
a. 	The motion to dismiss the Limitation-of-Liability Complaint on
file in this matter (Dkt. 1) is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE
TO AMEND.
b. The motion to dismiss the Amended-Third-Party Complaint on file
in this matter (Dkt. 54) is DENIED.
c. 	Crazy Pants and the Daiker Estate shall file an amended pleading
within 45 days of this Order, assuming that they still wish to
pursue the third-party defendants in federal court after dismissal of
the limitation complaint.
3. 	All remaining parties to this consolidated litigation are directed to
meet and confer, consistent with the directive in Paragraph D of this
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Order, within 21 days of this Order.
4. 	The Court’s January 26, 2023 Order—staying all claims and
proceedings against limitation plaintiffs Crazy Pants, LLC and the
Estate of Gregory John Daiker (Dkt. 7)—is DISSOLVED.
DATED: February 3, 2026
_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
U.S. District Court Judge
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