Grant v. Greystar Real Estate Partners, LLC et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
PAUL ALPHA GRANT,
Plaintiff,
v.
GREYSTAR REAL ESTATE
PARTNERS, LLC; KAPILINA BEACH
HOMES; and CONSERVICE, LLC,
Defendants.
CIV. NO. 25-00300 JMS-RT
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS, ECF NO. 22, WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS,
ECF NO. 22, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
I. INTRODUCTION
This case involves an alleged utility-overbilling scheme orchestrated
by Defendants Greystar Real Estate Partners, LLC (“Greystar”), Kapilina Beach
Homes (“Kapilina”), and Conservice, LLC (“Conservice”). See ECF No. 1. Pro se
Plaintiff Paul Alpha Grant (“Plaintiff”) claims to have been a victim of the scheme
and asserts claims under three federal statutes—the Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”), and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”)—as well as state-law
claims for “retaliation” and “spoliation.” See id. at PageID.3–6.
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Defendant Greystar filed a Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 22
(“Motion”), requesting dismissal of all claims, and Defendant Conservice joined
the Motion. ECF No. 47.1 For the reasons that follow, the Motion is GRANTED
as to all claims, with LEAVE TO AMEND as to Plaintiff’s RICO, retaliation, and
spoliation claims.2
II. BACKGROUND
A. 	Factual Background
This factual background is drawn from the allegations contained in the
Complaint, ECF No. 1, which are taken as true at this motion-to-dismiss stage.
See, e.g., Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff is a resident of Kapilina Beach Homes, a residential
community in Ewa Beach, Hawaii, managed by Defendant Greystar. ECF No. 1 at
PageID.4. In October 2024, Defendant Conservice—which performs “third-party
utility billing and submetering” for Kapilina Beach Homes—sent Plaintiff a utility
1 This Order refers to Defendants Greystar and Conservice collectively as “Defendants.”
2 The Complaint describes Defendant Kapilina as “a Delaware entity managed by”
Defendant Greystar, ECF No. 1 at PageID.4, and Defendant Greystar asserts that Defendant
Kapilina does not exist as a “separate entity.” ECF No. 22-1 at PageID.428 n.1. Regardless,
although Defendant Kapilina has not joined the Motion to Dismiss, all claims against Defendant
Kapilina are also DISMISSED, with LEAVE TO AMEND as to the RICO, retaliation, and
spoliation claims. See Silverton v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981)
(“A District Court may properly on its own motion dismiss an action as to defendants who have
not moved to dismiss where such defendants are in a position similar to that of moving
defendants or where claims against such defendants are integrally related.”). If Plaintiff files an
amended complaint, he should consider whether Kapilina is an appropriate or necessary
defendant.
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bill “reflecting grossly inflated usage and charges.” Id. In response, Plaintiff
undertook “a forensic investigation into utility billing practices at Kapilina Beach
Homes,” which involved “collecting photographic evidence of electric, gas, and
water meters” for “more than 90 tenant units.” Id. at PageID.4–5.
While Plaintiff’s investigation was ongoing, Defendant Greystar
“began selectively monitoring meters,” and “within 30 minutes” of Plaintiff
collecting data from one tenant’s gas meter, “Greystar staff arrived for the first
time ever” to take its own reading. Id. at PageID.5. Two tenants “were offered
zero utility bills and rent reductions” shortly after Plaintiff collected data from their
meters, and another tenant “received a refund for years of alleged overcharges.”
Id. In addition, all utility records from one tenant’s Conservice account were
“purged,” and Plaintiff’s list of potential witnesses was “compromised and
downloaded by an unauthorized party.” Id.
Plaintiff’s investigation revealed “that numerous tenants—including
himself—were being billed for utility usage that did not occur, indicating a pattern
of fraudulent billing,” and “[w]hen confronted with these discrepancies, neither
Greystar nor Conservice provided a meaningful response.” Id. at PageID.4. After
the investigation, Defendant Conservice “altered billing patterns, refunded charges,
or zeroed out bills without explanation.” Id. at PageID.5. Finally, “[s]hortly after
the evidence began mounting and was filed in conjunction with public records
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documenting complaints from other tenants,” Plaintiff was served an eviction
notice despite having “never been late on rent.” Id. at PageID.4–5.
B. 	Procedural Background
On September 26, 2025, Defendant Greystar filed a Motion to
Dismiss, arguing that none of Plaintiff’s claims is stated with sufficient factual
plausibility to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). ECF No. 22. On
October 29, 2025, Plaintiff requested an extension of the deadline to file his
Opposition to the Motion, explaining that he needed more time to “authenticate,
analyze, and integrate” documents released “for the first time” on October 28,
2025. ECF No. 32. The court granted Plaintiff’s request, but given his explanation,
the court reminded Plaintiff of the limited scope of review on a motion to dismiss.
ECF No. 34. Plaintiff made a second, similar request on November 6, 2025, ECF
No. 35, which the court granted with the same reminder. ECF No. 36. On
November 13, after the court denied a third requested extension, ECF No. 42,
Plaintiff filed his Opposition. ECF No. 43. Defendant Conservice joined the
Motion on November 18, 2025, ECF No. 47,3 and on November 28, 2025,
Defendant Greystar filed a Reply. ECF No. 52. The court decides the Motion
without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(c).
3 Although styled as a “Joinder,” ECF No. 47 appears on the docket as a pending
“Motion for Joinder,” and is GRANTED. See LR7.7 (permitting joinder in motions).
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III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement” of each claim
“showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To
determine whether that requirement is satisfied, the court must set conclusory
factual allegations aside, accept non-conclusory factual allegations as true, and
determine whether these allegations state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–80 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). The complaint “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of
action,” and instead “must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give
fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v.
Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (noting
that Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but “demands more than
an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]”). When ruling
on a motion to dismiss, the court considers only the complaint, attached exhibits,
and documents incorporated by reference. See Van Buskirk v. Cable News
Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002).4
4 Plaintiff’s Opposition claims that since the Complaint was filed, “extensive
corroborating data” has been uncovered and made part of the record, ECF No. 43 at PageID.537,
apparently through the 1,057 pages of exhibits attached to the Opposition. See ECF Nos. 43-1
through 43-51. At this motion-to-dismiss stage, however, the court may not consider new facts
alleged in the Opposition or exhibits attached to it. See, e.g., Andrews v. Hawaii County, 2013
(continued . . . )
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Pro se filings must be liberally construed, Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d
1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987), but “nonetheless must meet some minimum threshold
in providing a defendant with notice of what it is that it allegedly did wrong.”
Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995).
Leave to amend should be freely given “when justice so requires,”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), and should be denied only where “the pleading could not
possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Schmitt v. Kaiser Found.
Health Plan of Wash., 965 F.3d 945, 960 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).
In other words, leave to amend may be denied when amendment would be futile.
Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Team Equip., Inc., 741 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2014).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. 	The Complaint Fails to State a RICO Claim.
To state a federal RICO claim, a plaintiff must allege “(1) conduct
(2) of an enterprise [that effects interstate commerce] (3) through a pattern (4) of
racketeering activity (known as ‘predicate acts’) (5) causing injury to plaintiff’s
business or property.” United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joinders of Am. v. Bldg. &
WL 5274369, at *6 (D. Haw. Sept. 17, 2013). The court therefore considers only the parts of the
Opposition that are responsive to the Motion and do not allege new facts.
The court also reminds Plaintiff that under Local Rule 7.4, a brief in opposition to a
motion may not exceed 25 pages or 6,250 words. Plaintiff’s Opposition far exceeds these limits,
running to 129 pages and more than 27,000 words. See ECF No. 43. Going forward, Plaintiff’s
filings must comply with the Local Rules, or they may be stricken.
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Constr. Trades Dept., AFL-CIO, 770 F.3d 834, 837 (9th Cir. 2014); see also
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); Eclectic Props. E. LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d
990, 997 (9th Cir. 2014).
Defendants argue that the Complaint fails to allege (1) the existence
of an enterprise and (2) predicate acts constituting a pattern of racketeering
activity. ECF No. 22-1 at PageID.438–440. The court agrees.
1. 	The Complaint Fails to Allege the Existence of an Enterprise.
An “enterprise” includes “any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). An enterprise may also
consist of a “union or group of individuals associated in fact though not a legal
entity,” id., also known as an “association-in-fact enterprise.” See, e.g., Boyle v.
United States, 556 U.S. 938, 945 (2009). An association-in-fact enterprise must
have (1) a common purpose, (2) a structure or organization, and (3) longevity
necessary to accomplish the purpose, Eclectic Props., 751 F.3d at 997, but “need
not have a hierarchical structure” or “fixed roles.” Boyle, 556 U.S. at 948.
The Complaint neither alleges that Defendants were part of a
“partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity,” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4),
nor alleges sufficient facts to show an association-in-fact enterprise. Liberally
construed, the Complaint alleges that Defendants shared a common purpose of
obtaining money from tenants through “systemic utility overbilling fraud,” ECF
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No. 1 at PageID.3, but the Complaint lacks allegations relating to the “structure or
organization” of the enterprise or its “longevity.” The Complaint merely alleges
conduct by each Defendant, see, e.g., id. at PageID.5 (alleging that “Greystar
began selectively monitoring meters” and “Conservice altered billing patterns,
refunded charges, or zeroed out bills without explanation”), then makes the
conclusory assertion that “Defendants’ conduct is in violation of [RICO].”
Without plausible factual allegations showing that Defendants formed a “group”
that “function[ed] as a continuing unit” and “remain[ed] in existence long enough
to pursue a course of conduct,” Boyle, 556 U.S. at 948, the Complaint fails to plead
the existence of an enterprise.
2. 	The Complaint Fails to Allege a Pattern of Racketeering Activity.
A RICO plaintiff must also allege a “pattern” of “racketeering
activity.” United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joinders, 770 F.3d at 837. “Racketeering
activity” is defined as “any act or threat involving” a variety of enumerated state
and federal crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), also known as “predicate acts.” See, e.g.,
United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1412 (9th Cir. 1987). To show a
“pattern,” the plaintiff must allege facts showing that the predicate acts “are
related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.”
H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989) (emphasis omitted). A
plaintiff asserting RICO claims against multiple defendants “must allege at least
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two predicate acts by each defendant.” In re WellPoint Inc. Out-of-Network UCR
Rates Litig., 903 F. Supp. 2d 880, 914 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (emphasis in original).
The Complaint makes a conclusory assertion that Defendants’
“actions” and “conduct” are “consistent with racketeering activity,” ECF No. 1 at
PageID.5, but does not specify which “actions” or what “conduct” satisfies the
statutory definition of racketeering activity. See, e.g., Rezner v. Bayerische Hypo-
Und Vereinsbank AG, 2008 WL 11346211, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2008) (“A
plaintiff bringing a claim under RICO must establish that the defendant committed
some unlawful ‘predicate act.’”). The Complaint therefore fails to allege at least
two predicate acts by each Defendant. And because the Complaint fails to specify
which of Defendants’ actions constitute predicate acts, it necessarily fails to
establish a “pattern” by showing a relationship between predicate acts and a “threat
of continued criminal activity.” H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 239.
Plaintiff’s RICO claim is DISMISSED. But because the court cannot
say at this stage that amendment would be futile, Plaintiff is granted leave to
amend the claim.5
5 Defendants also argue, without elaboration, that the Complaint “fails to allege an effect
on interstate commerce.” ECF No. 22-1 at PageID.440. A nexus to interstate commerce is “an
essential element of a RICO violation, but the required nexus need not be great.” United States
v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 892 (9th Cir. 1981). “[A]ll that is required . . . is a showing that the
individual predicate racketeering acts have a de minimis impact on interstate commerce.” United
States v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d 1344, 1347 (1997). Here, the alleged scheme involved the
(continued . . . )
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B. 	The Complaint Fails to State a Spoliation Claim.
Hawaii courts have not recognized a tort claim for spoliation. See
Matsuura v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 102 Haw. 149, 168, 73 P.3d 687, 706
(2003) (“[T]his court need not resolve whether Hawai‘i law would recognize a tort
of spoliation of evidence.”); Jou v. Adalian, 2016 WL 4582042, at *19 (D. Haw.
Sept. 1, 2016) (discussing Matsuura and the absence of any subsequent Hawaii
cases recognizing a spoliation claim). Assuming a spoliation claim does exist
under Hawaii law, it would require a showing that the defendant’s destruction of
evidence significantly impaired the plaintiff’s ability to prove the underlying
claims. See Matsuura, 102 Haw. at 166–67, 73 P.3d at 704–05.
The Complaint contains two allegations involving possible destruction
of evidence: (1) “one tenant reported that all utility records from her Conservice
account had been purged and labeled ‘gone forever;’” and (2) Defendant Greystar
“attempted to retract an incriminating email.” ECF No. 1 at PageID.5. Given the
scope of Plaintiff’s investigation—which allegedly spanned five months and
yielded 17,000 pieces of “digital evidence” from “more than 90 tenant units,” id. at
PageID.1–6—the Complaint fails to show how these two isolated actions impaired
delivery of inflated utility bills by Conservice, based in Utah, to residents of Hawaii. ECF No. 1
at PageID.4. The utility bills directed payment to a Hawaii address associated with “Kapilina
Beach Homes,” ECF No. 1-1 at PageID.9, which Plaintiff alleges is a “Delaware entity managed
by” Defendant Greystar, a “foreign real estate management company.” ECF No. 1 at PageID.4.
Given these allegations, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled an effect on interstate commerce.
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Plaintiff’s ability to prove his other claims. Plaintiff’s spoliation claim is
DISMISSED. But because the court cannot say at this stage that amendment
would be futile, Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the claim.
C. 	The Complaint Fails to State a Retaliatory Eviction Claim.
Plaintiff asserts a cause of action for “retaliation.” ECF No. 1 at
PageID.6. Liberally construing the Complaint, the court assumes Plaintiff is
attempting to assert a claim for retaliatory eviction under Hawaii Revised Statutes
(“HRS”) § 521-74. See id. at PageID.2 (seeking damages for “retaliatory
eviction”); see also, e.g., ECF No. 43 at PageID.576 (referring to “retaliatory
eviction” and citing HRS § 521-74).6
Section 521-74 prohibits eviction after (1) a tenant “has complained in
good faith” to a government agency, (2) a government agency “has filed a notice or
complaint of a violation,” or (3) a tenant “has in good faith requested repairs.”
HRS § 521-74(a)(1)–(3). Section 521-74 applies only where the tenant has
continued to pay rent or has lawfully withheld rent. Id. § 521-74(a).
Plaintiff alleges that he “has never been late on rent,” which satisfies
the threshold requirement of a retaliatory eviction claim under § 521-74. Plaintiff
6 Under Hawaii law, retaliatory eviction may be asserted as an affirmative defense to an
eviction action or as a counterclaim. See Ryan v. Herzog, 142 Haw. 278, 286–87, 418 P.3d 619,
627–28 (2018). It is unclear whether this claim should have been brought, if at all, in the
underlying eviction action. For purposes of this Order, however, the court assumes that Plaintiff
may bring a retaliatory eviction claim here, outside the context of an eviction proceeding.
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further alleges that he was served an eviction notice “shortly after the evidence
began mounting and was filed.” ECF No. 1 at PageID.5. But the precise meaning
of this allegation is unclear; Plaintiff does not allege that the “evidence . . . was
filed” as part of a complaint to a government agency. Without more, this
ambiguous allegation is insufficient to state a claim under § 521-74.7 Plaintiff’s
retaliation claim is DISMISSED. But because the court cannot say at this stage
that amendment would be futile, Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the claim.
D. 	The Complaint Fails to State an FCRA Claim.
The FCRA applies only to “consumer reporting agencies.” See
Alexander v. Moore & Assocs., Inc., 553 F. Supp. 948, 949–50 (D. Haw. 1982)
(“The threshold question is whether the [FCRA] has any application in the instant
case, since the requirements of the [FCRA] apply only to ‘consumer reporting
agencies.’”). The Complaint does not claim that any Defendant is a consumer
reporting agency; it describes Defendant Greystar as a “real estate management
company” and Defendant Conservice as a company “engaged in the business of
third-party utility billing and submetering for residential properties.” ECF No. 1 at
PageID.4. Plaintiff’s FCRA claim is DISMISSED. And given the Complaint’s
descriptions of Defendants, the court concludes that amendment would be futile.
7 The Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff had requested repairs, or that a government
agency had filed a notice or complaint of a violation by Defendants. See HRS § 521-74(a)(2)–
(3).
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See Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 741 F.3d at 1086 (stating that leave to amend may be
denied when amendment would be futile).
E. 	The Complaint Fails to State an FDCPA Claim.
The FDCPA provides a right of action for certain prohibited conduct
by a “debt collector,” defined as “any person who uses any instrumentality of
interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is
the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly
or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692a(6). The FDCPA applies only to the collection of debts in default. See id.
§ 1962a(6)(F)(iii) (excluding from the definition of “debt collector” any person
whose activity “concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was
obtained by such person”).
The Complaint fails to allege that any Defendant is a “debt collector.”
Nothing in the Complaint suggests that Defendant Greystar’s “principal purpose is
. . . the collection of any debts,” or that it “regularly collects or attempts to collect”
debts owed to another. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). And although the Complaint’s
description of Defendant Conservice suggests that its business involves the
collection of payments owed by tenants to utility companies, that activity falls
outside the scope of the FDCPA. See Mitchell v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc.,
2010 WL 5387712, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2010) (“[T]he FDCPA only applies
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to debt which was in default.”). Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim is DISMISSED. And
given the Complaint’s descriptions of Defendants, the court concludes that
amendment would be futile.
F. 	The Complaint Fails to Differentiate Between Defendants.
Defendants also argue that the Complaint fails to “identify which
claim is asserted against which Defendant.” ECF No. 22-1 at PageID.435. The
court agrees.
“Undifferentiated pleading against multiple defendants is improper”
because a complaint must provide each defendant “with fair notice of its alleged
misconduct.” Corazon v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 2011 WL 1740099, at *4
(N.D. Cal. May 5, 2011); see also Ye Jiang v. Zhong Fang, 2021 WL 2895681, at
*5 (D. Haw. Jul. 9, 2021) (“Where, as here, Plaintiffs assert claims against groups
of Defendants without drawing distinctions between their conduct or including
requisite facts as to each claim, Plaintiffs violate FRCP 8.”).
The Complaint contains some allegations of specific conduct by
particular Defendants, see, e.g., ECF No. 1 at PageID.5 (alleging that “Greystar
began selectively monitoring meters” and “Conservice altered billing patterns,
refunded charges, or zeroed out bills without explanation”), but fails to connect
these allegations to particular claims. And other allegations are made against
Defendants generally, see, e.g., id. at PageID.6 (“Defendants’ conduct is in
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violation of [RICO], and relevant consumer protection statutes.”), or against
unidentified parties, see, e.g., id. at PageID.5 (alleging that “Plaintiff’s sealed
witness list was compromised and downloaded by an unauthorized party”).
Moreover, the Complaint’s “Causes of Action” section consists of a
single sentence: “To be inserted: Individual counts for RICO violation, consumer
fraud, retaliation, and spoliation.” Id. at PageID.6. This apparent placeholder
language fails to provide “each defendant with fair notice of the allegations made
against them so that they can defend themselves effectively.” Russo v. Fed. Med.
Servs., Inc., 744 F. Supp. 3d 914, 922 (N.D. Cal. 2024). If Plaintiff files an
amended complaint, he must clearly attribute alleged actions to particular
Defendants and specify which claims are asserted against which Defendants.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, ECF No. 22, and DISMISSES all claims, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as
to Plaintiff’s RICO, spoliation, and retaliation claims. Plaintiff is not granted leave
to amend as to his FDPA and FCPRA claims. Plaintiff may file an amended
complaint by January 20, 2026. Failure to file an amended complaint by that date
will result in automatic dismissal of this action.8
8 Plaintiff’s Opposition is combined with a “Motion for Preservation of Evidence,
Expedited Discovery, and Protective Order Safeguarding the Identity and Testimony of
(continued . . . )
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, December 22, 2025.
Cooperating Tenants and Witnesses.” ECF No. 43 at PageID.531. Plaintiff’s Motion is
DENIED for four reasons. First, Plaintiff’s motion does not raise “the same subject matter” as
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. See LR7.7 (“Any motion raising the same subject matter as an
original motion may be filed by the responding party together with the party’s opposition . . . .”).
Second, Plaintiff’s request for expedited discovery is premature because the parties have not yet
conferred under Rule 26(f) and discovery has not yet been authorized by the court. See ECF No.
31. Third, protective orders are generally not available until “discovery is sought.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(c)(1). And fourth, Plaintiff has not clearly explained the need for, or the scope of, the
requested order for preservation of evidence. See generally, ECF No. 43. If Plaintiff files an
amended complaint, he may clarify his request in a separate motion at the appropriate time.
/s/ J. Michael Seabright
J. Michael Seabright
United States District Judge
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