Lee, Jr. v. Rising Phoenix Holdings Corporation et al

1:25-cv-00083Hid8 mai 2026

Texte intégral

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI‘I
WILFRED L. LEE, JR.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RISING PHOENIX HOLDINGS CORP.,
et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-00083-DKW-RT
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO ALTER
JUDGMENT1
On February 17, 2026, the Court granted the motion to dismiss filed by
Defendants Rising Phoenix Holdings Corporation, TB Customer Relations LLC,
Brooke Fisher, and Melissa Burke (“Defendants”). Dkt. No. 84. On March 5, 2026,
pro se Plaintiff Wilfred L. Lee filed a motion for reconsideration, Dkt. No. 86, which
is now before the Court. 	For the reasons described herein, the motion for
reconsideration is DENIED.
FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 17, 2026, the Court entered an order granting Defendants’
motion to dismiss and dismissing Lee’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) with
prejudice. 	Dkt. No. 84. 	As relevant here, the Court concluded that Lee failed to
1 Pursuant to Local Rul 7.1(c), the Court finds these matters suitable for disposition without a
hearing.
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state a retaliation claim under the ADA. Dkt. No. 84 at 10–14. Lee had based his
ADA retaliation claim on a comparison of himself to Genierose Piho and Daphne
Henion, non-disabled employees whom he alleged had not been disciplined or
terminated despite engaging in behavior similar to himself. Dkt. No. 68 ¶ 38. The
Court found this comparison unpersuasive because Piho and Henion were not
similarly situated. 	In particular, the Court noted that Lee’s SAC had omitted
allegations from his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) in which he stated that he
had been disciplined for both time record discrepancies and complaints from
subordinate 	agents, 	whereas 	Piho 	and 	Henion 	had 	only 	engaged 	in 	time
discrepancies. Dkt. No. 84 at 12–14. The Clerk entered Judgment. Dkt. No. 85.
On March 5, 2026, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that the
Court erred in dismissing his ADA retaliation claim. Dkt. No. 86. Lee argued that
1) the Court’s reliance on allegations from the FAC was a manifest error of law; 2)
the FAC allegations were contradicted by allegations within Lee’s own pleadings
and therefore should be disregarded; 3) the Court improperly included “comparator
alignment” as an element of an ADA retaliation claim; and 4) Lee’s allegations
establish that Defendants failed to adhere to disciplinary standards outlined in an
employee handbook, which sufficiently shows that the reasons given for his
suspension and demotion were pretextual. Id. at 4–8.
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On March 16, 2026, Defendants responded in opposition to the motion for
reconsideration, arguing that Lee had failed to demonstrate any error of law or fact.
Dkt. No. 88. On March 22, 2026, Lee replied, substantially repeating his arguments
for reconsideration. Dkt. No. 89.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	59(e) 	permits 	a 	litigant 	to 	file 	a
reconsideration “motion to alter or amend a judgment” within 28 days after entry of
the judgment. 	A “motion for reconsideration must demonstrate reasons why the
court should reconsider its prior decision” and “set forth facts or law of a strongly
convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision.” 	Donaldson v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 947 F. Supp. 429, 430 (D. Haw. 1996) (citation omitted).
Reconsideration is “an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of
finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Est. of Bishop,
229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
As such, it is generally only appropriate:
(1) if such motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact
upon which the judgment rests; (2) if such motion is necessary to
present newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) if
such motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or (4) if the
amendment is justified by an intervening change in controlling law.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011). Each one of these
“four reasons . . . is a ‘high hurdle’ that should not occur ‘absent highly unusual
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circumstances.’” Chang v. Straub Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 2014 WL 712613, at *1 (D.
Haw. Feb. 21, 2014) (quoting Weeks v. Bayer, 246 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 2001)).
Reconsideration cannot be used “to raise arguments or present evidence for
the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation,”
Kona, 229 F.3d at 890, and “[m]ere disagreement with a previous ruling is not a
sufficient basis for reconsideration.” 	McAllister v. Adecco Grp. N.A., 2018 WL
6682984, at *2 (D. Haw. Dec. 19, 2018). 	The decision of whether to grant
reconsideration 	is 	ultimately 	“committed 	to 	the 	sound 	discretion 	of 	the
court.” 	Navajo Nation v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Indian
Nation, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003).
DISCUSSION
Even 	when 	liberally 	construed,2 Lee’s 	motion 	provides 	no 	basis 	for
reconsideration.
First, Lee takes issue with the Court having cited to facts appearing within the
FAC, rather than relying solely on his SAC allegations, arguing that the Court did
so by incorrectly relying on Jackson v. Loews Hotels, Inc., 2019 WL 6721637 (C.D.
Cal. July 24, 2019). Dkt. No. 86 at 5–6. The Court indeed cited to Jackson for the
proposition that it could look to facts omitted from the SAC in determining if Lee’s
2 Because Lee is pro se, the Court liberally construes his filings. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007).
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claims could be dismissed, Dkt. No. 84 at 13, but Lee fails to explain why that
reliance was improper. 	Lee states only that, unlike in his action, the plaintiff in
Jackson “failed to challenge the employer’s reason.” 	Dkt. No. 86 at 5. 	As
Defendants point out, Jackson was not an employment case, and Lee’s line of attack
has no connection to the underlying point made by the Court: that facts omitted from
a prior pleading may be treated as judicial admissions, and a party may not avoid
factual statements previously pled to circumvent prior court rulings. 	See Dkt. No.
88 at 6 n.2. At any rate, the Court cited to several other cases to support the same
legal principle, the use of which Lee does not challenge. See Dkt. No. 84 at 13–14
(citing to Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lacelaw Corp., 861 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1988) and Huey
v. Honeywell, Inc., 82 F.3d 327 (9th Cir. 1996)).
Lee relatedly argues that the Court could not use the omitted facts as judicial
admissions because those facts contradicted the allegations in his SAC. Dkt. No. 86
at 5–6. However, Lee fails to establish any contradiction. Specifically, Lee claims
that two paragraphs from his SAC “do not concede[] the validity of ‘agent
complaints’” 	and 	instead 	“identify 	them 	as 	a 	proffered 	rationale 	that 	is
unsubstantiated by the record.” Id. at 5. In the first cited paragraph, Lee alleges that
Defendants’ company policy required that employees be given “copies of all
progress discipline documentation,” and that Defendants keep accurate records of
“personnel actions.” 	Dkt. No. 68 ¶ 61. 	In the second, Lee alleges that records
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concerning his “performance and complaints” were absent from his personnel file
and never provided to him. Id. ¶ 62. These allegations do not in any way refute the
omitted facts from the FAC that the Court relied upon; namely, that Lee was under
scrutiny for both timekeeping discrepancies and complaints from his agents. 	Dkt.
No. 84 at 12–14. Given that there was no contradiction, Lee’s argument fails.
Lee 	further 	asserts 	that 	the 	Court 	improperly 	included 	“comparator
alignment” as an element of an ADA retaliation claim. 	The Court did indeed
consider if the situations of Piho and Henion—employees to whom Lee had
expressly compared himself—were similar to that of Lee. Dkt. No. 86 at 14. But
evaluating the “surrounding circumstances” of what Lee views as retaliation is a
permissible part of the plausibility analysis for the causation element of any ADA
retaliation claim. 	See Norton v. PHC-Elko, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1088 (D.
Nev. 2014), aff’d, 673 F. App’x 714 (9th Cir. 2016) (“An employer’s more favorable
treatment of similarly situated employees is probative of pretext.”). 	It was Lee’s
decision to compare himself to other employees—the Court merely evaluated if that
comparison was valid. 	See Hawaii Stevedores, Inc. v. HT&T Co., 363 F.Supp.2d
1253, 1269 (D. Haw. 2005) (“Mere disagreement with a previous order is an
insufficient basis for reconsideration.”).
Finally, Lee argues that there was another ground to find pretext for his
demotion and suspension buried within an employee handbook, an excerpt of which
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he provides with his motion. 	Dkt. No. 86-3. 	Lee asserts that the disciplinary
proceedings 	against 	him 	violated 	the 	handbook, 	which 	“mandates 	specific
investigation and documentation for grievances”—such a violation, according to
Lee, demonstrates pretext. Dkt. No. 86 at 6. Lee fails to state what portions of the
handbook his demotion and suspension contradicted, nor can the Court find any. In
fact, the excerpt Lee provides states that, notwithstanding Defendants’ progressive
discipline policy, “employees may be terminated without prior notice or disciplinary
action.” Dkt. No. 86-3 at 4. So, to the extent that Lee argues that the actions taken
against him violated the discipline policy, the handbook itself states otherwise.
Accordingly, 	none 	of 	Lee’s 	arguments 	demonstrate 	grounds 	for 	the
extraordinary remedy of reconsideration. 	Kona Enters., Inc., 229 F.3d at 890. His
motion is therefore denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Lee’s Motion for Reconsideration, Dkt. No.
86, is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 8, 2026 at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.
___________________________
Derrick K. Watson
Chief United States District Judge
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