Wyatt et al v. United States of America, The

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF HAWAII
ARIANA WYATT, et al.
Plaintiffs,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
CIV NO. 23-00065 LEK-KJM
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTION TO [DKT. 138]
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDER DENYING EMERGENCY MOTION TO EXTEND
THE SCHEDULE; AND ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDER
DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ EMERGENCY MOTION TO EXTEND THE SCHEDULE
On August 7, 2025, Plaintiffs Ariana Wyatt,
individually, and as next friend to her minor child, I.W., and
Meredith Wilson (“Plaintiffs”) filed their Emergency Motion to
Extend the Schedule (“8/7 Motion”), seeking to extend all
deadlines after an expert witness experienced an emergency.
[Dkt. no. 125.] On August 26, 2025, the magistrate judge filed
the Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion to Extend the
Schedule (“8/26/25 Order”). [Dkt. no. 138.] Plaintiffs filed a
motion for reconsideration of the 8/26/25 Order on August 29,
2025 (“Motion for Reconsideration”). [Dkt. no. 139.]
On October 29, 2025, the magistrate judge issued an
order denying the Motion for Reconsideration (“10/29/25 Order”).
[Dkt. no. 164.] On November 12, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an
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objection asking the Court to set aside the 8/26/25 Order and
grant the requested extension or limited relief (“Objection”).
[Dkt. no. 166.] On November 26, 2025, Defendant United States of
America (“United States”) filed a response opposing the
Objection (“Opposition”). [Dkt. no. 170.]
The Court considers the Objection as a non-hearing
matter pursuant to Rule LR7.1(d) of the Local Rules of Practice
of the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii
(“Local Rules”). The Objection is denied and the 8/26/25 Order
is adopted for the reasons set forth below.
BACKGROUND
This Order incorporates the background from the
10/29/25 Order and supplements it as necessary. Plaintiffs
commenced this action by filing a Complaint on February 2, 2023.1
[Dkt. no. 1.] Under the original scheduling order, filed on
May 8, 2023, Plaintiffs were required to make disclosures
regarding expert witnesses no later than March 4, 2024. [Dkt.
no. 33 at ¶ 3.a.] Plaintiffs’ expert disclosures deadline was
extended five times.2 The operative scheduling order is the
May 21, 2025 Stipulated Sixth Amended Rule 16 Scheduling Order,
1 The operative pleading in this case is the Amended
Complaint filed on August 8, 2023. [Dkt. no. 44.]
2 The five stipulated amended scheduling orders that
extended the parties’ expert disclosures deadlines, can be found
at docket numbers 66, 68, 95, 101, and 110.
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which stated that Plaintiffs’ expert disclosures deadline was
August 15, 2025. [Dkt. no. 110 at 3.]
Following the 2021 release of jet fuel at the Red Hill
Bulk Fuel Storage Facility (“Red Hill”), over 7,300 plaintiffs
filed tort actions against the United States in this district
court pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). The
instant case is one such action. See 10/29/25 Order at 2. On
June 6, 2024, the United States filed an omnibus Motion to Stay
Depositions across six related FTCA actions, including the
instant action (“6/6/24 Motion”). [Dkt. no. 72.] Out of the six
related actions, Plaintiffs were the only group of plaintiffs to
oppose the 6/6/24 Motion. [Id. at 1.] In their response in
opposition to the 6/6/24 Motion, filed on June 20, 2024,
Plaintiffs argued that if the depositions were stayed, their
ability to present expert opinions would be stymied for months.
[Dkt. no. 77 at 4.] On July 17, 2024, the magistrate judge
issued an order granting the 6/6/24 Motion (“7/17/24 Order”).
[Dkt. no. 85.] The 7/17/24 Order noted that the parties were
“continuing to advance their cases with written discovery,” and
stated that the parties “may continue to work with and prepare
their experts.” [7/17/24 Order at 7.] As of the filing of the
7/17/24 Order, Plaintiffs’ deadline to disclose their experts
was October 4, 2024. See Stipulated Third Amended Rule 16
Scheduling Order, filed 5/15/24 (dkt. no. 68), at 3.
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On August 29, 2024, a notice concerning a motion to
continue the stay of depositions until October 15, 2024 was
filed in the instant case. See Notice of Motion to Continue Stay
of Depositions, filed 8/29/24 (dkt. no. 88). Plaintiffs filed a
statement on September 5, 2024 indicating that they did not
oppose that motion pursuant to an agreement made between
Plaintiffs and the United States to extend deadlines. [Dkt.
no. 93.] That same day, the magistrate judge filed an entering
order extending the stay. [Dkt. no. 94.] The Stipulated Fourth
Amended Rule 16 Scheduling Order was filed on September 11,
2024, which extended Plaintiffs’ expert disclosures deadline
from October 4, 2024 to April 18, 2025. [Dkt. no. 95 at 3.] The
stay of depositions lasted 90 days. Between the Stipulated Third
Amended Rule 16 Scheduling Order and the Stipulated Fourth
Amended Rule 16 Scheduling Order, Plaintiffs’ expert disclosures
deadline was extended by 196 days.
Plaintiffs began consulting with Gerry D. Beckett,
C.Hg. (“Beckett”), a hydrogeologist, in June 2024. [10/29/25
Order at 4, 8 (citations omitted).] However, Beckett did not
accept a testifying role until early May 2025, as he was
awaiting clearance from the Hawai`i State Department of Health
(“DOH”) regarding his ability to serve as an expert in the
instant case due to his work as a subject-matter expert on Red
Hill issues for the State of Hawai`i. [Id. at 9 (citations
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omitted).] Plaintiffs also worked with an unnamed hydrogeologist
between April 28, 2025, and May 1, 2025. [Id. at 14 (citation
omitted).] Further, “Plaintiffs’ counsel had ongoing
conversations with two other hydrogeologists,” between “the
inception of this litigation” and “as recently as April 2025.”
[Id. at 13-14 (quotation marks and citation omitted).]
In July 2025, Plaintiffs indicated an intent to seek a
schedule extension on at least two occasions prior to learning
of Beckett’s medical condition. [8/26/25 Order at 7 (citation
omitted).] First, on July 11, 2025, Plaintiffs’ counsel sent
counsel for the United States an email, which expressed
Plaintiffs’ intent to request that the magistrate judge extend
the schedule to align the parties’ fact discovery cutoff with
the fact discovery cutoff of the related FTCA cases. See
10/29/25 Order at 16 (citation omitted). Second, on July 21,
2025, Plaintiffs requested that the United States agree to a
forty-five-day extension of all deadlines. See id. (citation
omitted). Counsel for the United States responded that they
opposed the request to extend Plaintiffs’ expert disclosures
deadlines. [Id. (citations omitted).]
On July 25, 2025 — four days after the second
extension request — Plaintiffs allegedly became aware of
Beckett’s medical issues. [Id. at 16-17 (citations omitted).]
That evening, Plaintiffs’ counsel emailed the United States’s
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counsel and requested that the United States stipulate to a six-
month extension of expert discovery deadlines due to Beckett’s
health concerns. See Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion
to Extend the Schedule (ECF No. 125), filed 8/13/25 (dkt.
no. 131), Declaration of Eric A. Ray (“Ray Decl.”) at ¶ 19.
Counsel for the United States responded on July 28, 2025, with a
request to meet and confer. [Id. at ¶ 20.] On August 1, 2025,
Plaintiffs offered to meet and confer on August 7, 2025. [Id. at
¶ 21.] After conferring on August 7, 2025, Plaintiffs elected to
file the 8/7 Motion. See 10/29/25 Order at 4.
On August 26, 2025, the magistrate judge denied the
8/7 Motion, finding that Plaintiffs did not satisfy the good
cause standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4)
because they did not act diligently in retaining and disclosing
Beckett as an expert by the August 15, 2025 deadline. See
8/26/25 Order at 6-7, 10. Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration
was denied in the 10/29/25 Order. See generally 10/29/25 Order.
In the 10/29/25 Order, the magistrate judge found that the
8/26/25 Order was not based on manifest errors of fact, [id. at
7-10,] was not manifestly unjust, [id. at 10-13,] and was
supported by the record, [id. at 13-19].
STANDARD
I. 	Review of a Magistrate Judge’s Order
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated:
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[Title 28 United States Code] Section 636(b)(1)
and its procedural counterpart, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 72, create a distinction between
“non-dispositive” pretrial motions that may be
referred to a magistrate judge for a decision and
“case-dispositive motions” that “may be referred
only for evidentiary hearing, proposed findings,
and recommendations” to the district court unless
the parties agree otherwise. Flam v. Flam, 788
F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United
States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th
Cir. 2003) (en banc)). When a magistrate judge
rules on a non-dispositive matter, a district
judge may “reconsider” that ruling only if it is
“clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). But
when a magistrate judge issues a report and
recommendation on a dispositive matter, a
district judge must “make a de novo determination
of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made.” Id. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
CPC Pat. Techs. Pty Ltd. v. Apple, Inc., 34 F.4th 801, 803–04
(9th Cir. 2022) (footnote omitted).
Nondispositive matters are those “pretrial matter[s]
not dispositive of a party’s claim or defense . . . .” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(a). “Under [Ninth Circuit] caselaw, to determine
whether a magistrate judge’s ruling denying a motion is
dispositive, [the Ninth Circuit] examine[s] whether the denial
of the motion effectively disposes of a claim or defense or
precludes the ultimate relief sought.” Bastidas v. Chappell, 791
F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).
The Ninth Circuit has explained, “Pretrial orders
of a magistrate [judge] under 636(b)(1)(A) are
reviewable under the ‘clearly erroneous and
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contrary to law’ standard; they are not subject
to de novo determination. The reviewing court may
not simply substitute its judgment for that of
the deciding court.” Grimes v. City & Cty. of San
Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 241 (9th Cir. 1991)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). Instead,
the court must defer to the nondispositive order
by a magistrate judge unless it is “clearly
erroneous or contrary to law.”
Ehart v. Lahaina Divers Inc., CIVIL NO. 21-00475 SOM-KJM, 2024
WL 1018363, at *1 (D. Hawai`i Mar. 8, 2024) (alteration in
Ehart).
Where the magistrate judge’s order,
findings, and/or recommendations involve a
dispositive matter, however, the Court must
review de novo those portions to which objections
are made and “may accept, reject, or modify, in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations
made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C); see also Local Rule 74.2; Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b). Under a de novo standard, the
Court reviews “the matter anew, the same as if it
had not been heard before, and as if no decision
previously had been rendered.” Freeman v.
DirecTV, Inc., 457 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir.
2006).
Batiste v. Sun Kona Fin. I, LLC, Civ. No. 15-00397 ACK-KSC, 2016
WL 756556, at *4 (D. Hawai`i Feb. 26, 2016).
II. 	Rule 16(b)(4)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) applies to
the modification of deadlines to disclose expert witnesses:
Rule 26 of the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure requires a party to disclose the
identity of any expert witness it may use at
trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A). “A party must
make [its expert] disclosures at the times and in
the sequence that the court orders.” Fed. R. Civ.
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P. 26(a)(2)(D). . . . Under Rule 16(b)(4) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, [a] scheduling
order deadline “may be modified only for good
cause and with the judge’s consent.” “The
pretrial schedule may be modified if it cannot
reasonably be met despite the diligence of the
party seeking the extension. If the party seeking
the modification was not diligent, the inquiry
should end and the motion to modify should not be
granted.” Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302
F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
DW Aina Le`a Dev., LLC v. Land Use Comm’n, Civil NO. 17-00113
SOM-WRP, 2023 WL 8237056, at *1 (D. Hawai`i Nov. 27, 2023) (some
alterations in DW Aina Le`a).3 “The party seeking to modify a
scheduling order bears the burden of demonstrating good cause.”
Lusk v. Five Guys Enters. LLC, Case No. 1:17-cv-00762-AWI-EPG,
2022 WL 5264265, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2022) (citing
Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th
Cir. 1992)). “Although the existence or degree of prejudice to
the party opposing the modification might supply additional
reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry is upon the
moving party’s reasons for seeking modification.” Johnson, 975
F.2d at 609 (citation omitted).
3 The district court’s judgment and several orders that were
appealed in DW Aina Le`a were affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. See
No. 24-1223, No. 24-1549, 2025 WL 546356 (9th Cir. Feb. 19,
2025).
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DISCUSSION
I. 	Standard of Review
The parties disagree on the legal standard that the
Court should apply. Plaintiffs argue that the Ninth Circuit’s
“‘functional approach’” for reviewing a magistrate judge’s
orders renders the 8/26/25 Order dispositive. See Objection,
Mem. of Law at 5 (quoting CPC Pat. Techs. Pty Ltd. v. Apple,
Inc., 34 F.4th 801, 807 (9th Cir. 2022)). They contend that the
8/26/25 Order precludes them from being able to introduce expert
testimony at trial, which, in their view, effectively vitiates
their ability to prove their claims. See id. The 8/26/25 Order,
however, did not actually or effectively adjudicate Plaintiffs’
claims. Rather, the 8/26/25 Order denied Plaintiffs’ request for
the modification of the scheduling order. Plaintiffs can still
prosecute their claims by introducing other evidence, relying on
any final findings of fact and conclusions of law in the related
FTCA cases, cf. 10/29/25 Order at 11 & n.2, and litigating the
case through other means. The 8/26/25 Order should be reviewed
under the clearly erroneous standard applicable to
nondispositive orders. However, the Court notes that it would
reach the same conclusion if it reviewed the 10/29/25 Order as a
dispositive order under the de novo standard.
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II. 	Plaintiffs Fail to Establish Good Cause
A. 	Plaintiffs’ Lack of Diligence
Plaintiffs assert that the magistrate judge applied a
harsher standard than Rule 16(b)(4)’s good cause standard. See
Objection, Mem. of Law at 7. This argument lacks merit: the
magistrate judge did not demand that Plaintiffs exercise
“perfection,” [id. at 7, 11,] when retaining and disclosing an
expert. See generally 8/26/25 Order. Further, the Court finds
that the magistrate judge’s reasoning in the 8/26/25 Order (and
the 10/29/25 Order) satisfies the good cause standard because
the magistrate judge’s finding that Plaintiffs were not
reasonably diligent is supported by the record.
It is not disputed that Plaintiffs knew since the
commencement of this action that expert testimony would be
important. See 10/29/25 Order at 13 (stating that Plaintiffs’
counsel conversed with at least two other experts “‘[s]ince the
inception of this litigation, including during and immediately
after the stay was lifted in October 2024 and as recently as
April 2025 . . . .’” (quoting ECF No. 139-1 (Motion for
Reconsideration, Mem. in Supp.) at 7)). It is also not disputed
that Plaintiffs began consulting with Beckett in June 2024. See
8/26/25 Order at 4 (citation omitted). Beckett’s work with DOH
allowed him to become familiar with the hydrogeology of Red
Hill. See 8/26/25 Order at 5 (citation omitted).
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The decision to formally retain Beckett a few months
before the August 15, 2025 deadline was made pursuant to the
discretion and experience of Plaintiffs’ counsel. Plaintiffs
could have chosen a testifying expert with less Red Hill
experience but with a wider timeframe to prepare his or her
report, especially given the voluminous record at issue. See
Objection, Mem. of Law at 8-9 (describing the factual record as
spanning over eight million pages). Instead, Plaintiffs selected
a testifying expert with Red Hill experience but with an obvious
risk: that DOH would either refuse to permit him to serve as
Plaintiffs’ expert or that the permission would be granted too
near the expert disclosures deadline such that compliance with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) would have been
impossible. Plaintiffs could have avoided this risk by selecting
another expert or could have hedged this risk by requesting a
modification of the expert disclosures deadline the moment that
Beckett was retained. Plaintiffs did neither.
The record demonstrates that Plaintiffs appreciated
the importance of expert testimony since this litigation began.
See 10/29/25 Order at 13. Thus, the timing of Beckett’s
retention is more accurately characterized as a strategic error
stemming from a lack of diligence. It is uncontroverted that
Plaintiffs asked the United States for an extension of
Plaintiffs’ expert disclosures deadline on two separate
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occasions shortly before they filed the 8/7 Motion. See 8/26/25
Order at 7-8; 10/29/25 Order at 16. Given these requests, it
appears that time ran out for Beckett to prepare his report.
Plaintiffs were not diligent in waiting over two years to retain
and disclose an expert. See Buenviaje v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc.,
Case No. 23-cv-1938-W-MMP, 2024 WL 4584583, at *5 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 25, 2024) (concluding that the plaintiff was not diligent
after he missed an expert designation deadline despite
acknowledging the importance of expert testimony since the
inception of his case); Crews v. Domino’s Pizza Corp., Case No.
CV 08-03703 GAF (SSx), 2009 WL 10672774, at *2 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 26, 2009) (finding that an expert’s retention several
months before expert disclosures were required cut against the
plaintiffs’ assertion that they acted diligently in disclosing
their expert witnesses).
B. 	Impact of Deposition Stay
Plaintiffs contend that the magistrate judge
overlooked the stay’s impact on Plaintiffs’ ability to retain
experts. See Objection, Mem. of Law at 7-8. A review of the
10/29/25 Order refutes this contention. See 10/29/25 Order at 7-
10, 14-15 (discussing the stay of depositions and its impact on
the issue of Plaintiffs’ diligence or lack thereof). The Court’s
appraisal of the facts, however, leads the Court to conclude
that the 8/26/25 Order was not based on manifest errors of fact.
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The 7/17/24 Order made clear that all parties,
including Plaintiffs, could “continue to work with and prepare
their experts.” [7/17/24 Order at 7.] While Plaintiffs may have
needed to wait for the stay to be lifted to fully complete
expert reports, nothing in the 7/17/24 Order prevented
Plaintiffs’ experts from beginning to draft expert reports.
Further, the 7/17/24 Order did not forbid Plaintiffs from
engaging, retaining, and preparing their experts. See id. For
instance, any expert have been able to review other types of
discovery during the deposition stay.4 See id. (making clear that
“the stay is limited to depositions” and that “[t]he parties are
4 In a footnote, Plaintiffs assert that 8,094,912 pages of
documents were produced after the deposition stay was lifted.
[Objection, Mem. of Law at 9 n.1.] Plaintiffs do not address the
fact that their experts could have reviewed at least 6,867,090
pages of documents during the deposition stay. See id.
(comparing beginning Bates numbers 06867091 of November 2024
production with ending Bates numbers 14962003 of July 2025
production). By comparing beginning Bates numbers with ending
Bates numbers, Plaintiffs also do not address the fact that they
had in their possession 14,749,057 pages of documents to review
as of November 15, 2024. See id., Declaration of Counsel
(“Segawa Decl.”), Exh. 1 (November 15, 2024 production letter
from the United States’ counsel to Plaintiffs’ counsel).
Although the United States produced documents on July 11, 2025,
[Segawa Decl., Exh. 2 (July 11, 2025 production letter from the
United States’ counsel to Plaintiffs’ counsel),] Plaintiffs
possessed almost all of the United States’ responsive documents
as of November 15, 2024. The Court is not convinced that
seventy-eight pages of documents produced on July 11, 2025
prevented Plaintiffs from meeting their expert disclosures
deadline. See id. (noting the Bates range of Production Volume
73 as 14961925 through 14962003).
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continuing to advance their cases with written discovery”).
Further, Beckett served as a subject-matter expert for DOH
during the stay and was unable to accept a testifying role in
this case until an unspecified date in May 2025. [8/26/25 Order
at 4-6.] The Court concludes that the deposition stay did not
result in Plaintiffs’ expert disclosures deadline becoming a
deadline that “[could not] reasonably be met despite the
diligence of the party seeking the extension.” See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 16(b) advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment.
C. 	The “Backup Expert”
Plaintiffs argue that the magistrate judge imposed a
standard that departed from the Rule 16 “reasonable diligence
standard” by suggesting they should have retained a “backup
expert” to guard against medical emergencies. See Objection,
Mem. of Law at 12. Plaintiffs misstate the standard: Rule 16(b)
imposes a good cause standard; not a “reasonable diligence”
standard. See Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609-10 (delineating the good
cause standard). In any event, the magistrate judge did not
mandate redundant experts. Rather, the magistrate judge found
that a diligent party would not have waited until the final
months of the expert disclosures period to formalize the
retention of a testifying expert in a complex case, thereby
leaving no margin for error or unforeseen events. See 8/26/25
Order at 6-7; see also 10/29/25 Order at 19.
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D. 	Facts Not in Evidence
Plaintiffs object that the magistrate judge
“improperly assumed facts not in the record.” See Objection,
Mem. of Law at 13. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue the magistrate
judge wrongly inferred that they were idle during the period
between June 2024 and May 2025 and faulted Plaintiffs for
failing to clarify facts in areas that magistrate judge
identified as unclear but that “could have been resolved during
a hearing or supplemental briefing.” [Id.] This argument fails
for two primary reasons.
First, Plaintiffs misapprehend the burden of proof
under Rule 16(b)(4). It is the movant’s burden to demonstrate
good cause to modify a scheduling order. Lusk, 2022 WL 5264265,
at *3 (citing Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609). The magistrate judge
was under no obligation to solicit “Unheard Answer[s],”
[Objection, Mem. of Law at 13-14,] regarding Plaintiffs’
diligence; rather, it was Plaintiffs’ obligation to provide a
complete record supporting their request in the first instance.
The magistrate judge’s observation that the record lacked
information regarding Plaintiffs’ efforts was a comment on the
sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ showing, not an assumption of
negative facts. Second, the answers to questions that Plaintiffs
claim were improperly unsolicited do not alter the outcome of
the diligence analysis. Even accepting as true the four “Unheard
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Answer[s]” proffered by Plaintiffs,5 the dispositive fact remains
that Plaintiffs unreasonably delayed retaining a testifying
5 The following are the four answers Plaintiffs allege were
improperly unsolicited by the magistrate judge:
• Whether Plaintiffs knew of any preexisting medical
conditions of their hydrogeologist before
learning of the medical emergency in July 2025.
ECF #138 at 5.
o Unheard Answer: Plaintiffs had no knowledge.
• Whether Plaintiffs were working with their
hydrogeologist between June 2024 and May 2025.
Id. at 7.
o Unheard Answer: Yes.
• Whether Plaintiffs could have retained an
alternative expert who could have completed the
work earlier. Id.
o Unheard Answer: Plaintiffs did work with
other experts, but no other expert could
have completed the work before necessary
precedent fact discovery was complete, and
Mr. Beckett was uniquely equipped to meet
the Court’s deadline.
• Whether Plaintiffs diligently obtained other
experts. Id. at 8.
o Unheard Answer: Yes.
• Why Plaintiffs’ other experts’ opinions were
materially influenced by their hydrogeologists’
calculations. Id.
o Unheard Answer: Plaintiffs’ other experts are
relying on Mr. Beckett to provide testimony
about the concentration and duration of
exposure.
[Objection, Mem. of Law at 13-14 (emphasis in Mem. of Law).]
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expert. This decision falls short of the diligence required to
satisfy the good cause standard.
Having reviewed the record anew, the Court adopts the
magistrate judge’s finding that Plaintiffs did not meet the good
cause standard. Because Plaintiffs failed to establish
diligence, the magistrate judge was required to deny the request
to modify Plaintiffs’ expert disclosures deadline. See Johnson,
975 F.2d at 609.
III. Plaintiffs’ Remaining Arguments
Plaintiffs argue that the 8/26/25 Order violated
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, [Objection, Mem. of Law at
14-17,] and that the magistrate judge’s refusal to provide any
extension was unduly harsh, [id. at 17-18]. Both arguments are
moot: once the Court adopts the finding that Plaintiffs were not
diligent, the analysis ends. See Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609.
Even if the Court considered Plaintiffs’ alternative
arguments, they would not require a different result.
Plaintiffs’ reliance on Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624
F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 2010), for the proposition that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure should be construed to favor merits-
based resolutions is unpersuasive in this context. See
Objection, Mem. of Law at 15. While Rule 1 states a foundational
principle, the Ninth Circuit has clarified that a court’s
authority to enforce scheduling orders is essential to its
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ability to control its docket. See Johnson, 975 F.2d at 610.
Plaintiffs fail to cite — and the Court has not found — any
controlling authority that invokes Rule 1 to excuse a
demonstrated lack of diligence under Rule 16(b)(4).
Plaintiffs’ reliance on cases discussing harmless,
late disclosures is misplaced. See Objection, Mem. of Law at 15-
16. “Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party
opposing the modification might supply additional reasons to
deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving
party’s reasons for seeking modification.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at
609 (citation omitted). In other words, in the Rule 16(b)(4)
context, prejudice or harm to the non-moving party is relevant
only if there is a finding of diligence by the moving party.
None of Plaintiffs’ harmless disclosures cases involved a
judicial finding that the moving party lacked diligence when
disclosing its experts. That alone distinguishes these cases.
Additionally, while the district court in Western Towboat Co. v.
Vigor Marine, LLC, No. C20-0416-RSM, 2021 WL 2156694 (W.D. Wash.
May 27, 2021), found that the moving party acted “naively,” id.
at *2, the record here reflects a lack of diligence – not
naivete. [Objection, Mem. of Law at (citing W. Towboat).]
Finally, Plaintiffs’ argument that the magistrate
judge should have considered narrower relief pursuant to Pineda
v. City & County of San Francisco, 280 F.R.D. 517 (N.D. Cal.
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2012), is unavailing. [Objection, Mem. in Law at 17-18.] Pineda
addressed a motion to exclude experts under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) for deficient disclosures, rather than
a motion to modify a scheduling order under Rule 16(b)(4). See
Pineda, 280 F.R.D. at 520. This distinction is dispositive. In
Pineda, the district court’s analysis focused on whether the
plaintiffs’ failure was “substantially justified” or “harmless”
under Rule 37. See id. at 520-22. In the instant matter,
Plaintiffs must satisfy Rule 16(b)(4)’s “good cause” standard,
which hinges on diligence. Because Plaintiffs were not diligent,
see supra Discussion Section II.A., the Court need not reach the
Rule 37 harmlessness analysis applied in Pineda.
The 8/26/25 Order did not deprive Plaintiffs of the
ability to prosecute their case. The 8/26/25 Order denied
Plaintiffs’ request to extend the schedule for a sixth time. The
effect of the 8/26/25 Order may make it more difficult for
Plaintiffs to prove their case, but the cause of that effect was
Plaintiffs’ lack of diligence.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ Renewed
Objection to [Dkt. 138] Magistrate Judge’s Order Denying
Emergency Motion to Extend the Schedule, filed November 12,
2025, is DENIED. The Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion
to Extend the Schedule, filed August 26, 2025, is ADOPTED.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, January 5, 2026.
ARIANNA WYATT ET AL. V. USA; CV 23-00065 LEK-KJM; ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTION TO [DKT. 138] MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDER
DENYING EMERGENCY MOTION TO EXTEND THE SCHEDULE; AND ADOPTING
THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ EMERGENCY
MOTION TO EXTEND THE SCHEDULE
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