THOMAS v. GARDNER et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
LARRY THOMAS, Jr., 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:26-cv-173 (MTT)
)
Chief Judge LESLIE A. GARDNER, et 	)
al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
)
ORDER
On May 5, 2026, Plaintiff Larry Thomas Jr., proceeding pro se, filed his
complaint. ECF 1. That same day, he filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”). ECF 2. On May 29, 2026, he moved for recusal and for the Court to transfer this
case out of the Middle District of Georgia. ECF 5. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s
motion to proceed IFP (ECF 2) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion for recusal (ECF 5) is
DENIED. The Court must screen Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). For the reasons explained below, the complaint (ECF 1) is frivolous
and DISMISSED.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Proceed IFP
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) governs motions to proceed IFP. It provides:
[A]ny 	court 	of 	the 	United 	States 	may 	authorize 	the 	commencement,
prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or
appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person
who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such
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prisoner possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give
security therefor.1
When considering a motion to proceed IFP filed under § 1915(a), “the only
determination to be made by the court is whether the statements in the affidavit satisfy
the requirement of poverty.” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th
Cir. 2004) (citation modified). A plaintiff is not required to show he is “absolutely
destitute.” Id. (quoting Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339
(1948)). Rather, “an affidavit will be held sufficient if it represents that the litigant,
because of his poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs, and to support and
provide necessities for himself and his dependents.” Id. “A court may not deny an IFP
motion without first comparing the applicant’s assets and liabilities in order to determine
whether he has satisfied the poverty requirement.” Thomas v. Chattahoochee Jud. Cir.,
574 F. App’x 916, 917 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307–08).
However, § 1915(a) “should not be a broad highway into the federal courts.”
Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984). Rather, it “conveys only a
privilege to proceed without payment to only those litigants unable to pay costs without
undue hardship.” Mack v. Petty, 2014 WL 3845777, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2014).
District courts have “wide discretion” in deciding whether a plaintiff can proceed IFP,
and “should grant the privilege sparingly,” especially in civil cases for damages.
Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1306.
1 “Despite the statute’s use of the phrase ‘prisoner possesses,’ the affidavit requirement applies to all
persons requesting leave to proceed IFP.” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 n.1 (11th
Cir. 2004).
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The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s IFP affidavit. Plaintiff’s affidavit establishes that
he cannot pay the court fees without undue hardship. ECF 2. Thus, Plaintiff’s motion to
proceed IFP (ECF 2) is GRANTED.
B. Recusal
Plaintiff moves to “disqualify” the Court and all judges in the Middle District of
Georgia and to transfer the case to another district because Plaintiff sues “all Middle
District of Georgia judges.” ECF 5 at 1. Plaintiff also states that the Court is involved in
other cases Plaintiff has brought and appealed.2 Id. A judge “shall disqualify himself”
when he is a party to the proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(i); United States v. Patti,
337 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[A] judge should recuse himself under § 455(b)
when any of the specific circumstances set forth in that subsection exist.”). But under
the rule of necessity, when a plaintiff “indiscriminately brings suit against all of the
judges of a court, the judges may hear the case if there is no other judge from that court
available to hear it.” Davis v. Kvalheim, 261 F. App'x 231, 234 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing
Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1238–39 (11th Cir. 2000)); see also Humanitarian v.
Leary, 2024 WL 3297684, at *2 (M.D. Ga. June 21, 2024) (applying the rule of necessity
in a case brought by Plaintiff); Humanitarian v. Treadwell, 2024 WL 4700682, at *2
(M.D. Ga. Oct. 23, 2024) (same).
2 Both appealed cases involve every district court judge in the Middle District of Georgia. See
Humanitarian v. Leary, 2024 WL 3297684, at *2 (M.D. Ga. June 21, 2024) (“Plaintiff sues every district
court judge and magistrate judge in the Middle District of Georgia.”); Humanitarian v. Treadwell, 2024 WL
4700682, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 23, 2024) (“[E]very judge in this district has a personal interest in this case
and, thus, no other judge is available to preside.” (citation modified)).
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In this case, Plaintiff sues every district judge in the Middle District of Georgia,3
so no other district court judge is available to hear the case. ECF 1 at 2–6; 5 at 1. The
rule of necessity thus applies, and Plaintiff’s motion for recusal (ECF 5) is DENIED.
C. Frivolity Review
Section 1915 does not create an absolute right to proceed IFP in civil actions.
“Where the IFP affidavit is sufficient on its face to demonstrate economic eligibility, the
court should first docket the case and then proceed to the question of whether the
asserted claim is frivolous.” Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307 (citation modified). When
allowing a plaintiff to proceed IFP, the Court shall dismiss the case if the Court
determines that the complaint (1) “is frivolous or malicious”; (2) “fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted”; or (3) “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A claim is frivolous if it “has little or no chance of success,” meaning that it
appears “from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are ‘clearly baseless’
or that the legal theories are ‘indisputably meritless.’” Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392,
393 (11th Cir. 1993). “A dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim is
governed by the same standard as a dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).”4 Thomas v. Harris, 399 F. App’x 508, 509 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing
3 Plaintiff does not sue United States Magistrate Judges Amelia Helmick or Alfreda Sheppard. ECF 1 at
1–6. Still, Plaintiff named prior magistrate judges as defendants and apparently believes he has sued
every judge in the Middle District of Georgia. ECF 1 at 3; 5 at 1. In light of Plaintiff’s manifest intent to sue
every judge in the Middle District of Georgia, even if the Court could refer this case to a magistrate judge,
that would be fruitless. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 72.1(6); 73(b). Moreover, given that Plaintiff’s claims are
fantastical, referral to a magistrate judge would be a waste of judicial resources.
4 To avoid dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). On a motion to dismiss,
“all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the
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Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)). However, because Plaintiff
is proceeding pro se, his “pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings
drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d
1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation modified). Even so, “the district court does not
have license to rewrite a deficient pleading.” Osahar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 297 F. App’x
863, 864 (11th Cir. 2008).
Additionally, § 1915 “accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim
based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce
the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)
(citation modified); Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[W]ildly
implausible allegations in the complaint should not be taken to be true, but the court
ought not penalize the litigant for linguistic imprecision in the more plausible
allegations.”). “A lawsuit is frivolous if its claims involve factual contentions that are
fanciful, fantastic, irrational, and/or delusional.” Porter v. Governor, 667 F. App'x 766,
767 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992)). And
“[a]though a pro se litigant generally should be permitted to amend a complaint, a
district court need not allow amendment when it would be futile.” Id. (“[T]he claims are
frivolous because they include allegations that are fanciful, fantastic, irrational, and/or
delusional” and “[a]ny amendment in this case would have been futile because
[Plaintiff’s] amended complaint would still have been subject to dismissal”); Woldeab v.
DeKalb Cty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[A] district court need
light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Galectin Therapeutics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 843 F.3d 1257, 1269 n.4
(11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006)).
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not grant leave to amend when . . . a more carefully drafted complaint could not state a
claim.” (citation modified)).
Plaintiff's seventy-one-page complaint names eighteen defendants including
district court judges, magistrate judges, attorneys, and members of the Clerk’s Office.
ECF 1 at 2–6. Plaintiff also brings suit against “unknown officers” and “unknown
politicians,” and Plaintiff lists the names of additional “wrongdoers,” including Governor
Brian Kemp and Superior Court Judge James Prine, Jr. Id. at 6, 16–17. The complaint
asserts that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy the object of which was to allow
federal judges to “unlawfully make money” by “investing in an illegal organization,”
collecting “money from defendants” whom they “unlawfully help to win cases,” and by
“illegal gambling and drug dealing.” Id. at 19. Plaintiff states, “The course of conduct of
the enterprise is to overthrow the United States Government” and that Defendants “will
eventually change the democracy system in exchange for one that they have created of
their own.” Id.
The complaint alleges Defendants committed heinous acts against Plaintiff in
furtherance of the conspiracy. It states that on June 13 and November 9, 2024,
Defendants “victimized plaintiff by committing kidnapping, false imprisonment,
tampering with a victim, retaliating against a victim, political corruption, public
corruption, assault, battery, aggravated assault, aggravated sexual battery, aggravated
sodomy, and attempted murder” and received bribes for their participation. Id. at 18.
The complaint describes some of the acts. For example, it alleges that Defendants
“committed aggravated sexual battery and aggravated sodomy against Plaintiff in the
middle of the street while cars were passing” and that on a different date Defendants
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“attempted to take Plaintiff’s life by banging [P]laintiff’s head against [a] solid concrete
stairway and by forcefully choking Plaintiff[‘s] neck even after Plaintiff blacked out
several times.” Id. at 25–26, 30–31. “The common plan was to intentionally deny
[P]laintiff [a]ll his constitutional rights and as a result [P]laintiff would take a loss of
wages, undue delay, burden the [P]laintiff’s cases, and a huge property loss.” Id. at 19.
Plaintiff lists twenty-four claims in addition to criminal “counts.” Id. at 31–65. He requests
millions in noneconomic damages from each defendant and “that a 13% daily charge be
applied to all noneconomic damages.” Id. at 65–71. He also requests “$2.5 [q]uadrillion
in noneconomic damages” from Defendant Unknown Officers and “$333.3 [q]uadrillion
in noneconomic damages” from Defendant Unknown Politicians. Id. at 70.
Plaintiff identifies previous related cases he brought in the Middle District of
Georgia. Id. at 18. As Judge Sands observed in one of them, this is not the first time
Plaintiff has made “such outlandish allegations and claims.” Thomas v. Prine, 2026 WL
1691597, at *3 n.2 (M.D. Ga. June 11, 2026); see Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1350 (“On the
question of frivolousness, a litigant's history of bringing unmeritorious litigation can be
considered.”). Many of Plaintiff’s cases, like this case, involve allegations of conspiracy
and violence by large groups of public officials. In Prine, Plaintiff alleged “that sixty
defendants, including eleven state court judges and twenty-four attorneys, imprisoned
Plaintiff in a federal courthouse on two separate occasions for a week-long period to
perpetrate [] horrific violence.” 2026 WL 1691597, at *3. In a different case, Plaintiff
alleged Governor Kemp and others beat and sexually assaulted Plaintiff in the Thomas
County Jail. Thomas v. Prine, et al., Case No. 7:25-CV-13 (WLS), Dkt. No. 37 (M.D. Ga.
May 22, 2026); see also Thomas v. Governor's Off. for the State of Ga., Case No. 7:22-
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CV-112 (WLS), Dkt. No. 20 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 18, 2022) (alleging a vast conspiracy
involving sixty-six Defendants, including then-Governor Sonny Purdue). In another
case, Plaintiff alleged “every judge in the Middle District of Georgia, the U.S. Attorney's
office, and the clerk's office” conspired “to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional and civil
rights.” Leary, 2024 WL 3297684, at *2.
As in previous cases, Plaintiff’s “factually unsupported allegations are clearly
baseless,” “wholly incredible, irrational, and bordering on delusional.” Prine, 2026 WL
1691597, at *3. A more carefully drafted complaint could not remedy the deficiency.
Accordingly, the complaint (ECF 1) is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
II. CONCLUSION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and for the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s
motion to proceed IFP (ECF 2) is GRANTED, the motion for recusal (ECF 5) is
DENIED, and the complaint (ECF 1) is DISMISSED as frivolous.5
SO ORDERED, this 9th day of October, 2026.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 Plaintiff’s motions to “correct record” (ECF 3; 4) are DENIED as moot. The docket reflects the
defendants named in Plaintiff’s complaint. See ECF 1 at 2–6.
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