REESE v. SURGE STAFFING et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
AYSHIA S. REESE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SURGE STAFFING, et al.,
Defendants.
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CASE NO. 4:25-cv-228 (CDL)
O R D E R
Plaintiff 	Ayshia 	Reese, 	who 	is 	proceeding 	pro 	se, 	alleges
that Defendant Surge Staffing, LLC discriminated against her based
on 	her 	gender 	by 	terminating 	her 	employment 	and 	unlawfully
retaliated 	against 	her 	after 	she 	reported 	a 	workplace 	incident.
Reese also alleges that Defendant Harris Ventures, Inc. d/b/a Staff
Zone 	unlawfully 	discriminated 	against 	her 	based 	on 	her 	gender.
Both Surge Staffing and Staff Zone seek judgment on the pleadings,
arguing 	that 	Reese’s 	complaint 	fails 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	upon 	which
relief may be granted and that any Georgia state law claims against
Surge Staffing and Staff Zone are not legally cognizable. 	For the
following 	reasons, 	the 	Court 	grants 	both 	Defendants’ 	motions 	for
judgment on the pleadings (ECF Nos. 17 & 21).
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS STANDARD
A 	complaint 	must 	contain 	specific 	factual 	allegations 	that,
when taken as true, “raise a right to relief above the speculative
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level.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 	In
evaluating a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court must
“accept 	as 	true 	all 	material 	facts 	alleged 	in 	the 	non-moving
party’s pleading” and “view those facts in the light most favorable
to 	the 	non-moving 	party.” 	Perez 	v. 	Wells 	Fargo 	N.A., 	774 	F.3d
1329, 	1335 	(11th 	Cir. 	2014). 	“Judgment 	on 	the 	pleadings 	is
appropriate 	where 	there 	are 	no 	material 	facts 	in 	dispute 	and 	the
moving 	party 	is 	entitled 	to 	judgment 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	law.” 	Id.
(quoting Cannon v. City of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th
Cir. 	2001)). 	“If 	a 	comparison 	of 	the 	averments 	in 	the 	competing
pleadings 	reveals 	a 	material 	dispute 	of 	fact, 	judgment 	on 	the
pleadings 	must 	be 	denied.” 	Id. 	But 	if 	it 	is 	clear 	from 	the
pleadings 	that 	the 	non-moving 	party 	“would 	not 	be 	entitled 	to
relief” on a claim based on that party’s factual allegations, then
that claim should be dismissed. 	Horsley v. Rivera, 292 F.3d 695,
700 (11th Cir. 2002).
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Reese 	alleges 	the 	following 	facts 	in 	her 	complaint. 	Surge
Staffing 	hired 	Reese, 	but 	after 	Reese 	“reported 	a 	workplace
incident involving threats from a coworker, Surge failed to act.”
Compl. § 3, ECF No. 1-1. 	Reese was reassigned, then Surge Staffing
terminated 	her 	employment 	without 	explanation. 	Id. 	As 	to 	Staff
Zone, 	Reese 	alleges 	that 	Staff 	Zone 	“[f]orced 	workers 	to 	appear
daily 	under 	false 	pretenses” 	and 	“[p]aid 	minimum 	wage 	for 	unsafe
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and 	unregulated 	work, 	such 	as 	sweeping 	dust.” 	Id. 	Reese 	claims
that 	an 	unnamed 	Staff 	Zone 	manager 	knew 	the 	company 	mistreated
workers and would “speak in code mentioning how they would not let
me 	serve 	them.” 	Id. 	Reese 	further 	alleges 	that 	Staff 	Zone
“routinely 	chose 	workers 	based 	on 	favoritism” 	and 	denied 	Reese
work. 	Id.
Reese summarily alleges that Surge Staffing, Staff Zone, and
other Defendants discriminated against her based on her gender and
retaliated 	against 	her 	for 	reporting 	safety 	or 	harassment
concerns. 	Id. § 4. 	In her complaint, Reese alleged that she filed
a 	charge 	of 	discrimination 	with 	the 	Equal 	Employment 	Opportunity
Commission 	concerning 	Staff 	Zone’s 	alleged 	unlawful 	employment
practices but did not allege she filed an EEOC charge against Surge
Staffing.
Reese 	filed 	this 	action 	in 	Muscogee 	County 	Superior 	Court
against 	Surge 	Staffing, 	Staff 	Zone, 	and 	other 	defendants,
asserting 	a 	violation 	of 	her 	rights 	under 	Georgia 	law 	and
“potentially 	federal 	anti-discrimination 	laws.” 	Id. 	Reese
alleges that all Defendants violated her rights by discriminating
against her based on gender, wrongfully terminating or denying her
work, 	retaliating 	against 	her 	for 	reporting 	safety 	or 	harassment
concerns, and engaging in “[u]nfair labor practices that resulted
in extreme hardship” for Reese. Id.
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DISCUSSION
Both 	Surge 	Staffing 	and 	Staff 	Zone 	seek 	judgment 	on 	the
pleadings, 	arguing 	that 	Reese’s 	complaint 	fails 	to 	state 	a 	claim
against them upon which relief may be granted and that Georgia law
does not recognize a claim for discrimination or retaliation by a
private 	employer. 	Reese 	did 	not 	respond 	to 	either 	motion. 	The
Court reviewed Reese’s complaint and the pending motions and makes
the following rulings.
I. 	Federal Law Claims Against Surge Staffing and Staff Zone
Reese 	alleges 	that 	Surge 	Staffing 	and 	Staff 	Zone
discriminated 	against 	her 	based 	on 	her 	gender. 	The 	Court 	thus
construes 	her 	claims 	against 	Surge 	Staffing 	and 	Staff 	Zone 	as
arising 	under 	Title 	VII 	of 	the 	Civil 	Rights 	Act 	of 	1964, 	which
prohibits 	employment 	discrimination 	based 	on 	sex. 	42 	U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a). 	Title 	VII 	also 	prohibits 	an 	employer 	from
retaliating 	against 	an 	employee 	for 	opposing 	an 	unlawful
employment practice made unlawful by Title VII. 	42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
3(a). 	A Title VII complaint “must provide ‘enough factual matter
(taken 	as 	true) 	to 	suggest’ 	intentional 	[sex] 	discrimination.”
Davis 	v. 	Coca-Cola 	Bottling 	Co. 	Consol., 	516 	F.3d 	955, 	974 	(11th
Cir. 	2008), 	abrogated 	on 	other 	grounds 	by 	Ashcroft 	v. 	Iqbal, 	556
U.S. 662 (2009)(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Here, 	Reese 	alleges 	that 	at 	Surge 	Staffing, 	she 	reported 	a
“workplace 	incident 	involving 	threats 	from 	a 	coworker” 	and 	was
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later reassigned and terminated from her employment. 	Compl. § 3.
Reese 	alleges 	no 	facts 	from 	which 	it 	can 	be 	inferred 	that 	the
“workplace 	incident” 	involved 	sex 	discrimination 	or 	sexual
harassment, 	and 	she 	alleges 	no 	facts 	to 	suggest 	that 	her
reassignment 	and 	termination 	were 	because 	of 	her 	gender 	or 	in
retaliation 	for 	complaints 	of 	sex 	discrimination. 	Accordingly,
Reese 	did 	not 	state 	a 	plausible 	Title 	VII 	claim 	against 	Surge
Staffing, 	and 	her 	Title 	VII 	claims 	against 	Surge 	Staffing 	are
dismissed.1
Reese 	alleges 	that 	at 	Staff 	Zone, 	she 	worked 	daily 	at 	a
minimum 	wage 	rate 	performing 	tasks 	such 	as 	sweeping 	dust. 	Staff
Zone denied Reese work due to “favoritism,” and an unnamed manager
spoke “in code” about not letting Reese “serve them.” 	Id. 	Reese
alleges no facts to suggest that Staff Zone favored other workers
because of their gender or denied Reese work because of her gender.
Thus, 	Reese 	failed 	to 	state 	a 	plausible 	Title 	VII 	claim 	of 	sex
discrimination against Staff Zone, and her Title VII claims against
Staff Zone are dismissed.
1 Reese also did not allege that she exhausted administrative remedies
by filing an EEOC charge of discrimination against Surge Staffing. 	For
that additional reason, she cannot proceed on Title VII claims against
Surge Staffing. 	See Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 355 F.3d 1277,
1279 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (“Prior to filing a Title VII action,
. . . a plaintiff 	first must file 	a 	charge of 	discrimination with the
EEOC.”).
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II. 	State Law Claims Against Surge Staffing and Staff Zone
Reese 	also 	asserts 	state 	law 	claims 	against 	Surge 	Staffing
and Staff Zone. 	Reese alleges that Surge Staffing reassigned her
and later terminated her from her employment after she reported a
“workplace 	incident 	involving 	threats 	from 	a 	coworker.” 	Compl.
§ 3. 	The Court construes these allegations as attempting to assert
a 	retaliation 	claim 	under 	the 	state 	whistleblower 	statute.
Georgia’s 	Whistleblower 	Act 	provides 	a 	remedy 	for 	retaliation 	by
public 	employers 	but 	not 	for 	retaliation 	by 	private 	employers.
See O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(4) & (e) (providing a cause of action for
public 	employees 	who 	have 	been 	retaliated 	against 	by 	public
employers 	and 	defining 	a 	public 	employer 	as 	“the 	executive,
judicial, or legislative branch of the state; any other department
. 	. 	. 	which 	employs 	or 	appoints 	a 	public 	employee 	. 	. 	.; 	or 	any
local or regional governmental entity that receives funds from the
State of Georgia or any state agency). 	Reese does not allege that
Surge 	Staffing 	is 	a 	governmental 	entity 	that 	receives 	funds 	from
the 	state 	or 	is 	otherwise 	a 	public 	employer. 	Therefore, 	Reese
failed 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	under 	the 	Georgia 	Whistleblower 	Act 	for
unlawful retaliation.
Reese 	alleges 	that 	Staff 	Zone 	denied 	her 	work 	due 	to
“favoritism.” 	Compl. § 3. 	The Court construes these allegations
as attempting to assert a state law employment discrimination claim
against 	Staff 	Zone. 	Georgia’s 	Fair 	Employment 	Practices 	Act
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provides 	a 	remedy 	for 	employment 	discrimination 	against 	public
employers under certain circumstances but does not create a cause
of action for employment discrimination by private employers. 	See
O.C.G.A. 	§ 	45-19-29 	(making 	it 	unlawful 	for 	an 	“employer” 	to
discriminate against an employee or applicant because of her sex);
O.C.G.A. 	§ 45-19-22(6) 	(stating 	that 	“employer” 	for 	purposes 	of
the Georgia Fair Employment Practices Act is a “department, board,
bureau, 	commission, 	authority, 	or 	other 	agency 	of 	the 	state”).
Reese 	does 	not 	allege 	that 	Staff 	Zone 	is 	an 	arm 	of 	the 	state 	of
Georgia or is otherwise a public employer. 	Therefore, Reese failed
to 	state 	a 	claim 	under 	the 	Georgia 	Fair 	Employment 	Practices 	Act
for unlawful discrimination.
Reese’s 	factual 	allegations 	also 	fail 	to 	support 	any 	other
plausible 	state 	law 	claim 	against 	Surge 	Staffing 	and 	Staff 	Zone,
such as a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Accordingly, Surge Staffing and Staff Zone are entitled to judgment
on the pleadings as to Reese’s state law claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants both Surge
Staffing’s 	(ECF 	No. 	17) 	and 	Staff 	Zone’s 	motions 	for 	judgment 	on
the 	pleadings 	(ECF 	No. 	21) 	as 	to 	all 	of 	Reese’s 	claims 	against
Surge 	Staffing 	and 	Staff 	Zone. 	This 	action 	is 	now 	dismissed 	in
its entirety.
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IT IS SO ORDERED, this 24th day of November, 2025.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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