THOMAS v. COUNTRYMAN et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
QUARTEZ THOMAS, 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	Case No. 4:23-cv-86-CDL-AGH
:
Sheriff GREG COUNTRYMAN, 	:
:
Defendant. 	:
________________________________ 	:
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 35)
upon remand by the district judge (ECF No. 48). For the reasons stated below, it is
recommended that Defendant’s motion be granted on Plaintiff’s procedural due
process claim related to his placement solitary confinement.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Quartez Thomas’s claims arise from his confinement at the Muscogee
County Jail (“MCJ”) in Columbus, Georgia, where he was held as a pretrial detainee.
Recast Compl. 7, ECF No. 8; Compl. 7, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff complains that between
November 18, 2021 and February 14, 2023, he was punished with “(L.O.A.P) loss of
all privileges (Phone, CHIRP, T.V., store, visitation, etc.) 7 days at a time for minor
or major [and] 14 days at a time for serious violations totaling over 365 days from “50
to 60+” disciplinary charges. Recast Compl. 7, 11. He further alleges that at the time
he received these violations, he was in the MCJ “Special Housing Unit 4G”—which
he 	describes 	as 	similar 	to 	the 	tier 	program 	in 	the 	Georgia 	Department 	of
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Corrections—and that he “lost [his] phase” due to the disciplinary actions, requiring
him to “start the program over.” Id. at 11. Plaintiff alleges that this occurred because
Defendant Sheriff Countryman adopted a policy in the inmate handbook that allowed
punishment for minor and major violations without notice or a procedurally adequate
disciplinary hearing.1 Id. at 9. He contends that he received “(1) no written notice of
notification charges[,] (2) written statements of factfinders as to evidence relied on
[and] reasons for [disciplinary] action taken[,] (3) nor opportunity to call witnesses
and present documentary evidence in defense when permitting inmate to do so would
not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Id. In addition,
Plaintiff alleges that in the case of a serious violation, Defendant’s disciplinary
procedures policy provided that it was not until the disciplinary hearing that the
inmate learned of the evidence against him. 	Id. at 10. 	Plaintiff asserts that
Defendant’s policy deprived him of due process of law. Id. at 11.
The Court received Plaintiff’s original complaint (ECF No. 1) on May 22, 2023,
and his recast complaint (ECF No. 8) on August 21, 2023. After preliminary review,
Plaintiff’s procedural due process claims against Defendant were allowed to proceed
for further factual development. 	Order 4-5, Nov. 15, 2023, ECF No. 9. 	Defendant
answered (ECF No. 16) the complaint on January 29, 2024, and moved for summary
judgment (ECF No. 35) on December 23, 2024. Plaintiff timely responded (ECF No.
44), and Defendant filed a reply (ECF No. 45) on April 15, 2025.
1 It is not entirely clear from Plaintiff’s allegations whether he is alleging he received no hearings
whatsoever for minor and major violations or that the hearings he received were perfunctory and
without any of the constitutionally-mandated procedural requirements.
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On July 21, 2025, the Court recommended that Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment be granted (ECF No. 46). On August 19, 2025, the district judge
adopted the portion of the undersigned’s recommendation that Defendant be granted
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims as it related to his loss of privileges and loss
of “phase” in the 4G housing program. Order 1, Aug. 19, 2025, ECF No. 48. However,
the district judge remanded the case for consideration of Plaintiff’s claim that he was
“punished by imposition of ‘solitary confinement’ without due process.” 	Id. (quoting
Recast Compl. 11, ECF No. 8). 	Specifically, the undersigned’s attention was directed
to Plaintiff’s assertion in his recast complaint that he “suffered depression, anxiety,
and other diagnosis as a result to solitary confinement imposition for punishment
reasons of [his] disc from November 18th 2021 to July 14 2023 without due process
(procedural) not even having a chance to defend accusations properly[.]” 	Recast
Compl. 11. 	The district judge instructed the undersigned to “consider whether
summary judgment is appropriate as to this claim based on qualified immunity,
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, abandonment, and/or any other ground
asserted by Defendant, and then issue a report and recommendation addressing this
claim.” Id. at 2.
In his screening order, the previous magistrate judge did not specifically
identify a claim related to placement in solitary confinement. Order, Nov. 15, 2023.
Further, the undersigned did not construe Plaintiff’s recast complaint as alleging a
procedural due process claim arising from such placement, and seemingly defense
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counsel did not either because such claim was not addressed in Defendant’s briefing.2
Therefore, in order to address the claim, the Court ordered supplemental briefing by
the parties. Order 2, Aug. 27, 2025, ECF No. 49.
The Court received Defendant’s supplemental brief and exhibits on September
10, 2025 (ECF No. 50). Plaintiff did not file a supplemental brief.3 Pursuant to the
district 	judge’s 	directive, 	the 	undersigned 	submits 	this 	supplemental
recommendation.
DISCUSSION
In his original motion for summary judgment, Defendant moved for summary
judgment on two grounds. 	First, he argued that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 3-4, ECF No. 35-
2 Thus, although Plaintiff never mentioned the solitary confinement claim in his briefing on the
summary judgment motion, he cannot be said to have abandoned the claim because Defendant did not
raise the ground in his motion. See Pourghoraishi v. Flying J, Inc. 449 F.3d 751, 765 (7th Cir. 2006)
(“The party opposing summary judgment has no obligation to address grounds not raised in a motion
for summary judgment.” (citing Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 148 (7th Cir. 1990) (“When a party
moves for summary judgment on ground A, the opposing party need not address grounds B, C, and so
on; the number of potential grounds for (and arguments against) summary judgment may be large,
and litigation is costly enough without requiring parties to respond to issues that have not been raised
on pain of forfeiting their position.”))).
3 In its order for supplemental briefing, the Court provided that Plaintiff would have fourteen days
following service of Defendant’s supplemental brief to file a supplemental response. Order 2-3, Aug.
27, 2025. Defendant’s supplemental brief attached a certificate of service indicating that Plaintiff was
served on September 10, 2025. Def.’s Suppl. Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 8, ECF No. 50. Despite
having already notified Plaintiff of his right to respond to the supplemental brief in its original order,
the Court again reminded Plaintiff that he had fourteen days from September 10, 2025, to file a
supplement brief. 	Text-Only Order, Sept. 12, 2025, ECF No. 51. 	On October 30, 2025, the Court
received Plaintiff’s request for an extension of time to file a supplemental brief, wherein he complained
that he never received Defendant’s supplemental brief or the Court’s order for supplemental briefing.
Pl.’s Mot. for Extension 1-2, ECF No. 56. Giving Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, the Court ordered
Defendant to re-serve his supplemental brief and granted Plaintiff fourteen more days to respond upon
Defendant’s filing of a certificate of service of discovery. Text-Only Order, Oct. 30, 2025, ECF No. 57.
Defendant filed the certificate of service of discovery on November 13, 2025 (ECF No. 60). Plaintiff
failed to file a supplemental brief. Defendant’s certificates of service have been properly directed to
Plaintiff’s address on file, and the Court’s orders sent to the same address have not been returned.
Thus, it is clear to the Court that Plaintiff had abundant notice and opportunity to file a supplemental
brief but chose not to.
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1. Second, he argued that Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 4-7. In
his supplemental briefing, Defendant expands on his qualified immunity ground as
it relates to the solitary confinement claim but does not further address exhaustion.
Def.’s Suppl. Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 2-6, ECF No. 50.
As discussed below, the Court concludes that Defendant has not met his
burden of proving a failure to exhaust. 	However, the Court finds that Defendant is
entitled to qualified immunity on the solitary confinement claim.
I. 	Exhaustion
A. 	Exhaustion Standard
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title . . . by a
prisoner 	confined 	in 	any 	jail, 	prison, 	or 	other 	correctional 	facility 	until 	such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). When
a grievance procedure is provided for prisoners, “an inmate alleging harm suffered
from prison conditions must file a grievance and exhaust the remedies available
under that procedure before pursuing a § 1983 lawsuit.” 	Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d
1205, 1207 (11th Cir. 2000). “To exhaust administrative remedies in accordance with
the PLRA, prisoners must properly take each step within the administrative process.
If their initial grievance is denied, prisoners must then file a timely appeal.” Bryant
v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1378 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). 	“Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and
other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively
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without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Woodford
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006).
“The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance
procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison’s
requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.”
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). “The critical function of the grievance process
is that it provides the institution with notice of a problem such that they have an
opportunity to address the problem internally.” Toenniges v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 600
F. App’x 645, 649 (11th Cir. 2015).
“Because exhaustion of administrative remedies is a matter in abatement and
not generally an adjudication on the merits, an exhaustion defense . . . is not
ordinarily the proper subject for a summary judgment; instead, it should be raised in
a motion to dismiss, or be treated as such if raised in a motion for summary
judgment.”4 	Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1374-75 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Further, since dismissal for failure to exhaust is not an adjudication on the merits,
the Court can resolve factual disputes using evidence from outside the pleadings. Id.
at 1376.
“[D]eciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
4 Such is the case here. Therefore, although Defendant argues exhaustion in a summary judgment
motion, it will be treated as if raised in a motion to dismiss. Defendant specifically raised exhaustion
as a defense in his answer, so it is not waived. Def.’s Answer 2, ECF No. 16; see Black v. Camon, No.
7:06-cv-75-HL, 2008 WL 2119914, at *2 (M.D. Ga. May 19, 2008) (finding exhaustion was not waived
and could be asserted in a motion for summary judgment because defendants raised it as a defense in
their answer); see also Gomez v. Jackson, No. 1:18-cv-963, 2020 WL 4048061, at *9 n.9 (N.D. Ga. July
20, 2020) (citing cases to illustrate that “the Eleventh Circuit routinely affirms orders granting post-
answer motions to dismiss (styled as motions for summary judgment) for lack of exhaustion”).
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is a two-step process.” 	Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008).
“First, the court looks to the factual allegations in the defendant’s motion to dismiss
and those in the plaintiff’s response, and if they conflict, takes the plaintiff’s versions
of the facts as true.” 	Id. 	If, taking plaintiff’s facts as being true, the defendant is
entitled to dismissal for failure to exhaust, then the complaint should be dismissed.
Id. 	“If the complaint is not subject to dismissal at the first step . . . the court then
proceeds to make specific findings in order to resolve the disputed factual issues
related to exhaustion.” 	Id. 	The defendant bears the burden of proof during this
second step. 	Id. 	In resolving the factual dispute, a Court is authorized to make
credibility determinations. 	See Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1377-78 (finding that district
court did not clearly err in determining that plaintiff’s allegation that he was denied
access to grievance forms was not credible); see also Whatley v. Smith, 898 F.3d 1072,
1082-83 (11th Cir. 2018) (upholding district court finding that one of inmate’s
grievances was not filed).
A prisoner need only exhaust administrative remedies that are available. Ross
v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016). 	In Ross, the Supreme Court held that an
administrative procedure is unavailable under the PLRA when either (1) “it operates
as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any
relief to aggrieved inmates,” (2) it is “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking,
incapable 	of 	use,” 	or 	(3) 	“prison 	administrators 	thwart 	inmates 	from 	taking
advantage 	of 	a 	grievance 	process 	through 	machination, 	misrepresentation, 	or
intimidation.” Id. at 643-44. For a remedy to be available, it “must be capable of use
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for the accomplishment of its purpose.” 	Turner, 541 F.3d at 1084 (quotation marks
omitted). The burden is on the defendant to show that an administrative remedy is
available, but “once that burden has been met, the burden of going forward shifts to
the plaintiff, who . . . must demonstrate that the grievance procedure was subjectively
and objectively unavailable to him.” 	Geter v. Baldwin State Prison, 974 F.3d 1348,
1356 (11th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Turner, 541 F.3d at
1085). 	District courts must use the two-step Turner analysis when addressing the
availability of the grievance process. 	See Jenkins v. Sloan, 826 F. App’x 833, 839
(11th Cir. 2020) (directing district courts to apply “the two-step Turner test when
addressing the question of exhaustion and the availability of the grievance process”).
B. 	MCJ Grievance Procedures
Defendant submitted a declaration by Deputy Stephanie Culberson, the MCJ
grievance investigator, to explain MCJ’s grievance procedures. Culberson Decl. ¶ 2,
ECF No. 35-3. 	Culberson is familiar with MCJ’s grievance policies and procedures.
Id. MCJ’s grievance procedure are set forth in the Inmate Handbook (“Handbook”),
and Culberson attached to her declaration the December 2022 revised Handbook
(Exhibit A) and July 2021 revised Handbook (Exhibit B). Culberson Decl. ¶ 5. Under
MCJ’s grievance procedures, a grievance must be submitted via the jail kiosk system
within five days of the incident at issue. Culberson Decl. ¶ 6; Culberson Decl. 23, 63.5
The grievance officer has fifteen days to provide a written response to the grievance.
5 Because Culberson’s declaration and exhibits were filed together as one document instead of separate
attachments, the Court cites to Culberson’s exhibits by using the document number and electronic
screen page number shown at the top of each page by the Court’s CM/ECF software as opposed to any
other page number that may appear on the exhibits.
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Culberson Decl. ¶ 6; Culberson Decl. 24, 63. 	If the inmate disagrees with the
response, he or she may appeal to the jail commander or designee. Id. If the inmate
does not appeal, “it will be assumed that [the inmate] accept[s] the findings and the
case will be closed.” Culberson Decl. 24, 63. The jail commander or designee has ten
days to respond to an appeal. Id. at 24, 64. 	Upon the jail commander or designee’s
response, “the department grievance system is terminated.” 	Culberson Decl. ¶ 6;
Culberson Decl. 24, 64.
C. 	Defendant’s Contentions Regarding Exhaustion
According to Culberson, Plaintiff “was a problem inmate at the Jail whose
frequent 	violations 	ranged 	from 	attempting 	suicide, 	fighting, 	making 	threats,
destroying jail property, smearing feces and compromising jail security on multiple
occasions that resulted in him receiving a considerable accumulation of discipline.”
Culberson Decl. ¶ 4. She attaches “various” grievances filed by Plaintiff (Exhibit C)
to 	her 	declaration, 	including 	some 	in 	which 	he 	complained 	about 	procedural
deficiencies in disciplinary proceedings. Culberson Decl. ¶ 7; Culberson Decl. 88, 92,
94, 96-97. 	She concludes that “[w]hile it appears that Mr. Thomas may have
submitted several grievances in connection with the discipline he received, the
records do not indicate that he ever appealed the Jail staff’s responses to any such
grievances.” 	Culberson Decl. ¶ 6. 	Relying on Culberson’s declaration, Defendant
argues that “[w]hile jail records indicate that [Plaintiff] filed several grievances
alleging a failure to receive notice and due process in connection with the discipline
he received . . . , [Plaintiff] failed to appeal any grievance decision.” 	Pl.’s Mem. in
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Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 4.
In his declaration in response, Plaintiff asserts that he filed two grievances
regarding the disciplinary procedures in 2022. 	Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 44-3. 	He
states that one grievance was determined to be “non-grievable unsustained” and that
the other grievance “was denied [and] resolved informally.” Id. Because at the first
stage of the exhaustion analysis the Court must take Plaintiff’s version of the facts
as being true, his claims cannot be dismissed for lack of exhaustion at this first step.
Turner, 541 F.3d at 1082.
The second step of the Turner analysis requires the Court to resolve disputed
issues of fact related to exhaustion. 	Id. 	Although the Court did not decide the
exhaustion issue in its previous recommendation, it noted that Defendant had failed
to adequately complete the record on his exhaustion ground in his original motion for
summary judgment. 	R. & R. 3 n.1, July 21, 2025, ECF No. 46. 	Defendant only
submitted what Culberson describes as “various” grievances from 2023. 	Culberson
Decl. ¶ 7; Culberson Decl. 85-97. Thus, it appeared that Defendant had only provided
a portion of Plaintiff’s grievance records. The Court pointed this omission out in its
order for supplemental briefing and specifically instructed Defendant that if he
believed these records demonstrated exhaustion they must be submitted into the
record. 	Order 2 n.1, Aug. 27, 2025. 	In his supplemental response, Defendant does
not address exhaustion or attach Plaintiff’s complete grievance history. Thus, he has
failed to present specific evidence to rebut Plaintiff’s contention that he exhausted
his 	administrative 	remedies 	by 	submitting 	two 	grievances, 	one 	of 	which 	was
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determined to be “non-grievable unsustained” and the other “denied [and] resolved
informally.” Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 4.
The burden is on Defendant to show a lack of exhaustion. Turner, 541 F.3d at
1082. 	He chose not to tender Plaintiff’s complete grievance records into evidence to
meet this burden and therefore, he is not entitled to dismissal on this ground.6
II. 	Procedural Due Process
A. 	Legal Standards
1. 	Summary Judgment
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 	In determining whether a genuine dispute of
material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed
6 The Handbook provides that certain “areas cannot be grieved under the grievance system[.]”
Culberson Decl. 23, 62. In the list of such items, the Handbook provides: “Disciplinary actions are not
to be reviewed under the grievance system. 	Rather, disciplinary charges are to be filed under the
appeal procedures provided.” 	Id. 	In his response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
Plaintiff cites this language to raise an additional argument that complaints about the MCJ
disciplinary procedures are not grievable. Pl.’s Mem. in Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. 3, ECF No. 44-1.
Defendant does not address whether a complaint about the grievance process itself—as opposed to
specific disciplinary actions—is non-grievable, but he does argue that “because the record evidence is
devoid of any efforts by [Plaintiff] to appeal discipline he received . . . , dismissal for failure to exhaust
is warranted.” Def.’s Reply 2, ECF No. 45. But again, the burden is on Defendant to show a lack of
exhaustion, Turner, 541 F.3d at 1082, so if the disciplinary records demonstrate Plaintiff’s failure to
appeal disciplinary actions, then Defendant should have produced them. 	As with the grievance
records, however, Defendant has only produced the small portion of Plaintiff’s disciplinary records—
those related to his placement in 4G housing. 	Thus, the Court cannot tell to what extent, if any,
Plaintiff failed to appeal disciplinary actions. 	Further, considering that Plaintiff’s underlying
allegation is a denial of due process in the disciplinary procedures, the Court questions whether the
issue of exhaustion can be decided without submission to a jury. See Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460,
468 (2025) ) (“[W]e hold as a matter of statutory interpretation that parties have a right to a jury trial
on PLRA exhaustion when that issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim that falls under the
Seventh Amendment.”). However, because Defendant has not met his burden of showing a failure to
exhaust, the Court need not decide whether Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim is so intertwined
with the issue of exhaustion as to preclude summary judgment on that ground.
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in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, drawing all
justifiable inferences in the opposing party’s favor. 	Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 	A fact is material if it is relevant or necessary to the
outcome of the suit. 	Id. at 248. 	A factual dispute is genuine if the evidence would
allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
The party seeking summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility
of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those
portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of
a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)
(internal quotation marks omitted). If the movant meets this burden, “[t]he burden
then shifts to the nonmoving party, who is required to ‘go beyond the pleadings’ to
establish that there is a ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Whitehead v. BBVA Compass Bank,
979 F.3d 1327, 1328 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324). 	This
evidence must consist of more than conclusory allegations. See Avirgan v. Hull, 932
F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir. 1991). 	In sum, summary judgment must be entered
“against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
2. 	Procedural Due Process
“To make out a denial-of-procedural-due-process claim under § 1983, a plaintiff
must establish three elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty
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or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally inadequate process.”
Quintanilla v. Bryson, 730 F. App’x 738, 743 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Grayden v.
Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003)). 	For pretrial detainees, determining
the first element requires looking at whether the condition imposed amounts to
punishment 	because 	a 	pretrial 	detainee 	“may 	not 	be 	punished 	prior 	to 	an
adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.” 	Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 535 (1979); see 	Jacoby v. Baldwin Cnty., 835 F.3d 1338, 1348 (11th Cir. 2016)
(“[A] pretrial detainee is entitled to a due process hearing before being subjected to
‘conditions that amount to punishment.’” (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 535)). 	“The
determination of whether a condition of pretrial detention amounts to punishment
turns on whether the condition is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether
it is incident to some legitimate government purpose.” Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d
1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 538). “Where a constitutionally
protected liberty interest exists,” a pretrial detainee must be given: “(1) advance
written notice of the charges; (2) a written statement of the reasons for the
disciplinary action taken; and (3) the opportunity to call witnesses and present
evidence when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional
safety or correctional goals.” 	Jacoby, 835 F.3d at 1350 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
3. 	Supervisory Liability
“It is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable
under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of
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respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Christmas v. Harris Cnty., Ga., 51 F.4th
1348, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022). “Instead, supervisory liability under § 1983 occurs either
when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct
or when there is a causal connection between the actions of a supervising official and
the alleged constitutional deprivation.” 	Id. 	A causal connection can be established
if:
(1) “a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on
notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation and he failed to do
so”; (2) “the supervisor’s improper custom or policy led to deliberate
indifference to constitutional rights”; or (3) “facts support an inference
that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew
that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from
doing so.”
Hendrix v. Tucker, 535 F. App’x 803, 805 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Douglas v. Yates,
535 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008)).
4. 	Qualified Immunity
“[Q]ualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued
in their individual capacities as long as their conduct violates no clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 904 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted). A defendant seeking qualified immunity must show that, at the time of the
alleged wrongful acts, “he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority.”
Id. at 905. 	Once this is established, “the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show
that the grant of qualified immunity is inappropriate.” Id. To do so, a plaintiff must
“demonstrate: first, that the facts when viewed in a light most favorable to the
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plaintiff establish a constitutional violation; and, second, that the illegality of the
officer’s actions was clearly established at the time of the incident.” 	Id. 	(internal
quotation marks omitted).
B. 	Plaintiff’s Claim Relating to Placement in 4G Housing
The Court addressed Plaintiff’s claims relating to loss of privileges and “loss of
phase” in 4G housing in its previous recommendation, so the Court will focus solely
on 	Plaintiff’s 	additional 	claim 	related 	to 	his 	alleged 	placement 	in 	“solitary
confinement” without due process. Recast Compl. 11. As discussed above, Defendant
is entitled to summary judgment on this additional claim.
1. 	Plaintiff’s failure to respond
Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant’s supplemental brief in support of his
motion for summary judgment or his supplemental statement of undisputed material
facts (ECF Nos. 50, 50-1). The Local Rules of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Georgia (hereinafter “Local Rules”) provide:
The respondent to a motion for summary judgment shall attach to the
response a separate and concise statement of material facts, numbered
separately, to which the respondent contends there exists a genuine
dispute to be tried. Response shall be made to each of the movant’s
numbered material facts. 	All material facts contained in the movant’s
statement which are not specifically controverted by specific citation to
particular parts of materials in the record shall be deemed to have been
admitted, unless otherwise inappropriate.
M.D. Ga. L.R. 56. 	Because Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant’s supplemental
statement of facts, and thus did not specifically controvert any material facts set forth
therein, those facts are deemed admitted where appropriate.
The Court, however, “cannot base the entry of summary judgment on the mere
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fact that the motion was unopposed, but, rather, must consider the merits of the
motion.” 	United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave.,
Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). 	In considering the merits of a
motion for summary judgment, even an unopposed motion, a court “must review all
of the evidentiary materials submitted in support of the motion for summary
judgment.” Id. at 1101-02. In other words, the court cannot simply accept the facts
stated in a moving party’s statement of material facts as true, but must also review
the movant’s citations to the record and confirm that there are no issues of material
fact. Id. at 1103 n.6. Moreover, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows
the Court to consider the entire record when ruling on a motion for summary
judgment: “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other
materials in the record.”7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); see Baker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
903 F.2d 1515, 1519 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he court must consider the entire record in
the case, not just those pieces of evidence which have been singled out for attention
by the parties.”).
2. 	Undisputed material facts
In support of his supplemental brief, Defendant submitted the declaration of
Tammy Foster, a lieutenant at MCJ. 	Foster Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 50-2. 	According to
Foster, Plaintiff was placed in the “4G Special Management Problem Cellblock (‘4G’)”
7 The record includes Plaintiff’s recast complaint which is signed “under [] penalty of perjury [that] the
foregoing is true [and] correct.” Recast Compl. 12. Because this complies with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, it
substitutes for a sworn affidavit at the summary judgment stage. Roy v. Ivy, 53 F.4th 1338, 1344,
1347-48 (11th Cir. 2022). 	Similarly, Plaintiff’s response to the original summary judgment motion
includes a declaration made under penalty of perjury (ECF No. 44-3), which the Court also considers.
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in May 2021 after he violently attacked a jail guard. Id. ¶ 4. While Foster describes
4G as an “isolation dormitory” where inmates are “in a cell by themselves,” she states
that they “are not in complete isolation” and “are still able to converse with other
inmates in that dormitory.” Id. ¶ 5. Under the 4G policies, inmates who show good
behavior can earn increased privileges in 4G and an opportunity to return to general
population. Id. ¶ 6; Foster Decl. 13-14. 8
In support of her declaration, Foster attached an incident report showing that
on May 16, 2021, Plaintiff “slung” a guard to the ground and hit him with “a closed
fist.” 	Foster Decl. 6. 	When the guard attempted to use his radio to call for help,
Plaintiff grabbed it and threw it towards the shower. Id. Plaintiff then pulled a fire
extinguisher from the wall and pulled the pin. Id. The guard was able to run into an
office. Id. Another guard entered the office, and when she saw Plaintiff approaching,
she ran behind a locked door. At that point, a third guard armed with a taser arrived,
took the fire extinguisher from Plaintiff, and escorted him back to his cell—cell
number 148. Id. Other officers then arrived and took Plaintiff to 4G. Id.
According to Foster, Plaintiff was given “notice of his infraction, notice of right
to appeal[,] and a pre-deprivation hearing for [the] incident.” Foster Decl. ¶ 4; Foster
Decl. 6. 	The result of the hearing was a loss of privileges for fourteen days. 	Id.
Further, 	“[f]ollowing 	the 	incident 	and 	pre-deprivation 	hearing, 	[Plaintiff] 	was
transferred from 148 to 4G isolation dormitory.” Foster Decl. ¶ 5. Foster adds that
8 	As with Culberson’s declaration, Foster’s declaration and exhibits were filed together as one
document instead of separate attachments. Therefore, the Court cites to Foster’s exhibits by using the
document number and electronic screen page number shown at the top of each page by the Court’s
CM/ECF software as opposed to any other page number that may appear on the exhibits.
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because Plaintiff “continued to commit infractions on a near daily basis,” including
“multiple 	suicide 	attempts, 	fighting, 	making 	threats, 	destroying 	jail 	property,
smearing 	feces, 	throwing 	unknown 	liquids 	at 	officer[s] 	through 	his 	door flap,
[Plaintiff] spent the remainder of his incarceration at [MCJ] back and forth between
4G and High Suicide Prevention dorms of [MCJ].” 	Id. ¶ 7. 	Foster attached a
summary of Plaintiff’s numerous MCJ violations. Foster Decl. 17-20.
3. 	Defendant is entitled to summary judgment
Defendant contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff
received constitutionally adequate due process regarding his placement in 4G and
because there is no evidence of Defendant’s personal involvement in Plaintiff’s
placement in 4G. 	Def.’s Suppl. Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 3-5. 	The Court
disagrees in part with the first argument but agrees with the second.9
a. 	Adequacy of Process
In support of the first argument, Defendant relies on Foster’s declaration that
Plaintiff received notification of the charges and a pre-deprivation hearing prior to
placement in 4G. 	Def.’s Suppl. Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 3 (citing Def.’s
9 	Defendant also argues that to the extent Plaintiff asserts an official capacity claim pursuant to
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), he is entitled to summary judgment
because MCJ’s disciplinary procedures do not “endorse constitutional violations” and because “there
is no evidence of a policy, custom, or deliberate indifference attributable to Columbus Consolidated
Government or [Defendant].” Def.’s Suppl. Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 5-6. However, the Court
does not construe Plaintiff’s recast complaint as asserting an official capacity claim. Even if it did,
Defendant is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Purcell ex rel. Est. of Morgan v. Toombs
Cnty., Ga., 400 F.3d 1313, 1325 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Sheriff Kight functions as an arm of the State—not
of Toombs County—when promulgating policies and procedures governing conditions of confinement
at the Toombs County Jail. Accordingly, even if Purcell had established a constitutional violation,
Sheriff Kight would be entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in his official capacity.”).
Finally, even if Defendant was not entitled to immunity, Plaintiff cannot—as discussed below—show
a policy or custom that caused a violation of his right to procedural due process.
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Statement of Undisputed Fact (“SMF”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 50-1). 	As noted previously,
Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant’s supplemental briefing or evidence, and thus
the only evidence in support of his solitary confinement due process claim is the
statement in his recast complaint that his placement was “without due process
(procedural) not even having a chance to defend accusations properly.” Recast Compl.
11. 	This vague statement, which does not specify how his due process rights were
violated in connection with is placement in 4G is insufficient to defeat summary
judgment.
However, while the documents submitted by Defendant indicate Plaintiff was
given a hearing in connection with his placement in 4G, it does not appear that he
was given adequate advance notice. 	The Supreme Court has held that an inmate
must be given “no less than 24 hours” advance written notice “to enable him to
marshal the facts and prepare a defense.” 	Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564
(1974); see Jacoby, 835 F.3d at 1350 (citing Wolff to require that pretrial detainees be
given 	“advance 	written 	notice 	of 	charges” 	prior 	to 	placement 	in 	disciplinary
segregation). 	Here, the evidence shows that the assault, notice, and hearing all
occurred on the same day—May 16, 2021. Foster Decl. 6, 17.
b. 	Supervisory Liability
Nevertheless, 	the 	Court 	agrees 	that 	Defendant 	is 	entitled 	to 	summary
judgment because there is no evidence that Defendant was aware that Plaintiff did
not receive adequate notice prior to his assignment in 4G or was even aware of the
circumstances behind Plaintiff’s placement in 4G. In Plaintiff’s recast complaint, he
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admits that Defendant did not “personally participate” in the alleged constitutional
violation and instead premises his claim against Defendant on his role as “a
supervisor official” who “created” or “revised” disciplinary procedures that failed to
provide adequate due process, including lack of advance written notice of charges.
Recast Compl. 9-11.
However, the undisputed evidence shows that MCJ’s disciplinary procedures
explicitly require that an inmate be given advance written notification of charges and
that “[t]he hearing is not to occur sooner than 24 hours after formal notification of
charges being delivered to you.” Culberson Decl. 26, 67-68. Thus, any failure of MCJ
officers to provide Plaintiff with adequate advance notice was not due to Defendant’s
policies. 	Further, Plaintiff presented no evidence that there was a history of
widespread abuse of MCJ officers failing to give adequate advance notice of charges
prior to a hearing, that Defendant directed subordinates not to give such notice or
was aware of such failure and declined to stop them, or any other evidence that
establishes supervisory liability.
Finally, while Plaintiff contends that he wrote letters to Defendant, he has not
submitted any of the letters he wrote, and his recast complaint indicates his letters
were about deficiencies in the policy, see Recast Compl. 11, which, as discussed above,
clearly provided for advance notice and other procedural protections. Culberson Decl.
26-28, 67-70. 	These protections include the right to assistance in preparing for the
hearing if warranted; the right to have the hearing prosecutor read the evidence
against the inmate and cross-examine any witnesses called; the right of the inmate
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to call witnesses when it does not jeopardize jail security; the right to testify and
present evidence on the inmate’s behalf; and the right to appeal an adverse decision.
Id.
In summary, the evidence establishes that Plaintiff was a problematic, violent,
and dangerous inmate whom MCJ did the best it could to manage while still providing
constitutionally adequate due process protections. 	More significantly, for present
purposes, there is no evidence of Defendant’s knowledge or involvement in any
procedural due process violations, whether in connection with placement in 4G or
otherwise, and he is entitled to summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, it is recommended that Defendant’s motion
for summary judgment (ECF No. 35) be GRANTED as it relates to Plaintiff’s
placement in solitary confinement. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may
serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time
to file objections, within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy
hereof. Any objection should be no longer than TWENTY (20) PAGES in length. The
district 	judge 	shall 	make 	a 	de 	novo 	determination 	of 	those 	portions 	of 	the
Recommendation 	to 	which 	objection 	is 	made. 	All 	other 	portions 	of 	the
Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1,
“[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations
contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of
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28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order
based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the
time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the
absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error
if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED, this 5th day of January, 2026.
s/ Amelia G. Helmick
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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