CLAY v. GAMBLE et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATHENS DIVISION
BYRON DONNELLE CLAY, :
:
Plaintiff, :
: No. 3:25-cv-00121-TES-AGH
v. :
:
MS. GAMBLE, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Byron Clay, an inmate in the Walton County Jail in Monroe,
Georgia, filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 1. On October
17, 2025, the Court dismissed this civil action for Plaintiff’s failure to obey the Court’s
orders. ECF No. 11. Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration of that dismissal under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
ECF No. 18. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) states that:
the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,
or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
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prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Plaintiff relies upon a “workflow interaction” attached to his motion as “newly
discovered evidence” under Rule 60(b). ECF No. 18. Plaintiff argues that this evidence
demonstrates that he was unable to pay a partial initial filing fee of $41.67 in this case
because of the actions of a Walton County jail administrator. See id. Plaintiff requests that
this Court reopen this matter “so the merits can be considered.” Id. at 2.
District courts have the authority under Rule 60(e) to “relieve a party … from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding… [for] any … reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(e). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 18) is GRANTED
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(e) and the Court VACATES its prior Dismissal Order (ECF
No. 11) and Judgment (ECF No. 13) to now review Plaintiff’s newly discovered evidence
and reconsider its dismissal for failure to obey the orders of the court. The Court will also
consider the merits of Plaintiff’s complaint as he requests.
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO OBEY
COURT ORDERS
I. Procedural History
Plaintiff was first ordered to pay the filing fee on August 5, 2025 and was notified
he had fourteen days to do so. ECF No. 4. On August 22, 2025, Plaintiff requested an
extension of time to pay the fee stating that although he has funds in his jail account to pay
the fee, he cannot transmit them until some unnamed “responsible official returns” from
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some unnamed event on some unspecified date. ECF No. 5 at 2. Although Plaintiff’s
motion for an extension of time was vague and confusing, his request was granted on
August 26, 2025 and he was given another deadline of fourteen days to pay the fee. ECF
No. 6. Plaintiff again did not pay the fee. Instead, Plaintiff filed motions in two of his
other pending cases averring that he did not have family support to pay the court ordered
fees in those cases. 1 See ECF No. 5 in Clay v. Minor, 3:25-cv-127-TES-AGH (filed Sep.
8, 2025); ECF No. 5 in Clay v. Cooper, 3:25-cv-124-TES-AGH (filed Sep. 11, 2025).
Plaintiff’s motions to waive the initial filing fees were denied after the Magistrate Judge
found that Plaintiff had spent significant funds on discretionary items rather than paying
his court ordered fees. ECF No. 6 in Clay v. Minor, 3:25-cv-127-TES-AGH; ECF No. 6
in Clay v. Cooper, 3:25-cv-124-TES-AGH. In the present civil action, Plaintiff was
ordered on September 18, 2025 to show cause why his civil action should not be dismissed
for his failure to obey the court’s orders and he was provided yet another fourteen days to
pay the fee. ECF No. 7. Plaintiff’s partial initial filing fees were then paid by sources
independent of the Walton County Jail in two of his other pending civil actions. See ECF
No. 18 at 2; Clay v. Minor, 3:25-cv-127-TES-AGH ($41.67 fee paid on October 7, 2025
via money order by family friend/ fiancé); Clay v. Pressly, 3:25-cv-144-TES-AGH ($35.53
1 Within five months, Plaintiff has filed seven § 1983 complaints in this Court. Clay v.
Stidham, 3:25-cv-114-TES-AGH (filed July 21, 2025); Clay v. Gamble, 3:25-cv-121-TES-
AGH (filed July 31, 2025); Clay v. Cooper, 3:25-cv-124-TES-AGH (filed Aug. 8, 2025);
Clay v. Minor, 3:25-cv-127-TES-AGH (filed Aug. 14, 2025); Clay v. Pressly, 3:25-cv-
144-TES-AGH (filed Sep. 8, 2025); Clay v. Batts, 3:25-cv-167-TES-CHW (filed Oct. 20,
2025); Clay v. Mendez, 3:25-cv-196-TES-AGH (filed Dec. 11, 2025).
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fee paid on Oct. 14, 2025 via money order by family friend/ fiancé). On October 17, 2025,
this Court found that Plaintiff had failed to comply with the Court’s order to pay the filing
fee in this case and dismissed his complaint without prejudice. ECF No. 11.
II. Analysis
The Court has now thoroughly reviewed the procedural history of this case and
Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 18) including his newly discovered
evidence entitled “workflow interaction” (ECF No. 18-2).
Of initial concern to the Court is that Plaintiff has made past averments to the Court
that he lacks funds in his jail account to pay filing fees and “the family support Plaintiff
relied on has stopped because Plaintiff’s family currently has no job or income.” ECF No.
5 in Clay v. Minor, 3:25-cv-127-TES-AGH (filed Sep. 8, 2025); ECF No. 5 in Clay v.
Cooper, 3:25-cv-124-TES-AGH (filed Sep. 11, 2025). However, after these averments, he
filed two more federal lawsuits that included certified account statements showing that
Plaintiff indeed carried positive balances in his inmate account and continued to receive
deposits into that account. See ECF No. 2-1 in Clay v. Batts, 3:25-cv-167-TES-CHW
(showing $111.53 on hand and average monthly deposits of $189.86 as of October 7,
2025); ECF No. 2-1 in Clay v. Mendez, 3:25-cv-196-TES-AGH (showing average monthly
deposits of $179.57 as of Dec. 4, 2025). Plaintiff’s documents in this case also reveal that
sometime before October 10, 2025, his fiancé “put [$] 300 on [his] books”. ECF No. 18-
3. Plaintiff has paid a total of $115.17 in partial initial filing fees in his other civil actions
via money orders from his family and/or fiancé independent of the deposits into this inmate
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account. Clay v. Minor, 3:25-cv-127-TES-CHW ($41.67 paid on Oct. 7, 2025); Clay v.
Pressly, 3:25-cv-144-TES-AGH ($35.53 paid on Oct. 14, 2025); Clay v. Batts, 3:25-cv-
167-TES-CHW ($37.97 paid on Nov. 20, 2025). Therefore, Plaintiff’s prior representations
to the Court that he had no financial ability to pay filing fees nor family support are
disingenuous, at best, and at their worst, an attempted fraud upon the Court and abuse of
the judicial process. See e.g., Daker v. Dozier, Civil Action No. 6:17-cv-110, 2017 WL
4448234, at *7 n.5 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 5, 2017) (noting that “that [Plaintiff] is attempting to
understate his assets in order to shirk his obligation to pay the full filing fee”); Dawson v.
Lennon, 797 F.2d 934, 935 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting the Eleventh Circuit had previously
“upheld dismissal of a § 1983 claim of a prisoner who professed to have no money in his
prison accounts, which in fact contained thirty cents, and who had a history of manipulating
his accounts to support claims of indigency”) (citing Collier v. Reigio, 760 F.2d 279 (11th
Cir.1985)); Mitchell v. Nobles, 873 F.3d 869, 875 (11th Cir. 2017) (Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure plainly “authorizes the district court to sanction a party who files
a pleading containing a false factual representation if that party knew of, or did not
reasonably inquiry into, the falsehood.”); Attwood v. Singletary, 105 F.3d 610, 613 (11th
Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (noting that even if plaintiff “believed the information [in his
affidavit] truthful at the time of filing . . . Rule 11 require[d the plaintiff] to make reasonable
inquiries into the veracity of the information filed before the court and to advise the court
of any changes”); Daker v. Owens, No. 21-13169, 2023 WL 8254348, at *3 (11th Cir.
Nov. 29, 2023) (affirming district court dismissal of prisoner case as a sanction for plaintiff
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misleading court as to his ability to utilize outside sources to pay filing fees).
Now turning specifically to the record in this case, Plaintiff verifies that he received
the orders of the Court and understood that he needed to pay a fee. ECF No. 18-1 at 1, 5;
ECF 18-2. Upon receiving the Court’s orders, Plaintiff discussed with his family/fiancé
how much he owed in filing fees and he was given money to pay these fees that Plaintiff
opted to have placed in his jail account rather than paid directly to the Court. ECF No. 18
at 1, 2, 6, 7. Although the Court first ordered Plaintiff to pay a partial initial filing fee on
August 5, 2025 (ECF No. 4) and provided him with fourteen days to do so, Plaintiff waited
seven weeks until September 24, 2025 to put in a written request to jail administrators to
forward the fee to the Court out of his inmate account (ECF Nos. 9, 18-2, 18-4). This was
more than two weeks after the deadline of September 9, 2025, that the court graciously
granted him through an extension of time (ECF No. 6). On September 27, 2025, Plaintiff
misrepresented to jail personnel that he had a twenty-one day extension granted in this case
to pay the fee when no such extension had been granted. ECF No. 18-2 at 5. Although jail
administration was confused as to whether Plaintiff needed to pay the partial initial filing
fee or whether they should deduct twenty percent from his account toward the full filing
fee, Plaintiff’s family confirmed to the Plaintiff on October 3, 2025, that he still needed to
initially pay the $41.67 partial filing fee in this case. ECF No. 18-3 at 1. Lastly, as late as
October 10, 2025, Plaintiff was aware this case had not yet been dismissed although he
missed all deadlines to pay and that he still could pay the partial initial filing fee. ECF
Nos. 10, 12, 18. In total, Plaintiff was provided more than seventy days to pay the filing
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fee from the time he was first ordered to pay the initial partial filing fee on August 5, 2025
(ECF No. 4) until the time that the Court finally dismissed this action on October 17, 2025
(ECF No. 11).
III. Conclusion
Although the correspondences in the “workflow interaction” between Plaintiff and
jail personnel could have led to confusion as to payment of partial filing fees in this civil
action for an inmate isolated from communication with the Court and family, that is not
the situation in this case. Plaintiff received the Court’s orders via mail and knew in early
August 2025 that he had to timely pay a partial initial filing fee in this case or the case
would be dismissed. Plaintiff utilized his family support system to receive clarification
directly from the clerks of this court and independent of anything he was told by jail
administrators to clarify the status of the partial initial filing fee in this case and the
deadlines to pay it. And finally, Plaintiff had the ability to directly pay his partial initial
filing fee through his family support system without having to request that the fee be
forwarded from his jail account. However, rather than paying the fee in this case directly
to the Court through family as he had done in two of his other pending cases, he has instead
opted to air disingenuous gripes that jail administrators caused him not to timely paying
the fee in this case. ECF Nos. 9, 12, and 18; Clay v. Batts, 3:25-cv-167-TES-CHW
(complaint signed by Plaintiff on October 15, 2025).
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff had the ability to pay the partial initial filing
fee in this case through family and his fiancé just as he has done in other civil actions and
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he just opted to disregard the court’s orders to pay the fee for this civil action. Walker v.
Powell, 351 F. App'x 384, 386 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (affirming district court
dismissal of a prisoner complaint where it was within Plaintiff’s control to pay filing fees
and to obey court orders and the Plaintiff did not do so). The Court further finds that
Plaintiff has demonstrated bad faith by falsely averring to the Court that he had no funds
or family support to pay fees for his federal lawsuits and that he was completely reliant on
jail administration to forward payment of the fees from his inmate trust account. See
Zocaras v. Castro, 465 F.3d 479, 484 (11th Cir. 2006) (Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure “forbids lying in pleadings, motions, and other papers filed with the
court.”); Barnes v. Dalton, 158 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding that a litigant
acts in bad faith when he attempts to perpetrate a fraud upon the court). The Court further
finds that Plaintiff demonstrated bad faith and needlessly delayed the movement of this
case by waiting until well beyond the deadlines set by this Court to request that jail
administrators and/or his outside support system pay the partial filing fee. See Eagle Hosp.
Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc., 561 F.3d 1298, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding
that a litigant demonstrates bad faith by needlessly delaying a case and by intentionally
disobeying a court order).
Accordingly, this civil action is DISMISSED without prejudice due to Plaintiff
failing to obey orders of this Court to timely pay a statutorily required partial initial filing
fee.2 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Brown v. Tallahassee Police Dep’t, 205 F. App’x 802, 802
2 Plaintiff is advised that the Court could have dismissed this civil action with prejudice
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(11th Cir. 2006) (“The court may dismiss an action sua sponte under Rule 41(b) for failure
to prosecute or failure to obey a court order.”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and Lopez v.
Aransas Cty. Indep. Sch. Dist., 570 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1978)); Wilson v. Sargent, 313
F.3d 1315, 1320–21 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (holding that a district court may dismiss
a civil action where a plaintiff fails to pay a court ordered filing fee).
PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
I. Standard of Review
The Prison Litigation Reform Act directs courts to conduct a preliminary screening
of every complaint filed by a prisoner who seeks redress from a government entity, official,
or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Courts must also screen complaints filed by a plaintiff
proceeding IFP. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Both statutes apply in this case, and the standard of
review is the same. “Pro se filings are generally held to a less stringent standard than those
drafted by attorneys and are liberally construed.” Carmichael v. United States, 966 F.3d
1250, 1258 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Still, the Court must dismiss a prisoner
due to Plaintiff’s conduct. See Zocaras, 465 F.3d at 483 (citing Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v.
M/V Monada, 432 F.3d 1333, 1339 (11th Cir.2005) (finding that dismissal with prejudice
is permissible when a district court finds (1) a clear record of delay or willful conduct, and
(2) lesser sanctions would be inadequate). Plaintiff is placed on notice that should he
demonstrate bad faith or deceitfulness in any other civil action before this Court then
sanctions may be imposed. These sanctions can include but are not limited to dismissals
for abuse of the judicial process or a monetary penalty or a prohibition against future pro
se filings pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See e.g., Daker v.
Ward, 999 F.3d 1300, 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2021) (affirming dismissal of prisoner
complaint as malicious due to plaintiff’s abuse of the judicial process); ECF No. 5 in Allen
v. Wheeler, 5:25-cv-00213-TES-CHW (M.D.Ga June 4, 2025) (restricting future filings
by an abusive litigant for a period of one year).
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complaint if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Miller v.
Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). On preliminary review,
the Court may dismiss claims that are based on “indisputably meritless legal” theories and
“claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Id. (citations omitted). A claim
can be dismissed as malicious if it is knowingly duplicative or otherwise amounts to an
abuse of the judicial process. Daker v. Ward, 999 F.3d 1300, 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2021)
(affirming dismissal of duplicative complaint “in light of [prisoner’s] history as a prolific
serial filer”).
A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“Factual allegations [in a complaint] must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). In other words, the
complaint must allege enough facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will
reveal evidence” supporting a claim. Id. at 556. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) an act or
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omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a
statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting
under color of state law. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995).
If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements or fails to provide factual allegations in
support of his claim or claims, the complaint is subject to dismissal. See, e.g., Bingham v.
Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1176-77 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of certain claims at
preliminary screening because prisoner failed to allege sufficient facts to show a violation
of his rights), abrogated on other grounds by Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1255 (11th
Cir. 2024) (en banc).
II. Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff’s claims arise from his incarceration at the Walton County Jail. ECF No.
1 at 6. Plaintiff states that on June 10, 2025, he contacted mental health through a kiosk
using his cellmate’s information to notify them that his cellmate was suicidal. Id. Later
that evening, the cellmate was removed from the cell and placed on suicide watch. Id.
Plaintiff complains that on June 11, 2025, he was told that he was being placed on suicide
watch and he was then put “in the pad cell against [his] will due to mental health provider
Ms. Gamble.” Id. On June 12, 2025, Plaintiff spoke with Defendant Gamble who
explained that since Plaintiff was the one who used the kiosk to report suicide threats and
because she found his cellmate not to be suicidal then she believed Plaintiff was possibly
suicidal so she placed him in the “pad cell”. Id. Plaintiff claims this “was against S.O.P.”
and violated his constitutional rights. Id. Plaintiff seeks a million dollars in damages as
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well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 7.
I. Plaintiff’s Claims
A. Claims against Defendants Correct Health, Walton County Sheriff’s Office,
and the Walton County Jail
Plaintiff names Correct Health, the Walton County Sheriff’s Office, and the Walton
County Jail as Defendants. Id. at 1, 4. However, Plaintiff does not provide any allegations
within his statement of claim that links these Defendants to any constitutional violation.
See ECF No. 1 at 6-7. A district court properly dismisses a complaint when the plaintiff,
other than naming a defendant in the caption of the complaint, fails to state any allegations
that connect the defendant with an alleged constitutional violation. Douglas v. Yates, 535
F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Pamel Corp. v. P.R. Highway Auth., 621 F.2d 33,
36 (1st Cir. 1980)) (“While we do not require technical niceties in pleading, we must
demand that the complaint state with some minimal particularity how overt acts of the
defendant caused a legal wrong.”); Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir.
1986); Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1380 (11th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted)
(stating there must be proof of an affirmative causal connection between the actions taken
by a particular person ‘under color of state law’ and the constitutional deprivation”).
Furthermore, as to Defendants Walton County Sheriff’s Office and Walton County
Jail, federal courts have long recognized that sheriff’s departments, county detention
facilities, and police departments are not legal entities subject to suit or liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992) (advising that
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“sheriff’s departments and police departments are not usually considered legal entities
subject to suit . . . .”); Bunyon v. Burke County, 285 F. Supp.2d 1310, 1328 (S. D. Ga. 2003)
(dismissing claim against police department, reasoning that it was not a legal entity subject
to suit); Shelby v. City of Atlanta, 578 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 (N. D. Ga. 1984) (concluding
that the City of Atlanta Police Department is not a proper defendant because it is “merely
the vehicle through which the City government fulfills its policing function”). Thus,
Plaintiff’s claims against the Walton County Sheriff’s Office and Walton County Jail must
be dismissed because they are not entities subject to suit in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.
Lastly, in naming his Defendants, Plaintiff states that Correct Health is the “health
care provider” under which Defendant Gamble provides services. ECF No. 1 at 4 and 5.
The Court can only surmise that Plaintiff is attempting to hold Defendant Correct Health
vicariously liable for the actions of Defendant Gamble. However, it is well-settled in the
Eleventh Circuit that supervisory officials cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely on the
basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. See, e.g., Keating v. City of Miami, 598
F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir.2010); Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999);
Hendrix v. Tucker, 535 F. App’x 803, 805 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (“The standard by which a supervisor is held liable in her individual
capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous.”). Instead, to establish
liability against a supervisor, a prisoner must allege facts showing a causal connection
between the supervisory defendants’ actions and an alleged constitutional violation such
as the supervisor personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation, directed
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their subordinates to act unlawfully, or knew their subordinates would act unlawfully but
the supervisor failed to stop them. Keating, 598 F.3d at 762. Here, Plaintiff has made no
showing of a causal connection between a constitutional violation and any action of Correct
Health. See Hernandez v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 281 F. App’x 862, 866-67 (11th Cir. 2008)
(per curiam) (rejecting claim where the plaintiff failed to allege decision making officials
took specific actions amounting to a constitutional violation).
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Correct Health,
Walton County Sheriff’s Office, and Walton County Jail are DISMISSED without
prejudice for failure to state a claim.
B. Claims against Defendant Gamble
Violation of Standard Operating Procedures Claim
Plaintiff complains that Defendant Gamble’s decision to place him in “the pad cell
was against “S.O.P.” ECF No. 1 at 6. 7. However, “[i]n a § 1983 action, a federal court
considers whether a constitutional right has been infringed, not whether bureaucratic
procedures have been violated.” Jones v. Schofield, No. 1:08-CV-7 WLS, 2009 WL
902154, at 3 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2009) (citing Rineholtz. v. Campbell 64 F.Supp.2d 721,
731 (W.D.Tn.1999). “Prison regulations and Standard Operating Procedures do not confer
federal rights to prisoners that may be enforced or redressed in a § 1983 action.” Id.; see
also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481–82 (1995) (finding that jail and prison
regulations are “primarily designed to guide correctional officials in the administration of
a prison ... [and are] not designed to confer rights on inmates” that would create liberty
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interests protected by the Due Process clause of the Constitution.); Morrall v. Warden, 859
F. App'x 883, 884 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 481–82) (holding that
prisoners have no constitutional liberty interests “in the mandatory language of prison rules
and regulations.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, any constitutional
claim raised by Plaintiff based solely in Defendant Gamble violating jail policies or
standard operating procedures is subject to dismissal.
Unconstitutional Condition of Confinement Claim
“Claims involving the mistreatment of arrestees or pretrial detainees in custody are
governed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.” Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85
F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996); see also Jacoby v. Baldwin County, 835 F.3d 1338, 1344
(11th Cir. 2016). However, “the standard for providing basic human needs to those
incarcerated or in detention is the same under both the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.”). Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1024 n. 5 (11th Cir. 2001)
(en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561–63; Hamm v. DeKalb
Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[I]n regard to providing pretrial detainees
with such basic necessities as food, living space, and medical care the minimum standard
allowed by the due process clause is the same as that allowed by the eighth amendment for
convicted persons.”); Christmas v. Nabors, 76 F.4th 1320, 1330-31 (11th Cir. 2023)
(explaining pretrial detainee must satisfy Eighth Amendment standard to prevail on claim
under Fourteenth Amendment).
While “the Due Process Clause forbids punishment of a person awaiting trial but
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not yet adjudged guilty of any crime,” Hamm, 774 F.2d at 1572 (citation omitted), “the fact
that [pretrial] detention interferes with the detainee's understandable desire to live as
comfortably as possible and with as little restraint as possible during confinement does not
convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into ‘punishment.’” Wilson v.
Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1291 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
537 (1978)). Simply put, the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons or jails.
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981); Bennet v. Chitwood, 519 F. App'x 569, 574
(11th Cir. 2013) (“Merely showing that prison conditions are uncomfortable is not enough”
to establish an unconstitutional conditions of confinement claim). To state an
unconstitutional conditions of confinement claim, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective
and subjective component. Christmas, 76 F.4th at 1331. For the objective component, an
inmate must first allege that the deprivations he suffers are “‘sufficiently serious’ to
constitute a denial of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.’” Thomas v.
Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1304 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834 (1994)). This standard is only met when the challenged conditions present “an
unreasonable risk of serious damage to [the prisoner's] future health or safety,” Chandler
v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted), or if
society “considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates
contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk,” Helling
v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993). To meet the subjective standard in a jail or prison
conditions case, a plaintiff must show that the prison official acted with deliberate
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indifference to a serious risk of harm to the prisoner. Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1304; Christmas,
76 F.4th at 1331. To establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that
the defendant: (1) “was subjectively aware that the inmate was at risk of serious harm”; (2)
“disregarded that risk”; and (3) “acted with ‘subjective recklessness as used in the criminal
law.’” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1255 (citations omitted). Subjective awareness requires that the
defendant “‘must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’” Rodriguez v.
Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 617 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at
837). To establish that a particular “defendant acted with ‘subjective recklessness as used
in the criminal law’” the plaintiff's allegations must establish “that the defendant was
subjectively aware that his own conduct put the plaintiff at substantial risk of serious
harm.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1255 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839). “Furthermore, the
official may escape liability for known risks ‘if [he] responded reasonably to the risk, even
if the harm ultimately was not averted.’ ” Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1290 (quoting Farmer,
511 U.S. at 844); Wade, 106 F.4th at 1255 (citations omitted) (alteration in original)
(stating that “in any event, a defendant who ‘respond[s] reasonably’ to a risk, even a known
risk, ‘cannot be found liable’ under the Eighth Amendment”)
In this case, Plaintiff's allegations do not satisfy the objective nor the subjective
component of a conditions of confinement claim. As to the objective component, while
being placed in a “pad cell” may have been unpleasant to the Plaintiff, his temporary
confinement in a “pad cell” does not indicate the sort of extreme deprivation or serious risk
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to a prisoner's health or safety that satisfies a conditions of confinement claim. See
Quintanilla v. Bryson, 730 F. App'x 738, 746 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Under current precedent,
‘administrative segregation and solitary confinement do not, in and of themselves,
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.’”) (quoting Shelley v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1420,
1428–29 (11th Cir. 1987)); Moore v. Hunter, 847 F. App'x 694, 695 (11th Cir. 2021)
(finding that inmates placed on suicide watch are often housed in administrative
segregation in stripped down cells). In fact, it has been repeatedly held that short periods
of confinement in a bare cell where the conditions are much worse than Plaintiff alleges in
his present complaint do not violate the Constitution. See McMahon v. Beard, 583 F.2d
172, 175 (5th Cir.1978) (no constitutional violation when a suicidal pretrial detainee was
placed in a “strip cell” for 90 days without clothing, a mattress, sheets, or blankets);3
Fischer v. Ellegood, 238 F. Appx. 428, 433 (11th Cir. 2007) (requiring an inmate to sleep
on the “bare cement floor” without a mattress for five days does not amount to an Eighth
Amendment violation); Turner v. Warden, GDCP, 650 F. App'x 695, 701 (11th Cir. 2016)
(prisoner failed to show that being left in strip cell with no property and in a paper gown
for ten days without food for a 24-hour period created an unreasonable risk of harm to his
health or safety); O'Connor v. Kelley, 644 F. App'x 928, 932 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding
prisoner failed to state the conditions of his confinement were cruel and unusual where
prisoner alleged that he “suffered pain, swelling, itching, numbness in his feet and legs
3 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the
Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981.
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(including where a bullet was lodged in his leg), stomach pain, and headaches” from being
placed in a cold suicide prevention cell for weeks).
Plaintiff has further failed to satisfy the subjective component of his conditions of
confinement claim. Defendant Gamble, a mental health provider, determined that Plaintiff
had made a report about suicidal ideations on a jail kiosk and as a precaution, placed
Plaintiff on suicide watch in a segregated cell.4 Defendant Gamble’s determination that
Plaintiff needed to be temporarily placed in a padded cell is in no way indicative that she
acted with the subjective recklessness necessary to show deliberate indifference to any
imaginable risk of harm but instead demonstrates that she took cautionary measures to
prevent an inmate from possibly harming himself. See Wade, 106 F.4th at 1255.
For the reasons set forth, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Gamble are
DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
CONCLUSION
This Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 18) pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(e) and VACATES its prior Dismissal Order (ECF No. 11) and
Judgment (ECF No. 13). Upon review of the complete record in this case including
Plaintiff’s newly discovered evidence (ECF No. 18), the Court finds that Plaintiff could
have paid the filing fee in this case as ordered but simply did not do so. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for his failure to obey the orders
4 Indeed, Plaintiff himself in his most recent lawsuit filed with this Court claims he has
mental health conditions including mood disorder, depression, and anxiety. See ECF No.
1 at 11-12 in Clay v. Mendez, Case No. 3:25-cv-196-TES-AGH (filed Dec. 11, 2025).
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of the Court. Furthermore, for the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s complaint is also
DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.
SO ORDERED, this 23rd day of December, 2025.
S/ Tilman E. Self, III
TILMAN E. SELF, III, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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