Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ALBANY DIVISION
A.L., 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	CASE NO.: 1:24-CV-152 (LAG) (ALS)
:
COMMMISSIONER OF 	:
SOCIAL SECURITY, 	:
:
Defendant. 	:
:
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Consent Motion for Attorney’s Fees Under the Equal
Access to Justice Act (Consent Motion). (Doc. 15). Therein, Plaintiff requests that the
Court approve attorney’s fees in the amount of $3,581.66 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d).
(Id. at 1).
Plaintiff filed a Complaint on September 26, 2024, seeking review of the Social
Security Administration’s denial of Plaintiff’s claim for disability benefits. (Doc. 1). On
February 24, 2025, the Commissioner of Social Security filed an Unopposed Motion for
Entry of Judgment Under Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) with Reversal and Remand
of the Cause to the Defendant (Doc. 12), which the Court granted on August 12, 2025 (Doc.
13). Plaintiff filed the subject Consent Motion on November 5, 2025. (Doc. 15).
Pursuant to the EAJA, a court shall award attorney’s “fees and other expenses” to
a prevailing party in a non-tort civil action against the United States “unless the court finds
that 	the 	position 	of 	the 	United 	States 	was 	substantially 	justified 	or 	that 	special
circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Because the Court
reversed and remanded this action, Plaintiff is a prevailing party and the Court must award
Plaintiff attorney’s fees unless the government’s position was substantially justified or
special circumstances make the award unjust. See Johnson v. Acting Comm’r of Sec. Sec.,
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No. 5:12-CV-460 (MTT), 2014 WL 657370, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 20, 2014) (“A claimant
who obtains a court order remanding her Social Security claim to the Commissioner for
further proceedings is a prevailing party for purposes of the EAJA.” (citing Shalala v.
Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300–01 (1993))). The Commissioner does not argue that the
government’s position was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an
award unjust. See Stratton v. Bowen, 827 F.2d 1447, 1450 (11th Cir. 1987) (“The
government bears the burden of showing that its position was substantially justified.”
(citations omitted)). Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees.
Under the EAJA, the Court determines the amount of a reasonable fee using the
lodestar method—i.e., “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation
multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983);
Comm’r, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161 (1990) (explaining that Hensley’s lodestar
method applies to EAJA cases). In determining the number of hours reasonably expended,
fee applicants must exercise “billing judgment.” Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery,
836 F.2d 1292, 1301 (11th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted); see also Sanfilippo v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., No. 08-14203, 2009 WL 1532039, at *3 (11th Cir. June 3, 2009) (per curiam)
(citation omitted). “This must necessarily mean that the hours excluded are those that
would be unreasonable to bill to a client and therefore to one’s adversary irrespective of
the skill, reputation or experience of counsel.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301 (emphasis and
citation omitted).
To determine the appropriate hourly rate, the Court utilizes a “two-step analysis.”
Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029, 1033 (11th Cir. 1992). First, the Court must “determine
the market rate for ‘similar services [provided] by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills,
experience, and reputation.’” Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Second, if the
market rate is greater than $125.00 per hour, the Court must determine whether to “adjust
the hourly fee upward” to account for any “increase in the cost of living[] or a special
factor.” Id. at 1033–34; 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (“[A]ttorney fees shall not be awarded
in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living
or a special factor . . . justifies a higher fee.”).
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Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees for a total of 14.22 hours of work. (Doc. 15 at 1).
Upon review of Plaintiff’s Counsel’s billing records and because the Commissioner does
not oppose Plaintiff’s Motion, the Court finds that 14.22 hours is reasonable for this case.
See I.W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:19-CV-194 (LAG) (TQL), 2022 WL 15996319, at
*2 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2022) (finding that “[t]he sixty-five hours expended by Plaintiff’s
Counsel was reasonable based on the nature of the case”); Thomas v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 7:09-CV-52 (HL), 2012 WL 2343755, at *2 (M.D. Ga. June 20, 2012) (stating that
“40.25 hours is generally reasonable” for EAJA cases). Second, Plaintiff’s hourly rates of
$251.84 and $257.09 are reasonable, based on the maximum hourly rate under the EAJA
and an adjustment for inflation based on the Consumer Price Index for September 2024,
December 2024, and August 2025, when Plaintiff’s Counsel performed this work. (Doc.
15-3 at 2; Doc. 15-4 at 4). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Consent Motion (Doc. 15) is
GRANTED. Plaintiff shall receive $3,581.66 in attorney’s fees. Payment shall be made
payable to Plaintiff and delivered to Plaintiff’s Counsel if Plaintiff owes a federal debt. If
the U.S. Department of the Treasury determines that Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt,
the Government may accept Plaintiff’s assignment of EAJA fees and pay them directly to
Plaintiff’s Counsel.
SO ORDERED, this 31st day of December, 2025.
/s/ Leslie A. Gardner
LESLIE A. GARDNER, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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