NEWELL v. MYERS et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ALBANY DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER NEWELL, 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	Case No. 1:23-cv-14-LAG-AGH
:
WARDEN DARREN MYERS, et al., 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
_________________________________ 	:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Defendants Brown and Williams’s motion for summary
judgment (ECF No. 92). 	For the reasons stated below, it is recommended that
Defendants’ motion be granted in part and denied in part.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s claims arise from his confinement at Autry State Prison (“ASP”) in
Pelham, Georgia. 	2d Recast Compl. 5, ECF No. 27. 	Plaintiff states that he was
injured at ASP on February 23, 2022, suffering “multiple broken bones in [his] face
to include a broken upper jaw, cheek bone, and eye socket.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff alleges
generally that Defendants were responsible for a fifty-one day delay in him receiving
necessary reconstructive surgery and for not providing appropriate medical care
during this period, including necessary pain medication and an altered diet. 	Id. at
7-19. 	He also alleges that on one occasion following his surgery, Defendant Brown
refused to let him go to an appointment to get a mold casting for dentures. 	Pl.’s Objs.
3-4, ECF No. 32.
The Court received Plaintiff’s original complaint on January 23, 2023 (ECF
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No. 1). 	After twice being instructed to recast his complaint, the Court received
Plaintiff’s second recast complaint on August 7, 2023 (ECF No. 27). 	Following
preliminary review, Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference to a serious medical need
claims were allowed to proceed for further factual development against Defendants
Warden 	Darrin 	Myers, 	Lieutenant 	Williams, 	Physician’s 	Assistant 	Bradford,
Lieutenant Brown, and Health Services Administrator Shores.1, 2 	Order & R. 13,
Dec. 6, 2023, ECF No. 33; Order 1, Jan. 19, 2024, ECF No. 36 (adopting order and
recommendation). 	Brown and Williams filed an answer (ECF No. 55) on March 1,
2024, and moved for summary judgment (ECF No. 92) on November 27, 2024. 	The
Court notified Plaintiff of his right to respond to the motion within thirty days.
Notice, Nov. 27, 2024, ECF No. 93. 	Plaintiff was warned that if he failed to respond
to the motion for summary judgment, the Court could accept the factual assertions in
the motion as true and that final judgment could be entered against him. 	Id.
Despite this notice, Plaintiff failed to file a response to the motion for summary
judgment. 	Defendants’ motion is ripe for review.
1 After Plaintiff filed his second recast complaint (ECF No. 27), the Court initially recommended that
the claims against Defendant Brown and Shores be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 	Order & R.
9-10, Oct. 24, 2023, ECF No. 29. 	However, Plaintiff filed objections (ECF No. 32) to the
recommendation and provided further factual allegations. 	The Court construed these objections as a
supplement to his second recast complaint and considered the factual assertions therein when
conducting its preliminary screening. 	Order & R. 1, Dec. 6, 2023, ECF No. 33.
2 Following the filing of a suggestion of death (ECF No. 41) for Myers, the Court ordered that Curtis
Carter, Myer’s successor as warden at ASP, be substituted as defendant for Myers on Plaintiff’s official
capacity claims. 	Order 1, Feb. 14, 2024, ECF No. 50. 	The Court subsequently recommended that
the official capacity claims against Carter be dismissed as moot due to Plaintiff’s transfer out of ASP.
R. & R. 6, June 20, 2025, ECF No. 103. 	That recommendation was adopted on July 22, 2025. 	Order
1, ECF No. 105. 	Defendants Bradford and Shores have a pending motion to dismiss based on
discharge in bankruptcy (ECF No. 108), which the Court will address in a separate recommendation.
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DISCUSSION
I. 	Motion for Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 	In determining whether a genuine dispute of
material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed
in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, drawing all
justifiable inferences in the opposing party’s favor. 	Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 	A fact is material if it is relevant or necessary to the
outcome of the suit. 	Id. at 248. 	A factual dispute is genuine if the evidence would
allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 	Id.
The party seeking summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility
of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those
portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of
a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)
(internal quotation marks omitted). 	If the movant meets this burden, “[t]he burden
then shifts to the nonmoving party, who is required to ‘go beyond the pleadings’ to
establish that there is a ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 	Whitehead v. BBVA Compass
Bank, 979 F.3d 1327, 1328 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324).
This evidence must consist of more than conclusory allegations. 	See Avirgan v. Hull,
932 F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir. 1991). 	In sum, summary judgment must be entered
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“against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial.” 	Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
II. 	Plaintiff’s Failure to Respond
Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment or their
statement of facts. 	The Local Rules of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Georgia (hereinafter “Local Rules”) provide:
The respondent to a motion for summary judgment shall attach to the
response a separate and concise statement of material facts, numbered
separately, to which the respondent contends there exists a genuine
dispute to be tried. 	Response shall be made to each of the movant’s
numbered material facts. 	All material facts contained in the movant’s
statement which are not specifically controverted by specific citation to
particular parts of materials in the record shall be deemed to have been
admitted, unless otherwise inappropriate.
M.D. Ga. L.R. 56. 	Because Plaintiff did not respond to the summary judgment
motion, and thus did not specifically controvert any material facts set forth in
Defendants’ statement of undisputed material facts (ECF No. 92-1), the facts set forth
therein are deemed admitted where appropriate.
The Court, however, “cannot base the entry of summary judgment on the mere
fact that the motion was unopposed, but, rather, must consider the merits of the
motion.” 	United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., 363
F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). 	In considering the merits of a motion for summary
judgment, even an unopposed motion, a court must “review all of the evidentiary
materials submitted in support of the motion for summary judgment.” 	Id. at
1101-02. 	In other words, the court cannot simply accept the facts stated in a moving
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party’s statement of material facts as true, but must also review the movant’s
citations to the record and confirm that there are no issues of material fact. 	Id. at
1103 n.6. 	Moreover, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the Court
to consider the entire record when ruling on a motion for summary judgment: “The
court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in
the record.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); see Baker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 903 F.2d
1515, 1519 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he court must consider the entire record in the case,
not just those pieces of evidence which have been singled out for attention by the
parties.”).
III. 	Undisputed Material Facts
On February 20, 2022, Plaintiff was attacked by another inmate in the
dayroom at ASP, causing a laceration to Plaintiff’s face. 	Pl.’s Dep. 12:21-13:10,
13:17-20, ECF No. 111-1; Williams Ex. 2, at 1, ECF No. 92-6. 	Later that night,
Plaintiff—who was assigned to the top bunk in his cell—attempted to get off his bunk
to use the restroom when he fell and hit his face on a desk.3 	Pl.’s Dep. 12:24-13:1,
13:21-14:5, 15:8-10. 	He blacked out and later woke up in a pool of blood. 	Id. at
14:15-22. 	Plaintiff was able to get back into his bunk, and he stayed there until 9:30
a.m. the next morning, when he reported his injury to a guard and was taken to the
prison medical unit. 4 	Id. at 15:20-16:20. 	The medical unit determined that
3 Plaintiff attributed the fall to a decision by the Georgia Department of Corrections (“GDC”) to remove
ladders from bunks, thus requiring Plaintiff to jump from the top bunk to the desk stool to get down.
Pl.’s Dep. 13:23-14:5, 42:10-16.
4 Plaintiff initially only reported the fall from the bunk and not the inmate attack. 	Pl.’s Dep.
13:11-14; Williams Ex. 2, at 5. 	In his deposition, Plaintiff explained that this was because he initially
did not believe the attack caused his injuries but that now he was unsure. 	Pl.’s Dep. 13:1-3, 13:14-16.
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Plaintiff’s injuries required that he be seen at an outside facility. 	Id. at 16:21-23.
Warden Myers and another prison official were present in the medical unit at the
time and approved Plaintiff’s transport to the hospital. 	Id. at 17:18-18:3.
Plaintiff was taken to Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital (“Phoebe Putney”) by
Officer Christopher and another officer. 	Id. at 20:11-17; Williams Ex. 1, at 5, ECF
No. 92-5. 	An emergency room physician examined Plaintiff, stitched the lacerations
to his face, and ordered a CT scan. 	Pl.’s Dep. 21:18-22:10. 	It was determined that
Plaintiff suffered multiple broken bones to his face, a broken jaw, and a laceration to
his 	eye. 	Id. 	at 	42:16-18. 	According 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	deposition 	testimony, 	the
emergency room physician told the escorting officers that Plaintiff needed emergency
facial reconstruction surgery and that he had already reserved an operating room and
notified the on-call surgeon. 	Id. at 22:1-6, 23:1-7. 	Officer Christopher then called
Defendant Lieutenant Williams and told him that the emergency room physician had
ordered reconstructive surgery due to the seriousness of Plaintiff’s injuries. 	Id. at
23:22-24:4, 25:16-20. 	Williams—whose duties as the officer in charge of second shift
included keeping track of inmate movements—responded that unless bones were
protruding through Plaintiff’s face, Christopher was not to let Plaintiff have surgery.5
Id. at 24:4-7, 25:20-24; Williams Decl. ¶ 2, ECF Nos. 92-4, 95-1. 	Christopher again
told Williams of the emergency room physician’s statements about the seriousness of
Plaintiff’s injuries and need for urgent reconstructive surgery. 	Pl.’s Dep. 24:8-13,
25:25-26:6. 	In response, Williams stated, “[L]et me repeat myself, if his bones are
5 Plaintiff testified that his bones were never protruding through his face. 	Pl.’s Dep. 52:12-17.
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not protruding through his face, do not let him have surgery and bring him back to
Autry now.”6 	Id. at 26:6-9. 	Plaintiff testified that Christopher had his cell phone
on speakerphone during this conversation, that Plaintiff recognized Williams’s voice,
and that Williams identified himself when he answered the phone. 	Id. at 24:18-25.
Following the emergency room visit, officers returned Plaintiff to ASP. 	Id. at
27:1; Williams Ex. 2, at 6. 	Williams met Plaintiff upon his return and escorted him
to administrative segregation, explaining to Plaintiff that Myers had ordered the
placement so that Plaintiff could be “isolated from any further injury and given the
chance to heal.” 	Pl.’s Dep. 27:7-9, 27:16-18, 28:4-8. 	The ASP administrative
segregation unit had its own medical unit, and inmates would be escorted to the
medical room to see providers. 	Id. at 32:1-7. 	According to Plaintiff, nurses did pill
call twice a day in segregation, and he received medication every day, though he
believes he was just on nighttime medication. 	Id. at 31:5-16. 	Furthermore,
Plaintiff reported seeing Defendant Bradford—a physician’s assistant—“multiple
times on a person-to-person basis.” 	Id. at 31:20-23, 37:4-20. 	This included weekly
appointments and those occasions when Bradford was doing rounds checking on the
well-being of inmates, which occurred multiple times during the week. 	Id. at
66:4-16.
6 Williams denies giving the order or being involved in Plaintiff’s transport to and from the hospital.
Williams Decl. ¶ 18, ECF No. 92-4. 	However, Plaintiff testified that Williams identified himself on
the phone and that he recognized Williams’s voice. 	Pl.’s Dep. 24:18-25. 	Williams cites movement
history records showing that another officer authorized Plaintiff’s transport to and from the hospital.
Williams Decl. ¶ 19; Williams Ex. 1, at 5-6. 	However, these records do not disprove or contradict
Plaintiff’s testimony that it was ultimately Williams who told Officer Christopher to return Plaintiff
to ASP without having the surgery. 	Therefore, the Court assumes for summary judgment purposes
that the conversation with Christopher occurred and that Williams gave the order as described.
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During the time Plaintiff was in administrative segregation, he testified that
he was denied pain relief medication and an altered diet—which he said he needed
because he could not chew his food. 	Id. at 11:10-12, 31:16-20, 44:8-16. 	He spoke
“every time” that the nurses came to his cell about his need for pain medication and
an altered diet and spoke to Bradford about it as well. 	Pl.’s Dep. 31:16-23, 65:21-25.
He 	contended 	that 	Brown 	and 	Williams 	had 	the 	authority 	to 	give 	inmates
over-the-counter pain medication and that each housing unit kept Tylenol for that
purpose. 	Id. at 33:13-17, 34:12-19. 	Brown—who was the building supervisor—
never provided Plaintiff with over-the-counter medication, though on rare occasions,
he received some from two other officers. 	Id. at 29:20-22, 33:18-34:2. 	In addition,
although Brown and Williams did not have the authority to place Plaintiff on a
prescription medical diet, they could order that inmates be provided with specialty
trays, such as a soft-diet tray. 	Id. at 32:8-33:12.
While Plaintiff was in ASP administrative segregation, he was waiting to be
seen by a specialist for further evaluation and treatment of his injuries. 	Bradford
saw Plaintiff upon his initial return to ASP from Phoebe Putney and referred him for
an 	“emergency 	consult” 	for 	facial 	reconstructive 	surgery. 	Id. 	at 	36:21-37:1,
55:23-56:11. 	However, according to Plaintiff, two weeks went by without him being
seen by the specialist. 	Id. at 56:11-13. 	Bradford then put in another consult
request, and two weeks later Plaintiff was finally seen by a specialist at Augusta
State Medical Prison (“ASMP”). 	Pl.’s Dep. 56:13-16, 56:24-57:4. 	The specialist
informed Plaintiff that he needed urgent surgery and that the surgery was “supposed”
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to occur the following week. 	Id. at 59:21-25. 	However, the surgery did not occur,
and Bradford had to request another consultation. 	Id. at 60:1-4. 	Plaintiff returned
to the specialist, who confirmed the need for surgery, and again scheduled it for the
following week. 	Id. at 60:4-8 	Again, the week went by without the surgery. 	Id. at
60:9. 	Plaintiff testified that the following week, Warden Myers woke him up for an
emergency transport to Augusta. 	Id. at 60:10-12 	Myers told Plaintiff that he had
been “woken up in the middle of the night by the deputy warden of care and treatment
for Augusta because [Plaintiff] had missed multiple surgery dates.” 	Pl.’s Dep.
60:12-16. 	Plaintiff was transported to ASMP on April 12, 2022, and then taken to
Augusta University Hospital on April 15, 2022, where he underwent surgery. 	Id. at
58:12-20; Williams Ex. 1, at 2. 	Plaintiff returned to ASP on April 28, 2022. 	Pl.’s
Dep. 58:25-59:2; Williams Ex. 1, at 1.
In approximately December 2022 or January 2023—when he was in the “final
point of recovery from having surgery”—Plaintiff was scheduled to receive a “top
plate” to replace the teeth taken out during his reconstructive surgery. 	Pl.’s Dep.
39:13-18, 40:5-11. 	Plaintiff was supposed to get “the casting for his dentures.” 	Id.
at 40:18-21. 	However, Brown would not let Plaintiff leave for the appointment
because he was dressed only in shorts. 	Id. at 39:18-21. 	She instructed Plaintiff to
“get nude” in front of her and another inmate and to “put on a pair of pants.” 	Id. at
39:23-25 	Brown refused to turn her head while Plaintiff changed his clothes, and
because Plaintiff refused “to get naked and change [his] clothes in front of her,” she
refused to take him to his appointment. 	Id. at 39:25-40:4. 	As of the date of his
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deposition in October 2024, Plaintiff had still not received the casting. 7 	Id. at
40:22-23. 	He stated that he filed a Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) complaint
against Brown. 	Pl.’s Dep. 40:12-14
IV. 	Deliberate Indifference Standard
“To 	prevail 	on 	a 	deliberate 	indifference 	to 	serious 	medical 	need 	claim,
[p]laintiffs must show: (1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendants’ deliberate
indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the
plaintiff’s injury.” 	Mann v. Taser Int’l, 	Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (2009).
Whether a plaintiff has a serious medical need is an objective inquiry. 	Farrow v.
West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). 	“[A] serious medical need is considered
one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so
obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention.” 	Id. (quotation marks omitted). 	Further, “the medical need must be one
that, if left unattended, poses a substantial risk of serious harm.” 	Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). 	“[M]edical treatment violates the Constitution only when
it is so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to
be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” 	Dang ex rel. Dang v. Sheriff, 871 F.3d 1272,
1280 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
7 In his objections/supplement to the second recast complaint, Plaintiff suggested that Brown caused
a delay of his facial reconstructive surgery by removing orders from his medical file when he returned
from ASMP. 	Pl.’s Objs. 2-3, ECF No. 32. 	However, in his deposition, Plaintiff admitted that he never
saw Brown actually go through his medical file, and when asked if she ever caused him to miss an
appointment, the only incident Plaintiff mentioned was the one where she allegedly told him to change
his pants in front of her. 	Pl.’s Dep. 38:23-39:9, 39:10-40:7. 	Thus, the Court deems this speculative
allegation as abandoned, and to the extent it is not, it recommends Brown be granted summary
judgment on the claim because of a lack of evidence.
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To satisfy the deliberate indifference element, a “plaintiff must demonstrate
that the defendant acted with subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law.”
Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1262 (2024) (quotation marks omitted). 	“[T]o do
so, [the plaintiff] must show that the defendant was actually, subjectively aware that
his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff—with the
caveat . . . that even if the defendant actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate
health or safety, he cannot be found liable . . . if he responded reasonably to the risk.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
V. 	Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
In his second recast complaint, as supplemented by his objections to the Court’s
original report and recommendation, Plaintiff alleges that Williams and Brown were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in the following ways: (1)
Williams prevented him from having surgery at Phoebe Putney on February 21, 2022,
resulting in him enduring unnecessary pain and suffering for fifty-one days until he
finally underwent surgery; (2) Williams and Brown refused to provide him pain
medication and an altered diet to account for his inability to chew food; and (3) Brown
prevented him from going to an appointment to have a mold cast for a dental plate to
replace the teeth removed during his facial reconstruction surgery. 	2d Recast
Compl. 11-13, 17; Pl.’s Objs. 1-4.
Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff cannot
show deliberate indifference and because they are entitled to qualified immunity.
Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 7-12, ECF No. 92-2. 	The Court agrees that
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Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as it pertains to the pain medication
and the dental plate replacement claims but not as to the surgery and altered diet
claims.
A. 	Delay in Facial Reconstruction Surgery
Williams argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on the surgery claim
because Plaintiff has not placed medical records into evidence to show that the delay
in surgery exacerbated his medical condition. 	Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ.
J. 9. 	However, Plaintiff has never alleged that the delay in surgery worsened his
medical condition, only that the delay caused him unnecessary pain and suffering.8
2d Recast Compl. 5.
Williams also argues that even if he gave the order to return Plaintiff to ASP
without surgery, Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant was “actually, subjectively
aware that this alleged statement was given knowing that it would cause Plaintiff
not to receive surgery or any form of treatment that had been prescribed or
recommended at that time.” 	Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 9. 	Williams
asserts that “[t]here is no evidence that [he] spoke with the outside medical provider
about the alleged seriousness of Plaintiff’s facial injury before Plaintiff was ordered
returned to ASP.” 	Id. at 10. 	This is disingenuous. 	The evidence shows that
Officer Christopher relayed to Williams in great detail what the emergency room
doctor 	had 	said 	about 	Plaintiff’s 	medical 	condition 	and 	the 	need 	for 	urgent
8 Further, the Court notes that Defendants have also not placed Plaintiff’s medical records into
evidence even though they likely have greater ability to do so than Plaintiff, who is both indigent and
incarcerated.
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reconstructive surgery, including the fact that the emergency room doctor had
ordered the surgery. 	Pl.’s Dep. 23:22-24:16, 25:16-26:9. 	Despite this Williams
refused to allow the surgery and ordered Plaintiff’s return to ASP. 	And even if he
was not himself authorized to approve the surgery, the evidence shows that he did
not even attempt to explain the situation to one who had such authority and seek
approval. 	Defendant has not presented any evidence that the GDC had a policy to
not allow emergency surgery or that such approval could not have been obtained
under the circumstances.
Williams also argues that there is no evidence that he actually knew that by
not approving the surgery that “Plaintiff’s pain would not be adequately treated at
ASP or that he would not have facial surgery until April 18, 2022.” 	Defs.’ Br. in
Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 10. 	However, Williams denies the conversation with
Christopher even took place and has not presented any evidence as to what may have
been going through his mind at the time he ordered Plaintiff’s return without surgery.
As it is, the evidence shows that Williams refused to allow urgent surgery to relieve
Plaintiff’s pain and suffering without any apparent justification. 	The evidence is
sufficient to allow a jury to conclude that Williams was actually, subjectively aware
that by refusing to allow urgent surgery— as opposed to treatment at some unknown
date and time—he was causing a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff.
B. 	Pain Medication and Altered Diet
In Plaintiff’s second recast complaint—as supplemented by his objections—he
alleges that Defendants refused to provide him necessary pain medication and an
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altered diet. 	2d Recast Compl. 11-12; Pl.’s Objs. 2. 	Regarding the pain medication,
the Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. 	Plaintiff
admits that while he was in administrative segregation, pill-call nurses came by twice
a day and he saw Bradford multiple times during the week. 	Pl.’s Dep. 31:5-23, 66:4-
19. 	This was in addition to Plaintiff’s consultations at ASMP. 	Id. at 59:16-18.
Thus, Williams and Brown could not be faulted for trusting these medical providers
to prescribe any necessary pain medication, and their failure to intervene does not
constitute “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law.”9 	Wade, 106 F.4th
at 1262.
The Court reaches a different conclusion as to the altered diet. 	Defendants
do not address this claim in their brief, though in their declarations, they both state
that they had no authority to “place inmates on special diets for medical conditions.”
Williams. Decl. ¶ 6; Brown Decl. ¶ 5 ECF Nos. 92-7, 95-2. 	However, Plaintiff’s claim
is not that they deprived him of a medically prescribed diet. 	He admitted in his
deposition that neither had the authority to place him on a prescription diet. 	Pl.’s
Dep. 32:10-11, 17-19. 	His allegation is not that he needed a special diet as far as
calories, sodium, nutrients, etc. 	His claim is much more basic. 	He alleges that due
to his broken jaw, he literally could not chew his food. 	Pl.’s Objs. 2; Pl.’s Dep. 11:10-
12, 31:18-21. 	According to Plaintiff, both Williams and Brown could make the
“command decision” to give him a different tray, including soft diet tray, and that he
9 Further, although neither Defendant cites it as a reason for not giving Plaintiff over-the-counter
pain medication, Plaintiff admitted in his deposition that he had in the past taken too many pills while
in custody. 	Pl.’s Dep. 34:6-11.
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had seen them do that on other occasions. 	Pl.’s Dep. 32:8-33:12. 	Neither Defendant
has submitted evidence to refute this allegation 	Thus, the undisputed evidence as
it stands shows that despite knowing that Plaintiff could not chew his food,
Defendants refused to provide him with an altered food tray that Plaintiff could eat
with his broken jaw. 	A jury could conclude that this refusal constitutes deliberate
indifference.
C. 	Dental Treatment
Brown does not specifically address Plaintiff’s allegation that she refused to
escort him to an appointment to get a mold casting for dentures because he would not
“get naked” in front of her. 	Pl.’s Objs. 3-4; Pl.’s Dep. 39:10-40:11. 	Instead, she
denies generally ever preventing Plaintiff from receiving medical care or being aware
of 	him 	missing 	or 	being 	denied 	such 	treatment. 	Brown 	Decl. 	¶¶ 	16, 	18.
Nevertheless, even assuming the incident occurred, Plaintiff cannot show that Brown
“was actually, subjectively aware” that her “conduct caused a substantial risk of
serious harm to [Plaintiff].” 	Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262. 	According to Plaintiff’s
allegations, the appointment at issue was not away from the prison but at the
“Facility Dental Office.” 	Pl.’s Objs. 3. 	Further, the purpose of the appointment was
simply to get fitted for dentures. 	Pl.’s Dep. 40:20-21. 	Thus, while Brown’s
conduct—if it occurred as alleged—may have been reprehensible, the evidence does
not support her being aware that causing Plaintiff to miss this one visit to the prison
dentist office would cause a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff.10
10 At the time of Plaintiff’s deposition, he had still not received the casting for dentures. 	Pl.’s Dep.
40:22-23. 	Plaintiff offers no explanation as to why he could not have gotten fitted for the dentures at
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D. 	Qualified Immunity
1. 	Qualified immunity standard
“[Q]ualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued
in their individual capacities as long as their conduct violates no clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 904 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). 	A
defendant seeking qualified immunity must show that, at the time of the alleged
wrongful acts, “he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority.” 	Id. at
905. 	Once this is established, “the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that
the grant of qualified immunity is inappropriate.” 	Id. 	To do so, a plaintiff must
“demonstrate: first, that the facts when viewed in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff establish a constitutional violation; and, second, that the illegality of the
officer’s actions was clearly established at the time of the incident.” 	Id. 	(quotation
marks omitted). 	Here, there is no dispute that Defendant was acting in the scope of
his discretionary authority.
2. 	Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity
Defendants 	argue 	that 	they 	are 	entitled 	to 	qualified immunity 	because
Plaintiff cannot show that they violated his constitutional rights. 	Defs.’ Br. in Supp.
of Mot. for Summ. J. 12. 	However, as discussed above, the Court concludes that
there is an issue of fact as to whether Defendants violated Plaintiff’s constitutional
another time, considering the dental office was at the prison. 	Plaintiff identified only this single
occasion as one where Brown caused him to miss an appointment. 	Id. at 39:10-40:11.
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rights by not authorizing surgery and by refusing to provide him with an altered diet.
Defendants do not address the clearly-established prong of the qualified
immunity analysis. 	Nevertheless, it was clearly established at the time of the events
in this case that deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs was
illegal. 	Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1232 (11th Cir. 2016) (“And it is clearly
established that a delay in treatment which results in additional pain and suffering
constitutes deliberate indifference.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Wade, 106
F.4th at 1255; Harris v. Coweta Cnty., 21 F.3d 388, 393 (11th Cir. 1994) (“It is well
settled that prison officials’ deliberate indifference to prisoners’ serious medical needs
gives rise to a constitutional claim.”); Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1538 (11th
Cir. 1990) (“[A]n unexplained delay of hours in treating a serious injury states a
prima facie case of deliberate indifference.”); Taylor v. Blue, 824 F. App’x 994, 995
(11th Cir. 2020) (“It is also well established that a ‘few hours’ delay’ in treating serious
and painful injuries like broken bones may amount to deliberate indifference.”
(quoting Harris, 21 F.3d at 394)); Brown v. Thompson, 868 F. Supp. 326, 330 (S.D.
Ga. 1994) (“Denial of food and medical attention are, prima facie, clearly established
violations 	of 	the 	Eighth 	Amendment.” 	(collecting 	cases)). 	Consequently,
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity should be
denied as to the two surviving claims.
SUMMARY
In summary, the Court concludes that there are genuine issues of material fact
on Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants’ refusal to authorize surgery and to provide an
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altered diet constituted deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in violation
of the Eighth Amendment.11 	On Plaintiff’s remaining claims, the Court agrees that
he has failed “to go beyond the pleadings to establish that there is a genuine issue for
trial,” and therefore recommends that Defendants be granted summary judgment on
those claims. 	Whitehead, 979 F.3d at 1328 (quotation marks omitted)
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, it is recommended that Defendants Brown
and Williams’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 92) be GRANTED IN PART
AND DENIED IN PART. 	Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve
and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to
file objections, within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy hereof.
Any objection should be no longer than TWENTY (20) PAGES in length. 	The district
judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation
to which objection is made. 	All other portions of the Recommendation may be
reviewed for clear error.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1,
“[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations
11 Defendants cite a single sentence from Plaintiff’s deposition to suggest that he admitted that
Defendants did not act with deliberate indifference. 	Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 11. 	The
testimony at issue came in response to questions about whether Plaintiff was able to see medical
providers while in administrative segregation and whether he was ever denied a sick call request form
for such appointment. 	Pl.’s Dep. 34:20-35:13. 	Plaintiff explained that there were such occasions but
attributed it to understaffing and forgetfulness. 	Id. at 35:15-36:8. 	He then stated, “I don’t believe
any people that were involved in this were of malicious intent.” 	Id. at 36:11-13. 	Plaintiff never
mentions Defendants in this exchange, and in context, it is clear that Plaintiff was only referring to
sick calls for appointments at ASP. 	He has never alleged a problem with seeing ASP medical
providers while in administrative segregation, and as discussed herein, admits seeing Bradford on
multiple occasions.
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contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order
based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the
time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. 	In the
absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error
if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED, this 14th day of November, 2025.
s/ Amelia G. Helmick
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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