Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No.: 25-cv-25325-JB
LY NGUYEN,
Petitioner,
v.
CHARLES PARRA, in his official capacity as
Assistant Field Office Director, Krome North
Service Processing Center, et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________________________/
ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Petitioner Ly Nguyen’s Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”). ECF No. [1]. On November 18, 2025, this
Court entered an Order to Show Cause, requiring the Respondents to file a response
to the Petition by no later than November 21, 2025. 	ECF No. [6]. 	On Friday,
November 21, 2025, Respondents filed a Response to the Court’s Order to Show
Cause, ECF No. [17], along with audio recordings which were conventionally filed
with the Clerk of Court in Miami, Florida, ECF No. [13].1 	Petitioner filed a Reply,
ECF No. [18], along with a record of Petitioner’s Removal Proceedings under seal,
ECF No. [14]. 	Upon due consideration of the parties’ submissions, the pertinent
portions of the record, and the applicable law, for the reasons explained below, the
Petition is GRANTED IN PART.
1 The Court notes that the recordings submitted were not clearly audible.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Vietnam who has resided in the United States in
March 2023. ECF No. [1] at ¶ 41. At the time of his initial encounter with Customs
and Border Protection (“CBP”), CBP released Petitioner on his own recognizance “[i]n
accordance with section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act [codified at 8
U.S.C. ¶ 1226].” ECF No. [17-4] at 1. 	On March 26, 2025, the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), charging Petitioner
with inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”) as “an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or
paroled,” and thereby initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner under 8
U.S.C. § 1229(a). ECF No. [17-3] at 1.
On September 16, 2025, DHS issued a Warrant for Arrest of Alien authorizing
immigration officers to arrest and take into custody for removal proceedings under
sections 236 and 287 of the INA. 	ECF No. [17-5]. 	The same day, Petitioner was
arrested at his United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) check-
in appointment in Miramar, Florida. ECF No. [1] at ¶ 43. Petitioner has since been
detained at Krome. Id.
Following his arrest and detainment at Krome, ICE issued a Form I-286, or
“Notice of Custody Determination” to continue Petitioner’s detention without an
opportunity to post bond or be released on other conditions pursuant to section 236.
ECF No. [17-6]. On October 23, 2025, Petitioner appeared with counsel and with the
assistance of an interpreter in a hearing regarding his removal proceedings. See ECF
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No. [13]. Another hearing was set before the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(“EOIR”) for November 19, 2025, to allow counsel to prepare. 	Id. 	At the November
19, 2025, hearing, Petitioner again appeared with counsel and with the assistance of
an interpreter, and requested that the matter be reset for an additional hearing on
December 22, 2025, at 9:00 a.m. to allow for his new counsel to prepare. Id.
On November 20, 2025, the day prior to filing its Response, ICE cancelled the
Form 	I-286 	as 	“improvidently 	issued,” because 	Petitioner 	“is 	an 	applicant 	for
admission detained pursuant to INA § 235(b)(2)(A)”. ECF No. [17-2] at ¶ 15.
On November 14, 2025, Petitioner filed the instant Petition. 	ECF No. [1].
Petitioner raises a total of three claims. See generally id. at 11–15. Count I alleges
that Petitioner’s continued detention contravenes the INA because the mandatory
detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) was improperly applied to him, as a
person who previously entered the United States and was residing in the country
before being placed in removal proceedings. Id. at ¶¶49–51. Count II alleges that 8
U.S.C. § 1226 should instead apply to individuals like Petitioner, and that the
application of § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner unlawfully mandates his continues detention
and violated 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19. Id. at ¶¶ 52–59. Lastly, Count
III 	alleges 	that 	the 	government’s 	detention 	of 	petitioner 	without 	a 	bond
redetermination hearing to determine whether he is a flight risk or a danger to others
violates his right to due process. 	Id. at ¶¶ 56–60. Petitioner requests that this Court
issue an Order that (i) issues a Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring that Respondents
release Petitioner or, (ii) in the alternative, provide Petitioner with a bond hearing
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pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days, and (iii) declare Petitioner’s
detention unlawful. To date, Petitioner has not requested a custody redetermination
hearing (“bond hearing”) before EOIR. See ECF No. [17] at 3.
II. 	ANALYSIS
District courts have the authority to grant writs of habeas corpus. 	See 28
U.S.C. § 2241(a). Habeas corpus is fundamentally “a remedy for unlawful executive
detention.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (citation omitted). A writ may
be issued to a petitioner who shows that he is being held in custody in violation of the
Constitution or federal law. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 	The Court’s jurisdiction
extends to challenges involving immigration detention. 	See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
A. Petitioner’s Detention Is Governed By 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), Not 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)
Respondents contend that Petitioner’s entry into the United States without
inspection or admission renders him an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C.
section 1225(b)(2)(A), which makes him subject to mandatory detention and does not
compel his release or a bond hearing. 	ECF No. [17] at 2. 	Petitioner asserts that 8
U.S.C. § 1225 is being incorrectly applied, and that his detention is governed by 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a), which allows for the release of noncitizens on bond. 	ECF Nos. [1]
at ¶ 50, [18] at 2. The Court examines each of these statutes in turn, and concludes
that § 1226(a) applies to Petitioner.
i. 	8 U.S.C. § 1225
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Section 1225 governs the inspection, detention, and removal of applicants for
admission. 	See 8 U.S.C. § 1225 et seq. 	Applicants for admission are defined as
noncitizens “present in the United States who ha[ve] not been admitted” or those
“arriv[ing] in the United States.” Id. All applicants for admission “must be inspected
by immigration officers to ensure that they may be admitted into the country
consistent with U.S. immigration law.” 	Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287
(2018).2 	To that end, “U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain
certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2).” Id.
at 289 (emphasis added).
“Section 1225(b)(1) applies to all aliens initially determined to be inadmissible
due 	to 	fraud, 	misrepresentation, 	or 	lack 	of 	valid 	documentation.” 	Id. 	Such
noncitizens are generally subject to expedited removal “without further hearing or
review.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). However, if the noncitizen expresses “an intention to
apply for asylum” or a fear of persecution,” the statute requires referral to an
interview with an immigration officer. 	Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). 	If the immigration
officer 	finds 	a 	“credible 	fear,” 	the 	noncitizen 	“shall 	be 	detained 	for 	further
consideration of the application for asylum.” Id.
On the other hand, “Section 1225(b)(2) is broader” and “serves as a catchall
provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1).”
2 Indeed, Jennings began its analysis by emphasizing the temporal and categorical
distinction between the detention statutes. Section 1225 applies to noncitizens who
are “seeking admission into the country” at the border or a port of entry, whereas
section 1226 governs those “already in the country pending the outcome of removal
proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 285–89.
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Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. 	Noncitizens covered under § 1225(b)(2) are detained for
removal proceedings “if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien
seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted” into the
country. 	8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 	Importantly, detention under § 1225(b)(2) is
mandatory. See Gomes v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-11571, 2025 WL 1869299, at *8 (D. Mass.
July 7, 2025).
ii. 	8 U.S.C. § 1226
Federal immigration law “also authorizes the Government to detain certain
aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” Jennings,
583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added). Section 1226(a) provides that when a noncitizen
has been “arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be
removed from the United States,” the Attorney General may either continue to detain
the individual or release them on bond or conditional release. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
The statute thus “establishes a discretionary detention framework.” Gomes, 2025 WL
1869299, at *2. Importantly for purposes of the instant action, “[f]ederal regulations
provide that aliens detained under [section] 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the
outset of detention.” 	Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1),
1236.1(d)(1)); see also Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25-Civ-5937, 2025 WL 2371588,
at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025) (“To be sure, a noncitizen detained under [section]
1226(a) is undoubtedly entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge.”).
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iii. 	Petitioner’s Detention Is Governed By 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), Not
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)
The 	question 	of 	whether 	section 	1225(b)(2) 	or 	section 	1226(a) 	governs
Petitioner’s detention is a question of statutory interpretation squarely within the
Court’s jurisdiction. 	Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425,
at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 9, 2025) (noting that the interplay of these two sections is a
matter “of statutory interpretation belong[ing] historically within the province of the
courts.”) (citing Loper Bright Enter. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 386 (2024)); Barrios
v. Shepley, No. 25-cv-00406, 2025 WL 2772579, at *5 (D. Me. Sept. 25, 2025) (district
court had jurisdiction to review petitioner’s challenge to the “statutory framework”
regarding his detention); see Gomes, 2025 WL 1869299, at *8 n.9 (“Courts must
exercise independent judgment in determining the meaning of statutory provisions”);
Mosqueda, 2025 WL 2591530, at *7 (district court had jurisdiction to decide whether
§ 	1225 	or 	§ 	1226 	applied 	as 	“[t]hese 	are 	purely 	legal 	questions 	of 	statutory
interpretation.”).
From the outset of Petitioner’s case, both CBP and DHS proceeded under
section 1226. 	Specifically, CBP’s Order of Release on Recognizance stated that
Petitioner was being released on his own recognizance “[i]n accordance with section
236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act,” codified at section 1226. ECF No. [17-
4]. 	Additionally, the NTA that DHS issued to Petitioner did not classify him as an
“arriving alien.” 	ECF No. [17-3]. 	Instead, the NTA charged him as “present in the
United States without admission or parole.” 	Id. 	This classification places him
squarely within section 1226. 	See e.g., Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *8
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(emphasizing ICE’s selection of “present” rather than “arriving” on the NTA as
evidence that § 1226 applied); see also Hyppolite v. Noem, No. 25-4304, 2025 WL
2829511, *8 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025) (respondent’s initial classification of petitioner
“certainly is relevant to the Court's assessment of the credibility and good faith of
‘Respondents’ new position as to the basis for [Hyppolite’s] detention, which was
adopted post hoc and raised for the first time in this litigation.’”) (citation omitted);
Perez v. Berg, No. 25-cv-494, 2025 WL 2531566, at *2 (D. Neb. July 24, 2025) (“The
Court notes that the government itself charged Petitioner as an alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or paroled rather than an arriving alien.”)
(quotations omitted).
B. Petitioner is Entitled to a Bond Hearing Under Section 1226(a)
Since Petitioner’s detention is governed by section 1226(a), he is entitled to an
individualized bond hearing before an Immigration Judge.3
As discussed above, both CBP and DHS have proceeded with Petitioner’s case
under section 236 of the INA, which is codified at section 1226. See ECF Nos. [17-3]
and [17-4]. Section 236.1(d)(1) of the INA gives a detainee the right to seek review of
a custody decision before an Immigration Judge. 	8 C.F.R. § 236.1(s)(1); see also
Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *7 (“Decades of consistent agency practice also
support 	[petitioner’s] 	entitlement 	to 	a 	bond 	redetermination 	hearing 	under 	§
3 Although a bond hearing has not been held, the Court notes that Respondent
concedes that Petitioner is being detained under section 1225, and has not argued
that Petitioner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
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1226(a)”). 	Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing in accordance with
the INA.
Accordingly, Counts I and II of the Petition are meritorious, and Petitioner is
entitled to relief thereon.
C. Petitioner’s Due Process Claim
The Court declines to reach the merits of Petitioner’s due process claims raised
in Count III of the Petition, as it is granting the relief he seeks in Counts I and II.
See, e.g., Puga v. Assistant Field Office Dir., Krome N. Serv. Processing Ctr., No. 25-
24535-CIV, 2025 WL 2938369, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2025) (declining to reach the
merits of the petitioner’s due process claim because it granted the requested relief in
another count, but allowing the due process claim to be reasserted if the respondents
do not comply with the court’s order to provide a bond hearing or release); Pizarro
Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *8. Should Respondents fail to comply with this Order
by providing Petitioner a bond hearing consistent with section 1226(a), Petitioner
may renew his due process claim. Given that Count III is an unripe claim contingent
on Petitioner not receiving a custody determination hearing under section 1226(a),
“the Court must dismiss it without prejudice[.]” Babilla v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 20-
cv-1434, 2020 WL 6870610, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2020) (citations omitted); see
also Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (“A claim is not ripe for
adjudication if it rests upon ‘contingent future events that may not occur as
anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all[.]’” (alteration added; quoting Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580–81 (1985)).
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III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as
follows:
1. 	Petitioner Ly Nguyen’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. [1],
is GRANTED IN PART. The Court has determined that Petitioner falls under 8
U.S.C. 	§ 	1226(a), 	and 	accordingly, 	Respondents 	shall 	afford 	Petitioner 	an
individualized bond hearing consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or otherwise release
Petitioner.
2. 	Count III of the Petition is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
3. 	The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida this 1st day of December, 2025.
_______________________________________
JACQUELINE BECERRA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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