USA v. Michael Anthony Abbott

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 24-cr-20098-BLOOM/Elfenbein
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL ANTHONY ABBOTT,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
ORDER DENYING BOND PENDING APPEAL
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant Michael Anthony Abbott’s Motion
for Stay of Surrender Pending Appeal (“Motion”), ECF No. [169], filed on November 7, 2025.
The Government filed a Response, ECF No. [173], to which Defendant filed a Reply. ECF No.
[175]. 	The 	Court 	has 	considered 	the 	Motion, 	the 	record, 	the 	supporting 	and 	opposing
submissions, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, the
Motion is denied.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On July 2, 2025, after a three-day trial, the jury found Defendant Michael Anthony
Abbott guilty as to Count I of the Superseding Indictment: “knowing[] transmi[ssion] in
interstate commerce any communication containing a threat to injure the person of another . . .
with the intent to communicate a threat and with the knowledge that it would be viewed as a
threat,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). ECF No. [134]. Following the jury’s verdict,
Defendant filed a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, ECF No. [147], and a Motion for New
Trial, ECF No. [148], both of which the Court denied. ECF No. [158]. On October 22, 2025, the
Court sentenced Defendant to ten months imprisonment followed by three years of supervised
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release. ECF No. [163]. 	On November 3, 2025, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal. ECF No.
[166]. On November 10, 2025, the Court granted Defendant’s Unopposed Motion to Stay
Surrender pending the resolution of the instant Motion. ECF No. [171].
Defendant filed the instant Motion, arguing that the Court should allow him to remain out
on bond pending appeal, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3143(b) and 3145(c), because he presents no
risk of flight or danger to the community, the appeal raises substantial questions of law and fact
that are likely to result in reversal, a new trial, or a substantially reduced sentence, and the appeal
is not for the purpose of delay. ECF No. [169]. Defendant argues the appeal raises four
substantial questions of law or fact: (1) whether, as a matter of law, a conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 875(c) can stand “where the government secured a verdict only by substituting a different
meaning for the undisputed plain meaning of the defendant’s words . . . and by severing the
statement from its self-defense context”; (2) whether a conviction under Section 875(c) can stand
“where the Government relied solely on the tone of the message and the reaction of a single third
party—contrary 	to 	Elonis 	and 	Counterman—while 	disregarding 	evidence 	establishing 	a
reasonable, court-validated belief in lawful self-defense . . . 	all of which by definition negates
any intent to commit unlawful violence”; (3) whether the Court erred in instructing the jury “that
a ‘conditional threat’ could be a true threat, where the only condition present was lawful self-
defense, which was the theory of defense, effectively nullifying that defense and permitting
conviction for speech that, as a matter of law, could not reflect an intent to commit unlawful
violence”; (4) “whether the Court erred in refusing to apply the four-level reduction under
U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(6).” Id.
In its Response, the Government argues (1) Defendant is subject to 18 U.S.C. §
3143(b)(2), not (b)(1), because he was convicted of a crime of violence; (2) Defendant cannot
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meet Section 3145(c)’s exceptional circumstances test; and (3) in the alternative, Defendant
cannot show a substantial question of fact or law likely to result in reversal, an order for a new
trial, or a non-incarcerative sentence. ECF No. [173]. In his Reply, Defendant argues that Section
3143(b)(1) applies, and Defendant has raised substantial issues on appeal. ECF No. [175].
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Section 3143(b) details two standards that the Court must apply when evaluating whether
a defendant should be subject to release or detention pending appeal by the defendant, depending
on the offense of which the defendant has been found guilty. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b). Subparagraph
(1) of Section 3143(b) states:
Except as provided in paragraph (2), the judicial officer shall order that a person
who has been found guilty of an offense and sentenced to a term of imprisonment,
and who has filed an appeal or a petition for a writ of certiorari, be detained,
unless the judicial officer finds—
(A) by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a
danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released
under section 3142(b) or (c) of this title; and
(B) that the appeal is not for the purpose of delay and raises a substantial question
of law or fact likely to result in—
(i) reversal,
(ii) an order for a new trial,
(iii) a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment, or
(iv) a reduced sentence to a term of imprisonment less than the total of the
time already served plus the expected duration of the appeal process.
If the judicial officer makes such findings, such judicial officer shall order the
release of the person in accordance with section 3142(b) or (c) of this title, except
that in the circumstance described in subparagraph (B)(iv) of this paragraph, the
judicial officer shall order the detention terminated at the expiration of the likely
reduced sentence.
18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1).
If, however, a person “has been found guilty of an offense in a case described in
subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of subsection (f)(1) of section 3142 and sentenced to a term of
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imprisonment, and who has filed an appeal or a petition for a writ of certiorari,” the Court “shall
order that . . . person . . . be detained.” Id. § 3143(b)(2). Relevant here, Section 3142(f)(1)(A)
includes cases that involve “a crime of violence, a violation of section 1591, or an offense listed
in section 2332b(g)(5)(B) for which a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more is
prescribed[.]” Id. § 3142(f)(1)(A). Additionally, a person subject to detention under Section
3143(b)(2) “who meets the conditions of release set forth in section 3143(a)(1)1 or (b)(1), may be
ordered released, under appropriate conditions . . . 	if it is clearly shown that there are
exceptional reasons why such person’s detention would not be appropriate.” Id. § 3145(c).
III. 	DISCUSSION
The parties disagree as to whether Defendant’s crime of conviction—18 U.S.C. §
875(c)—requires that his Motion be analyzed under the more lenient 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1)
standard 	or 	the 	more 	stringent 	“exceptional 	reasons” 	standard 	under 	Section 	3145(c).
Specifically, Defendant argues that Section 875(c) is not a crime of violence, as described in
Section 3142(f)(1)(A) and, even if it were, it does not prescribe “a maximum term of
imprisonment of 10 years or more.” ECF No. [175] at 1. Although the Government argues that
the “maximum term of imprisonment” qualifier does not apply to crimes of violence under
Section 3142(f)(1)(A), it recognizes that courts have split on the issue. ECF No. [173] at 5 & n.1
(citing cases). Without binding caselaw from the Eleventh Circuit, the Court need not decide the
question because, as discussed below, Defendant has failed to demonstrate that his appeal raises
a substantial question of law or fact, which would be required regardless of whether the Section
3143(b)(1) or Section 3145(c) standard applied.2
1 Defendant does not argue that he has met the conditions of release set forth in Section
3143(a)(1).
2 Defendant also has not pointed to any “exceptional reasons” as to why his “detention would not
be appropriate.” 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c). Defendant argues in his Reply that “[c]ourts routinely find
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Whether a question is “substantial” for purposes of Section 3143(b)(1)(B) 	“must 	be
determined on a case-by-case basis.” United States v. Giancola, 754 F.2d 898, 901 (11th Cir.
1985). A “‘substantial question’ is one of more substance than would be necessary to a finding
that it was not frivolous. It is a ‘close’ question or one that very well could be decided the other
way.” Id.
First, Defendant argues that the appeal raises the following substantial question:
whether, as a matter of law, a conviction under § 875(c) can stand where the
government secured a verdict only by substituting a different meaning for the
undisputed plain meaning of the defendant’s words (relabeling ‘onsite’ as ‘on
sight’) and by severing the statement from its self-defense context?
ECF No. [169] at 5.
Defendant argues that the Government’s theory “relied entirely on isolating a single line
(‘I will shoot onsite: Plescow, Pino Perez, Andrew Steele, and Garcia’) from the broader email
chain[.]” Id. However, as the Government notes, “the jury ‘is free to choose among the
constructions of the evidence.’” ECF No. [173] at 8 (quoting United States v. McDowell, 250
F.3d 1354, 1365 (11th Cir. 2001)). Indeed, “Defendant told the jury his preferred meaning[,]” but
after considering all of the evidence “the jury rejected it.” Id. The jury had the opportunity to
consider all the emails in the chain that now Defendant argues were “excis[ed,] unambiguous
references to self-defense, all linked only to Georgia.” ECF No. [169] at 5. Although Defendant
was only indicted for the email “I will shoot onsite: Plescow, Pino Perez, Andrew Steele, and
Garcia”, the jury was presented with the context of the entire email chain and ultimately rejected
Defendant’s interpretation of the evidence. See ECF No. [140-2]. As the Court stated in its
exceptional circumstances where the legal questions on appeal are novel, weighty, and likely to
become controlling in future cases.” ECF No. [175] at 5. However, Defendant does not cite any
caselaw to support this proposition and, as discussed below, Defendant has failed to demonstrate
that his appeal raises any substantial questions of law or fact.
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Omnibus Order denying Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Motion for New
Trial:
Defendant did not state in the subject email that he would only shoot the named
officers “in self-defense.” He reaffirmed that he would shoot the officers in a
separate email 30 minutes later, stating “[g]oing forward: If encountered, in self
defense, I will shoot” the officers. ECF No. [140-2] at 1-2. Although Defendant
argues that this subsequent self-defense statement provides context to his intent,
Defendant also stated in the same email chain, “Ruby Ridge or Blue Ridge?” and
“[a] cop that abuses their power should be shot dead, if necessary.” Id.
ECF No. [158] at 9.
The Court concluded in its previous Order that “[a] reasonable jury could interpret those
statements as undermining any contention that Defendant intended only to engage in lawful self-
defense.” Id. at 10. To the extent Defendant argues that the Government “rewr[ote] the plain
meaning of ‘onsite,’” Defendant also notes that “the Government conceded at trial . . . that a
plain reading of ‘onsite’ referred to a site or place.” ECF No. [169] at 4. Even if a plain reading
of the indicted email yielded the conclusion that Defendant would shoot the officers “on site” in
Georgia, Defendant still has not presented a substantial question of law or fact because such an
interpretation would nonetheless satisfy the elements of Section 875(c). See ECF No. [158] at 8
(“[a]dding the buzz words ‘self-defense’ is not a ‘get-out-of-jail-free’ card for any threatening
statement.”) (quoting ECF No. [149] at 7).
Second, Defendant argues his appeal raises the following substantial question:
whether a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) can stand where the Government
relied solely on the tone of the message and the reaction of a single third party—
contrary to Elonis and Counterman—while disregarding evidence establishing a
reasonable, court-validated belief in lawful self-defense against the very people
who are the subject of the communication, had previously acted violently outside
their lawful duties, all of which by definition negates any intent to commit
unlawful violence.
ECF No. [169] at 6-7.
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Defendant argues that the Government did not present “proof that the defendant either
intended his words as a threat or knew they would be perceived as such[,]” but “relied instead on
an argument of moral blame, arguing that [Defendant] was angry, frustrated, or intemperate and
imposing the reaction of (primarily) one third party.” Id. at 5-6. 	In Response, the Government
notes that, “whether the Defendant had the requisite intent is a classic jury question.” ECF No.
[173] at 8 (citing Williams v. Obstfeld, 314 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2002)). The Government further
argues that, in order to establish Defendant’s subjective intent, the jury could have relied upon
(1) the Defendant’s obvious anger towards his victims; (2) his motive for his
anger; (3) his inability to recover civilly; (4) the Defendant’s status as a well-
educated professional; (5) the fact that he identified the victims by name; (6) the
fact that the threats were made years later after he could not obtain any other
recourse; (7) the fact that the threats were made to third parties (so the anticipated
victims would not be tipped off); (8) the identified method of intended force
(shooting) and (9) common sense to determine that the Defendant knew or
intended that his statement would be perceived as threatening.
Id.
In Reply, Defendant argues that the Government “asserts that the jury could infer intent
from anger, motive, and professional status, but none of these facts satisfies the mens rea
required under controlling law.” ECF No. [175] at 6. However, the Government argues that it
“did not rely solely on the tone—it advanced contextual evidence that the Defendant had a years-
long vendetta against the people he threatened.” ECF No. [173] at 8. Indeed, it is unclear how the
evidence presented by the Government fails to satisfy the mens rea required by Elonis v. United
States, 575 U.S. 723 (2015) and Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023). In Elonis, the
Supreme Court stated “[t]here is no dispute that the mental state requirement in Section 875(c) is
satisfied if the defendant transmits a communication for the purpose of issuing a threat or with
knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat.” 575 U.S. at 740. As the Court
stated in its previous Order:
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Defendant expressed his animosity toward both the threatened officers and the
individuals on the email chain. See ECF No. [140-2] at 2. (“Most of you are not
welcome to me [sic] homestead. For those not welcome, bring body bags.”).
These repeated and violent emails provided sufficient evidence upon which the
jury could have relied to find that the email in the Superseding Indictment was a
“serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence” to a group
of individuals. Black, 538 U.S. at 359.”
ECF No. [158] at 11.
To the extent Defendant argues that the jury could not rely upon “the reaction of a single
third party” to the email in order to establish that Defendant intended or knew the email would
be perceived as a true threat, he fails to explain why this evidence was insufficient. ECF No.
[169] at 6. As the Court stated in its previous order, “[t]he language of § 875(c) does not require
that the threat be made directly to the intended target; it simply prohibits ‘any threat to injure the
person of another’ made in interstate commerce.” ECF No. [158] at 6 (quoting United States v.
Morales, 272 F.3d 284, 288 (5th Cir. 2001)). The fact that Manny Fernandez’s reaction to
receiving the email “was to forward it to CGPD Chief Hudak demonstrates that he viewed it as a
threat.” Id. at 5. “The evidence supported that Defendant stated, ‘I will shoot onsite:’ and then
named four police officers with whom he had previously had negative interactions. It would
strain reason to suggest that those words were intended to communicate anything other than a
direct threat on their lives.” Id. at 6. Therefore, Defendant has not presented a substantial
question of law or fact.
Third, Defendant argues his appeal presents the following substantial question:
whether it was error to instruct the jury that a “conditional threat” could be a true
threat, where the only condition present was lawful self-defense, which was the
theory of defense, effectively nullifying that defense and permitting conviction for
speech that, as a matter of law, could not reflect an intent to commit unlawful
violence.
ECF No. [169] at 9.
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Defendant argues that “the conditional threat instruction, considered together with the
evidence and self-defense theory of defense, created a logical and legal inconsistency[]” because
“[t]he only condition present was self-defense, in Georgia no less.” Id. at 7. Defendant relies
upon the fact that a “true threat,” which is not protected by the First Amendment, is one in which
“the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence[.]” Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (emphasis added). Defendant
argues that because his “belief in the lawfulness of self-defense [was] not only sincere but legally
reasonable[,]” his email did not express an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence. ECF
No. [169] at 7.
In Response, the Government argues that “[t]he jury instruction did not say that all
conditional statements are true threats (which would contradict the statement that a valid self-
defense claim is not a true threat).” ECF No. [173] at 9. Indeed, it is unclear how “the
instructions allowed the jury to convict [Defendant] even if it believed that the condition attached
to the use of force was lawful[,]” ECF No. [175] at 6, as Defendant argues, given that the jury
was instructed that “[a] conditional threat can be a true threat. In other words, a threat to commit
violence unless a particular act is taken can be a true threat.” ECF No. [130] at 7 (emphases
added). The jury was also instructed that “[t]he law recognizes that self-defense is not unlawful
violence.” Id. Therefore, as the Government notes, “[i]f the jury believed that the defendant’s
conditional statement was a valid self-defense claim, they would have acquitted” because they
were instructed that a conditional threat can be a true threat, but self-defense is not unlawful
violence. ECF No. [173] at 9; ECF No. [130] at 7.
Furthermore, “Defendant fails to cite any caselaw to support his argument that merely
adding the phrase ‘in self defense’—in a separate email, 30 minutes later—to an otherwise
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obvious threat of violence is sufficient to insulate him from prosecution under Section 875(c).”
ECF No. [158] at 12 (citing ECF No. [140-2] at 1-2). Indeed, even if “the Miami-Dade State
Attorney’s Office had previously acknowledged that the state court in Mr. Abbott’s 2020 Stand-
Your-Ground hearing was poised to find that Officers Pino-Perez and Plescow were acting
outside their legal duties, and that the State dismissed the case to avoid an adverse ruling[,]” ECF
No. [169] at 7, as the Court stated previously, “this fact is insufficient to demonstrate that
Defendant believed that anytime an officer approached his home, he would be legally justified in
shooting them.” ECF No. [158] at 9. Furthermore, Defendant’s argument “cannot justify the
threat against Officer Garcia, ‘who was not present on the property in March 2020 at all[.]’” Id.
(quoting ECF No. [149] at 8). Because, as the Court previously concluded, both jury instructions
on conditional threats and self-defense were correct statements of law, Defendant has not raised
a substantial issue of law or fact. See id. at 17.
Fourth, Defendant argues his appeal presents the following substantial question:
whether the Court erred in refusing to apply the four-level reduction under
U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(6) by treating the line “I will shoot onsite, in self-defense”
within a single email chain as a second threat, even though the record established
one continuous, brief communication showing little or no deliberation, and where
the alleged “second threat” referred expressly to lawful self-defense which, by
definition and under Virginia v. Black, cannot constitute unlawful violence.
ECF No. [169] at 11.
Section 2A6.1(b)(6) of the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines provides for
a four-level reduction if “the offense involved a single instance evidencing little or no
deliberation[.]” 	Defendant 	argues 	that 	the 	December 	18, 	2022 	emails 	were 	“only 	one
communication: an email chain written over the course of a few hours . . . Nothing in the record
supports that [Defendant] engaged in multiple acts or a deliberative pattern of threats.” Id. at 9.
However, as the Government argues, the series of emails sent on December 18, 2022 “were sent
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seriatim, one after the other, not a single time with little or no deliberation.” ECF No. [173] at 9.
Indeed, the record reflects that Defendant sent several emails. At 8:12 pm on December 18,
2022, Defendant wrote “I am in Georgia. Most of you are not welcome to me homestead. For
those not welcome, bring body bags.” ECF No. [140-2] at 2. Seventeen minutes later, Defendant
wrote “Ruby Ridge3 or Blue Ridge?” Id. Nine minutes after that, Defendant sent the email for
which he was indicted: “I will shoot onsite: Plescow, Peno Perez, Andrew Steele, and Garcia.”
Id. Over the course of the next nineteen minutes, Defendant sent two non-threatening emails, in
which he stated that the individuals who he previously threatened to shoot “should be fired.” Id.
at 1-2. However, eleven minutes after stating those individuals should be fired, Defendant
resumed his threats, stating that “Going forward: If encountered, in self defense, I will shoot
Plescow, Pino Perez, a Steele, and/or Garcia.” Id. at 1. In total, thirty minutes elapsed between
the time Defendant sent the email for which he was indicted and “Going forward: If encountered,
in self defense, I will shoot Plescow, Pino Perez, a Steele, and/or Garcia.” Id. at 1-2. The passing
of thirty minutes—and the fact that Defendant sent two emails separate, non-threatening emails
before sending yet another threatening one—demonstrates that Defendant had sufficient time to
deliberate over his words. To the extent Defendant argues that the second email was not
threatening because he stated that he would shoot the officers “in self defense,” as stated above,
merely adding the phrase “in self defense” cannot absolve the Defendant of liability. Therefore,
Defendant has not presented a substantial question of law or fact.
Because Defendant has not set forth a substantial question of law or fact to be raised in
3 As the Court stated in its previous Order and “[a]s mentioned at trial, ‘Ruby Ridge’ likely
referred to an incident in August 1992 in which FBI agents and United States Marshals ‘engaged
in an 11-day standoff with self-proclaimed white separatist Randy Weaver, his family, and a
friend[,]’ which resulted in the death of Weaver’s wife, his son, and a U.S. Marshal. Ruby Ridge,
Brittanica.com, https://www.britannica.com/event/Ruby-Ridge (last updated Aug. 26, 2025).”
ECF No. [158] at 10 n.2.
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his appeal, he has not satisfied the requirements for release pending appeal under either 18
U.S.C. §§ 3143(b)(1)(B) or 3145(c).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. 	Defendant’s Motion for Stay of Surrender Pending Appeal, ECF No. [169], is
DENIED.
2. 	Defendant shall surrender to serve his sentence at the institution designated by the
Bureau of Prisons or, if not yet designated, to the U.S. Marshals Service for the
Southern District of Florida by 12:00 Noon on Friday, January 5, 2026.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida on December 4, 2025.
_________________________________
BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to: Counsel of Record
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