MICHELE SNYDER v. CARNIVAL CORPORATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 22-cv-22481-ALTMAN/Lett
MICHELE SNYDER,
Plaintiff,
v.
CARNIVAL CORPORATION,
Defendant.
__________________________________/
ORDER
Our Plaintiff, Michele Snyder, has filed a motion for partial summary judgment. See Plaintiff’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s MSJ”) [ECF No. 62]. Carnival Corporation, our
Defendant, then filed its own motion for summary judgment on all claims. See Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (“Def.’s MSJ”) [ECF No. 63]. We referred the cross-motions for summary
judgment to U.S. Magistrate Judge Enjoliqué A. Lett, see Order of Referral [ECF No. 75], who
recommended “that [the] Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be granted and
[the] Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be denied,” Report and Recommendation (“R&R”)
[ECF No. 83] at 1. Magistrate Judge Lett also cautioned the parties as follows:
Within 	fourteen 	days 	after 	being 	served 	with 	a 	copy 	of 	this 	Report 	and
Recommendation, any party may serve and file written objections to any of the above
findings and recommendations. The parties are hereby notified that a failure to timely
object waives the right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on
unobjected-to 	factual 	and 	legal 	conclusions 	contained 	in 	this 	Report 	and
Recommendation.
Id. at 10–11 (first citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); then citing S.D. FLA. M AG . R. 4(b); and then citing 11th
CIR . R. 3-1). Carnival timely objected, see Defendant’s Objections to the R&R (the “Objections”) [ECF
No. 84], and Snyder responded, see Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Amended
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Objections (“Response to Objections”) [ECF No. 85]. After careful review, we OVERRULE the
Defendant’s Objections and ADOPT Magistrate Judge Lett’s R&R in full.
T HE FACTS
“On August 7, 2021, Plaintiff Michele Snyder arrived outside the Port of Galveston Terminal
Building, located in Galveston, Texas,” Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts (“Carnival Facts”)
[ECF No. 63-1] ¶ 1, “planning to board the [Carnival] M/S ‘BREEZE,’” Plaintiff’s Statement of
Material Facts (“Snyder Facts”) [ECF No. 61] ¶ 2. After Snyder and her husband “dropped their
luggage off at the designated area[,]” the Snyders sat down on a nearby bench “for approximately 15
minutes” before proceeding to the Terminal’s door. Snyder Facts ¶¶ 5–7; see also Carnival Resp. to
Snyder Facts [ECF No. 66] ¶¶ 5–7 (not disputing these points). While walking towards the door,
Snyder “tripped and fell” on a stanchion in the walkway. Snyder Facts ¶ 8; see also Carnival Resp. to
Snyder Facts ¶ 8 (“Undisputed that Plaintiff tripped and fell.”). After her fall, “a nearby worker came
to her assistance.” Snyder Facts ¶ 10 (citing Michele Snyder Deposition (“Snyder Dep.”) [ECF No.
33-1] at 59:4–17); see also Carnival Resp. to Snyder Facts ¶ 10 (not disputing this point). Workers then
told Snyder that “they needed to get [her] onboard the ship to the medical center,” and “someone on
the ship then assisted her [a]board the ship.” Snyder Facts ¶ 11; Carnival Resp. to Snyder Facts ¶ 11
(“Undisputed that uniformed employee brought her aboard the ship on a wheelchair.”). Once Snyder
was in the ship’s medical center, “an onboard doctor took X-rays, and determined that [she] had
broken her wrist.” Snyder Facts ¶ 13 (citing Snyder Dep. at 72:9–25); see also Carnival Resp. to Snyder
Facts ¶ 13 (“Undisputed.”).
On August 5, 2022, Snyder sued Carnival, alleging one count of negligent maintenance, see
Compl. [ECF No. 1] ¶¶ 19–25 (Count I), and one count of negligent failure to warn, see id. ¶¶ 26–31
(Count II). At a hearing on September 5, 2024, we held that maritime law didn’t govern this action. See
September 5, 2025, Paperless Minutes [ECF No. 56]. Both sides have now moved for summary
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judgment. In her motion, Snyder asks us to grant “partial summary judgment in her favor, to the effect
that Carnival did control the area where she fell at the material time and therefore had a duty of
reasonable care to her under the facts of this case.” Pl.’s MSJ at 9 (emphasis omitted). Carnival, by
contrast, moves for summary judgment on three issues. First, Carnival believes that it had “no duty to
the Plaintiff outside the Terminal Building[.]” Def.’s MSJ at 2. Second, Carnival argues that, even if it
did owe Snyder a duty, “the broken stanchion was an open and obvious condition,” which Carnival
had “no duty to warn of or correct[.]” Id. at 15–16. Third, Carnival says that, even if the stanchion
wasn’t open and obvious, “Carnival had no notice of any risk creating condition outside the Terminal
Building[.]” Id. at 15.
Magistrate Judge Lett recommended that we grant Snyder’s MSJ and deny Carnival’s MSJ. See
R&R at 10 (“[T]he Court recommends that the District Court grant Plaintiff’s motion for partial
summary judgment and deny Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.” (emphases omitted)). As
to whether Carnival owed Snyder a duty of care,1 Magistrate Judge Lett found that Snyder was entitled
to summary judgment because “[t]he day of the incident was a cruise day, the incident location falls
squarely within Terminal Two, and Carnival therefore had a duty to provide reasonable care to protect
invitees onto the premises.” Id. at 7. Magistrate Judge Lett then concluded that summary judgment
wasn’t appropriate as to Carnival’s claims that “the broken stanchion was an open and obvious
condition,” Def.’s MSJ at 15–16, and that “Carnival had no notice of any risk creating condition
outside the Terminal Building,” id. at 15. On each of these issues, Magistrate Judge Lett determined
that “there are material facts that create an issue [of] fact[.]” R&R at 10. Carnival objected to all the
R&R’s findings, see generally Objections, and Snyder timely responded, see generally Response to
Objections.
1 Recall that both parties moved for summary judgment on this issue. See Pl.’s MSJ at 9; see also Def.’s
MSJ at 15–16.
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T HE LAW
When a party objects to a report and recommendation, “[t]he district judge must determine de
novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.” F ED . R. C IV . P.
72(b)(3). “A general objection, or one that merely restates the arguments previously presented, is not
sufficient to alert the court to alleged errors on the part of the magistrate judge. An objection that
does nothing more than state a disagreement with a magistrate’s suggested resolution, or simply summarizes
what has been presented before, is not an ‘objection’ as that term is used in this context.” VanDiver v. Martin,
304 F. Supp. 2d 934, 937–38 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (emphasis in original); cf. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140,
150 (1985) (“It does not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate
[judge]’s factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects
to those findings.”). “Objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation and report must be specific
and clear enough to permit the district court to effectively review the magistrate judge’s ruling.”
Knezevich v. Ptomey, 761 F. App’x 904, 906 (11th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). “Frivolous, conclusive, or
general objections need not be considered by the district court.” United States v. Tardon, 493 F. Supp.
3d 1188, 1209 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (Lenard, J.) (quoting Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1548 (11th Cir.
1988)). “If no objection or only [a] partial objection is made to the magistrate judge’s report, the district
judge reviews those unobjected portions for clear error.” Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App’x 781, 784
(11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999) (cleaned up)).2
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” F ED . R. CIV . P. 56(a). “By its very terms,
this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will
not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that
2 As we said, clear-error review is extremely deferential. Clear error is “more than just maybe or
probably wrong”; it’s error that “strike[s] us as wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated
dead fish.” Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988).
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there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986).
An issue of fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law. Id. at
248. A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence could lead a reasonable jury to find
for the non-moving party. See ibid.
At summary judgment, the moving party bears the initial burden of “showing the absence of
a genuine issue as to any material fact.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997);
see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (“[A] party seeking summary judgment always
bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying
those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.”). Once the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving
party to “come forward with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” See Bailey v. Allgas,
Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1243 (11th Cir. 2002) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
The Court, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “need consider only the cited
materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” FED . R. CIV . P. 56(c)(3); see also Green v.
Northport, 599 F. App’x 894, 895 (11th Cir. 2015) (“The district court could consider the record as a
whole to determine the undisputed facts on summary judgment.”); HRCC, Ltd. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int’l
(USA), Inc., 703 F. App’x 814, 817 (11th Cir. 2017) (noting that a “court may decide a motion for
summary judgment without undertaking an independent search of the record” (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56 advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment)). In any event, on summary judgment, the Court
must “review the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.” Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001).
“In sum, if there are any genuine issues of material fact, the Court must deny summary
judgment and proceed to trial.” Amaya v. Vilsack, 754 F. Supp. 3d 1311, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2024) (Altman,
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J.) (citing Whelan v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 2013 WL 5583970, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2013)
(Ungaro, J.)). On the other hand, we must grant summary judgment if a party “has failed to make a
sufficient showing on an essential element of her case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; see also Lima v. Fla.
Dep’t of Children & Families, 627 F. App’x 782, 785–86 (11th Cir. 2015) (“If no reasonable jury could
return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and
summary judgment will be granted.” (quoting Beal v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 20 F.3d 454, 459 (11th
Cir. 1994))).
ANALYSIS
As we’ve said, a party serving written objections to a report and recommendation must
“specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which
objection is made, the specific basis for such objections, and supporting legal authority.” S.D. FLA.
L. MAG. R. 4(B). Carnival’s Objections fail to comply with this simple requirement. In fact, although
Carnival advances several different objections to the R&R, its eight-page Objections include only one
case citation. And, as we explain below, that one case is a non-binding, unpublished decision that’s
easily distinguishable from ours. Put simply:
The law demands that lawyers present their clients’ cases with argument and citation. It
doesn’t—nor should it—permit lawyers to fling whatever arguments they might
conjure (however far-fetched or frivolous) at the judge in the hopes that, by a
prodigious use of a Westlaw account, that intrepid judge (and his smart law clerk)
might find the one case that stands in support of their proposition.
MY. P.I.I. LLC v. H&R Marine Eng’g, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1346 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (Altman, J.). In
the end, a “party objecting to a report and recommendation must cite ‘statutory, rule, or case authority,
in support of its position.’” Vital Pharms., Inc. v. Monster Energy Co., 2020 WL 2091996, at *8 n.11 (S.D.
Fla. May 1, 2020) (Altman, J.) (quoting S.D. F LA . L.R. 4(a)).
Here, Carnival “cited no relevant authority for its position—and its objection thus fails on that
basis alone.” Ibid.; see also United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1361 (11th Cir. 2009) (“It is reasonable
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to place upon the parties the duty to pinpoint those portions of the magistrate’s report that the district
court must specially consider. This rule facilitates the opportunity for district judges to spend more
time on matters actually contested and produces a result compatible with the purposes of the
Magistrates Act.”); Albrechtsen v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 309 F.3d 433, 436 (7th Cir. 2002)
(“Courts are entitled to assistance from counsel, and an invitation to search without guidance is no
more useful than a litigant’s request to a district court at the summary judgment stage to paw through
the assembled discovery material.”). Carnival seems to think it’s our job to find support for its
arguments. It’s not. See H&R Marine, 544 F. Supp. 3d at 1346; see also Inversiones YV3343, C.A. v. Lynx
FBO Fort Lauderdale, LLC, 2024 WL 2938805, at *5 (S.D. Fla. June 11, 2024) (Altman, J.) (“By failing
to identify any legal authority to support its negligence claim, Inversiones provides us with no way of
understanding the legal relevance of its proffered evidence.” (collecting cases)).
So, to the extent Carnival challenges Magistrate Judge Lett’s well-reasoned and supported legal
conclusions, we OVERRULE its Objections because Carnival wholly failed to support any of its
arguments 	with 	citations 	to 	relevant 	legal 	authorities. 	Nevertheless, 	and 	in 	the 	interest 	of
completeness, we’ll go through and reject each of Carnival’s arguments on the merits.
I. 	Duty of Care
First, Carnival objects to Magistrate Judge Lett’s “basis for concluding” that “a duty of care
exists on behalf of Carnival for the specific area where Plaintiff is alleged to have fallen.” Objections
at 2 (emphasis omitted). Magistrate Judge Lett found that, because “[t]he day of the incident was a
cruise day [and] the incident location falls squarely within Terminal Two,” Carnival “had a duty to
provide reasonable care to protect invitees onto the premises.” R&R at 7. The Magistrate Judge felt
this way for several reasons:
First, earlier in the litigation, Carnival admitted that the incident occurred in the terminal
building of Terminal Two. Second, the Diagrams provided the approximate location of the
accident and the Port of Galveston itself notes that the area falls within the purview of
Terminal Two. Further, the terms of the operating Agreement clearly and unequivocally detail
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responsibilities that Carnival had in maintaining the premises during cruise days, specifically
to keep Terminal Two free of debris in a safe, orderly and clean condition.
Ibid. (first citing Carnival Supp. Resp. Interrog. [ECF No. 33-2] No. [15];3 and then citing Plaintiff’s
Response to Def.’s MSJ (“Response to Def.’s MSJ”) [ECF No. 65] at 2–3); see also Objections at 2
(quoting the same section). Carnival objects to all three findings. Because Carnival and Snyder both
moved for summary judgment on the question of whether Carnival owed Snyder a duty of care,
Carnival’s objections apply both to Magistrate Judge Lett’s recommendation that we grant Snyder’s
MSJ and her recommendation that we deny this aspect of Carnival’s MSJ. See generally Objections.
As to Magistrate Judge Lett’s first finding, Carnival asserts that it “is simply incorrect” that
“Carnival admitted that the incident occurred in the terminal building of Terminal Two[.]” Id. at 2
(quoting R&R at 7). This objection is frivolous. True, Magistrate Judge Lett cited the wrong
interrogatory: Interrogatory fifteen, not eleven, contains Carnival’s admission. Compare Carnival Supp.
Resp. Interrog. No. 11 (“Carnival is not in possession of this information pertaining to the Terminal
Building.”), with id. No. 15 (admitting, in pertinent part, that “Plaintiff’s alleged incident occurred in
the Galveston Passenger Terminal Building 2 area on August 7, 2021 before the Plaintiff boarded the
Carnival Breeze for her cruise.”). But it’s an admission nonetheless.4 See CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Gen.
Mills, Inc., 2019 WL 2513793, at *3 (N.D. Ga. June 17, 2019) (Thrash, J.) (“[T]he Eleventh Circuit has
approved of the grant of summary judgment based upon a party’s admission of allegations in
pleadings.” (citing Galdames v. N & D Inv. Corp., 432 F. App’x 801, 804 (11th Cir. 2011) (concluding
3 The R&R miscites to Carnival Supp. Resp. Interrog. No. 11 when the correct record citation is
Carnival Supp. Resp. Interrog. No. 15.
4 Carnival didn’t bother to point out the incorrect citation. What’s more, Carnival supplemented its
interrogatory specifically for the purpose of admitting that the incident occurred in “Terminal Two” and
not just the “Galveston Passenger Terminal.” Compare Carnival Supp. Resp. Interrog. No. 15 (Non-
Supplemented Answer) (“Plaintiff’s incident occurred on August 7, 2021 in the Galveston Passenger
Terminal before the Plaintiff boarded the cruise.” (emphasis added)), with id. No. 15 (Supplemented
Response) (“Plaintiff’s alleged incident occurred in the Galveston Passenger Terminal Building 2 area on
August 7, 2021 before the Plaintiff boarded the Carnival Breeze for her cruise.” (emphasis added)).
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that a district court properly granted summary judgment based on admissions made in the defendant’s
answer))); see also Cooper v. Meridian Yachts, Ltd., 575 F.3d 1151, 1177–78 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[F]acts
judicially admitted are facts established not only beyond the need of evidence to prove them, but
beyond the power of evidence to controvert them.” (cleaned up)). It’s Carnival, in short, that “is simply
incorrect.” Objections at 2.
In any event, Carnival provides no record citations or legal support for this objection. As we’ve
said: “To properly raise an argument, a litigant must support the argument with factual and legal
authority.” Turk Hava Yollari Anonim Ortakligi v. Erkilic, 2025 WL 1295060, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 23,
2025) (Williams, J.); see also Inversiones, 2024 WL 2938805, at *5 (“Indeed, courts in our District routinely
refuse to entertain arguments that ignore our Local Rules by failing to ‘incorporate a memorandum
of law citing supporting authorities.’” (cleaned up) (quoting S.D. F LA. L.R. 7.1(a)(1))); see, e.g., Brown v. NCL
(Bah.) Ltd., 2016 WL 8716482, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2016) (Lenard, J.) (denying summary judgment
where the plaintiff simply “restates the facts and, without citation to legal authority, suggests that the
facts entitle her to summary judgment” (cleaned up)); Belony v. Amtrust Bank, 2011 WL 2297669, at *2
(S.D. Fla. June 8, 2011) (Marra, J.) (“Defendant’s failure to cite any authority for this principle makes
it difficult for the Court to rule in its favor . . . [and] is itself a basis to deny its motion.”). “If the
Magistrate Judge did, in fact, incorrectly rely on [the] evidence, [Carnival] could easily have identified
those errors by referring to the R&R’s citations and checking Magistrate Judge [Lett’s] work. But
[Carnival] hasn’t done that.” Clear Spring Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Wello & Mom, LLC, 768 F. Supp. 3d 1360,
1369 (S.D. Fla. 2025) (Altman, J.). Instead, Carnival simply gestured at what the Plaintiff (allegedly)
didn’t say in her deposition (again, with no pin cites or quotations): “No one,” Carnival says, “including
the Snyders, has testified that the incident occurred inside the building. Although the plaintiff has been
inconsistent on the location of the alleged fall, at no time did she testify or allege in a pleading that the
fall happened inside the building.” Objections at 2 (emphasis omitted). But we have no idea what
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Snyder said (or didn’t say) at her deposition because Carnival elected not to cite that deposition (or
anything else).
What we do have in the record is Carnival’s admission. “Answers to interrogatories are a form
of evidence that may be used as evidence at summary judgment.” Hamner v. Tuscaloosa Cnty. Sch. Sys.,
2021 WL 615203, at *2 n.4 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 17, 2021) (Coogler, J.) (citing F ED . R. CIV . P. 56(c)(1)(A)).
And Carnival fails to identify any evidence in the record that contradicts its admission. See S.D. F LA .
L. M AG . R. 4(B) (requiring that objections state “the specific basis for such objections, and supporting
legal authority”). That absence of evidence is fatal to its claim. See Breaux v. NCL (Bah.) Ltd., 2022 WL
2304254, at *8 (S.D. Fla. June 24, 2022) (Altman, J.) (“No evidence (it goes without saying) isn’t enough
to withstand summary judgment.”); Wills v. Walmart Assocs., Inc., 592 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1220 n.6 (S.D.
Fla. Mar. 22, 2022) (Altman, J.) (“[S]peculation isn’t enough to survive summary judgment.”); Harrell
v. City of Opa-Locka, 2022 WL 898565, at *20 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2022) (Altman, J.) (“[A]t summary
judgment, a plaintiff must produce evidence to support her contention[s.]”); Nat’l Health Fin. DM, LLC
v. Sea Spine Orthopedic Inst., LLC, 2022 WL 2065045, at *8 (S.D. Fla. June 8, 2022) (Altman, J.) (“And
no evidence isn’t enough to survive summary judgment.”).
We therefore overrule Carnival’s objection to Magistrate Judge Lett’s finding that “Carnival
admitted that the incident occurred in the terminal building of Terminal Two.” R&R at 7.
Carnival next objects to Magistrate Judge Lett’s conclusion that “the Diagrams provided the
approximate location of the accident and the Port of Galveston itself notes that the area falls within
the purview of Terminal Two.” Ibid. (citing Response to Def.’s MSJ at 2–3). As Carnival sees it, “the
diagram has a mark of the approximate location of the incident and is labeled ‘Terminal Building Two’,
this is inapposite of the questions raised in the summary judgment filed by Plaintiff and in the response
memorandum of law.” Objections at 3. And, Carnival says, “[t]he title of the document is Cruise
Terminal Two but the location is clearly marked outside of the buildings and what appears to be a
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walkway.” Ibid. “This,” Carnival contends, “is consistent with [Snyder’s] testimony as to where the
incident occurred which clearly states that it was outside of the building.” Ibid. But (again) Carnival
doesn’t cite to Snyder’s (or anyone else’s) deposition and doesn’t offer any citations or supporting
authority for its argument. And, while Carnival references multiple diagrams, it only identifies one of
those in passing—and without any pin cite at all. See id. at 3 (“One of the diagrams is attached to the
Magistrate’s ruling” (citing the R&R generally)). Carnival’s “objection amounts to no more than a
disagreement, which, as stated, is insufficient to overturn the well-reasoned decision of the Magistrate
Judge.” Barron v. EverBank, 2019 WL 1996697, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 15, 2019) (Totenberg, J.). We thus
OVERRULE Carnival’s objection to Magistrate Judge Lett’s finding that “the Diagrams provided
the approximate location of the accident and the Port of Galveston itself notes that the area falls
within the purview of Terminal Two.” R&R at 7.
Finally, Carnival objects to Magistrate Judge Lett’s determination that “the terms of the
operating Agreement clearly and unequivocally detail responsibilities that Carnival had in maintaining
the premises during cruise days, specifically to keep Terminal Two free of debris in a safe, orderly and
clean condition,” ibid., because, “[b]y ruling that Maritime Law does not apply, this Court has found
that as a matter of law, the Plaintiff’s incident did not occur during disembarkation or embarkation
into the ship which is the only basis for establishing a duty pursuant to the contract,” Objections at 4.
But Carnival misunderstands our holding. We did find that maritime law didn’t govern this action, see
September 5, 2025, Paperless Minutes—and thus asked the parties to re-brief their motions for
summary judgment, see Order to File Renewed Motions for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 57]. But
that doesn’t mean (as Carnival insists) that “the only basis for establishing a duty pursuant to the
contract” would be for the Plaintiff to show that the incident “occur[ed] during disembarkation or
embarkation into the ship[.]” Objections at 4. That may be the law in Texas—or it may not be. But
Carnival doesn’t cite any law for that proposition (not a single case), it doesn’t cite any provision of the
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operating agreement, and it doesn’t provide any other support for its view that the operating agreement
between Carnival and the Port of Galveston imposed a duty on Carnival only “during disembarkation
or embarkation into the ship[.]” Ibid.
On this issue, as we’ve detailed, we ordered renewed briefing. See September 5, 2025, Paperless
Minutes; Order to File Renewed Motions for Summary Judgment. Based on that renewed briefing,
Magistrate Judge Lett determined both that “Florida’s choice-of-law doctrine requires the application
of Texas tort law to the present set of facts in ruling on the motions” and that Carnival “had an
operating agreement with the Port of Galveston over Terminal Two which granted Carnival the license
to operate the terminal on days where cruise ships were embarking and disembarking.” R&R at 7
(citing Snyder Facts ¶¶ 20–29).5 Magistrate Judge Lett thus reasoned that Carnival “functioned as an
operator of Terminal Two of the Port of Galveston based on the Operating Agreement and therefore
had a duty of care to individuals coming to Terminal Two on cruise days.” Ibid. The Snyders were
embarking on the day of the incident, see Snyder Facts ¶ 2, and Carnival had a license to operate the
terminal, see Operating Agreement [ECF No. 36-6].6 Magistrate Judge Lett thus found that the Snyders
were invitees to whom Carnival owed a duty of care. See R&R at 7 (“The day of the incident was a
cruise day, the incident location falls squarely within Terminal Two, and Carnival therefore had a duty
to provide reasonable care to protect invitees onto the premises.”). And Texas law does seem to
support this conclusion. As one Texas court has explained:
One ‘special relationship’ that gives rise to a duty to take action to prevent harm to others is
the relationship between a premises owner or operator and those present on the premises;
within this context, the law imposes a duty on the premises owner or operator to take action
to make the premises reasonably safe or to warn invitees and licensees of an unreasonable
danger.
5 Carnival doesn’t object to Magistrate Judge Lett’s findings that Texas law applies and that the
operating agreement granted Carnival a license. See generally Objections. Having found no clear error
on the face of these findings, we’ll accept and adopt them here. See Macort, 208 F. App’x at 784 (“If
no objection or only [a] partial objection is made to the magistrate judge’s report, the district judge
reviews those unobjected portions for clear error.”).
6 Carnival failed to attach the operating agreement to either its MSJ or its Objections. See generally Docket.
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Jenkins v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 415 S.W.3d 14, 37 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Surratt, 102 S.W.3d 437, 441 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (“With respect to a slip-and-fall case, the
owner/operator owes a duty to its invitees to exercise reasonable care to protect them from dangerous
conditions on the premises known or discoverable to it.” (first citing Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez,
968 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1998); then citing Rosas v. Buddies Food Store, 518 S.W.2d 534, 536–37 (Tex.
1975))); Whisenhunt v. WestRock, Tex., L.P., 628 F. Supp. 3d 693, 699 (E.D. Tex. 2022) (“The owner or
operator of property owes the highest degree of care to an invitee.”). At any rate, Carnival hasn’t
shown that the Magistrate Judge got this wrong under Texas law—which it doesn’t bother to cite. We
therefore agree with Magistrate Judge Lett that Carnival owed Snyder a duty of care because Carnival
had a “license to operate the terminal on days where cruise ships were embarking and disembarking.”
R&R at 7.7
In sum, Carnival hasn’t offered a single proper objection. And, in any event, its objections are
meritless. We therefore OVERRULE Carnival’s Objections and ADOPT the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation that we “grant Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment[.]” Id. at 10.
7 Besides, Carnival’s objection is improper. Carnival already advanced this argument in its Response
to Snyder’s MSJ. See Carnival’s Response to Snyder’s MSJ [ECF No. 67] at 1 (arguing that “this court
has determined that Maritime Law does not apply, and therefore, the court has ruled as a matter of
law that plaintiff’s fall did not occur while on board or embarking on the subject ship” and therefore
that the “Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that Carnival had a duty to Plaintiff outside the Terminal
Building before checking into her cruise, and on that basis alone the motion should be denied”). Since
Carnival’s objection “simply summarizes what has been presented before,” it “is not an ‘objection’ as that term
is used in this context.” VanDiver, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 937–38; see also Holland v. Colvin, 2015 WL
1245189, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 18, 2015) (Hopkins, J.) (“A party objecting to an R & R may not simply
restate the arguments previously presented.”); Marlite, Inc. v. Eckenrod, 2012 WL 3614212, at *2 (S.D.
Fla. Aug. 21, 2012) (Moreno, C.J.) (“It is improper for an objecting party to . . . [submit] papers to a
district court which are nothing more than a rehashing of the same arguments and positions taken in
the original papers submitted to the Magistrate Judge. Clearly, parties are not to be afforded a ‘second
bite at the apple’ when they file objections to a[n] R & R.” (quoting Camardo v. Gen. Motors-Rate Emps.
Pension Plan, 806 F. Supp. 380, 382 (W.D.N.Y. 1992))).
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II. 	Open and Obvious
Next, Carnival asks for summary judgment because (it says) “the stanchion was an open and
obvious condition[.]” Objections at 15–16. In her R&R, Magistrate Judge Lett rejected this argument,
reasoning that “[t]he facts present[ed] in this case are inconclusive” and “create an issue of [material]
fact[.]” R&R at 10. In recommending that we deny Carnival’s motion, Magistrate Judge Lett wrote the
following:
The facts present[ed] in this case are inconclusive. The only evidence about the location of the
stanchion at the time of the incident comes from testimony from Snyder and her husband.
The exact positioning of the stanchion, the dimensions of the broken stanchion, and the
amount of people around at the time of the incident that could have obfuscated Snyder’s view
are all unknown factors. . . . In viewing the evidence in this case in the light most favorable to
Snyder as the nonmoving party, the Court is unable to make the legal finding that the danger
presented by the stanchion in this case was “open and obvious” as a matter of law.
Id. at 8–9.
Carnival now objects, insisting that “the stanchion [wa]s open and obvious” because it was
“noticeable to anyone paying attention.” Objections at 6. Responding to the Magistrate Judge’s
suggestion that someone might have been blocking Snyder’s view of the stanchion, Carnival says that
Snyder herself “testified that the area was not crowded,” ibid. (citing Snyder Dep. at 46:5–7),8 that “she
observed the area for roughly 15 minutes before traversing it,” ibid. (citing Snyder Dep. at 31:12–14),
that “she did not see any other passengers trip on the stanchion,” ibid. (citing Snyder Dep. at 46:17–
19), and that she “would have seen the stanchion had she been watching where she was going,” ibid.
(citing Snyder Dep. at 46:8–16).9
8 Carnival cites Snyder’s deposition as “Exhibit 2.” But we don’t know which “Exhibit 2” Carnival is
referring to because it doesn’t attach any exhibits to its Objections. And neither its Motion nor its
Statement of Facts included a transcript of Snyder’s deposition. See generally Docket.
9 Carnival also claims that the “Plaintiff’s husband testified that the corner would be ‘the best place
for it to avoid any injury to any person.’ Exhibit 3, Charles Snyder Deposition, 42:20–43:3.”
Objections at 6. But the deposition of Charles Snyder appears nowhere in our record. “At the summary
judgment stage, [Carnival] must point to record evidence and cannot rely on unsupported factual
assertions.” Perez v. Garcia, 2016 WL 7492559, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2016) (Conway, J.), aff’d sub
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As an initial matter, Carnival misrepresents what Snyder actually said in her deposition.
Carnival deceptively paraphrases Snyder as conceding that she “would have seen the stanchion had
she been watching where she was going.” Ibid. (citing Snyder Dep. at 46:8–16). But that’s not what
she testified to. Here’s how that part of the deposition went down:
Q: So if you had been looking down at the ground, you would have been able to see
the base? . . .
A: Okay. I can’t say for sure that I would have - - I mean, if I was blatantly looking
down I suppose, but . . .
Snyder Dep. at 46:8–16. Far from conceding that she would have seen the stanchion, Snyder initially
hedged (“I can’t say for sure that I would have”)—not evidence of anything—and then speculated (“if
I was blatantly looking down I suppose”). And we won’t grant Carnival summary judgment on a
statement that mixes circumspection with speculation. See Roberta L. Marcus, Inc. v. New Cingular Wireless
PCS, LLC, 2013 WL 5554142, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 3, 2013) (Scola, J.) (“Argument is not evidence,
and allegations and speculation are not enough on summary judgment.”); May v. City of Union Springs,
2021 WL 1425319, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 15, 2021) (Thompson, J.) (“Speculation cannot substitute
for evidence at summary judgment.”); Parker v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 2018 WL 9437354, at *7 (N.D.
Ga. Aug. 23, 2018), aff’d, 769 F. App’x 875 (11th Cir. 2019) (“It is all speculation, and mere speculation
is not enough to defeat (or support) a motion for summary judgment.”); Cendan v. Sch. Bd. of Broward
Cnty., Fla., 628 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1205 (S.D. Fla. 2022) (Altman, J.) (“Again, we don’t draw inferences
that aren’t based on the evidence.”). So, this first purported admission doesn’t justify Carnival’s request
for summary judgment.
The other three statements—that Snyder “testified that the area was not crowded,” Objections
at 6 (citing Snyder Dep. at 46:5–7), that “she observed the area for roughly 15 minutes before
traversing it,” ibid. (citing Snyder Dep. at 31:12–14), and that “she did not see any other passengers
nom. Perez v. Anastasia M. Garcia, P.A., 701 F. App’x 938 (11th Cir. 2017). We obviously cannot consider
evidence the parties elected not to include in the record.
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trip on the stanchion,” ibid. (citing Snyder Dep. at 46:17–19)—likewise fail to satisfy Carnival’s burden.
Under Texas law, “[t]he phrase [‘open and obvious’] is better considered as a summation of strong
facts that display contributory negligence as a matter of law. It includes a summation of the presence
of danger and also that the invitee knew and appreciated that presence of danger, or should have.”
Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512, 521 (Tex. 1978). In fact, the Parker Court explicitly
“dispel[ed] the idea that anything that can be seen precludes recovery because it is open and obvious.”
Id. at 520–21. That the area wasn’t crowded doesn’t prove that someone (or some thing) wasn’t
standing between Snyder and the stanchion. For similar reasons, that Snyder was observing the area
(even for 15 minutes) doesn’t establish that she saw (or should have seen) the stanchion. The
stanchion, which was broken and missing its pole, was low to the ground and would only have been
seen by someone who was looking down while walking—not necessarily a natural posture. And the
fact that other passengers didn’t trip on the stanchion is simply irrelevant. Since the area wasn’t
crowded, other passengers may not have come close to the stanchion or, if no one had been in their
way, they may have seen it sooner than Snyder did.
Either way, we agree with Magistrate Judge Lett that there are open factual questions for the
fact-finder to resolve. We therefore OVERRULE Carnival’s open-and-obvious objection.
III. 	Notice
Finally, Carnival argues that “there simply is no evidence in this record that any employee of
Carnival had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition.” Objections at 5. In support of
this position, Carnival cites two things: first, a non-binding (and very different) Texas appellate-court
decision; and second, Snyder’s testimony (again, without citation). We’ll consider (and reject) each in
turn.
First, in the last paragraph of its Objections, Carnival finally cites a legal case, Molina v. HEB
Grocery Co., L.P., 2017 WL 4766655 (Tex. App. 2017), for the following proposition: “Because notice
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is a prerequisite to establish Carnival’s liability in both direct negligence claims asserted by Plaintiff
and Plaintiff cannot provide any such evidence, Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law.” Objections
at 6. But Molina involved a slip-and-fall claim against a grocery-store owner whose employee testified
(as the plaintiff did) that he didn’t know when the liquid was dropped on the ground. See Molina, 2017
WL 4766655, at *4 (“The evidence is undisputed that [the employee] did not see the liquid on the
floor until after Molina had fallen.”). The court therefore explained that, “with no evidence as to the
length of time the substance was on the floor, there is no basis upon which a factfinder could assess
the opportunity [the defendant] had to discover and remove it.” Id. at *4 (quoting Fontenette-Mitchell v.
Cinemark USA, Inc., 2016 WL 6833104, at *3 (Tex. App. 2016)). And that does appear to be the state
of Texas law in slip-and-fall cases. See, e.g., Cox v. H.E.B. Grocery, L.P., 2014 WL 4362884, at *3 (Tex.
App. 2014) (“With no evidence as to the length of time the peach piece was on the floor, there is no
basis upon which a factfinder could assess the opportunity H.E.B. had to discover and remove it.”);
Sova v. Bill Miller Bar-B-Q Enters., Ltd., 2006 WL 1788231, at *4 (Tex. App. 2006) (“It was Sova’s burden
to produce more than a scintilla of evidence demonstrating that [the restaurant] had actual or
constructive knowledge of an unreasonably dangerous condition on its premises, based on either a
specific puddle that was on the floor long enough for [the restaurant] to have discovered and rectified
it or on the manner in which the condiment bar was generally maintained.”). In the Molina Court’s
view, it was “just as likely that the puddle was created while [the plaintiff] was standing at the
condiment bar (leaving the restaurant virtually no time to discover and remedy the condition) as it was
that the substance had been on the floor for some time.” Molina, 2017 WL 4766655, at *3 (quoting
Sova, 2006 WL 1788231, at *4).
But this isn’t a dangerous-liquids case. Unlike a liquid, which (as Molina pointed out) could have
been spilled on the floor a second before the plaintiff fell—leaving the premises owner no chance to
clean it up—the stanchion is a feature of the terminal, being either stuck into the ground or placed
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there in some permanent (or semi-permanent) way. And since, at summary judgment, we must draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, see Pennington, 261 F.3d at 1265, we must
accept the Plaintiff’s view that the permanence of the stanchion easily distinguishes it from spilled
liquids. We therefore reject Carnival’s reliance on Molina.
Second, Carnival insists (again) that Snyder’s “testimony contradicts [her] own pleadings on this
matter.” Objections at 5–6. But Carnival doesn’t tell us what about Snyder’s pleadings were
contradictory. And, in any event, because “pleadings aren’t evidence,” we don’t much care if they
contradict the evidence so long as that evidence is sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Amaya,
754 F. Supp. 3d at 1321. And the evidence (according to Snyder) is that “[t]wo” Carnival employees
told her that the stanchion “shouldn’t have been there.” Snyder Dep. at 61:4–7. Plus, as Magistrate
Judge Lett explained, “[t]he facts about the length of time the hazard existed are amorphous at best;
because no video footage exists of the incident, it is difficult to make a determination about the amount
of notice that Carnival had regarding the stanchion in the walkway.” R&R at 10.10
CONCLUSION
In the end, Carnival’s Objections are both improper and without merit. See Objections at 5–7.
We therefore ORDER and ADJUDGE as follows:
1. 	The Defendant’s Objections to the Report and Recommendation [ECF 84] are
OVERRULLED.
10 Here (again) Carnival merely regurgitates the arguments it advanced in its Motion for Summary
Judgment. Compare Def.’s MSJ at 8–15, with Objections at 4–8. As we’ve said: “It is improper for an
objecting party to submit papers to a district court which are nothing more than a rehashing of the
same arguments and positions taken in the original papers submitted to the Magistrate Judge.” Marlite,
2012 WL 3614212, at *2. “Clearly, parties are not to be afforded a ‘second bite at the apple’ when they
file objections to a[n] R & R.” Ibid. Carnival’s objection thus “amounts to no more than a pervasive
disagreement with the report’s conclusion and resembles a protracted tantrum more than a focused
and reasoned objection.” Rath v. Marcoski, 2016 WL 7049378, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2016) (Merryday,
J.), aff’d, 718 F. App’x 910 (11th Cir. 2017). So, we could overrule Carnival’s objection on this ground
alone.
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2. 	The Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 83] is ACCEPTED and ADOPTED
in full.
3. 	The Plaintiff’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 62] is GRANTED.
4. 	The Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 63] is DENIED.
5. 	The Clerk shall REOPEN this case. By December 23, 2025, the parties must submit
a joint scheduling report, proposing dates for all remaining pre-trial deadlines and trial.
DONE AND ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on December 16, 2025.
__________________________________
ROY K. ALTMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc: 	counsel of record
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