Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 0:25-CV-62261-MIDDLEBROOKS/AUGUSTIN-BIRCH
MIGUEL ANGEL OCEGUEDA GONZALEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, et al.,
RESPONDENTS.
________________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON
AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The Honorable Donald M. Middlebrooks, United States District Judge, referred this matter
to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation. DE 8.
Respondents filed a response to the Petitioner Miguel Angel Ocegueda Gonzalez’s Amended
Petition for Habeas Corpus, DE 12, and the parties submitted additional briefing. DE 14; DE 18;
DE 19; DE 20. The Court held a hearing on Petitioner’s Amended Petition on December 9, 2025,
and required supplemental briefing from the parties afterwards. The parties thereafter submitted
supplemental briefing. DE 23; DE 24. Having carefully considered the record, the briefing, and
the arguments made by counsel, the Court RECOMMENDS GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus [DE 11].
I. Background
This case is one of many cases around the country stemming from the Department of
Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) recent changes to its interpretation of the Immigration and
Nationality Act’s (“INA”) detention provisions and the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)
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agreement with that interpretation in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).
On July 8, 2025, DHS informed Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) employees that
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), rather than 8 U.S.C. § 1226, applies to all non-citizens present in the United
States who have “not been admitted . . . whether or not at a designated port of arrival.” See Merino
v. Ripa, No. 25-23845-CIV, 2025 WL 2941609, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2025) (quoting ICE
Memo: Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applications for Admission, AILA
Doc. No. 25071607 (July 8, 2025)). As such, DHS has taken the position that non-citizens present
in the United States who have not been admitted or paroled are subject to mandatory detention
without the possibility of bond. Id. On September 5, 2025, the BIA agreed with this interpretation,
issuing a binding ruling in Matter of Yajure Hurtado that immigration judges lack the authority to
hear bond requests or to grant bonds to non-citizens who are present in the United States without
admission because those non-citizens are properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). See
Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). With this overarching background in
mind, the Court now turns to the details of this case.
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico who has resided in the United States for
approximately twenty years. DE 11 ¶¶ 2, 4. On August 21, 2025, Petitioner was taken into ICE
custody at the Broward Transitional Center. DE 13-1; DE 13-4. Subsequently, removal
proceedings began against Petitioner after the issuance of a “Notice to Appear,” which charged
Petitioner with being “an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled.”
DE 13-6.
During the pendency of his removal proceedings, Petitioner has had two bond hearings,
but both bond hearings were “no actioned.” The first bond hearing was “no actioned” because
Petitioner did not have an original identity document. DE 13-7 ¶ 12. The second bond hearing was
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“no actioned” because the immigration judge determined that Petitioner’s argument––that he had
lawfully entered the United States as a child––was an issue to be determined as part of his removal
proceedings. Id. ¶ 13. Petitioner’s counsel explained at the hearing before this Court that, when a
bond hearing is “no actioned,” it is as if the bond hearing never occurred, and Petitioner could
move for another bond hearing. Petitioner, however, has not moved for another bond hearing. A
master calendar hearing is currently set in Petitioner’s case for December 29, 2025, at 9:00 A.M.
DE 13-11.
II. Analysis
In his Amended Petition,1 Petitioner contends that he is being improperly detained without
a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and requests for the Court to grant habeas relief and
either order his release or order Respondents to provide him with a prompt and individualized
bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226. DE 11. In response, Respondents raise numerous
arguments that courts around the country have roundly rejected and which this Court likewise finds
unpersuasive. Accordingly, the Court recommends granting in part and denying in part Petitioner’s
Amended Petition and ordering Respondents to either afford Petitioner a prompt, individualized
bond hearing before an immigration judge or release him. The Court explains below.
A. The Correct Respondent
As an initial matter, Respondents contend that Petitioner has not named the correct
Respondent. DE 13 at 2 n.1. Petitioner has named the following individuals as Respondents: Kristi
Noem, Pamela Bondi, Garret Ripa, Todd Lyons, Juan Agudelo, and Sirce Owen. 28 U.S.C. § 2243
provides that petitions for writ of habeas corpus shall be directed “to the person having custody of
the person detained.” Since Petitioner is currently detained at Broward Transitional Center,
1 This Court required Petitioner to amend his initial Petition because the initial Petition did not clearly indicate where
Petitioner was currently in custody. DE 10.
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Respondents assert that the correct Respondent is Assistant Field Office Director Juan Gonzalez.
DE 13 at 2 n.1. Petitioner has named the Assistant Field Office Director of Broward Transitional
Center as a Respondent, but Petitioner names that individual as Juan Agudelo. It is not apparent to
the Court whether the Assistant Field Office Director for Broward Transitional Center has multiple
last names and Petitioner chose the wrong last name or whether Petitioner has named the wrong
individual. In either event, the Court recommends substituting Juan Gonzalez for Juan Agudelo
and dismissing the remaining Respondents. See Cong v. McNeil, No. 205-CV-131-FTM-29SPC,
2008 WL 4328223, at *1 n.1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2008) (substituting correct respondent and
dismissing incorrect respondent); see also Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434 (2004) (“[T]here
is generally only one proper respondent to a given prisoner’s habeas petition.”).
B. Jurisdiction
Respondents contend that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) divests this Court of jurisdiction to hear
Petitioner’s Amended Petition. DE 13 at 5–8. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) provides that courts do not have
jurisdiction to “hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or
action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
orders against any alien under this chapter.” However, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) is “not to be construed
broadly as a zipper clause applying to the full universe of deportation-related claims, but instead
as applying narrowly to only the three discrete governmental actions enumerated in that
subsection.” Wallace v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 616 F. App’x 958, 960 (11th Cir.
2015) (quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “only claims that arise from one of the covered actions
are excluded from [court] review . . . .” Camarena v. Dir., Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 988 F.3d
1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2021). This Court, like countless other courts in this District and around the
country, concludes that a challenge to the legality of a non-citizen’s detention does not fall under
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the ambit of any of the three covered actions in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). See, e.g., Merino, 2025 WL
2941609, at *3 (“Petitioner is not challenging Respondents’ decision to execute a removal order,
nor is Petitioner challenging Respondents’ decisions to commence or adjudicate his removal
proceedings. Instead, Petitioner is challenging his ongoing detention, which is not a claim barred
by § 1252(g).”); Boffill v. Field Off. Dir., No. 25-CV-25179-JB, 2025 WL 3246868, at *3 (S.D.
Fla. Nov. 20, 2025) (“Petitioner’s claim does not implicate the Attorney General’s decision to
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders. Rather, Petitioner challenges
the legality of his detention. Such claim is reviewable.”); Orozco-Martinez v. Lynch, No. 1:25-
CV-1353, 2025 WL 3223786, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 19, 2025) (“Petitioner’s action requesting
a writ of habeas corpus ordering Respondents to conduct a bond hearing does not seek review of
a discretionary decision to ‘commence proceedings,’ ‘adjudicate’ a case, or ‘execute’ a removal
order. Instead, Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus challenging his continued confinement
without bond. This action falls outside of the narrow scope of §1252(g) and within the Court’s
jurisdiction.”). Accordingly, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) does not divest this Court of jurisdiction.
Respondents also contend that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) divests this Court of jurisdiction. 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) provides that “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact, including
interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action
taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter” is
only available “in judicial review of a final order under this section.” Otherwise, “no court shall
have jurisdiction . . . to review such an order or such questions of law or fact.” Id. But 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)(9) “does not present a jurisdictional bar where those bringing suit are not asking for review
of an order of removal, the decision to seek removal, or the process by which removability will be
determined.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cali., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1907 (2020)
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(quotation marks and ellipses omitted). This Court, like countless other courts in this District and
around the country, concludes that a challenge to the legality of a non-citizen’s detention does not
seek review of an order of removal, the decision to seek removal, or the process by which
removability will be determined. See, e.g., Bofill, 2025 WL 3246868, at *4 (“Petitioner is
challenging his mandatory detention under section 1225(b), and his entitlement to a bond hearing.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that section 1252(b)(9) does not divest the Court of
jurisdiction to consider the Petition.”); Orozco-Martinez, 2025 WL 3223786, at *3 (“Petitioner is
challenging his entitlement to a bond hearing, and for the reasons set forth above, the Court
concludes that § 1252(b)(9) does not divest the Court of jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s habeas
petition.”). Accordingly, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) does not divest this Court of jurisdiction, and the
Court is satisfied that jurisdiction exists to hear Petitioner’s Amended Petition.
C. Exhaustion
Respondents next contend that Petitioner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
DE 13 at 7–8; DE 24. Courts generally do not require the exhaustion of administrative remedies,
though, where “no genuine opportunity for adequate relief exists . . . or an administrative appeal
would be futile.” Linfors v. United States, 673 F.2d 332, 334 (11th Cir. 1982). Given that Matter
of Yajure Hurtado is binding precedent on immigration judges and subjects Petitioner, a non-
citizen who is present in the United States and has not been admitted or paroled, to mandatory
detention without the possibility of bond, there is no adequate administrative remedy for Plaintiff.
The Court, like countless other courts in this District and around the country, concludes that
Petitioner should not have to exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief. See,
e.g., Puga v. Assistant Field Off. Dir., Krome N. Serv. Processing Ctr., No. 25-24535-CIV, 2025
WL 2938369, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2025) (“Since the result of Petitioner’s custody
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redetermination and any subsequent bond appeal to the BIA is nearly a foregone conclusion under
Matter of Yajure Hurtado, any prudential exhaustion requirements are excused for futility.”);
Boffill, 2025 WL 3246868, at *5 (“[C]onsidering In re Yajure Hurtado, it appears evident that a
noncitizen like Petitioner, who has resided in the United States for years but has not been admitted
or paroled, will be subject to mandatory detention without bond under section 1225(b)(2) upon
review by the BIA.”); Orozco-Martinez, 2025 WL 3223786, at *5 (“[G]iven the Government’s
position and the BIA’s recent decision in Yajure Hurtado, requiring Petitioner to exhaust his
administrative remedies and request a bond hearing would likely be futile.”).
This holds true even though Petitioner has not requested a bond hearing or been denied
bond. See Lopez-Lugo v. Bondi, No. 2:25-CV-02380-TMC, 2025 WL 3551435, at *2 (W.D. Wash.
Dec. 11, 2025) (“The fact that Lopez-Lugo has not yet had a bond hearing does not mean his
habeas petition is not ripe for review.”); Salinas v. Woosley, No. 4:25-CV-121-DJH, 2025 WL
3243837, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 20, 2025) (waiving exhaustion requirement for petitioner who had
not requested an initial bond hearing); Quishpe-Guaman v. Noem, No. 4:25-CV-00211-TWP-
KMB, 2025 WL 3201072, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 17, 2025) (finding exhaustion of petitioner’s
administrative remedies would be futile, even though petitioner had not even appeared before an
immigration judge); Hurtado-Medina v. Raycraft, No. 25-CV-13248, 2025 WL 3268896, at *8
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 24, 2025) (“Because seeking release from an Immigration Judge would be a
futile gesture, the Court, like numerous other district courts to have considered the issue, declines
to require Petitioners to move for release on bond in Immigration Court as a precondition of
seeking relief here.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)); Parada-Hernandez v. Johnson, No.
3:25-CV-2729-K-BN, 2025 WL 3465958, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2025) (“Requiring Parada-
Hernandez to request a bond hearing before an IJ and (if bond were denied) appeal the decision
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before filing his habeas petition would be inappropriate because it would exacerbate his alleged
constitutional injury––detention without a bond hearing.” (quotation marks omitted)), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 3:25-CV-2729-K-BN, 2025 WL 3463682 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 2025);
Figueroa v. Hermosillo, No. 2:25-CV-02228-TMC, 2025 WL 3230466, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov.
19, 2025) (“[T]he fact that Respondents have not received hearing requests from either Carrillo
Ahilon or Lopez Mendez does not preclude habeas relief for those Petitioners.”); Barco Mercado
v. Francis, No. 25-CV-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (“To
force Mr. Barco to request a bond hearing from an immigration judge––which would be denied
under the BIA’s recent decision and, even if it were held, would result in release being denied
under that decision––and then appeal that denial to the same BIA that has prevented immigration
judges from hearing bond requests in the first place, all before allowing Mr. Barco to seek judicial
review of his arrest and redetention, would be Kafkaesque.” (quotation marks omitted)). The Court
does not recommend requiring Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking
habeas relief.
D. The Appropriate Statute Governing Petitioner’s Detention
Finally, Respondents argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), as opposed to 8 U.S.C. § 1226,
properly governs the detention of non-citizens who are present in the United States, like Petitioner.
DE 13 at 8–16. This contention has been flatly rejected by countless courts in this District and
across the country. See, e.g., Puga, 2025 WL 2938369, at *5 (“[N]umerous courts that have
examined the interpretation of section 1225 articulated by Respondents––particularly following
the BIA’s decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado––have rejected their construction and adopted
Petitioner’s.”); Boffill, 2025 WL 3246868, at *7 (“Indeed, other Courts in this Circuit and District
have uniformly rejected Respondents’ expansive interpretation of section 1225.”); Hyppolite v.
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Noem, No. 25-CV-4304 (NRM), 2025 WL 2829511, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025) (“[I]n the
approximately 	two 	and 	one-half-months 	since 	Respondents 	began 	to 	broadly 	invoke 	§
1225(b)(2)(A) to justify the mandatory detention of noncitizens who already reside within the
United States, well over a dozen federal courts around the country have rejected Respondents’
novel and illogical interpretation of the INA.”). This Court likewise rejects Respondents’ argument
and concludes that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention.
As explained by the Supreme Court, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) “primarily applies to aliens seeking
entry into the United States,” whereas 8 U.S.C. § 1226 “applies to aliens already present in the
United States.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297, 303 (2018). Here, Petitioner’s Notice to
Appear charges him with being “an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted
or paroled.” DE 13-6. Notably, Petitioner was not charged as an “arriving alien.” See id. As such,
Petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226, not 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). See, e.g., Boffill,
2025 WL 3246868, at *6 (“[T]he NTA that DHS issued to Petitioner did not classify him as an
‘arriving alien.’ Instead, the NTA charged him as ‘present in the United States without admission
or parole.’ This classification places him squarely within section 1226.” (citations omitted));
Merino, 2025 WL 2941609, at *3 (“Petitioner, who has resided in the country for nearly a decade
and was apprehended while already within the United States, not at the border, falls under §
1226(a), not § 122(b)(2) . . . .”); Patel v. Hardin, No. 2:25-CV-870-JES-NPM, 2025 WL 3442706,
at *5 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 2025) (“It is undisputed that Patel has been in this country since 2011. His
detention is thus governed by § 1226(a).”); Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025
WL 2609425, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (“[I]n the Notice to Appear, ICE marked Pizzaro
Reyes as ‘present in the United States,’ and notably not as ‘arriving.’ The fact that the Notice to
Appear listed ‘arriving’ and ‘present’ as two distinct options, and that ICE selected ‘present,’
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reinforces how novel Respondents’ proposed statutory interpretation is. Overall, the legislative
history and agency guidance supports the argument that § 1226(a) applies to Pizarro Reyes.”).
III. Recommendation
Having concluded that Petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), Petitioner
is entitled to an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge. See Jennings, 583 U.S.
at 306 (“Federal regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at
the outset of detention.” (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1))). Accordingly, the Court
RECOMMENDS GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART Petitioner’s Amended
Petition for Habeas Corpus [DE 11]. Specifically, the Court recommends ordering Respondents to
either afford Petitioner a prompt, individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge or
release Petitioner.
The Court acknowledges that a district court in the Central District of California recently
granted final judgment in a class action lawsuit, declaring that the members of the class are
detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and are entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge.
Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, at docket entry 94 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18,
2025). Petitioner claims to be a member of this class. DE 14 at 2 (“Petitioner is a class member
whose detention has now been judicially declared unlawful.”). Nonetheless, the Court still
recommends ruling on Petitioner’s Amended Petition because only this Court, and not the
California court, has jurisdiction to rule on Petitioner’s Amended Petition. See Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
at 442 (“Congress added the limiting clause––‘within their respective jurisdictions’––to the habeas
statute in 1867 to avert the inconvenient and potentially embarrassing possibility that every judge
anywhere could issue the Great Writ on behalf of applicants far distantly removed from the courts
whereon they sat. Accordingly, with respect to habeas petitions designed to relieve an individual
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from oppressive confinement, the traditional rule has always been that the Great Writ is issuable
only in the district of confinement.” (quotation marks, citations, and alteration omitted)).
Within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation,
any party may serve and file written objections to any of the above findings and recommendations.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); S.D. Fla. Mag. R. 4(a). The parties are hereby notified that a failure to
timely object waives the right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report and Recommendation.
11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2014).
DONE AND SUBMITTED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 23rd day of
December, 2025.
___________________________________
PANAYOTTA AUGUSTIN-BIRCH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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