TAYLOR v. STATE OF FLORIDA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PANAMA CITY DIVISION
CARL TAYLOR, JR.,
Petitioner,
v. 	Case No. 5:25cv036-TKW/MAF
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
___________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On or about February 5, 2025, Petitioner Carl Taylor, Jr., a state inmate
proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1. On August 1, 2025, Respondent filed an answer,
with exhibits. 	ECF No. 16. 	Petitioner Taylor has not filed a reply, although
he was given the opportunity to do so. 	See ECF No. 13.
The matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate
Judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and
Northern District of Florida Local Rule 72.2(B). 	After careful consideration,
the undersigned has determined no evidentiary hearing is required for the
disposition of this matter. 	See Rule 8(a), R. Gov. § 2254 Cases. 	For the
reasons stated herein, the filings before the Court show Petitioner is not
entitled to federal habeas relief, and this § 2254 petition should be denied.
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Procedural Background
By information filed January 23, 2023, in Bay County Circuit Court
Case 2022-CF-5074, the State of Florida charged Petitioner Carl Taylor, Jr.,
with four counts 	in connection with events that 	occurred on or about
December 16, 2022: (1) felon in possession of ammunition, a second degree
felony, contrary to sections 775.087(2) and 790.23(1), Florida Statutes; (2)
introduction of contraband into state correctional institution, a third degree
felony, 	contrary 	to section 944.47, 	Florida Statutes; 	(3) 	possession 	of
marijuana less than 20 grams, a first degree misdemeanor, contrary to
section 893.13(6)(b), Florida Statutes; and (4) possession of paraphernalia,
a first 	degree misdemeanor, contrary 	to section 893.147(1)(a), 	Florida
Statutes. Ex. 2 (Information).1
On October 4, 2023, Petitioner Taylor signed a Plea, Waiver and
Consent form, reflecting he was entering a guilty plea to three of the four
charges (Counts 1, 3, and 4) as well as one count of felony battery in a
different case, 2023-CF-1775. 	Ex. 3 (Plea, Waiver and Consent). 	Among
other things, the form indicates agreement to adjudication of guilt and
imposition of 48 months’ probation as well as 150 days’ jail time credit and
1 Hereinafter, all citations to the state court record, “Ex. –,” refer to exhibits submitted with Respondent’s
answer, ECF No. 16.
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time served on misdemeanors. 	Id. 	On October 13, 2023, the court
adjudicated him guilty and sentenced him to 48 months’ probation. Ex. 5.
On February 22, 2024, a Warrant for Violation of Probation (VOP) was
signed and served on Petitioner Taylor based on a new law violation. Ex. 6.
Taylor entered a plea to the VOP charge on July 24, 2024, agreeing that his
probation would be modified and extended to sixty (60) months from the
supervision start date. Ex. 7. On July 25, 2024, nunc pro tunc July 24, 2024,
the judge entered an Order of Modification of Probation reflecting Taylor’s
“probation was modified to extend to sixty (60) months from the original date”
and “[p]revious conditions reimposed.” Ex. 8. It does not appear that Taylor
appealed from this order or otherwise challenged it in state court.
On February 27, 2025, the Department of Corrections filed a Violation
Report requesting a warrant for Taylor’s arrest based on two new law
violations (aggravated battery and aggravated assault). Ex. 9. On May 28,
2025, Taylor admitted the violation and the court revoked his probation. See
Ex. 1. 	In a judgment and sentence entered May 28, 2025, the court
sentenced Taylor to ten (10) years in prison on Count 1 in case number
2022-CF-5074 and five (5) years in prison on Count 1 in case number 2023-
CF-1775, to run concurrently. Ex. 10. Taylor did not appeal. 	See ECF No.
16 at 4.
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In the meantime, as indicated above, on or about February 5, 2025,
Taylor filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
ECF No. 1. 	The petition presents one ground described as “Felon in
possession of Ammunition in Florida” and asserting, as supporting facts: “In
case no. 22005074FMA by state law in Florida the jury is told in Florida
Statute 10.15(b) give only if defendant is charged with the alternative of
carrying a concealed weapon, see 790.001 F.S.” ECF No. 1 at 9. Petitioner
indicates he did not raise this claim by direct appeal or in a Rule 3.850
motion. 	Id. 	As relief, he seeks “release from probation and clemency of
right.” 	Id. at 19.
On August 1, 2025, Respondent filed an answer, with exhibits. 	ECF
No. 16. 	Petitioner Taylor has not filed a reply, although he was given the
opportunity to do so. 	See ECF Nos. 13, 15.
Analysis
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), federal courts may grant
habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody. Section 2254(d) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
claim –
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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 	See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180-83
(2011); Gill v. Mecusker, 633 F.3d 1272, 1287-88 (11th Cir. 2011). 	“This is
a ‘difficult to meet’ and ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court
rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the
doubt.’” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,
102 (2011), and Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)). This Court’s
review 	“is 	limited 	to 	the 	record 	that 	was 	before 	the 	state 	court 	that
adjudicated the claim on the merits.” 	Id.
Taylor filed this § 2254 petition on or about February 5, 2025, prior to
his most recent VOP, for new offenses committed February 21, 2025, which
resulted in the court imposing a 10-year prison sentence in May 2025.
Compare ECF No. 1 with Exs. 1, 9, 10. 	Taylor did not appeal his judgment
and sentence. 	See ECF No. 16 at 4. 	In the only ground presented in the
§ 2254 petition, Taylor appears to raise a claim regarding jury instructions.
ECF No. 1 at 9. 	As Respondent indicates, to exhaust such a claim, Taylor
would have had to present the claim to the state courts, which he did not do.
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See ECF No. 16 at 5-7. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal application
for writ of habeas corpus “shall not be granted unless it appears that” the
applicant “has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). 	It is well settled that, absent extraordinary
circumstances, a federal court will not decide the merits of § 2254 claims
until they have been exhausted in state court. 	28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A);
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982); Picard v. Conner, 404 U.S. 270, 275
(1971). 	An applicant has not exhausted state remedies “if he has the right
under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question
presented.” 	28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). 	Further, “state prisoners must give the
state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by
invoking one complete round of the state’s established appellate review
process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). “Where a return
to state court would be futile – because the petitioner’s claims would clearly
be barred by state procedural rules – a federal court can ‘forego the needless
judicial ping-pong’ and treat unexhausted claims as procedurally defaulted.”
Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1260 n.56 (11th Cir. 2014). 	See
O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 839-40, 848. 	Because Taylor did not present his
claim to the state court, and a return to state court would be futile at this
point, his claim is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted.
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Further, as Respondent also points out, it is not clear why Taylor
asserts a jury instruction claim when he did not proceed to trial in this case.
Id. at 7. In addition, to the extent Taylor has presented a claim, it appears to
be based entirely on state law and is, thus, not cognizable in a federal
habeas proceeding. 	Id. at 17-18.
Based 	on 	the foregoing, 	Petitioner Taylor 	has 	not 	presented 	an
exhausted claim cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding. 	See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. The § 2254 petition should be denied.
Conclusion
Petitioner Taylor has not shown entitlement to federal habeas relief. It
is respectfully RECOMMENDED that the § 2254 petition, ECF No. 1, be
DENIED.
Certificate of Appealability
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United
States District Courts provides that “[t]he district court must issue or deny a
certificate of 	appealability when it 	enters 	a final order adverse to the
applicant,” and if a certificate is issued “the court must state the specific issue
or issues that satisfy the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).” Rule
11(b) provides that a timely notice of appeal must still be filed, even if the
court issues a certificate of appealability.
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Petitioner fails to make a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
483-84 (2000) (explaining substantial showing) (citation omitted). Therefore,
the Court should deny a certificate of appealability. The second sentence of
Rule 11(a) provides: “Before entering the final order, the court may direct the
parties to submit arguments on whether a certificate should issue.” 	The
parties shall make any argument regarding a certificate by filing objections
to this Report and Recommendation.
Leave to appeal in forma pauperis should also be denied. See Fed. R.
App. P. 24(a)(3)(A) (providing that before or after notice of appeal is filed,
the court may certify appeal is not in good faith or party is not otherwise
entitled to appeal in forma pauperis).
Recommendation
It is therefore respectfully RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY the
§ 2254 petition (ECF No. 1). It is further RECOMMENDED that a certificate
of appealability be DENIED and that leave to appeal in forma pauperis be
DENIED.
IN CHAMBERS at Tallahassee, Florida, on November 5, 2025.
S/ Martin A. Fitzpatrick
MARTIN A. FITZPATRICK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this
Report and Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific
written objections to these proposed findings and recommendations.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A copy of the objections shall be served upon
all other parties. 	A party may respond to another party’s objections
within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. 	Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	Any different deadline that may appear on the
electronic docket is for the Court’s internal use only and does not
control. 	If a party fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendations as to any particular claim or issue contained in a
Report and Recommendation, that party waives the right to challenge
on appeal the district court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual
and legal conclusions. 	See 11th Cir. R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
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