BROWN v. YOUNG et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
BRITTNEY BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No.: 4:25cv419-MW/MJF
ROGER A. YOUNG and
MELISSA TUCKER,
Defendants.
__________________________/
ORDER ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND
IMPOSING SANCTIONS
This Court has considered, without hearing, the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation, ECF No. 59, and has also reviewed de novo Plaintiff’s objections,
ECF No. 60, Defendants’ objections, ECF No. 61, and the parties’ responses to
objections, ECF Nos. 62 and 68.
This Court accepts the Magistrate Judge’s recommended findings of fact
following an evidentiary hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions. If anything, the
Magistrate Judge was generous in evaluating the witness testimony, making
credibility calls, and determining the motivations of witnesses and counsel with
respect to Ms. Tucker’s false affidavit that defense counsel submitted to this Court
and continued to defend after it became clear to everyone that it contains false
statements 	purporting 	to 	be 	true 	under 	penalty 	of 	perjury. 	Specifically, 	the
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Magistrate Judge accepted Ms. Tucker’s dubious claim that she did not realize at the
time she made certain statements that they were not based on her personal knowledge
and 	that she did not intend to deceive this Court based on her misunderstanding
about the concept of “personal knowledge.” Moreover, the Magistrate Judge did not
find that Ms. Tucker’s prior defense counsel knowingly submitted a false declaration
when Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction was still pending. The problem
for this Court, however, is both Ms. Tucker’s and her defense counsel’s continued
defense of her false statements once the absence of personal knowledge as a basis
for certain assertions and the falsity of paragraphs 4 and 5 in her declaration became
clear through discovery.
Ms. Tucker’s continued quibbling with the content of her affidavit and what
constituted personal knowledge when she made the sworn statements within that
affidavit undermines the system of justice. Moreover, Ms. Tucker’s defense
counsel’s 	continued 	defense 	of 	Ms. 	Tucker’s 	false 	statements 	flouts 	the
responsibilities that counsel must abide by.
This Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation of the
narrow sanction of striking the false statements—namely, paragraphs 4 and 5—from
Ms. Tucker’s sworn declaration, dated October 28, 2025. See ECF No. 21-1.
Although these false statements were material to this Court’s prior ruling on the
motion for preliminary injunction, this Court concludes that, while a close call, the
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omission of these two paragraphs would not have changed the outcome at the
preliminary injunction hearing. Moreover, like the Magistrate Judge, this Court
affords defense counsel the benefit of the doubt with respect to the initial submission
of the false declaration inasmuch as Ms. Tucker testified that she had made some
changes to the declaration prior to its submission. Given this testimony, this Court
does not find that defense counsel knowingly submitted a false declaration.
However, all counsel has an affirmative obligation to ensure that they are not
submitting false evidence and if they later learn of the falsity of material evidence,
they must take reasonable remedial measures to correct the error. See R. Reg. Fla.
Bar 4-3.3(a)(4). The problem with defense counsel’s actions in this case is that,
rather than admit that the declaration was poorly drafted and contained false
statements and then correct the record, they continued to defend it throughout this
case, even after it became clear that Ms. Tucker did not know certain facts for which
she had previously attested to possessing personal knowledge.
Defense counsel continues to play with language to defend the declaration at
issue, characterizing the challenged declaration as containing “source defects,”
“overstatements,” and “evidentiary weakness,” see ECF No. 61 at 5–6, even after it
became clear at Ms. Tucker’s deposition that her declaration contained false
information. There is a label for what Ms. Tucker did— making false statements.
And there is a label for what defense counsel has done—vexatious litigation. See 28
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U.S.C. § 1927. This Court would have readily shown grace to both Ms. Tucker and
defense counsel had they done what any reasonable litigant should have done in this
circumstance—and what the rules of professional conduct require counsel to do—
and corrected the false statements for the record. But both Ms. Tucker and her
defense counsel doggedly defended the indefensible with respect to the false
statements contained in her declaration. On this basis, this Court is awarding fees for
the time spent litigating the sanctions motion before Judge Fitzpatrick as Ms. Tucker
and defense counsel unnecessarily duplicated proceedings by continuing to defend
Ms. Tucker’s false statements once the falsity of her statements and her lack of
personal knowledge to support such assertions in paragraphs 4 and 5 of her
declaration in response to the motion for preliminary injunction became clear.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED:
The report and recommendation, ECF No. 59, is accepted and adopted, over
the parties’ objections, as this Court’s opinion. Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, ECF
No. 44, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion is GRANTED
insofar as this Court STRIKES paragraphs 4 and 5 from ECF No. 21-1 and awards
fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and this Court’s inherent authority. The motion is
otherwise DENIED. This Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees
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based 	on 	Ms. 	Tucker’s 	and 	defense 	counsel’s1 objectively 	unreasonable
multiplication of proceedings in continuing to defend the Tucker declaration once it
became clear that Ms. Tucker lacked personal knowledge to make the false
statements identified above. Fees shall be split between Ms. Tucker and defense
counsel and will be assessed at the conclusion of this case. To be clear, there must
be a sanction for Ms. Tucker and her prior counsel’s continued efforts to ignore the
obvious—that Ms. Tucker lacked the personal knowledge necessary to make certain
statements in her declaration and that such statements were, in fact, false—and
defend the indefensible once that lack of personal knowledge and falsity became
clear following Ms. Tucker’s deposition. Finally, Plaintiff’s motion to exclude
Defendants’ evidence, ECF No. 52, is DENIED as moot.
SO ORDERED on May 12, 2026.
s/Mark E. Walker 	____
United States District Judge
1 To be clear, this Court is awarding fees against counsel with the law firm of Lawson Huck
Gonzalez, PLLC, who represented Ms. Tucker and Roger Young through the litigation of the
sanctions motion and evidentiary hearing and subsequently withdrew from representing Ms.
Tucker on May 4, 2026. See ECF No. 64. Fees shall not be assessed against Miriam Coles, who is
Ms. Tucker’s new attorney.
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