HOKAMA v. DAVIS et al

Page 1 of 3
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
STEPHANIE HOKAMA,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 3:25-cv-2612-TKW-ZCB
TONYA DAVIS, et al.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER
This case is before the Court based on the magistrate judge’s Report and
Recommendation (R&R) (Doc. 11) and Plaintiff’s objections (Doc. 12). The Court
reviewed the issues raised in the objections de novo under 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3), and based on that review, the Court agrees with the
magistrate judge’s determination that Plaintiff’s pending motions should be denied
because she failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on her claims.
None of the arguments in Plaintiff’s objections are persuasive, but the only
one that warrants any comment is her argument that the Younger abstention doctrine1
does not apply because the complaint is raising a standalone completed
1 The magistrate judge cited this doctrine in a separate order (Doc. 10) as one of several
reasons why Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a plausible claim for relief, and he relied on the
complaint’s failure to state a claim as the basis for his conclusion in the R&R that Plaintiff was
not entitled to a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. See Doc. 11 at 2.
Case 3:25-cv-02612-TKW-ZCB Document 14 Filed 01/09/26 Page 1 of 3

Page 2 of 3
constitutional violation, not a challenge to the state court process. That argument is
not persuasive because the complaint and Plaintiff’s motion for
preliminary/temporary relief are plainly based on things that have occurred (and are
allegedly still occurring) an ongoing state dependency proceeding. Moreover, even
if Plaintiff was correct that Younger abstention does not apply because the specific
proceeding that resulted in the alleged unconstitutional removal of her children is
completed, that would not help her because of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
As intimated by the magistrate judge in the order dismissing the complaint
with leave to amend, see Doc. 10 at 8, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal
courts from exercising jurisdiction over a complaint “brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of
those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,
284 (2005). The doctrine applies where (as here) “the source of the plaintiff’s injury
is the state-court judgment itself,” Efron v. Candelario, 110 F.4th 1229, 1236 (11th
Cir. 2024), and it applies “whether the plaintiff admits to filing a direct appeal of the
judgment or [as here] tries to call the appeal something else,” Behr v. Campbell, 4
F.4th 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:
Case 3:25-cv-02612-TKW-ZCB Document 14 Filed 01/09/26 Page 2 of 3

Page 3 of 3
1. The magistrate judge’s R&R is adopted and incorporated by reference
in this Order.
2. Plaintiff’s “Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for
Preliminary Injunction” (Doc. 5) is DENIED.
3. Plaintiff’s “Motion to Suppress and Declare Unconstitutional the
Warrantless Seizure of Minor Child” (Doc. 7) is DENIED.
4. This case is returned to the magistrate judge for further pretrial
proceedings.
DONE AND ORDERED this 9th day of January, 2026.
__________________________________
T. KENT WETHERELL, II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 3:25-cv-02612-TKW-ZCB Document 14 Filed 01/09/26 Page 3 of 3