MOULTRIE v. PRICE et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
EDDIE JAMES MOULTRIE,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No.: 3:25cv1349/LC/ZCB
N. PRICE, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in
this civil rights action. 	After performing its screening duties under 28
U.S.C. 	§§ 	1915(e)(2)(B), 	1915A(a)-(b), 	the 	Court 	identified 	several
deficiencies in the amended complaint (Doc. 12) and ordered Plaintiff to
correct those deficiencies by filing a second amended complaint. 	(Doc.
14). Plaintiff has now filed a second amended complaint. (Doc. 17).
The Court must screen the second amended complaint to determine
if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from immune defendants. 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B), 	1915A(a)-(b). 	Because 	Plaintiff’s 	second 	amended
complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief, his federal claims
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should be dismissed, and supplemental jurisdiction should be declined
over Plaintiff’s state law claim.
I. Plaintiff’s Allegations1
Plaintiff 	names 	three 	officials 	of 	Santa 	Rosa 	Correctional
Institution (SRCI) as Defendants: (1) Former Officer N. Price; (2) Officer
C. Coates; and (3) Captain W.M. Turner. 	Plaintiff sues Defendants in
their individual capacities. (Doc. 17 at 2-3).
According to the second amended complaint, on June 12, 2024,
Defendant Price escorted Plaintiff to a classification callout. 	Defendant
Price stayed outside the callout room until the callout ended. 	On June
18, Plaintiff allegedly learned the callout was “a retaliatory ploy” after
receiving a disciplinary report from the classification officer. 	Plaintiff
claims the report falsely accused him of a spoken threat during the
callout. 	Plaintiff alleges recording devices could not have captured the
inside of the callout room. 	Plaintiff called Defendant Price as a witness
for Plaintiff’s upcoming hearing on the report to describe Plaintiff’s
conduct during the callout. (Doc. 17 at 5-6).
1 Plaintiff’s allegations are assumed true at this stage. DeVillier v. Texas,
601 U.S. 285, 288 n.1 (2024).
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At 8:00 a.m. on June 20, 2024, Plaintiff saw Defendants Price and
Coates in the recreation yard before Plaintiff went to his disciplinary
hearing. Plaintiff’s hearing lasted approximately five minutes. Plaintiff
allegedly was “shocked” when the hearing officers presented evidence,
and Plaintiff learned that Defendant Price falsely accused Plaintiff of
unruly behavior. Plaintiff claims a formal grievance that he filed proves
Defendant Price lied. (Id. at 6).
Plaintiff 	returned 	to 	his 	cell 	after 	the 	hearing, 	and 	he 	saw
Defendant Price leaving the area. Plaintiff’s property was outside of his
cell, and the cell was in disarray. Plaintiff went to his cell’s window and
confronted Defendant Price who was next to Defendant Coates in the
yard. 	Plaintiff asked Defendant Price “why’d you lie on the witness
statement and trash[] my cell.” (Id.).
Defendant 	Price 	responded, 	“you 	shouldn’t 	of 	called 	me 	as 	a
witness.” (Id. at 7). Plaintiff told Defendant Price that his statement got
Plaintiff “maxed out.” (Id.). Defendant Price told Plaintiff he was stupid
to think he would be a witness against other prison staff. 	Plaintiff told
Defendant Price he was going to get in trouble after Plaintiff obtained
evidence proving Defendant Price lied and ransacked Plaintiff’s cell.
Defendant Price told Plaintiff, “do it and you’ll see what’ll happen.” (Id.).
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Plaintiff states that Defendant Price’s comment bothered him, and he
decided not to try and prove Defendant Price’s misconduct. (Id.).
Around 1:30 p.m., Defendant Price came to Plaintiff’s cell with
other officers and told Plaintiff to submit to restraints because he was
going on property restriction. Plaintiff refused, and Defendant Price left
to find a supervisor. 	Plaintiff packed his property and tried messaging
his family on his tablet. 	Defendants Price and Turner arrived, and
Defendant Turner ordered Plaintiff to drop the tablet and submit to
restraints. 	Plaintiff said he would comply after sending his message.
Defendant Turner left and returned with a mental health counselor but
then sent the counselor away before she could do anything. (Id. at 7-8).
Defendants Price and Turner and other staff prepared to enter
Plaintiff’s cell, but Plaintiff’s “submissive posture prevented the use of
chemical agents.” 	(Id. 	at 8). 	Plaintiff was searched and placed in
restraints. Defendant Price and another officer then entered the cell, and
Plaintiff allegedly could hear them damaging his property. 	Plaintiff
alleges 	a 	camera 	captured 	Defendant 	Turner 	watching 	Plaintiff’s
property being destroyed. (Id. at 8-9).
When 	Defendant 	Price 	put 	Plaintiff 	on 	property 	restriction,
Plaintiff “assumed” it was because Defendant Price learned about a civil
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complaint Plaintiff was drafting before the disciplinary hearing. 	(Id. at
9). 	Plaintiff alleges he asked the officer with him “what’s going on?” to
which the officer responded, “Price said you did or said something to him
that’s all I know.” 	(Id.). 	When Plaintiff re-entered his cell, he found all
of his property removed except for a toothbrush and toilet paper.
On June 21, 2024, Plaintiff received another disciplinary report in
Defendant Turner’s name for disobeying the June 20th order to drop his
tablet and submit to a search. 	(Id. at 9-10). 	Plaintiff’s property was
returned on June 23, 2024, but he assumed it was not his because the
property did not resemble Plaintiff’s. Plaintiff was not allowed to inspect
the property before signing for it. Defendants Price and Coates were
allegedly responsible for inventorying Plaintiff’s property. 	Plaintiff’s
property was in disarray when it was returned to his cell. 	The property
had a moldy smell, his papers were damaged, and he was missing books
and magazines. 	Plaintiff raised this issue to the dorm supervisor who
responded, “what do you want me to do about it?” (Id. at 10-11). Plaintiff
submitted a grievance regarding the damaged property, but it was
denied. (Id. at 11).
Plaintiff submitted an informal grievance about the moldy papers,
but the grievance was returned. 	Plaintiff showed the moldy papers to
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the warden who said to write to “McDuff” about the issue. (Id. at 11-12).
Plaintiff states there is no “McDuff” and that this was a way to return
the grievance without action. Plaintiff sought various recordings to show
that Defendant Turner’s basis for the property restriction was untrue.
(Id. at 12).
On July 15, 2024, prison staff went to Plaintiff’s cell to place him on
property restriction. (Id. at 13). Plaintiff refused to submit to restraints,
so that a use of force camera could capture his moldy property. Plaintiff
states he was not given a disciplinary report for refusing to comply but
that the use of force was never documented. Plaintiff asked for copies of
the property restriction forms for June 20, 2024, and July 15, 2024, but
was told they did not exist. Plaintiff claims this shows concealment of
Defendants’ actions by evidence destruction. (Id.).
Plaintiff brings Fourteenth Amendment retaliation claims and
state law claims for loss of property against all three Defendants. 	For
relief, Plaintiff seeks damages and attorney’s fees. (Doc. 17 at 17-22).
II. Statutory Screening Standard
To 	survive 	dismissal 	at 	screening, 	“a 	complaint 	must 	contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
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(cleaned up). 	The plausibility standard is met only where the facts
alleged enable “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Id. 	Plausibility means
“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Id. 	“Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.” 	Id. (cleaned up).
Determining if a complaint states a plausible claim is “a context-
specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The Court is “not
bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
Id. at 678 (cleaned up). 	And “bare assertions” that “amount to nothing
more 	than 	a 	formulaic 	recitation 	of 	the 	elements” 	of 	a 	claim 	“are
conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true.” 	Id. at 681 (cleaned up).
“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations.” 	Id. at 679.
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III. Discussion
A. Plaintiff 	has 	failed 	to 	allege 	a 	plausible 	Fourteenth
Amendment due process violation resulting from the prison
disciplinary proceeding.
Count 	1 of the 	second amended complaint 	alleges Fourteenth
Amendment 	claims 	against 	all 	three 	Defendants 	regarding 	his
disciplinary hearing. 	(Doc. 17 at 17-19). 	Although the second amended
complaint is not entirely clear, the Court construes this claim as being
brought under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 	The
Due 	Process 	Clause 	encompasses 	a 	substantive 	component 	and 	a
procedural component. 	Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109, 1118 (11th
Cir. 2013). 	Because Plaintiff’s allegations involve challenges to prison
disciplinary proceedings, he appears to be asserting a procedural due
process claim. 	Procedural due process claims have three elements: 	“(1)
a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest;
(2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.” Yarbrough
v. Decatur Hous. Auth., 941 F.3d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir. 2019). 	But
importantly, “the fact that prisoners retain rights under the Due Process
Clause in no way implies that these rights are not subject to restrictions
imposed by the nature of the regime to which they have been lawfully
committed.” 	Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). 	“Prison
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disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the
full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not
apply.” 	Id.
The gist of Plaintiff’s allegations is that Defendant Price gave false
testimony in a hearing on an allegedly false disciplinary charge, falsified
a basis for property restriction, and damaged Plaintiff’s property. 	“The
filing of a false disciplinary charge, standing alone, does not state a
constitutional claim. The Constitution requires only that the plaintiff be
afforded due process at the institutional hearing (on the allegedly false
charge), which represents the plaintiff’s opportunity to expose falsities or
inaccuracies.” 	Hall v. Poppell, No. 2:20cv380, 2021 WL 3602807, at *5
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2021).
There are “specific hearing procedures that prison disciplinary
panels must comply with to satisfy the standards of procedural due
process in the prison setting.” 	O’Bryant v. Finch, 637 F.3d 1207, 1213
(11th Cir. 2011). “[P]risoners must receive: (1) advance written notice of
the charges against them; (2) an opportunity for the inmate to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence, so long as doing so is
consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals; and (3) a
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written statement by the factfinder outlining the evidence relied on and
the reasons for the disciplinary action.” 	Id.
The 	second 	amended 	complaint 	fails 	to 	plausibly 	allege 	that
Plaintiff did not receive advanced written notice of the charges, that he
was denied an opportunity to call witness or present evidence, or that he
did not receive a written statement outlining the evidence behind and
reasons for the disciplinary action.2 	Instead, Plaintiff takes issue with
being 	found 	guilty 	of 	disciplinary 	charges 	based 	on 	allegedly 	false
information. 	Again, however, the “filing of a false disciplinary charge,
standing alone, does not state a constitutional claim.” 	Poppell, 2021 WL
3602807, at *5. 	Because his allegations do not show that the hearing
failed to comply with procedural due process requirements, Plaintiff fails
to plausibly allege due process claims regarding the disciplinary hearing.
Plaintiff essentially argues that his procedural due process rights
were violated because his disciplinary conviction was based on Defendant
Price’s false testimony. (Doc. 17 at 17). Procedural due process requires
2 Plaintiff admits he received a written disciplinary report accusing him
of a spoken threat and received a hearing on the report at which he
presented evidence in the form of Defendant Price’s testimony. (Doc. 17
at 5-6). 	And nowhere does Plaintiff allege that he did not receive a
written statement summarizing the findings against Plaintiff.
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that “the findings of the prison disciplinary board are supported by some
evidence in the record.” 	Superintendent, Massachusetts Corr. Inst.,
Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). 	“Due process in this context
does 	not 	require 	examination 	of 	the 	entire 	record, 	independent
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.
And the ‘some evidence’ standard is satisfied by even a meager showing,
so long as the record is not so devoid of evidence as to render the
tribunal’s determination arbitrary.” 	Smart v. England, 93 F.4th 1283,
1290 (11th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). 	In other words, the “decision need
only have some basis in fact.” Yarbrough, 941 F.3d at 1028 (cleaned up).
Though Plaintiff disagrees with the outcome, Plaintiff’s disciplinary
conviction was based on “some evidence.” That evidence was Defendant
Price’s statements “in the DR witness statement[.]” 	(Doc. 17 at 6).
Plaintiff argues these statements were false, but that does not constitute
a due process violation because the statements, even if false, still are
some evidence that Plaintiff committed the infractions. See Hill, 472 U.S.
at 456-57 (holding a disciplinary panel complied with due process when
convicting prisoner based on oral testimony and written report by prison
guard); see also Murray v. Givens, 2018 WL 3463309, at *4 (N.D. Ala.
May 14, 2018) (“Due process requires only that an inmate be afforded a
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hearing on the charges against him. Therefore, a prisoner’s allegation of
false disciplinary charges fails to state a claim so long as due process was
provided.” (cleaned up)), adopted, 2018 WL 3455692 (N.D. Ala. July 18,
2018). 	Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that his
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights were violated by
Defendant Price giving false testimony at the disciplinary hearing.
B. Plaintiff 	has 	failed 	to 	plausibly 	allege 	a 	Fourteenth
Amendment due process claim involving the destruction of
his property.
Plaintiff has also failed to state a plausible Fourteenth Amendment
due 	process 	claim 	involving 	the 	destruction 	of 	his 	property. 	As
mentioned above, the Due Process Clause encompasses substantive and
procedural 	components. 	Substantive 	due 	process 	protects 	only
“fundamental” rights. 	Kentner v. City of Sanibel, 750 F.3d 1274, 1279
(11th Cir. 2014). 	Fundamental rights “are protected from certain state
actions regardless of the procedures the state uses.” 	Doe v. Moore, 410
F.3d 1337, 1343 (11th Cir. 2005). In contrast, “areas in which substantive
rights are created only by state law . . . are not subject to substantive due
process protection . . . because substantive due process rights are created
only by the Constitution.” 	Lewis v. Brown, 409 F.3d 1271, 1272-73 (11th
Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). 	Thus, such state-law rights “are protected by
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procedural, not substantive, due process[.]” 	DeKalb Stone, Inc. v. Cnty.
of DeKalb, Ga., 106 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997).
Property interests are generally created and defined by state law—
not the U.S. Constitution. 	Greenbriar Village, L.L.C. v. Mountain Brook
City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2003). 	They are not fundamental
rights and are not entitled to substantive due process protection. 	See id.
at 1262-63 (“[N]on-legislative deprivations of state-created rights . . .
cannot support a substantive due process claim[.]”). 	Because property
rights 	are 	not 	fundamental, 	Plaintiff 	fails 	to 	plausibly 	allege 	a
substantive due process claim based on his property being damaged.
Busse v. Lee Cnty., Fla., 317 F. App’x 968, 973 (11th Cir. 2009) (affirming
dismissal of substantive due process claim because “[p]roperty rights
would not be fundamental since they are based on state law” and thus
the plaintiff “could not bring a viable substantive due process claim based
on the alleged denial of a state-defined property right”); see also Regions
Bank v. Hyman, 91 F. Supp. 3d 1234, 1243 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (“A claim for
deprivation 	of 	property 	without 	due 	process 	under 	the 	Fourteenth
Amendment is not one for violation of substantive due process . . . .”).
As to procedural due process, the Supreme Court has unequivocally
held that an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state
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actor “does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful
postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 533 (1984). 	Under Florida law, a person may file a tort action
in state court to recover damages for destruction of property. 	See Fla.
Stat. § 768.28. 	And also under Florida law, a plaintiff “can sue the
officers for the conversion of his personal property.” 	Jackson v. Hill, 569
F. App’x 697, 698 (11th Cir. 2014) (affirming dismissal of procedural due
process claim where plaintiff alleged that officials “denied him access to
personal property”). 	Thus, Plaintiff has a meaningful, post-deprivation
state law remedy available to challenge the alleged loss of his property.
See Loor v. Bailey, 708 F. App’x 992, 994-95 (11th Cir. 2017) (“The
existence of § 768.28 provides Loor with a meaningful, post-deprivation
remedy to challenge the loss of property.” (cleaned up))
C. Plaintiff has failed to state a Fourteenth Amendment due
process claim for retaliation.
The second amended complaint alleges retaliation against Plaintiff
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 	More specifically, Plaintiff
claims that Defendant Price violated the Fourteenth Amendment by
testifying falsely at the disciplinary hearing and destroying Plaintiff’s
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property in retaliation for Plaintiff exercising his due process right to call
Defendant Price as a witness during a disciplinary proceeding. (Doc. 17
at 17). 	This Fourteenth Amendment retaliation claim fails because
“neither the Supreme Court nor [the Eleventh Circuit] have held that
there is a separate constitutional right to be free from retaliation for the
exercise of a due-process right.” 	Zen Group, Inc. v. Agency for Health
Care Admin., 80 F.4th 1319, 1326 (11th Cir. 2023) (affirming qualified
immunity dismissal of various claims, including due process retaliation
claim). 	To the extent Plaintiff’s second amended complaint alleges that
the alleged retaliatory conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause, the claim would similarly fail.3 	See Ratliff v.
DeKalb Cnty, Ga., 62 F.3d 338, 340 (11th Cir. 1995) (explaining that “no
3 Plaintiff has argued that two circuit courts have permitted prisoners to
assert retaliation claims that are based on something other than the
exercise of free speech under the First Amendment. 	(Doc. 18 at 2). 	The
Court would first note that one of the cases cited by Plaintiff—Rouse v.
Benson, 193 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 1999)—is a First Amendment retaliation
case and adds no support to Plaintiff’s argument. See Rouse, 193 F.3d at
940 (stating that the plaintiff claimed prison officials violated “his First
Amendment rights of free speech and free exercise of religion”). 	In any
event, 	the 	Eleventh 	Circuit 	has made 	clear that 	its 	precedent 	has
“cabin[ed] the scope of the anti-retaliation right to specific constitutional
provisions—most often the First Amendment.” Zen Group, Inc., 80 F.4th
at 1328. And it has “never recognized a general, free-floating right to be
free from retaliation.” 	Id.
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established right exists under the equal protection clause to be free from
retaliation”).
D. Supplemental 	jurisdiction 	should 	be 	declined 	over
Plaintiff’s state law claim.
If the federal claims are dismissed as discussed above, then the
remaining claim would be a state law loss of property claim. (Doc. 17 at
19). 	A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over state law claims when it has “dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
A court’s decision “to exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction after
dismissing every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely
discretionary.” 	Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639
(2009). The Eleventh Circuit has “encouraged” district courts to exercise
that discretion and decline supplemental jurisdiction “the federal claims
have been dismissed prior to trial.” 	Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d
1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004). 	Thus, a court “will rarely err by declining
supplemental jurisdiction after the federal claims that supported its
jurisdiction are dismissed.” 	Silas v. Sheriff of Broward Cnty., Fla., 55
F.4th 863, 866 (11th Cir. 2022). 	The stage of the federal proceedings is
important, with the “preference for declining supplemental jurisdiction”
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being “particularly strong when the federal claims have dropped out of
the lawsuit in its early stages.” 	68V BTR Holdings, LLC v. City of
Fairhope, 737 F. Supp. 3d 1222, 1239 (S.D. Ala. 2024) (cleaned up).
Considering that the current case is in its infancy, the Court should
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law loss of
property claim if the federal claims are dismissed as recommended. 	See
Royal Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 31-32 (2025) (“[I]f
the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction . . . supplemental jurisdiction persists, [but] the district court
need not exercise it: 	Instead, the court may (and indeed, ordinarily
should) kick the case to state court.”).
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons above, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	The federal claims in the second amended complaint (Doc. 17)
be DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1) for
failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
2. 	Supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law loss of
property 	claim 	be 	declined 	and 	such 	claim 	DISMISSED 	without
prejudice to Plaintiff pursuing it in state court.
3. 	All pending motions be DENIED as moot.
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4. 	The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment accordingly
and close this case.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 16th day of March 2026.
/s/ Zachary C. Bolitho
Zachary C. Bolitho
United States Magistrate Judge
Notice To The Parties
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must
be 	filed 	within 	fourteen 	days 	of 	the 	date 	of 	the 	Report 	and
Recommendation. 	Any 	different 	deadline 	that 	may 	appear 	on 	the
electronic 	docket 	is 	for 	the 	court’s 	internal 	use 	only 	and 	does 	not
control. 	An objecting party must serve a copy of the objections on all
other parties. 	A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s
findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation
waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. 	See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28
U.S.C. § 636.
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