BARNETTE-KRUGER v. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ANDREW LAWRENCE 	)
BARNETTE-KRUGER, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-00831 (UNA)
)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, a state prisoner, has filed a pro se “Petition for Habeas Corpus” (“Pet.”), ECF No.
1, and an Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. 	For the
explained below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s IFP Application and dismisses this matter without
prejudice.
Plaintiff’s “Petition” bears several defects. 	First, the Petition is not captioned for this
District––it is captioned for “the Federal District Court of the United States,” Pet. at 1, in
contravention of Federal Rule 10(a) and D.C. Local Civil Rule 5.1(g). 	Second, it is unsigned, in
contravention of Federal Rule 11(a). See generally id. Third, although the pleading is labeled as
a “Petition for Habeas Corpus,” id. at 1, Plaintiff does not, in fact, seek a writ of habeas corpus or
otherwise challenge the legality of his conviction, sentence, or detention.1 Instead, he alleges that
“the United States of America has been under attack via torroidal induction via gamma wave
propulsion through the Artifice Stratagem,” id. at 1, and that “the CIA wants Donald J. Trump, Jr.
1 	The Court is not bound by Plaintiff’s characterization of his cause of action by his pleading’s title, and is
instead obligated to construe his claims by the allegations raised and the relief sought. See McLean v. United States,
No. 90-0318-01, 2006 WL 543999, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar.3, 2006) (quoting Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375,
381–82 (2003)).
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assassinated,” id. at 2 (cleaned up). He contends that the government has engaged in a treasonous
criminal conspiracy “from within” in violation of the Constitution and the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. See id. at 1–3. The relief sought is unclear, but it appears
that he would like criminal charges to be brought against the CIA or others. See id. at 3.
Relevant here, a pleading “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A pleading that lacks “an arguable basis
either in law or in fact” is frivolous, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), and here,
Plaintiff’s Petition falls squarely into this category. 	Indeed, this Court is obligated to dismiss
Plaintiff’s Petition because “the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly
incredible,” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992), and “postulat[e] events and
circumstances of a wholly fanciful kind,” Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1307–08 (D.C. Cir.
1981); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), and the Court cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction
over such claims, see Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (“Over the years, this Court
has repeatedly held that the federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within
their jurisdiction if they are ‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.’”)
(quoting Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579 (1904)); Tooley v.
Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (examining cases dismissed “for patent
insubstantiality,” including where the plaintiff allegedly “was subjected to a campaign of
surveillance and harassment deriving from uncertain origins.”).
Furthermore, insofar as Plaintiff demands the institution of criminal charges, he may not
do so. 	The Court lacks jurisdiction to compel an investigation or criminal charges by any law
enforcement agency. See Otero v. U.S. Attorney General, 832 F.2d 141, 141–42 (11th Cir. 1987)
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(per curiam); see also Jafree v. Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 1982). The Executive Branch
has absolute discretion to make such decisions and they are not subject to judicial review. United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974); see Shoshone–Bannock Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476,
1480–81 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234, 234–35 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see also
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“[A]n agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce,
whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's
absolute discretion.”).
Finally, Plaintiff’s IFP Application is denied. Like his Petition, Plaintiff’s IFP Application
is unsigned and unsworn, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), and it is also
uncaptioned, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a); D.C. LCvR 5.1(c)(1). 	It also provides absolutely no
information about his current financial circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), (b)(1)–(2); see
also Paracha v. Bush, 374 F. Supp. 2d 118, 120–21 (D.D.C. 2005) (explaining that, pursuant to
the applicable requirements, “an in forma pauperis application [must] be accompanied by an
affidavit containing, inter alia, a statement of all assets petitioner possesses, . . . an[d] [an] estimate
of . . . monthly expenses,” and denying the petitioner’s IFP application as insufficiently detailed);
Scott v. City of Chicago, No. 25-cv-01284, 2025 WL 1684118 (D.D.C. Jun. 12, 2025) (same).
Furthermore, Plaintiff has not provided a copy a certified copy of his trust fund account statement
(or institutional equivalent), including the supporting ledger sheets, for the six-month period
immediately preceding the filing of this case, as required under the PLRA. 	See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(2).
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Accordingly, and for these reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s IFP Application is denied, and
this matter is dismissed without prejudice. 	A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum
Opinion.
DATE: May 26, 2026 	/s/ CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
United States District Judge
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