WOODALL v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
NICHOLAS WOODALL, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	) 	Civil Action No. 1:25-mc-00146 (UNA)
)
)
v. 	)
)
)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On December 11, 2025, the Court entered a Minute Order directing Plaintiff, who had
provided only a P.O. Box address, in contravention of D.C. LCvR 5.1(c)(1), to within 30 days, file
a notice listing his full residence address and other required contact information, with the option
of filing that information in a notice under seal, or alternatively, file a motion setting forth his
reasons for use of the P.O. Box address. Plaintiff has since filed both a Motion for Leave to Use
P.O. Box, ECF No. 4, with a Supplemental Notice, ECF No. 5, and a Motion for Leave to File
Residence Address Under Seal, ECF No. 6. Upon review, the Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion for
Leave to File Residence Address Under Seal and denies his Motion for use of the P.O. Box address.
The Court also grants Plaintiff’s pending Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, ECF
No. 2. However, for the reasons stated below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Rule 27 Petition (“Pet.”),
ECF No. 1, dismisses this matter without prejudice.
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, has filed a Rule 27 against the “District of Columbia Court
(Superior Court — Moultrie Courthouse), by and through the Executive Office.” Pet. at 1. 	He
alleges that he was a victim of “a battery that occurred at the Moultrie Courthouse on Jan. 16th
2025, where [he] was stabbed with a needle or sharp object tipped-in or injecting a toxic substance;
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while [he] was filing a civil document in room 5000,” and courthouse personnel have allegedly
refused to review or release “CCTV surveillance footage, access logs, electronic communications,
and audit trails,” related to the alleged incident without a subpoena. See Pet. at 5; Pet. Exhibits,
ECF No. 1-1. He demands that the Court enter an order directing preservation of evidence and
directing unnamed DC Moultrie Executive Officer(s) and records custodians to offer declarations
and appear for depositions. See Pet. at 9–10.
A Rule 27 petition may be granted “[i]f the court is satisfied that the perpetuation of the
testimony may prevent a failure or delay of justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 27(a)(3). To comport with
Rule 27, a party must (1) demonstrate he expects to bring an action in the federal courts but cannot
currently do so; (2) explain the subject matter of the expected action; (3) describe the facts he
intends to establish through the desired testimony and the reasons for needing to perpetuate that
testimony; (4) identify the adverse parties and the parties to be deposed by name and address; and
(5) serve the petition in accordance with the applicable rules. 	See Fed. R. Civ. P. 27(a); Penn.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1371, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same). Plaintiff has fallen
well short of this standard.
First, Rule 27 applies to “situations where, for one reason or another, testimony might be
lost to a prospective litigant unless taken immediately, without waiting until after a suit or other
legal proceeding is commenced.” Lucas v. Judge Advoc. Gen., Naval Crim. Invest. Servs., 245
F.R.D. 8, 9 (D.D.C. 2007) (citation omitted), aff’d, 279 Fed. Appx. 11 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per
curiam). More specifically, Rule 27 petitions are generally granted only when a witness will be
unavailable because of age or infirmity. See Penn. Mut., 68 F.3d at 1376; Petition of Kunimoto,
No. 96-MS-232, 1996 WL 622094, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 16, 1996) (same).
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Plaintiff has not asserted that testimony could be lost because a potential witness is gravely
ill or injured and in danger of dying. 	See Penn. Mut., 68 F.3d at 1374 (finding that, where the
“appellants offered no evidence regarding [the deponent’s] age or health which suggest[ed] he may
be unavailable for any trial[,]” they failed to satisfy “Rule 27's requirement that a petitioner
demonstrate an immediate need to perpetuate testimony.”). 	Indeed, Plaintiff has not even
identified a specific deponent, which is insufficient. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 27(a)(1)(E); Penn. Mut.,
68 F.3d at 1374; see also In Re Andrews, No. 11–45, 2011 WL 7168675, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 2,
2011) (denying Rule 27 petition where the plaintiff failed to to identify a specific deponent, and
generally sought to “depose an unnamed ‘Informant Claims Examiner,’” and because he did “not
contend that the proposed deponent’s age or health mandate[d] the immediate need for such
testimony.”) (citing Kendrick v. Irwin, 77 F. App’x 770, 771 (6th Cir. 2003)), R&R adopted sub
nom. Andrews v. United States, 2012 WL 404818 (S.D. Ohio, Feb. 08, 2012).
Second, Plaintiff has not established that he is currently unable to file a lawsuit. 	To the
contrary, Plaintiff has already filed an assault and battery lawsuit in D.C. Superior Court arising
from the alleged incident, see Notice of Related Case, ECF No. 3 (citing Woodall v. Unknown,
No. 2025-CAB-004829 (D.C. Super. Ct. filed Jul. 24, 2025)), which is active and ongoing, and in
which the Superior Court has recently ordered officials to produce a declaration and video footage
responsive to Plaintiff’s subpoena, and it has also ordered an in camera review of same, see
Woodall, No. 2025-CAB-004829, Dkt. at Order (Apr. 17, 2026).1
Accordingly, Plaintiff can indeed to bring the intended lawsuit and demand the relief
sought, because he has, and that also moots the relief sought in this case. See In Re Andrews, 2011
1 	A court may take judicial notice of the docket and facts on the public record in other court proceedings. See
Covad Commc'ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 407 F.3d 1220, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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WL 7168675, at *2 (finding that the plaintiff failed to show that he was currently unable to bring
suit because he had recently filed at least three lawsuits, and because his pro se status and inability
to obtain counsel bore no relevance).
Furthermore, as a general rule, applicable here, this Court lacks jurisdiction to interfere
with the proceedings or review decisions made by the D.C. Superior Court, see Fleming v. United
States, 847 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D.D.C. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1150 (1995), and a federal
court cannot intervene in ongoing local proceedings, see District Properties Assocs. v. District of
Columbia, 743 F.2d 21, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), and its progeny restrains federal courts from interfering in ongoing state judicial
proceedings.”).
Third, Plaintiff has not presented “a particularized reason why the deposition is needed to
prevent against loss.” Petition of Kunimoto, 1996 WL 622094, at *3 (citing Penn. Mut., 68 F.3d
at 1375). Plaintiff vaguely conjectures that the materials he seeks are at risk of “automatic deletion
or overwrite under standard retention policies[,]” see Pet. at 5, but without more specificity, this is
no more than ipse dixit, see Lucas, 245 F.R.D. at 10 (finding that plaintiff’s mere “delay and
difficulty” in seeking agency materials, and his conclusory assertions that there had been “a delay
in justice and . . . a strong possibility that . . . documents w[ould] be lost, resulting in a miscarriage
of justice,” did not show that he was unable to bring his claims or that evidence was at risk of loss)
(citation omitted); see also Application of Checkosky, 142 F.R.D. at 7–8 (general concerns about
the passage of time and the fading of memories do not constitute a particularized showing that the
testimony needs to be taken in advance of the contemplated action.); Lombard’s, Inc. v. Prince
Mfg., Inc., 753 F.2d 974, 976 (11th Cir. 1985) (Rule 27 petition denied which alleged only that
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witnesses were not “immune from matters of life (and death)” and that petitioner was “genuinely
concerned” that documents could be destroyed), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986).
Put differently, Rule 27 may only be employed in pursuit of “known testimony,”
Application of Checkosky, 142 F.R.D. at 7, because it is “not intended to be used as a discovery
statute,” Lucas, 245 F.R.D. at 9 (citation omitted), “and therefore may not be used as ‘a method of
discovery to determine whether a cause of action exists; and, if so, against whom action should be
instituted[,]’” id. at 9–10 (quoting In re Boland, 79 F.R.D. 665, 668 (D.D.C. 1978); citing Petition
of Gurnsey, 223 F. Supp. 359, 360 (D.D.C. 1963); Biddulph v. United States, 239 F.R.D. 291, 293
(D.D.C. 2007)). 	Here, Plaintiff explicitly demands discovery, see Pet. at 1–2, 6, 10, which is,
simply put, “an abuse” of Rule 27. See Wright, Miller & Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure,
§ 2071 at 651–652; see also Petition of Kunimoto, 1996 WL 622094, at *3 (“Kunimoto’s petition
must be denied because it seeks discovery, rather than the perpetuation of known testimony as
required by Rule 27.”). 	Accordingly, for all of the above-stated reasons, Plaintiff has failed to
carry his burden under Rule 27.
For all of these reasons, Plaintiff’s Petition is denied, and this matter is dismissed without
prejudice. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: 	April 27, 2026 	___________/s/____________
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge
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