IN RE ALL ASSETS HELD IN ACCOUNT JW3083094 IN THE NAME OF CARINALLI, S.A. AT JEFFERIES, LLC et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
No. 25-mc-96-TSC-MJS
IN RE: ALL ASSETS HELD IN ACCOUNT
JW3083094 IN THE NAME OF
CARINALLI, S.A. AT JEFFERIES, LLC, et
al.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The United States applied for a restraining order under 28 U.S.C. § 2467(d)(3) to preserve
assets held in U.S. bank accounts in the names of Respondents Sara Silvia Goldring Waisbiot
(“Goldring”), her business partners, and her businesses, that may be subject to forfeiture in
Uruguayan criminal proceedings. 	See Appl. at 2−4, ECF No. 1. 	The Uruguayan proceedings
involved allegations that Goldring misappropriated and fraudulently managed client accounts and
investments through brokerage companies she controlled, resulting in millions of dollars of losses
to her clients. See id. at 2, 5. In December 2022, a Uruguayan court ordered restraint of assets in
several of Respondents’ U.S. bank accounts and requested the United States’ assistance in
enforcing its orders. See id. at 2−3. In June 2025, the Attorney General’s designee, the Chief of
the Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section, found it in the interest of justice to certify the
Uruguayan restraining orders for enforcement. 	See id. at 12; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2467(b)(2),
(d)(3)(B)(ii).
The court referred the case to a Magistrate Judge for full case management up to and
including issuance of a Report and Recommendation on any dispositive issues. July 23, 2025 Min.
Order. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh, and on October 6, 2025, he issued
a Report and Recommendation recommending that the court grant the Government’s Application
and enter the requested restraining order. R. & R. at 22, ECF No. 14.
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Respondents timely objected to the Report. 	Objs., ECF No. 16. Having considered the
parties’ briefing on the Government’s application for a restraining order, the Report and
Recommendation, Respondents’ objections, the Government’s response, and the record, the court
adopts in full the Report’s recommendations.
I. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“District courts must apply a de novo standard of review when considering objections to,
or 	adoption 	of, 	a 	magistrate 	judge’s Report and Recommendation.” 	Means 	v. 	District 	of
Columbia, 999 F. Supp. 2d 128, 132 (D.D.C. 2013). The court may then “accept, reject, or modify
the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge
with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).
Five criteria must be met for a court to enforce a foreign restraining order: (1) the United
States and the foreign government that issued the restraining order must be parties to a formal
international agreement providing for mutual forfeiture assistance, 28 U.S.C. § 2467(a)(1); (2) the
Attorney General or her designee must certify that it is in the interest of justice to enforce the
foreign order, see id. § 2467(b)(2); (3) the foreign order must be issued in a manner consistent with
due process, see id. §§ 2467(d)(1)(A), (d)(3)(A)(ii); (4) the foreign court must have subject matter
jurisdiction, see id. §§ 2467(d)(1)(C), (d)(3)(A)(ii); and (5) the foreign order must not be
fraudulently obtained, see id. §§ 2467(d)(1)(E), (d)(3)(A)(ii).
II. 	ANALYSIS
Respondents do not challenge the Report’s determination that the Government has satisfied
the statutory criteria listed above or its rejection of their constitutional claims. See R. & R. at 6−9,
20−21. 	Respondents also omit any challenge to the Report’s rejection of a “dual forfeitability”
requirement—i.e., that the foreign-law violation must also trigger forfeiture under U.S. law—
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under § 2467(d)(3), or its conclusion that even if such a requirement applied, it would be satisfied
because the underlying conduct would satisfy the elements of wire and securities fraud. 	Id. at
12−17. Having considered the relevant materials, the court adopts the Report’s recommendation
as to those issues. 	Respondents raise two main objections to the Report: they argue “that the
Application impermissibly seeks to enforce a foreign restitution order” and “that the government
failed to show . . . that the proceeds of a crime can be traced to the Subject Accounts.” Objections
at 2. Judge Sharbaugh addressed and rejected each argument in his Report, and reviewing them
de novo, the court concurs with the Report.
First, Respondents argue that the Application impermissibly seeks to enforce a foreign
restitution order as opposed to a forfeiture order. Objections at 3. But as the Report notes, and as
Respondents concede, Respondents forfeited this argument by raising it for the first time at oral
argument before Judge Sharbaugh. See R. & R. at 9; Objs. at 19; U.S. ex rel. Davis v. D.C., 793
F.3d 120, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Respondents’ contention that they “did not realize it was a distinct
argument” until reading portions of “the English translations of Uruguayan Criminal Procedure
Code,” Objections at 20, does not provide sufficient “explanation, much less exceptional
circumstances, to excuse [their] failure to” raise the argument, Davis, 793 F.3d at 127. As Judge
Sharbaugh explained, “the factual predicate for this point—whether the underlying foreign orders
were aimed at restitution or forfeiture—was plainly apparent to Respondents when they filed their
brief.” R. & R. at 10. Raising the argument in their Objections to the Report does not cure their
failure to preserve it before Judge Sharbaugh. See Taylor v. D.C., 205 F. Supp. 3d 75, 89 (D.D.C.
2016) (“[F]ailure to present an argument to the Magistrate Judge constitutes a waiver of that
argument.”); Brown v. D.C., 324 F. Supp. 3d 154, 159 (D.D.C. 2018) (explaining that “objections
cannot ‘present new initiatives’ that were not put before the magistrate judge” (quoting Taylor,
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205 F.Supp.3d at 79)); Bulovic v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 8185732, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 27, 2023)
(holding argument forfeited when raised for first time in reply brief before Magistrate Judge).
Accordingly, the court declines to consider this argument.
Second, Respondents argue that under Luan v. United States, 722 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir.
2013), the Government must show that the U.S. bank accounts at issue contain the proceeds of a
crime. See Objs. at 23; Opp’n to Appl. at 22–23, ECF No. 5. In Luan, the D.C. Circuit held that
a federal court may issue a restraining order under § 2467(d)(3) when, among other requirements,
“the property to be restrained represents the suspected proceeds of a ‘violation of foreign law.’”
Luan, 722 F.3d at 392 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2467(a)(2)(A)). The court agrees with the Report that
reading Luan to adopt a traceability requirement “simply reaches too far,” especially given that the
Luan court “did not limit the permissible scope of a restraining order under Section 2467(d)(3)
based on traceability to specific assets.” R. & R. at 19 n.11; see Resp. to Objs. at 24, ECF No. 17
(distinguishing property that “‘represents’” the “‘suspected proceeds’” from “actual proven
criminal proceeds” and arguing that Respondents’ U.S. bank accounts “‘represent[] suspected
proceeds’ . . . because they are named as the subject assets in the restraining orders entered by the
Uruguay Court and are subject to forfeiture under Uruguayan law upon Ms. Goldring’s conviction”
(emphasis in original) (quoting Luan, 722 F.3d at 392)). 	Respondents’ reliance on email
correspondence from Jesse Ormsby, a DOJ prosecutor, see Objs. at 24; ECF No. 5-23 at 2, merely
distracts from the “the salient question,” which is “whether Uruguayan law permits forfeiture
absent tracing, and Respondents present no argument—let alone authority—to suggest that it does
not,” R. & R. at 18 (emphasis added).
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated 	above, the court 	ADOPTS the report 	and 	ACCEPTS the
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recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. 	ECF No. 14. 	Accordingly, the court GRANTS the
Government’s Application. 	ECF No. 1. 	A separate restraining order will accompany this
Memorandum Opinion.
Date: December 17, 2025
Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge
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