DANTZLER v. FOSTER et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
OSCAR C. DANTZLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHARLOTTE H. FOSTER, Individually and in
her Capacity as Judge for Division (B) through
the 21st Judicial District Court for the Parish of
Livingston and their agents, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 24-cv-1322 (JMC)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Plaintiff Oscar C. Dantzler, a resident of Louisiana, has sued several Louisiana state
court judges, a state court clerk, and the Mayor and Chief of Police of Hammond, Louisiana.
Dantzler alleges that the judges and clerk illegally conspired to dismiss his lawsuits in Louisiana
state court. See ECF 1. His claims against the local officials regard their alleged failure to
investigate and prosecute his criminal complaint against another Louisiana resident. See ECF 3.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF 9, and
DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to transfer venue, ECF 7.1
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Court draws the facts from the Plaintiff’s complaint, ECF 1, as supplemented by his
other filings, including his request to amend the complaint to add additional Defendants, see
1 Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of citations has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by
omitting internal quotation marks, emphases, citations, and alterations and by altering capitalization. All pincites to
documents filed on the docket in this case are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the
top of each page.
Case 1:24-cv-01322-JMC Document 13 Filed 03/27/26 Page 1 of 7

2
ECF 3; Ho v. Garland, 106 F.4th 47, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (“We . . . consider a pro se litigant’s
complaint in light of all filings, including filings responsive to a motion to dismiss.”). The Court
understands his claims to be as follows: First, he sues Judges Charlotte Foster and William Dykes
of the 21st Judicial District Court of Louisiana, along with Gary Stanga, the Clerk of Court of the
Parish of Tangipahoa, for participating in a conspiracy to have his cases pending in that district
improperly dismissed, including by working together with opposing counsel to “overlook” his
complaints and fail to send him court mail. See, e.g., ECF 1 at 4, 6, 9; ECF 3 at 2–3, 13. Throughout
his confusing and prolix complaint, he purports to assert various constitutional, statutory, and state
law claims, and seeks damages and a request for mandamus regarding the Louisiana court
proceedings. Second, he sues Edwin Bergeron and Peter Panepinto, the Chief of Police and Mayor,
respectively, of Hammond, Louisiana. He alleges that Bergeron and Panepinto have failed to
investigate his criminal complaints for identity theft against one Ashley Bass. See ECF 3 at 22–
23, 40–42. Here too, he alleges violation of his constitutional and civil rights, and again requests
mandamus relief, seemingly to compel prosecution of Bass.
Dantzler initially filed the suit against only Judges Foster and Dykes, ECF 1, but later
amended to include Stanga, Bergeron, and Panepinto, ECF 3 at 1, 21, 39. After Dantzler failed to
provide evidence that he served Defendants, the Court ordered him to show cause why the case
should not be dismissed for failure to serve and to prosecute. ECF 5. In response, Dantzler moved
to transfer the case to the Middle District of Louisiana, in the “interest of justice” conceding that
all defendants resided either in the Middle or Eastern Districts of Louisiana, “wherein all acts
giving rise to this action arose.” ECF 7 at 2. He also claimed to have successfully served
Defendants Foster and Dykes, id. at 2, who subsequently appeared. They moved to dismiss on
various grounds, including for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil
Case 1:24-cv-01322-JMC Document 13 Filed 03/27/26 Page 2 of 7

3
Procedure 12(b)(1), lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), improper venue under Rule
12(b)(3), defective service under Rule 12(b)(5), and failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
ECF 9. The Court then ordered Dantzler to respond to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. He instead
filed a document reiterating his desire to transfer the case. ECF 12.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
Defendants move to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and it is generally “presumed that a cause lies
outside [of] this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375,
377 (1994). If a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a claim, it must dismiss that
claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While pleadings by pro se litigants are generally held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, a pro se plaintiff still bears the burden
of establishing jurisdiction. Newby v. Obama, 681 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55 (D.D.C. 2010).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege facts sufficient to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). A pro se complaint must again “be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). But even a pro se plaintiff “must
plead factual matter that permits the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.”
Jones v. Horne, 634 F.3d 588, 596 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Finally, 	to 	“prevail 	on 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	for 	improper 	venue[] 	under 	Rule
12(b)(3)[,] . . . the defendant must present facts that will defeat the plaintiff’s assertion of venue.”
Ananiev v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 968 F. Supp. 2d 123, 129 (D.D.C. 2013). “Nevertheless, the
burden remains on the plaintiff to establish that venue is proper.” Id.
Case 1:24-cv-01322-JMC Document 13 Filed 03/27/26 Page 3 of 7

4
III. 	ANALYSIS
The Court first addresses the claims against Foster and Dykes, the only Defendants who
have appeared in the action. Despite being put on notice that he was obliged to respond to
Defendants’ motion to dismiss lest their arguments be deemed conceded, ECF 10, Dantzler opted
instead to reiterate his request to transfer venue, ECF 12. Because Dantzler has failed to oppose
Defendants’ motion, the Court will “treat the motion as conceded” under Local Civil Rule 7(b).
Washington v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 3d 185, 185 (D.D.C. 2017) (treating pro se litigant’s
failure to oppose motion as concession under LCvR 7(b) despite being advised in Fox order of this
potential consequence). Dantzler has also separately effectively conceded that venue is improper
in this district. See ECF 7; ECF 12.2
The Court will nevertheless address several of the moving Defendants’ grounds for
dismissal, because those grounds also demonstrate why the Court will deny Dantzler’s motion to
transfer the case to the Middle District of Louisiana in “the interest of justice.” See ECF 7 (citing
28 U.S.C. 1406(a)). Denial of such a request is proper when there are “substantive problems” with
the plaintiff’s asserted claims, including that they could not “properly be heard in any federal
court.” Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Indeed, “substantive problems” abound. Naartex Consulting Corp., 722 F.2d at 789. As
Defendants argue, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over many of Dantzler’s claims,
which in large part amount to a request to review the decisions of state courts in Louisiana. To the
2 Venue would be only proper in the District of Columbia under the general venue statute if all the Defendants resided
here, if a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim[s] occurred” here, or, if no other district
was appropriate, if “any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b)(1)–(3). None of these criteria are met here. Dantzler admits that “all defendants . . . reside in Louisiana,”
and that “all acts giving rise to this action arose” there. ECF 7 at 2. He makes no effort to claim that any Defendant is
subject to this Court’s personal jurisdiction. And in his motion to transfer to the Middle District of Louisiana, he also
acknowledges that “this court does not have proper jurisdiction to hear this matter,” which the court construes liberally
as addressing the venue issue (rather than other substantive issues of jurisdiction). Id.
Case 1:24-cv-01322-JMC Document 13 Filed 03/27/26 Page 4 of 7

5
extent that Dantzler attacks a final decision of Foster or Dykes, federal district courts may not hear
“cases that amount to the functional equivalent of an appeal from a state court.” Gray v. Poole,
275 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and
D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)). That includes when the plaintiff claims
“that the state judgment itself violates the [plaintiff’s] federal rights.” Johnson v. De Grandy,
512 U.S. 997, 1005–06 (1994). To the extent that he asks this Court to intervene in the state
proceedings through the use of writs of mandamus, he appears to premise jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361, which provides federal district courts jurisdiction over “any action in the nature of
mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform
a duty owed to the plaintiff.” See ECF 1 at 1 (petitioning for a “writ of mandamus for injunction
[sic] rel[ief]”); id. at 11. But federal courts—including a prior court in this district denying
Dantzler’s other cases against Louisiana judges—interpret section 1361 “to apply to employees of
the federal executive branch,” and cannot provide jurisdiction for relief against Louisiana state
officials. Dantzler v. Jorden, No. 24-cv-986, 2024 WL 4836403, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2024),
appeal dismissed, No. 24-7192, 2025 WL 1678129 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 13, 2025); United States v.
Choi, 818 F. Supp. 2d 79, 84 (D.D.C. 2011). And were there not jurisdictional problems with
Dantzler’s claims, a federal Court has strong prudential reasons to abstain from “interfer[ing] with
pending state judicial . . . proceedings.” Akbarieh v. Kissler, No. 25-cv-2196, 2026 WL 663220,
at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2026) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).
To the extent that Dantzler seeks damages against Foster and Dykes, those allegations fail
on the merits because they are barred by judicial immunity, which shields judges from claims for
money damages for “all actions taken in the judge’s judicial capacity, unless these actions are
taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction,” and therefore fail to state a claim under Rule
Case 1:24-cv-01322-JMC Document 13 Filed 03/27/26 Page 5 of 7

6
12(b)(6). Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S.
9, 11–12 (1991)); Smith v. Scalia, 44 F. Supp. 3d 28, 40 n.10 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding that absolute
judicial immunity is properly considered under Rule 12(b)(6)), aff’d, No. 14-5180, 2015 WL
13710107 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 14, 2015); Chambers v. Dep’t of Just., No. 24-cv-898, 2025 WL 740847,
at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2025) (same). Again, Dantzler has failed to respond to these arguments, let
alone allege facts in his materials showing that judicial immunity does not apply.
Stanga, Bergeron, and Panepinto have not appeared nor moved to dismiss, but the Court
will dismiss the claims against them as well. First, review of Dantzler’s amended complaint
indicates that the scope of the claims he brings against these three are more limited than those he
brings against Foster and Dykes, with the primary focus being a request for mandamus. But again,
the Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain a request for mandamus against these non-federal
officials. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action”). To the extent that Dantzler brings
additional claims against Stanga, Bergeron, and Panepinto, he has failed to present any evidence
that he has served these Defendants, despite being ordered to show such evidence and having been
told that his failure to serve would result in dismissal of his claims against them. See ECF 5. The
Court thus also dismisses any further pending claims against these three Defendants without
prejudice for failure to serve. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c), (m); Garlington v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth.,
303 F.R.D. 417, 418–19 (D.D.C 2014) (dismissing under similar circumstances); see also
Angellino v. Royal Fam. Al-Saud, 688 F.3d 771, 775 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“District courts have
inherent power to dismiss a case sua sponte for a plaintiff's failure to prosecute or otherwise
comply with a court order.”).
Case 1:24-cv-01322-JMC Document 13 Filed 03/27/26 Page 6 of 7

7
Finally, the Court also denies Dantzler’s request to transfer the claims against Stanga,
Bergeron, and Panepinto to the Middle District of Louisiana, given the “substantive problems”
with his claims. Naartex Consulting Corp., 722 F.2d at 789. In addition to the lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, his claims against Stanga are likely barred for reasons of judicial immunity.
See Sindram, 986 F.2d at 1460 (also extending immunity from damage suits to “clerks,” for the
“performance of tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process”). His claims against
Bergeron and Panepinto regarding his requests to investigate his allegations of identity theft, and
any damages claims against them present obvious problems of standing and qualified immunity.
See Dantzler v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., No. 24-cv-514, 2024 WL 5379295, at *10, *12
(M.D. La. Dec. 3, 2024) (rejecting Dantzler’s similar claims for these reasons), report and
recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 395480 (M.D. La. Feb. 4, 2025).
* 	* 	*
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF 9, is GRANTED, and
Plaintiff’s motion to transfer venue, ECF 7, is DENIED. The claims against all Defendants are
DISMISSED. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________
JIA M. COBB
United States District Judge
Date: March 27, 2026
Case 1:24-cv-01322-JMC Document 13 Filed 03/27/26 Page 7 of 7