HILADO v. MEDSTAR GEORGETOWN MEDICAL CENTER, INC.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
LIBERTY LACANILAO HILADO,
Plaintiff,
v.
MEDSTAR GEORGETOWN MEDICAL
CENTER, INC.,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 24-00007 (AHA)
Memorandum Opinion And Order
Liberty Hilado sued MedStar Georgetown Medical Center in a 13-count complaint arising
from alleged race and age discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation. After MedStar
answered the amended complaint and engaged in discovery, Hilado accepted an offer of judgment
that Medstar made under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, resolving all claims against MedStar,
and the court entered the judgment. The parties agree this court must now determine Hilado’s
entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
The court grants Hilado’s motion for fees in part and denies it in part.
I. Discussion
The parties agree that following MedStar’s offer, Hilado’s acceptance, and the court’s entry
of judgment, the court has discretion to award Hilado reasonable attorney’s fees. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(k) (stating that the court may “in its discretion” award “the prevailing party . . . a
reasonable attorney’s fee”); 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (same). “The most useful starting point for
determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983);
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see also DL v. District of Columbia, 924 F.3d 585, 588 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (explaining that the “basic
formula” for reasonable attorney’s fees is counsel’s reasonable hourly rate times the number of
hours reasonably expended on the litigation). The party seeking fees “bears the burden of
establishing entitlement to an award, documenting the appropriate hours, and justifying the
reasonableness of the rates.” Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C. Cir.
1995). The “essential goal” is “rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.” Fox v. Vice, 563
U.S. 826, 838 (2011).1
A. The Court Adopts Hilado’s Proposed Rates
The court first considers the reasonable hourly rates for counsel, which Hilado bears the
burden of establishing through evidence of “billing practices; the attorneys’ skill, experience, and
reputation; and the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” Covington, 57 F.3d at
1107. Hilado attaches a declaration from counsel attesting that counsel Stephen C. Swift and
Charity C. Swift have over 37 years and 14 years of experience, respectively, in litigating complex
federal employment cases. ECF No. 22-8 at 2. Hilado also attaches a rate table, which appears to
be the Laffey matrix adjusted based on the Legal Services Index (“LSI”). ECF No. 22-7; see also
Eley v. District of Columbia, 793 F.3d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (explaining that the LSI Laffey
matrix uses the Legal Services Index of the Bureau of Labor Statistics to adjust hourly rates for
inflation). Based on those submissions, Hilado proposes an hourly rate of $745 for Stephen Swift
and $675 for Charity Swift, which are lower than those in the rate table. See ECF No. 22-6 at 7;
ECF No. 22-7 at 3.
1 The law also allows a multiplier for “exceptional results,” to “compensate counsel for work of
exceptional quality as to which the lodestar award is inadequate.” Save Our Cumberland
Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 826 F.2d 43, 52–53 (D.C. Cir. 1987). There is no argument for a
multiplier here.
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MedStar does not challenge the reasonableness of the LSI Laffey matrix as applied to this
case or offer any alternative table, data, or rates. MedStar argues that Hilado has not justified the
proposed rates for two reasons. First, it challenges counsel’s “billing practices” by criticizing the
quality of their billing records, including lack of contemporaneity, vagueness, and block billing.
ECF No. 26 at 16–17. However, while those arguments are relevant—and, indeed, considered
below—in reducing counsel’s award, the relevant consideration for determining reasonable rates
is not the quality of counsel’s billing records, but rather counsel’s “usual billing rate.” Kattan by
Thomas v. District of Columbia, 995 F.2d 274, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see Covington, 57 F.3d at
1108 (describing an attorney’s “billing practices” as “her custom of charging reduced rates”). Here,
Hilado’s counsel represent, and MedStar does not dispute, that they do not have standard billing
practices because they represent plaintiffs “with little or no financial resources on contingency
basis.” ECF No. 27 at 12–13. In this context, Hilado is “entitled to an award based on the prevailing
market rates.” Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107 (explaining that attorneys “who either practice privately
and for-profit but at reduced rates reflecting non-economic goals or who have no established
billing practice” should be compensated based on prevailing market rates).
MedStar, second, argues that Hilado has not submitted adequate evidence of her counsel’s
skill, experience, and reputation, or of prevailing market rates in the community. ECF No. 26 at
17–18. As noted, however, Hilado has proffered a rate table, which sets forth rates based on market
data and level of experience, and MedStar does not dispute the propriety of that rate table as applied
to the relevant community nor offer any countervailing rates or evidence. Given that Hilado’s
proposed rates fall within the only evidence of market rates before the court, the court adopts them
as reasonable hourly rates. See Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109 (“In order to demonstrate this third
element, plaintiffs may point to such evidence as an updated version of the Laffey matrix or the
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U.S. Attorney’s Office matrix, or their own survey of prevailing market rates in the community.”);
Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. District of Columbia, 809 F.3d 58, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (upholding rates
based on LSI Laffey matrix); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec’y of Def., 675 F.2d
1319, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (observing that “[o]nce the fee applicant has provided support for the
requested rate, the burden falls on the [opposing party] to go forward with evidence that the rate
is erroneous” and “it must do so by equally specific countervailing evidence”).
B. The Court Excludes Time Spent On Hilado’s Stricken Motion To Compel And
Reduces Time Across The Board For Failure To Keep Contemporaneous Records
The court next considers “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation.”
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. The movant’s fee application “need not present the exact number of
minutes spent nor the precise activity to which each hour was devoted nor the specific attainments
of each attorney,” but “must be sufficiently detailed to permit the District Court to make an
independent determination whether or not the hours claimed are justified.” Concerned Veterans,
675 F.2d at 1327. “Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce
the award accordingly.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.
Hilado seeks fees for each stage of her counsel’s representation, from initial consultation
and representation in the administrative process, to preparation of the complaint and litigation
through discovery, to preparation of the fee application and reply. ECF No. 22-6 at 1–6; ECF No.
27 at 24. In support, Hilado attaches records of the time spent on relevant activities. ECF No. 22-
6. In total, she seeks fees relating to 517.5 hours for counsel’s representation through the
administrative process and litigation, 40 hours for the preparation of her fee application, and an
unspecified number of hours for preparation of her reply in support of the fee application. ECF
No. 22-2 at 5, 31; ECF No. 22-6 at 6; ECF No. 27 at 24. MedStar argues these hours are not
reasonable for a variety of reasons, some of which are well taken.
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MedStar first argues that the number of attorney hours “shocks the conscience” because of
the “drastic disparity between settlement amount and fee request.” ECF No. 26 at 1. This argument
is unsound. Courts have recognized that an attorney’s fee award “should not be reduced simply
because a plaintiff recovered a low damage award.” Cowan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 935 F.2d
522, 526 (2d Cir. 1991); see Thomas v. National Football League Players Ass’n, 273 F.3d 1124,
1129 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“That the fees awarded are, as the district court acknowledged, nearly five
times the amount of plaintiff’s recovery, does not make them excessive.” (cleaned up)). To do so
would “subvert the statute’s goal of opening the court to all who have meritorious civil rights
claims,” not only those who suffer severe injuries. Cowan, 935 F.2d at 524; see City of Riverside
v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 577 (1986) (“Congress enacted § 1988 specifically to enable plaintiffs to
enforce the civil rights laws even where the amount of damages at stake would not otherwise make
it feasible for them to do so.”). Indeed, attorney’s fees provisions exist, at least in part, to create
incentives for attorneys to represent people who might otherwise go without counsel and whose
rights might otherwise go without vindication.
However, on close review of the parties’ arguments and Hilado’s records—while also
recognizing that courts do not “conduct a minute evaluation of each phase or category of counsel’s
work,” Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citation omitted)—the court
finds it appropriate to exclude the following time:
• The court excludes 36.5 hours spent preparing Hilado’s motion to compel, which was
stricken for failure to comply with the court’s standing order. See Minute Order (Oct.
25, 2024); ECF No. 22-6 at 5; ECF No. 26 at 14; Shaw v. District of Columbia, 210 F.
Supp. 3d 46, 51 (D.D.C. 2016) (recognizing that courts may reduce a fee award for
hours billed that are “unnecessary to the litigation”).
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• The court reduces the 21.5 hours requested for tabulating the hours and costs expended
in this case. See ECF No. 22-6 at 1. The record indicates that counsel did not maintain
contemporaneous time records, which would have undoubtedly impacted the time
required to compile the hours and costs expended. Because this time was attributable
to counsel’s poor recordkeeping, the court finds it was not time reasonably expended,
and deducts 18.5 hours.
The court declines to exclude time required to prepare discovery that was not produced and
depositions that did not happen. That MedStar made, and Hilado accepted, an offer of judgment
after those events took place does not mean counsel’s preparation was unreasonable—indeed, it
was likely the diligent thing to do, and was thus “reasonably expended on the litigation.” Hensley,
461 U.S. at 433 The court also declines to reduce time as duplicative simply because two attorneys
conducted the recorded task. It is customary for multiple attorneys to work on a case, and the court
concludes that the entries requesting hours for both attorneys are reasonable, with most entries
stating that the attorneys reviewed and analyzed documents relevant to the litigation. See ECF No.
22-6 at 3–6. The court similarly declines to exclude time for administrative or clerical tasks.
Hilado’s counsel have explained that their firm consists of only two attorneys, with no clerical
staff to handle administrative tasks. ECF No. 27 at 14. As courts in this district have recognized,
asking “solo practitioners” or “small firms” to bill administrative tasks at a lower rate may
“unfairly punish plaintiffs and their counsel for not staffing [the] case as if they had the manpower
of a major law firm.” Bucher v. District of Columbia, 777 F. Supp. 2d 69, 75 (D.D.C. 2011); see
also District of Columbia v. Jeppsen, 686 F. Supp. 2d 37, 39 (D.D.C. 2010).
The court concludes that two further reductions are warranted. First, counsel’s failure to
maintain contemporaneous records warrants an across-the-board reduction. While courts should
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exercise humility in performing an after-the-fact audit of the time needed to zealously represent
and prevail for a client, that presumes accurate timekeeping. Therefore, “[a]ttorneys who anticipate
making a fee application must maintain contemporaneous, complete and standardized time records
which accurately reflect the work done by each attorney.” Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1327;
see also Kennecott Corp. v. EPA, 804 F.2d 763, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (explaining that
“contemporaneous time charges should be filed with the motion for attorneys’ fees as a matter of
course”). Here, Hilado’s counsel concede that at least some of their billing was not
contemporaneous. See ECF No. 27 at 12. Moreover, although the court might not reduce hours
based on block billing alone, here the lack of contemporaneous records likely also explains the
grouping and somewhat vague descriptions of tasks that should generally be spread out over
several different billing entries. See, e.g., ECF No. 22-6 at 2 (entry for work on EEOC
administrative proceedings from March 2022 to October 2023); id. (entry for preparing, reviewing
and editing the complaint). The court believes counsel’s after-the-fact records warrant an across-
the-board reduction of 30% for all time before the fee application. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 438
n.13 (explaining that the district court properly “reduced the hours of one attorney by thirty percent
to account for his inexperience and failure to keep contemporaneous time records”); see also Role
Models America, Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 973 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (awarding fees “for only
fifty percent of the attorney hours” requested due to “inadequate documentation, failure to justify
the number of hours sought, inconsistencies, and improper billing entries”).
The court, second, finds it necessary to reduce the fees sought for preparation of the fee
application and reply in support of that application. To be sure, “hours reasonably devoted to
litigating attorneys’ fees are compensable.” Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104, 1113–1114 (D.C. Cir.
1986). Indeed, it is important to allow fees to be recovered for reasonable time expended in
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preparing and defending one’s fee application. See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO, Local
3882 v. Fed’l Lab. Rels. Auth., 994 F.2d 20, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“No matter what the purpose of
an attorney’s fee provision, however, the availability of ‘fees for fees’ is essential to carrying out
Congress’ goal in including the provision in the first place.”). Here, however, Hilado moves for a
fee award of $59,995, without supporting the request with adequate records of time spent by each
attorney. See ECF No. 27 at 24. For its part, MedStar did not oppose Hilado’s entitlement to fees
related to her fee application, raising the issue only in a sur-reply. See ECF No. 26; ECF No. 33-2
at 2–3. Balancing the absence of documentation and MedStar’s partial failure to contest the fees,
the court reduces the fees related to Hilado’s fee application and reply by 50%.
The court accordingly awards the following fee award for time reasonably expended in
litigating this case to judgment:
Reasonable Rate Recoverable Hours Fee Award With
30% Reduction
Stephen C. Swift $745/hr 112 $58,408
Charity C. Swift $675/hr 350.5 $165,611.25
And the court further awards $29,997.50 for time spent litigating attorney’s fees. The court awards
Hilado $663 in costs, which MedStar does not oppose. ECF No. 22-2 at 32; ECF No. 26 at 5.
II. Conclusion
For these reasons, the court grants Hilado’s motion for attorney’s fees in part and denies it
in part. The court awards Hilado a total of $254,016.75 in attorney’s fees and $663 in costs.
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AMIR H. ALI
United States District Judge
Date: March 5, 2026
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