Moreno Santana v. Baltazar et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 26-cv-0787-WJM-SBP
RICARDO MORENO SANTANA,
Petitioner,
v.
JUAN BALTAZAR, in his official capacity as Warden
of the Denver Contract Detention Facility, et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER GRANTING HABEAS CORPUS PETITION
Before the Court is Petitioner Ricardo Moreno Santana’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (“Petition”). (ECF
No. 1.) Respondents Juan Baltazar, in his official capacity as Warden of the Denver
Contract Detention Facility; George Valdez,1 in his official capacity as Acting Field
Office Director of the Aurora Field Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”); Todd M. Lyons, in his official capacity as Acting Director of ICE; Kristi Noem, in
her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”);
and Pamela Bondi, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the United States
(collectively, “Respondents” or “the Government”) filed a response. (ECF No. 8.)
Moreno Santana filed a reply. (ECF No. 13.)
For the following reasons, the Petition is granted.
1 The Petition originally named Robert Hagan as the Field Office Director of ICE’s Aurora
Field Office, for whom the Government substituted Valdez. (ECF No. 8 at 1.)
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I. 	BACKGROUND
Moreno Santana is a native and citizen of Mexico who has resided in the United
States for over 20 years. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 3, 72.) In December 2025, ICE
apprehended Moreno Santana and initiated removal proceedings against him. (Id. at ¶¶
1, 4.) Following his initial detention, Moreno Santana appeared before an Immigration
Judge (“IJ”) for a custody redetermination hearing on January 12, 2026. (Id. at ¶ 6.)
The IJ concluded that Moreno Santana’s detention was governed by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a), found that he posed no flight risk or danger to the community, and ordered
him released on a $5,000 bond. (Id.)
Rather than immediately release Moreno Santana pursuant to the bond
conditions ordered by the IJ, however, DHS appealed the IJ’s bond decision to the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) on January 20, 2026 and invoked the automatic
90-day stay provision at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2). (Id. at ¶¶ 7–8; ECF No. 8 at 1–2.)
That regulation specifically provides that,
In any case in which DHS has determined that an alien
should not be released or has set a bond of $10,000 or
more, any order of the immigration judge authorizing release
(on bond or otherwise) shall be stayed upon DHS's filing of a
notice of intent to appeal the custody redetermination (Form
EOIR-43) with the immigration court within one business day
of the order, and, except as otherwise provided in 8 CFR
1003.6(c), shall remain in abeyance pending decision of the
appeal by the Board. The decision whether or not to file
Form EOIR-43 is subject to the discretion of the Secretary.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2).
In the pending BIA appeal, the Government contends Moreno Santana is subject
to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). (ECF No. 8 at 2.) The removal
proceedings against Moreno Santana, including his application for cancellation of
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removal, likewise remain pending in Immigration Court. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 5.) The IJ has
set an Individual Hearing for May 4, 2026. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Moreno Santana challenges his
continued detention pending the Government’s appeal to the BIA and notes that,
without this Court’s intervention, “he will have been detained for almost four months by
the time of [his Individual Hearing], despite having been granted bond.” (Id.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through
habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004). More
specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “confers jurisdiction upon the federal courts to hear [such
cases.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)
(authorizing any person to claim in federal court that they are being held “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States”)). “The fundamental
purpose of a § 2241 habeas proceeding is the same as that of § 2254 habeas and §
2255 proceedings: they are an ‘attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.’” McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Com'n, 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973)).
III. 	ANALYSIS
The Court interprets the Petition to foremost challenge the Government’s
continued assertion on appeal that Moreno Santana is subject to mandatory detention
under § 1225(b)(2)(A). While the Court acknowledges that this statute is the driving
force behind the Government’s position on appeal before the BIA, it is undisputed that
this statutory authority is not the basis for Moreno Santana’s current detention. As both
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parties acknowledge, the Government is “detaining him solely on the basis of 8 C.F.R. §
1003.19(i)(2).” (ECF No. 13 at 6; see also ECF No. 8 at 2 (“Petitioner is currently
detained under § 1226(a)—not § 1225(b)(2)(A).”).) Moreno Santana points to no
authority permitting the Court to issue what would essentially be an advisory opinion on
the applicability of § 1225(b)(2)(A) in this case. Thus, the Court agrees with the
Government that Moreno Santana’s prospective challenge to a future ruling by the BIA
that he is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) is, at this time, not ripe.2
On the other hand, there is no dispute that Moreno Santana’s due process
challenge to the Government’s invocation of the automatic stay regulation is properly
before this Court. (ECF No. 1 at 22–23.)3 And, as explained below, the Court agrees
with Moreno Santana that the Government’s application of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) has
violated his procedural due process rights. Accordingly, he must be immediately
released.
As a threshold matter, the Court observes that the Government posits that a
noncitizens’ procedural due process rights end at the point they request bond from an IJ
and have had the opportunity to appeal any adverse bond decision to the BIA. (See
2 That said, the Government is clearly aware that the Court has already repeatedly
weighed in on this issue. See Temaj Lopez v. Baltasar, 2026 WL 628199, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar.
6, 2026); Singh v. Baltasar, 2026 WL 601950, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 4, 2026); Hernandez v.
Baltazar, 2026 WL 507518, at *1 (D. Colo. Feb. 24, 2026); Fuentes Bonilla v. Baltazar, 2026 WL
452365, at *1 (D. Colo. Feb. 18, 2026); Alvarez Hernandez v. Baltazar, 2026 WL 304362, at *1
(D. Colo. Feb. 5, 2026); Garcia Abanil v. Baltazar, ---- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2026 WL 100587, at *1
(D. Colo. Jan. 14, 2026); Morales Lopez v. Baltazar, 2026 WL 25161, at *1 (D. Colo. Jan. 5,
2026).
3 The Government also interpreted the Petition to assert that the automatic stay
regulation violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and its implementing regulations.
(ECF No. 8 at 3–4.) To the extent the Petition made such an argument, it appears Moreno
Santana has abandoned it in his reply, in which the Court understands him to argue only that
the automatic stay provision is violative of his due process rights. (ECF No. 13 at 3–7.)
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ECF No. 8 at 5 (“The process for evaluating bond for aliens—the very process currently
playing out before the BIA here—provides the requisite notice.”); see also id. (“Petitioner
has not shown that he is not receiving notice and opportunity to be heard as to bond,
and he has thus not made out a procedural due process violation.”).) Contrary to this
position, however, the Court concludes that the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976) test properly governs this procedural due process challenge.
This is not a remarkable conclusion. On the contrary, it is in keeping with several
other court decisions, including in this District, that have applied the Mathews standard
in immigration habeas cases. See Merchan-Pacheo v. Noem, 2026 WL 88526, at *4
(D. Colo. Jan. 12, 2026) (thoroughly rejecting argument that the Mathews test does not
apply in similar circumstances); see also L.G. v. Choate, 744 F. Supp. 3d 1172, 1181
(D. Colo. 2024) (applying Mathews in a similar context and observing that “Tenth Circuit
precedent demonstrates that the Mathews test is appropriate when determining what
process is constitutionally due”); Vizguerra-Ramirez v. Baltazar, 2025 WL 3653158, at
*13 (D. Colo. Dec. 17, 2025) (applying Mathews in a similar context); Rodriguez Diaz v.
Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022) (collecting cases and noting that, “when
considering due process challenges to [discretionary noncitizen detention,] other circuits
. . . have applied the Mathews test”); Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 27 (1st Cir.
2021) (applying Mathews test to section 1226(a) challenge); Velasco Lopez v. Decker,
978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020) (same); Gunaydin v. Trump, 784 F. Supp. 3d 1175,
1185 (D. Minn. 2025). Persuaded by this reasoning, the Court proceeds to apply the
Mathews factors to this case.
Under Mathews v. Eldridge, courts must consider three factors when evaluating
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whether a petitioner has made out a procedural due process violation: (1) “the private
interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at
335.
All three Mathews factors strongly support Moreno Santana’s position that 8
C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) violates his procedural due process rights. First, Moreno
Santana’s private interest in this case is beyond dispute: As a result of the automatic
stay regulation, Moreno Santana has lost his freedom for several months—despite the
fact that an IJ determined that he did not pose a risk of flight or danger sufficient to deny
bond. A person’s physical freedom “is the most elemental of liberty interests.” Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); see also Vizguerra-Ramirez, 2025 WL 3653158,
at *13 (same); Carlon v. Kramer, 2025 WL 2624386, at *3 (D. Neb. Sept. 11,
2025) (same); Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020) (finding, in assessing
the first Mathews factor, that “[t]he deprivation [petitioner] experienced while
incarcerated was, on any calculus, substantial. He was locked up in jail. He could not
maintain employment or see his family or friends or others outside normal visiting
hours.”); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (directing courts, when assessing the
first Mathews factor, to consider only the petitioner's interests at stake in ongoing
detention without consideration of the respondents’ justifications for the
detention); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (stating that an individual's interest in being free
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from detention “lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects”).
Moreno Santana’s loss of freedom comes at significant cost. Despite not being
accused of committing any crime, the Government is detaining Moreno Santana in a
facility that the undersigned has already found “strongly resemble[s] penal
confinement.” Arostegui-Maldonado v. Baltazar, 794 F. Supp. 3d 926, 940 (D. Colo.
2025). Moreover, as a result of the automatic stay regulation, the Government has
separated Moreno Santana from his family. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 91.) Given all this, the first
Mathews factor strongly supports Moreno Santana’s procedural due process claim.
Second, the likelihood that the Government is erroneously depriving Moreno
Santana of his right to freedom is especially high in these circumstances. Indeed, “the
only individuals subject to the automatic stay are those who, by definition, prevailed at
their bond hearing.” Carlon, 2025 WL 2624386, at *3; Gunaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at
1187 (same). Despite prevailing at his bond hearing, the automatic stay provision
allowed the Government to effectively disregard the IJ’s custody determination and
deprive Moreno Santana of his liberty anyway. Put another way, “the automatic stay
regulation empowers ICE—the losing party in the bond hearing—to unilaterally override
the decision of the [Immigration] Judge and keep the noncitizen detained pending
appeal. Such a rule allows the government to bypass its burden of proof at bond
hearings and usurp the role of the Immigration Judge.” Sampiao v. Hyde, 799 F. Supp.
3d 14, 32 (D. Mass. 2025).
“Other courts considering the automatic stay provision have found this
problematic as well.” Carlon, 2025 WL 2624386, at *3; Zavala v. Ridge, 310 F. Supp.
2d 1071, 1077–78 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (recognizing that “[a] unilateral determination made
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by the [Immigration and Naturalization] Service attorney that effectively overrules the
reasoned decision of the Immigration Judge poses a serious risk of error” in that “it
conflates the functions of adjudicator and prosecutor”); Ashley v. Ridge, 288 F. Supp.
2d 662, 668, 671 (D.N.J. 2003) (explaining that the automatic stay regulation produces
a “patently unfair situation by ‘tak[ing] the stay decision out of the hands of the judges
altogether and giv[ing] it to the prosecutor who has by definition failed to persuade a
judge in an adversary hearing that detention is justified’” and “renders the Immigration
Judge's bail determination an empty gesture”).
Nevertheless, the Government maintains that “further review by the BIA will
enhance, not reduce, the accuracy of a bond decision, and this factor thus does not
weigh in favor of a due process violation.” (ECF No. 8 at 7.) The Government confuses
the issue. It does not need the automatic stay provision to challenge the IJ’s bond
determination before the BIA. It can simply appeal the IJ’s bond determination while
Moreno Santana enjoys his freedom as that appellate procedure plays out.
Moreover, the Government’s argument “frames the concern for accuracy solely in
[its own] favor . . . .” Rivas, 2026 WL 444732, at *3. “[T]he traditional due process
concern with accuracy . . . is meant to protect the individual interest.” Benham v.
Ledbetter, 785 F.2d 1480, 1487 (11th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added); see also Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525–26 (1958) (“Where one party has at stake an interest of
transcending value—as a criminal defendant his liberty—this margin of error is reduced
as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden of producing a
sufficiency of proof in the first instance . . . .”).
Frankly, the Court is far more concerned that Moreno Santana will be
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erroneously detained pending appeal than by the prospect of the IJ’s decision being
reversed while he is released on bond. See Rivas, 2026 WL 444732, at * 3 (“In matters
such as this, the concern for accuracy is that individuals will erroneously be deprived of
their liberty—the paramount interest at stake—as opposed to a concern with the
accuracy of an IJ's determination that an individual is not a danger or a flight risk.”).
Perhaps of greatest concern, “[t]he automatic stay regulation also inverts the
traditional burdens and standards governing requests for stays pending appeal.”
Sampiao, 799 F. Supp. 3d at 32. Specifically, the automatic stay provision gives the
Government carte blanche to keep noncitizens detained regardless of the particular
circumstances of a given case. “Ordinarily, to obtain a stay of a judge's order requires a
party to, inter alia, make ‘a strong showing’ that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its
challenge to that order.” Maza v. Hyde, 807 F. Supp. 3d 42, 49 (D. Mass.
2025) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)). By contrast, the automatic
stay regulation “turns these well-established procedural principles on their heads and
carries a significant risk of erroneous deprivation.” Gunaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at
1187; see also Vizguerra-Ramirez, 2025 WL 3653158, at *14 (finding that these
circumstances unfairly put petitioners “in the more difficult position of proving a
negative—that is, proving that [they are] neither a flight risk nor a danger to the
community”). “By flipping the traditional rules governing requests to stay pending
appeal, the automatic stay regulation invites significant risk of error in decisions that
deprive individuals of their liberty.” Sampiao, 799 F. Supp. 3d at 33.
What’s more, the automatic stay regulation is not the Government’s only
available tool for keeping a noncitizen detained after an IJ’s bond determination: The
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Government may also “request a discretionary emergency stay from the BIA.” Carlon,
2025 WL 2624386, at *4; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(i)(1) (granting BIA discretionary
stay authority); Gunaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1190 (“Respondents’ interest in
preserving the automatic stay regulation is almost entirely, if not entirely, reduced by the
mechanisms already in place for requesting an emergency stay from the BIA.”). “This
procedure, at minimum, mitigates the concern about DHS usurping the neutral
adjudicatory role of an Immigration Judge and provides additional safeguards that the
automatic stay provision lacks.” Merchan-Pacheo, 2026 WL 88526, at *15. Given all
this, the second Mathews factor favors Moreno Santana as well.
Third and finally, the Government does not have a significant interest in keeping
Moreno Santana detained by way of the automatic stay regulation. The Government
suggests that its interest in keeping Moreno Santana detained is strong because he
may flee if released pending appeal, which “could render the review process illusory.”
(ECF No. 8 at 7.) But the Government’s stated concern is misplaced because an IJ has
already found that Moreno Santana does not pose a flight risk sufficient to deny bond.
As such, the Government’s stated interest here is unsubstantiated and based on
nothing more than mere conjecture.
For all these reasons, the Court concludes, based on the Mathews factors, that
Moreno Santana has established that the Government’s use of the automatic stay
regulation offends his procedural due process rights.4 Accordingly, he is entitled to
immediate release, upon the posting of bond, from his unlawful detention.
4 Given the Court’s conclusion that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) violates Moreno Santana’s
procedural due process rights, it need not consider whether the automatic stay regulation also
violates Moreno Santana’s substantive due process rights.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. 	Magistrate Judge Susan B. Prose’s Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 4) is
MADE ABSOLUTE and the Petition (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED;
2. 	The Court GRANTS this relief pursuant to Claim III of the Petition, and
does not reach the other claims asserted by Moreno Santana;
3. 	By no later than this Sunday, March 15, 2026, the Government shall
IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Moreno Santana, upon the posting of the bond issued by the
IJ, along with all his personal belongings;
4. 	No onerous conditions of release shall be unilaterally imposed by
Respondents on Moreno Santana, including without limitation mandating that he wear
GPS monitoring, submit to mandatory reporting, or have his movements otherwise
restricted;
5. 	Respondents shall continue to be ENJOINED from removing or
transferring, or causing to remove or transfer, Moreno Santana from the District of
Colorado until such time as this Court, or the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, vacates
this Order;
6. 	Should Moreno Santana believe he has a good faith basis to seek
attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, he is GRANTED leave to
file a motion seeking the same, along with all supporting documentation, by no later
than April 10, 2026. The Government shall file a response by no later than May 1,
2026, and Petitioner shall file a reply by no later than May 15, 2026; and
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7. 	Judgment shall enter in Moreno Santana’s favor and against the
Government on March 27, 2026, UNLESS prior thereto the Court is informed that the
Government has failed to fully and timely comply with the terms of this Order.
Dated this 13 th day of March, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
______________________
William J. Martinez
Senior United States District Judge
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