Salakhov v. Baltasar et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 26-cv-00780-PAB
MARAT SALAKHOV,
Petitioner,
v.
JUAN BALTASAR, Warden of Denver Contract Detention Facility, et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on petitioner Marat Salakhov’s Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus [Docket No.1]. Respondents filed a response. Docket No. 7.
Petitioner filed a reply. Docket No. 8.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Russia. Docket No. 1 at 9, ¶ 36. On September 28,
2021, he entered the United States on a B-2 visa. Id., ¶ 37. On September 27, 2022,
fearing to return to Russia, petitioner applied for asylum with the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). Id., ¶ 38. On February 24, 2026,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detained petitioner while he was driving
near Cheyenne, Wyoming. Id. at 9-10, ¶ 39. Petitioner is currently detained at the
Denver Contract Detention Facility in Aurora, Colorado. Id. at 10, ¶ 40.
On February 25, 2026, petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See generally id. Petitioner brings a claim for violation of
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his Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process (Count I) and a claim for Violation of Bond
Regulations and Unlawful Denial of Release on Bond (Count II). Docket No. 1 at 10-13.
Petitioner seeks a declaration that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment, a Writ of
Habeas Corpus ordering respondents to release petitioner, an order that he is not to be
transferred outside the District of Colorado, and attorney’s fees. Id. at 13.
II. 	ANALYSIS
A. Count One: Zadvydas Claim
In Count One, petitioner alleges that his detention violates his Fifth Amendment
right to Due Process, citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Docket No. 1 at
10, ¶¶ 44-45. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that a noncitizen ordered removed
and detained under § 1231(a)(6) cannot be indefinitely detained without violating the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See 533 U.S. at 701. Zadvydas
held that a six-month period of post-removal detention is presumptively reasonable, but
“[a]fter this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is
no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the
Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id.
As of the date of this Court’s order, petitioner has been detained for 22 days.
While “multiple district courts have found that the six-month presumption in Zadvydas is
rebuttable,” petitioner must nonetheless demonstrate that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. See Vijdani v. Mattos, 2026
WL 560209, at *4 (D. Nev. Feb. 27, 2026). Petitioner has provided no allegations
showing that his removal is not significantly likely. See generally Docket No. 1.
Petitioner alleges that he applied for asylum on September 27, 2022, fearing his return
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to Russia, but provides no information as to whether asylum was granted. See id. at 9,
¶ 38. Petitioner does not allege that he was granted a withholding of removal to Russia
and, even if he was, why it is not significantly likely that he could be deported to a third
country.
Moreover, it is unlikely that Zadvydas is applicable here as there are no
allegations as to whether petitioner has a final order of removal. “The due process
analysis in Zadvydas applies to aliens with final orders of removal.” Gomez v. United
States Immigr. & Custom Enf’t, 2026 WL 63933, at *3 (D.N.M. Jan. 8, 2026). In fact, in
asserting that his purported detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 is unlawful, see Docket
No. 1 at 13, ¶¶ 54-55, petitioner suggests that he does not have a final order of removal
because § 1225 pertains to noncitizens who are undergoing removal proceedings. See
Gomez, 2026 WL 63933, at *3 (“Zadvydas does not apply to aliens like Petitioner –
detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) during removal proceedings.”).
Accordingly, the Court finds that petitioner has failed to carry his burden under
Zadvydas and will deny relief on Count I.
B. Count Two – Unlawful Denial of Release on Bond Claim
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) “contemplates two detention regimes
for noncitizens pending removal proceedings,” one controlled by § 1225 and one
controlled by § 1226. Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03094-CNS, 2025 WL
2996643, at *3 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025) (citation omitted). Section 1225 mandates
detention pending removal proceedings, providing that, “if the examining immigration
officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Unless
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certain exceptions are present, as provided for in §§ 1225(b)(2)(B) and (C), § 1225
“mandates detention without the opportunity for a bond hearing for the noncitizens to
whom it applies.” Hernandez, 2025 WL 2996643, at *3. Section 1226, on the other
hand, does not mandate detention, providing that “an alien may be arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United
States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Under § 1226(a)(2), the Attorney General has the
discretion to release a noncitizen on bond while removal proceedings are pending. 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2). “Federal regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a)
receive bond hearings at the outset of detention.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281,
306 (2018).
In Count Two, petitioner claims that he is being unlawfully detained pursuant to
§ 1225(b)(2). See Docket No. 1 at 13, ¶¶ 54-55. Petitioner contends that, instead, he
should be detained under § 1226(a) as someone who has been living in the country for
over four years. See id. at 11-12, ¶¶ 49-50. Thus, petitioner argues that he is eligible
for a bond hearing before an immigration judge. See id. at 12-13, ¶ 53. Respondents
concede that petitioner is being detained under § 1226(a), but contend that petitioner is
not entitled to relief given that he has not requested a bond hearing. Docket No. 7 at 1,
4. Respondents contend that petitioner “is eligible for a bond hearing,” such that he
“may request a bond hearing, and one will be scheduled for him.” Id. at 4.
Respondents attach the declaration of ICE Deportation Officer John Mansur, who states
that petitioner is not being detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), but is rather being
detained “pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and is eligible to seek custody redetermination
before the Immigration Judge.” Docket No. 7-1 at 3-4, ¶¶ 8-9. Mr. Mansur states that
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petitioner can file a motion for a custody redetermination hearing with the Executive
Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) and EOIR will schedule the hearing. Id. at 4,
¶ 9.
Petitioner does not contest that he has failed to request a bond hearing or that he
is being detained pursuant to § 1226 and thus has the ability to request a bond hearing.
See generally Docket No. 8. Given that there is no basis for Count II at this time, the
Court will deny relief for petitioner on Count II. The Court will therefore deny petitioner’s
habeas petition without prejudice.
III. 	CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that petitioner Marat Salakhov’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
[Docket No.1] is DENIED without prejudice.
DATED March 17, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
___________________________
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge
____	__	__	_________	__	__	______ ______	___________ __________________________________________________________________________
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