Granillo Chavarria v. Baltazar et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 26-cv-0712-WJM
ALFREDO GRANILLO CHAVARRIA,
Petitioner,
v.
JUAN BALTASAR, in his official capacity as Warden of the Denver
Contract Detention Facility, et al.
Respondents.
ORDER GRANTING HABEAS CORPUS PETITION
Before the Court is Petitioner Alfredo Granillo Chavarria’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”) (ECF No. 1) and
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“Motion”) (ECF No. 4). Respondents Juan
Baltazar, in his official capacity as Warden of the Denver Contract Detention Facility;
Robert Gaudian, in his official capacity as Field Office Director, Denver Field Office, of
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”); Kristi Noem, in her official capacity
as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Todd Lyons, in his official
capacity as Acting Director of ICE; and Pam Bondi, in her official capacity as Attorney
General of the U.S. Department of Justice (collectively, “Respondents” or “the
Government”), filed a response. (ECF No. 14.) Granillo Chavarria filed a reply. (ECF
No. 15.)
For the following reasons, the Petition is granted.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
Granillo Chavarria is a noncitizen who has lived in the United States since 2011.
(ECF No. 1 at 1, 2, 4.) He is common law married and the father of two U.S. citizen
children, ages three and seven, and two U.S. citizen stepchildren, ages 19 and 17. (Id.)
Granillo Chavarria works in the construction industry and has maintained steady
employment to support his family. (Id.) He has had no contact with the criminal justice
system that would subject him to mandatory detention. (Id.) Despite all this, in October
2025, ICE arrested and detained Granillo Chavarria after he dropped off his seven-year-
old son at school. (Id.)
In December 2025, Granillo Chavarria sought a bond hearing as a member of the
class in Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, — F.Supp.3d —, 2025 WL 3713987 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). (Id.) In January 2026, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) agreed that
Granillo Chavarria is a member of the Maldonado Bautista class and is therefore eligible
for custody redetermination under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (Id.) The IJ ultimately found that
Granillo Chavarria does not pose a flight risk or danger to the community. (Id.)
Accordingly, the IJ ordered that Granillo Chavarria be released upon posting a $45,000
bond. (Id.)
A day later, and before Granillo Chavarria could post bond, ICE filed an E-43
Form. (Id.) That document invokes a regulation that automatically stays the IJ’s bond
order pending DHS’s appeal of that order to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).
The automatic stay regulation states as follows:
Automatic stay in certain cases. In any case in which DHS
has determined that an alien should not be released or has
set a bond of $10,000 or more, any order of the immigration
judge authorizing release (on bond or otherwise) shall be
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stayed upon DHS's filing of a notice of intent to appeal the
custody redetermination (Form EOIR-43) with the
immigration court within one business day of the order, and,
except as otherwise provided in 8 CFR 1003.6(c), shall
remain in abeyance pending decision of the appeal by the
Board. The decision whether or not to file Form EOIR-43 is
subject to the discretion of the Secretary.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2). Granillo Chavarria remains in custody as a result of this
regulation.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through
habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004). More
specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “confers jurisdiction upon the federal courts to hear [such
cases.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)
(authorizing any person to claim in federal court that they are being held “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States”)). “The fundamental
purpose of a § 2241 habeas proceeding is the same as that of § 2254 habeas and §
2255 proceedings: they are an ‘attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.’” McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Com'n, 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973)).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Granillo Chavarria contends that the Government’s invocation of 8 C.F.R. §
1003.19(i)(2), the automatic stay regulation, violates his procedural and substantive due
process rights, as well as the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). (ECF No. 4 at 8–
13.) He also asks the Court to “enjoin Defendants from jailing [him] pursuant to §
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1225(b)(2) . . . .” (Id. at 2.) The Court agrees that the Government’s application of 8
C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) has violated Granillo Chavarria’s procedural due process rights.
Accordingly, he must be immediately released.
As a threshold matter, the Court observes that the Government posits that a
noncitizens’ procedural due process rights end at the point they request bond from an IJ
and have had the opportunity to appeal any adverse bond decision to the BIA. (See
ECF No. 14 at 8 (“The process for evaluating bond for aliens—the very process
currently playing out before the BIA here—provides the requisite notice.”); see also id.
(“Petitioner has not shown that he is not receiving notice and opportunity to be heard as
to bond, and has thus not made out a procedural due process violation.”).) Contrary to
this position, however, the Court concludes that the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976) test properly governs this procedural due process challenge.
This is not a remarkable conclusion. On the contrary, it is in keeping with several
other court decisions, including in this District, that have applied the Mathews standard
in immigration habeas cases. See Merchan-Pacheo v. Noem, 2026 WL 88526, at *4
(D. Colo. Jan. 12, 2026) (thoroughly rejecting argument that the Mathews test does not
apply in similar circumstances); see also L.G. v. Choate, 744 F. Supp. 3d 1172, 1181
(D. Colo. 2024) (applying Mathews in a similar context and observing that “Tenth Circuit
precedent demonstrates that the Mathews test is appropriate when determining what
process is constitutionally due”); Vizguerra-Ramirez v. Baltazar, 2025 WL 3653158, at
*13 (D. Colo. Dec. 17, 2025) (applying Mathews in a similar context); Rodriguez Diaz v.
Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022) (collecting cases and noting that, “when
considering due process challenges to [discretionary noncitizen detention,] other circuits
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. . . have applied the Mathews test”); Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 27 (1st Cir.
2021) (applying Mathews test to section 1226(a) challenge); Velasco Lopez v. Decker,
978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020) (same); Gunaydin v. Trump, 784 F. Supp. 3d 1175,
1185 (D. Minn. 2025). Persuaded by this reasoning, the Court proceeds to apply the
Mathews factors to this case.
Under Mathews v. Eldridge, courts must consider three factors when evaluating
whether a petitioner has made out a procedural due process violation: (1) “the private
interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at
335.
All three Mathews factors strongly support Granillo Chavarria’s position that 8
C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) violates his procedural due process rights. First, Granillo
Chavarria’s private interest in this case is beyond dispute: As a result of the automatic
stay regulation, Granillo Chavarria has lost his freedom for several months—despite the
fact that an IJ determined that he did not pose a risk of flight or danger sufficient to deny
bond. A person’s physical freedom “is the most elemental of liberty interests.” 	Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); see also Vizguerra-Ramirez, 2025 WL 3653158,
at *13 (same); Carlon v. Kramer, 2025 WL 2624386, at *3 (D. Neb. Sept. 11,
2025) (same); Gunaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1187 (same); Velasco Lopez v. Decker,
978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020) (finding, in assessing the first Mathews factor, that
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“[t]he deprivation [petitioner] experienced while incarcerated was, on any calculus,
substantial. He was locked up in jail. He could not maintain employment or see his
family or friends or others outside normal visiting hours.”); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at
529 (directing courts, when assessing the first Mathews factor, to consider only the
petitioner's interests at stake in ongoing detention without consideration of the
respondents’ justifications for the detention); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (stating that an
individual's interest in being free from detention “lies at the heart of the liberty that [the
Due Process] Clause protects”).
Granillo Chavarria’s loss of freedom comes at significant cost. Despite not being
accused of committing any crime, the Government is detaining Granillo Chavarria in a
facility that the undersigned has already found “strongly resemble[s] penal
confinement.” Arostegui-Maldonado v. Baltazar, 794 F. Supp. 3d 926, 940 (D. Colo.
2025). Moreover, as a result of the automatic stay regulation, the Government has
separated Granillo Chavarria from his family and made it practically impossible for him
to financially provide for his dependents. Given all this, the first Mathews factor strongly
supports Granillo Chavarria’s procedural due process claim.
Second, the likelihood that the Government is erroneously depriving Granillo
Chavarria of his right to freedom is especially high in these circumstances. Indeed, “the
only individuals subject to the automatic stay are those who, by definition, prevailed at
their bond hearing.” Carlon, 2025 WL 2624386, at *3; Gunaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at
1187 (same). Yet despite prevailing at his bond hearing, the automatic stay provision
allowed the Government to effectively disregard the IJ’s custody determination and
deprive Granillo Chavarria of his liberty anyway. Put another way, “the automatic stay
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regulation empowers ICE—the losing party in the bond hearing—to unilaterally override
the decision of the [Immigration] Judge and keep the noncitizen detained pending
appeal. Such a rule allows the government to bypass its burden of proof at bond
hearings and usurp the role of the Immigration Judge.” Sampiao v. Hyde, 799 F. Supp.
3d 14, 32 (D. Mass. 2025).
“Other courts considering the automatic stay provision have found this
problematic as well.” Carlon, 2025 WL 2624386, at *3; Zavala v. Ridge, 310 F. Supp.
2d 1071, 1077–78 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (recognizing that “[a] unilateral determination made
by the [Immigration and Naturalization] Service attorney that effectively overrules the
reasoned decision of the Immigration Judge poses a serious risk of error” in that “it
conflates the functions of adjudicator and prosecutor”); Ashley v. Ridge, 288 F. Supp.
2d 662, 668, 671 (D.N.J. 2003) (explaining that the automatic stay regulation produces
a “patently unfair situation by ‘tak[ing] the stay decision out of the hands of the judges
altogether and giv[ing] it to the prosecutor who has by definition failed to persuade a
judge in an adversary hearing that detention is justified’” and “renders the Immigration
Judge's bail determination an empty gesture”).
Nevertheless, the Government maintains that “further review by the BIA will
enhance, not reduce, the accuracy of a bond decision, and this factor thus does not
weigh in favor of a due process violation.” (ECF No. 14 at 10.) But this argument
disingenuously confuses the issue. The Government does not need the automatic stay
provision to challenge the IJ’s bond determination before the BIA. It can simply appeal
the IJ’s bond determination while Granillo Chavarria enjoys his freedom as that
appellate procedure plays out.
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Moreover, the Government’s argument “frames the concern for accuracy solely in
[its own] favor . . . .” Rivas, 2026 WL 444732, at *3. “[T]he traditional due process
concern with accuracy . . . is meant to protect the individual interest.” Benham v.
Ledbetter, 785 F.2d 1480, 1487 (11th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added); see also Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525–26 (1958) (“Where one party has at stake an interest of
transcending value—as a criminal defendant his liberty—this margin of error is reduced
as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden of producing a
sufficiency of proof in the first instance . . . .”).
Frankly, the Court is far more concerned that Granillo Chavarria will be
erroneously detained pending appeal than by the prospect of the IJ’s decision being
reversed while he is released on (in the Court’s view, an outrageously expensive) bond.
See Rivas, 2026 WL 444732, at * 3 (“In matters such as this, the concern for accuracy
is that individuals will erroneously be deprived of their liberty—the paramount interest at
stake—as opposed to a concern with the accuracy of an IJ's determination that an
individual is not a danger or a flight risk.”).
Perhaps of greatest concern, “[t]he automatic stay regulation also inverts the
traditional burdens and standards governing requests for stays pending appeal.”
Sampiao, 799 F. Supp. 3d at 32. Specifically, the automatic stay provision gives the
Government carte blanche to keep noncitizens detained regardless of the particular
circumstances of a given case. “Ordinarily, to obtain a stay of a judge's order requires a
party to, inter alia, make ‘a strong showing’ that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its
challenge to that order.” Maza v. Hyde, 807 F. Supp. 3d 42, 49 (D. Mass.
2025) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)). By contrast, the automatic
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stay regulation “turns these well-established procedural principles on their heads and
carries a significant risk of erroneous deprivation.” Gunaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at
1187; see also Vizguerra-Ramirez, 2025 WL 3653158, at *14 (finding that these
circumstances unfairly put petitioners “in the more difficult position of proving a
negative—that is, proving that [they are] neither a flight risk nor a danger to the
community”); Choate, 744 F. Supp. 3d at 1183–84 (same). “By flipping the traditional
rules governing requests to stay pending appeal, the automatic stay regulation invites
significant risk of error in decisions that deprive individuals of their liberty.” Sampiao,
799 F. Supp. 3d at 33.
What’s more, the automatic stay regulation is not the Government’s only
available tool for keeping a noncitizen detained after an IJ’s bond determination: The
Government may also “request a discretionary emergency stay from the BIA.” Carlon,
2025 WL 2624386, at *4; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(i)(1) (granting BIA discretionary
stay authority); Gunaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1190 (“Respondents’ interest in
preserving the automatic stay regulation is almost entirely, if not entirely, reduced by the
mechanisms already in place for requesting an emergency stay from the BIA.”). “This
procedure, at minimum, mitigates the concern about DHS usurping the neutral
adjudicatory role of an Immigration Judge and provides additional safeguards that the
automatic stay provision lacks.” Merchan-Pacheo, 2026 WL 88526, at *15. Given all
this, the second Mathews factor favors Granillo Chavarria as well.
Third and finally, the Government does not have a significant interest in keeping
Granillo Chavarria detained by way of the automatic stay regulation. The Government
suggests that its interest in keeping Granillo Chavarria detained is strong because he
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may flee if released pending appeal, which “could render the review process illusory.”
(ECF No. 14 at 10.) But the Government’s stated concern is misplaced because an IJ
has already found that Granillo Chavarria does not pose a flight risk sufficient to deny
bond. As such, the Government’s stated interest here is unsubstantiated and based on
nothing more than mere conjecture.
For all these reasons, the Court concludes, based on the Mathews factors, that
Granillo Chavarria has established that the Government’s use of the automatic stay
regulation offends his procedural due process rights. Accordingly, he is entitled to
immediate release, upon the posting of bond, from his unlawful detention.
IV. 	REMAINING ARGUMENTS
Given the Court’s conclusion that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) violates Granillo
Chavarria’s procedural due process rights, it need not consider whether the automatic
stay regulation also violates Granillo Chavarria’s substantive due process rights and the
APA.
Relatedly, the Court declines, at this time, to address Granillo Chavarria’s
request that it enjoin the Government from re-arresting him pursuant to section
1225(b)(2)(A). While the Court acknowledges that this statute is the driving force
behind the Government’s position on appeal before the BIA, it is undisputed that this
statutory authority is not itself responsible for Granillo Chavarria’s current detention. As
Granillo Chavarria acknowledges, the “automatic stay [is] the but for cause of his
detention.” (ECF No. 15 at 10 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).) And he
points to no authority permitting the Court to issue what would essentially be an
advisory opinion on the applicability of section 1225(b)(2)(A) in this case. (Id. at 11.)
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(That said, the Government is clearly aware that the Court has already repeatedly
weighed in on this issue. See, e.g., Morales Lopez v. Baltazar, 2026 WL 25161 (D.
Colo. Jan. 5, 2026).)
V. 	CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. 	The Court’s Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 11) is MADE ABSOLUTE and
Granillo Chavarria’s Petition (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED;
2. 	The Court GRANTS this relief pursuant to Claim 1 of the Petition, and
does not reach the other claims asserted by Granillo Chavarria in his Petition;
3. 	The Motion is DENIED AS MOOT (ECF No. 4);
4. 	By no later than this Saturday, March 14, 2026, the Government shall
IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Granillo Chavarria, upon the posting of the bond
issued by the IJ, along with all his personal belongings;
5. 	No onerous conditions of release shall be unilaterally imposed by
Respondents on Granillo Chavarria, including without limitation mandating that
he wear GPS monitoring, submit to mandatory reporting, or have his movements
otherwise restricted;
6. 	Respondents are hereby ENJOINED from removing or transferring, or
causing to remove or transfer, Granillo Chavarria from the District of Colorado
until such time as this Court, or the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, vacates this
Order;
7. 	Should Granillo Chavarria believe he has a good faith basis to seek
attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, he is GRANTED
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leave to file a motion seeking the same, along with all supporting documentation,
by no later than April 9, 2026. The Government shall file a response by no later
than April 30, 2026, and Petitioner shall file a reply by no later than May 14,
2026; and
8. 	Judgment shall enter in Granillo Chavarria’s favor and against the
Government on March 26, 2026, UNLESS prior thereto the Court is informed
that the Government has failed to fully and timely comply with the terms of this
Order.
Dated this 12 th day of March, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
______________________
William J. Martinez
Senior United States District Judge
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