Singh v. Baltasar et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 26-cv-0611-WJM
HARKIRAT SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
JUAN BALTASAR, in his official capacity as Warden
of the Denver Contract Detention Facility, et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER GRANTING HABEAS CORPUS PETITION
Before the Court is Petitioner Harkirat Singh’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”) (ECF No. 1) and Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order (“Motion”) (ECF No. 2). Respondents Juan Baltasar, in his official
capacity as Warden of the Denver Contract Detention Facility; Todd Lyons, in his official
capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”); Kristi
Noem, in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”); and Pamela Bondi, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the
United States (collectively, “Respondents” or “the Government”) filed a response. (ECF
No. 11.) Singh filed a reply. (ECF No. 12.)
For the following reasons, the Petition is granted.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Singh is a native and citizen of India who first entered the United States without
inspection in May 2024. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 1.) He claims he fled India in fear for his life
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and is currently pursuing an application for asylum in Immigration Court. (Id. at ¶ 4.)
Singh was briefly detained upon his initial entry into the United States but was
released shortly thereafter on his own recognizance and placed in ICE’s Alternatives to
Detention (“ATD”) program. (Id. at ¶ 1.) Singh has no criminal history and states that
he maintained perfect compliance with his conditions of release under the ATD
program, including attending every scheduled check-in with ICE. (Id. at ¶ 2, 3.)
Singh continued on bond without incident until roughly a month ago, when local
law enforcement stopped a vehicle in which he was a passenger for a “traffic matter.”
(Id. at ¶ 5.) The officers questioned Singh about his immigration status, and he told
them he had a pending case in Immigration Court. (Id.) Upon learning as much, the
officers promptly detained Singh without a warrant or individualized custody
determination and subsequently transferred him to the custody of ICE. (Id.)
As of the date of the Petition, no final order of removal had been entered in
Singh’s immigration proceedings. (Id. at ¶ 4.) Nevertheless, the Government now
claims that Singh is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)—not 8
U.S.C. § 1226. (Id. at ¶ 4, 6–7; ECF No. 11 at 2, 4.) Singh brings the Petition and
Motion to challenge the legality of his detention under § 1225(b).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through
habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004). More
specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “confers jurisdiction upon the federal courts to hear [such
cases.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)
(authorizing any person to claim in federal court that they are being held “in custody in
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violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States”)). “The fundamental
purpose of a § 2241 habeas proceeding is the same as that of § 2254 habeas and §
2255 proceedings: they are an ‘attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.’” McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Com'n, 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973)).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Singh contends that his mandatory detention under § 1225 violates the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights.
(See generally ECF No. 1.) As a result, Hernandez seeks a “prompt bond hearing
before an Immigration Judge or, in the alternative,” immediate release from detention.
(Id. at 2–3, 11–12.)
The Government submits that “[t]he central legal issue presented in this case
concerns whether a noncitizen who is present in the United States and has not been
admitted is subject to mandatory detention by [ICE] under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), or
whether such a noncitizen is entitled by § 1226(a) to seek a bond hearing.” (ECF No.
11 at 2.) The Government further submits that the particular facts of this case are not
germane to this central legal issue. (Id. at 2.) On the contrary, the Government
acknowledges that “[t]his issue is not materially different from an issue this Court has
resolved in prior rulings in other cases.” (Id. (citing Garcia Abanil v. Baltazar, ---- F.
Supp. 3d ----, 2026 WL 100587, at *1 (D. Colo. Jan. 14, 2026); Morales Lopez v.
Baltazar, 2026 WL 25161, at *1 (D. Colo. Jan. 5, 2026)).)
In Morales Lopez, the Court made the following very clear: “Like dozens of other
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federal district courts across the country, including in this Circuit, the Court concludes
that Morales Lopez's detention is properly governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A).” 2026 WL 25161, at *4 (citing Nava Hernandez v. Baltazar, et al., 2025
WL 2996643, at *4 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025)). The Morales Lopez case involved facts
substantially similar to those at issue in Singh’s case. See generally id.
Then, only a week or so later, the Court fleshed out the reasoning behind this
ruling in Garcia Abanil. See generally 2026 WL 100587, at *1. It summarized the
pertinent issue as follows:
[S]ince Yajure Hurtado, many lawsuits have been filed
challenging Respondents’ recent practice of subjecting all
noncitizen immigrants present in the United States to
mandatory detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A). As in
many of those previously filed actions, Garcia Abanil alleges
here that his continued detention under 1225(b)(2)(A)
violates the INA, as well as his substantive due process
rights. (ECF No. 1.) The Court analyzes each of these
claims below. Ultimately, it joins the many federal courts
across the country that have been faced with virtually
identical challenges in concluding that Garcia Abanil is
subject to detention only under § 1226(a)—not
§ 1225(b)(2)(A)—and his continued detention without an
individualized custody determination accordingly violates his
constitutional right to due process.
Id. at *4.
The Court held in that case:
The Court, like numerous other courts presented with this
very same question of statutory interpretation, agrees with
Garcia Abanil. “The weight of authority interpreting § 1225
has recognized that ‘for section 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply,
several conditions must be met—in particular, an ‘examining
immigration officer’ must determine that the individual is:
(1) an ‘applicant for admission’; (2) ‘seeking admission’; and
(3) ‘not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.’”
Loa Caballero v. Baltazar, 2025 WL 2977650, at *6 (D. Colo.
Oct. 22, 2025) (quoting Martinez v. Hyde, 2025 WL
2084238, at *2 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (internal citations
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omitted)).
. . .
At bottom, “[n]oncitizens who are just ‘present’ in the country
. . ., who have been here for years upon years and never
proceeded to obtain any form of citizenship[,] . . . are not
‘seeking’ admission.” Lopez-Campos, 797 F. Supp. 3d at
781. And “[a]s § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to those
noncitizens who are actively ‘seeking admission’ to the
United States, it cannot, according to its ordinary meaning,
apply to [persons who have] already been residing in the
United States for several years.’ Lopez Benitez v. Francis,
795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2025). Put another way,
noncitizens in Garcia Abanil's position, who entered the
United States many years ago, are not ‘seeking admission’
to the United States but are instead “seeking to remain in the
United States.” Lepe v. Andrews, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104,
1113 (E.D. Cal. 2025); see also J.G.O. v. Francis, 2025 WL
3040142, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2025) (“‘[S]eeking
admission’ requires an alien to continue to want to go into
the country. The problem, as [petitioner] points out, is that
he's already here; you can't go into a place where you
already are.” (emphasis in original)).
Id. at *4–5.
The Court did not, however, base its conclusion on the plain text of the
controlling statutes alone. Rather, it went on to observe that
Respondents’ proffered interpretation of § 1225 appears
facially inconsistent with related implementing regulations.
Though, “[w]ith Chevron laid to rest,” the Court must “follow
the Supreme Court's charge to ‘exercise independent
judgment’ in interpreting the relevant statutory language,”
Rangel-Fuentes v. Bondi, 155 F.4th 1138, 1143 (10th Cir.
2025) (internal citation omitted), courts may nonetheless
“seek aid from the interpretations of those responsible for
implementing particular statutes,” Loper Bright Enters. v.
Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394 (2024). “[I]nterpretations
issued contemporaneously with the statute at issue, and
which have remained consistent over time, may be
especially useful in determining the statute's meaning.” Id.
As relevant here, the implementing regulation for § 1225(b)
states that “any arriving alien who appears to the inspecting
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officer to be inadmissible, and who is placed in removal
proceedings pursuant to section 240 of the Act shall be
detained in accordance with section 235(b) of the Act.” 8
C.F.R. § 235(c)(1) (emphasis added). In this way, “[t]he
regulation appears to contemplate that applicants seeking
admission are a subset of applicants ‘roughly
interchangeable’ with ‘arriving aliens.’” Cordero Pelico v.
Kaiser, 2025 WL 2822876, at *11 ([N.D. Cal.] Oct. 3, 2025)
(quoting Martinez, 2025 WL 2084238, at *6) (emphasis in
original). An “arriving alien” is defined under the regulatory
scheme as “an applicant for admission coming or attempting
to come into the United States at a port-of-entry.” 8 C.F.R. §
1.2. “This plainly does not describe petitioners,” like Garcia
Abanil, who already “reside in the United States.” Kaiser,
2025 WL 28227876, at *11.
Id. at *5.
Finally, the Court observed that Garcia Abanil’s illegal detention violated his
substantive due process rights. See id. at 6 (“Here, the parties’ arguments appear, at
least implicitly, to acknowledge that Garcia Abanil's due process claim rises and falls
with the Court's determination of whether he is detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A) or
§ 1226(a).”). The Court expounded: “[B]ecause Garcia Abanil is statutorily entitled
under § 1226 to more process than he has thus far received, his continued detention
without an individualized bond hearing necessarily violates his Fifth Amendment right to
due process.” Id.; cf. Lopez Benitez, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 495 (concluding, at least as it
pertains to the first factor set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), that
“the facts clearly demonstrate[d] that [petitioner] was ‘entitled to more process than he
received’ pursuant to § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations” and thus “a violation
of [petitioner's] ‘liberty interest is clearly established’ here”).
Respondents “respectfully disagree with th[e]se rulings.” (ECF No. 11 at 2.)
Moreover, they point out that the Fifth Circuit has since agreed with their proffered
interpretation of the statute. (Id. at 2 (citing Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, --- F.4th ---,
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2026 WL 323330, at *5–10 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026).) Nevertheless, “Respondents
acknowledge that until the Tenth Circuit rules on this issue, this Court’s prior ruling on
this issue would lead the Court to reach the same result here if the Court adheres to
[Garcia Abanil and Morales Lopez], as the facts of this case are not materially
distinguishable from those cases for purposes of the Court’s decision on the legal issue
of whether Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).”
(Id. at 3.) As a result, “while Respondents do not consent to issuance of the writ and
reserve the right to appeal, to expedite disposition of this case,” they submit that they
have nothing to add beyond the legal arguments the undersigned has already fully
considered and rejected elsewhere. (Id.)
The Court sees no basis to depart from the extensive reasoning outlined in its
published decision in Garcia Abanil. More to the point, not only is it not bound by the
Fifth Circuit’s intervening decision, it is singularly unpersuaded by it. See Singh v.
Baltazar, — F. Supp. 3d. —, 2026 WL 352870, at *3–4 (D. Colo. Feb. 9, 2026) (similarly
rejecting Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Buenrostro-Mendez). Furthermore, unlike the
circumstances of the Buenrostro-Mendez decision, the petitioner here does not concede
that he is an applicant “for admission within the meaning of § 1225(a)(1).” See Bautista
v. Santacruz, — F. Supp. 3d. —, 2026 WL 468284, at *7 n.6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2026)
(observing that the petitioners in that case did not concede the “seeking admission”
point as did the petitioners in Buenrostro-Mendez).
Like that of the petitioner in Garcia Abanil and Morales Lopez, Singh’s detention
properly falls under section 1226(a). As such, the Court readily finds and concludes
that Respondents have violated his statutory and constitutional rights by arguing
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otherwise and denying him an opportunity to post bond.1
Accordingly, the Court shall order the Government to provide Hernandez with a
bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a) within seven days of this Order. The Court
believes, on the limited record before it, that an Immigration Judge is better suited to
consider whether he poses a flight risk or danger to the community in the first instance.
Cf. Loa Caballero, 2025 WL 2977650, at *9; Alvarez v. Noem, 2025 WL 2942648, at *9
(W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025).
As for the procedures that will govern at that bond hearing, the Court reiterates
its holding in Garcia Abanil: It is the Government's burden to “justify[] a noncitizen's
continued detention at a bond hearing.” 2026 WL 100587, at *4; Arauz v. Baltazar,
2025 WL 3041840, at *4 n.3 (D. Colo. Oct. 31, 2025); see also Espinoza Ruiz v.
Baltazar, 2025 WL 3294762, at *2 (D. Colo. Nov. 26, 2025) (ordering that the
Government would carry the burden of proof for the bond hearing under § 1226(a)); Loa
Caballero, 2025 WL 2977650, at *9 (“During such [§ 1226(a) hearing], the Respondents
bear the burden of justifying detention.”); Mendoza Gutierrez, 2025 WL 2962908, at *14
(directing that “the Government shall bear the burden of justifying [detention] by clear
and convincing evidence of dangerousness of risk of flight”).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1 Notably, the Court’s conclusion here is consistent with the numerous other
decisions the undersigned has reached in the very recent past. Cf. Hernandez v.
Baltazar et al., 2026 WL 507518, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 24, 2026); Fuentes Bonilla v.
Baltazar et al., 2026 WL 452365, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 18, 2026); Martinez-Orellana v.
Hagan et al., Civil Action No. 26-cv-0355-WJM (D. Colo. Feb. 13, 2026) (ECF No. 14);
Alvarez Hernandez v. Baltazar et al., 2026 WL 304362, at *1–4 (D. Colo. Feb. 5, 2026);
Garcia Abanil, — F.Supp.3d —, 2026 WL 100587, at *4; Morales Lopez, 2026 WL
25161, at *4–5.
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1. 	The Court’s Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 7) is MADE ABSOLUTE and
Singh’s Petition (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED;
2. 	The Court GRANTS this relief to Singh pursuant to his individual claims for
relief asserted in the Petition. It does not reach the merits of Singh’s contention that he
is entitled to substantially the same relief as a member of the class certified in
Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, Case No. 5:25-CV-1873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal.);
3. 	The Motion is DENIED AS MOOT (ECF No. 2);
4. 	Within seven days of this Order, the Government shall provide Singh with
a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
5. 	At the bond hearing, the Government shall bear the burden to justify
Singh’s continued detention by clear and convincing evidence;
6. 	Should the Immigration Judge determine that release on bond is
appropriate, no onerous conditions of release shall be unilaterally imposed by
Respondents on Singh, including without limitation mandating that he wear GPS
monitoring, submit to mandatory reporting, or have his movements otherwise restricted;
7. 	Respondents are hereby ENJOINED from removing, transferring, or
causing the removal or transfer, of Singh from the District of Colorado during the
pendency of this action;
8. 	Should Singh believe he has a good faith basis to seek attorney's fees
pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, he is GRANTED leave to file a motion
seeking the same, along with all supporting documentation, by no later than April 1,
2026. The Government shall file a response by no later than April 22, 2026, and Singh
shall file a reply by no later than May 6, 2026; and
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9. 	Judgment shall enter in Singh’s favor and against the Government on
March 18, 2026, UNLESS prior thereto the Court is informed that the Government has
failed to fully and timely comply with the terms of this Order.
Dated this 4th day of March, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
______________________
William J. Martinez
Senior United States District Judge
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