Garcia-Perez v. Guadian et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 25-cv-04069-PAB
WILSON RENE GARCIA-PEREZ,
Petitioner,
v.
ROBERT GUADIAN, Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations,
Denver Field Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
TODD LYONS, Acting Director Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
US IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
JUAN BALTASAR, Warden of Denver Contract Detention Facility, Aurora, Colorado,
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
US DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
SIRCE OWEN, Acting Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, and
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW,
Respondents.
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on petitioner Wilson Rene Garcia-Perez’s
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Docket No. 1]. Respondents filed a response.
Docket No. 11. Petitioner filed a reply. Docket No. 12.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is an 18-year-old citizen of Guatemala. Docket No. 1 at 2, 5, ¶¶ 1, 23.
On or about August 2, 2021, petitioner arrived in the United States near Sasabe,
Arizona where he was detained by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). 1 Id.
1 In a declaration, DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE“)
Deportation Officer John Mansur states that, “[o]n August 2, 2021, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) encountered Petitioner at or near Sasabe, Arizona, shortly
after he illegally crossed the border into the United States from Mexico.” Docket No. 11-
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at 5, ¶ 24. At the time, petitioner was a 14-year-old unaccompanied minor. Id.; Docket
No. 11-1 at 2, ¶ 7. On August 3, 2021, DHS issued a Notice to Appear indicating that it
intended to initiate removal proceedings against petitioner. Docket No. 1 at 5, ¶ 25.
The Notice was never filed with the immigration court and removal proceedings were
not initiated. Id.; Docket No. 11-1 at 2-3, ¶ 8. On or about August 29, 2021, petitioner
was released to the custody of his father. Docket No. 1 at 5, ¶ 26; Docket No. 11-1 at 3,
¶ 9.
On November 22, 2025, petitioner appeared for an immigration appointment and
was detained by DHS. Docket No. 1 at 5, ¶ 29. ICE issued a new Notice to Appear to
petitioner, initiating removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). Id. at 6, ¶ 30;
Docket No. 11-1 at 3, ¶ 11. The Notice charges petitioner with being inadmissible to the
United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Docket No. 11-1 at 3, ¶ 11.
Respondents claim that petitioner is being held pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Id.,
¶ 12.
On December 2, 2025, petitioner requested a custody redetermination hearing
before an immigration judge. Docket No. 1 at 6, ¶ 31. On December 8, 2025, petitioner
appeared for an initial hearing in his removal proceedings where he was granted
additional time to retain an attorney. Docket No. at 11-1 at 3-4, ¶ 15. On December 11,
2025, petitioner and his counsel appeared before an immigration judge for a custody
redetermination hearing. Id. at 4, ¶ 16. At the hearing, the immigration judge found that
the court lacked jurisdiction to redetermine petitioner’s custody status. Id. On
1 at 2, ¶ 7. Mr. Mansur states that “Petitioner illegally entered the United States at an
unknown location and date.” Id., ¶ 5. The Court need not resolve the date on which
petitioner entered the country, finding it undisputed that he has been in the United
States since at least August 2, 2021.
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December 29, 2025, petitioner appeared for a master calendar hearing. Id., ¶ 17.
Petitioner is currently detained at the Denver Contract Detention Facility in Aurora,
Colorado. Docket No. 1 at 2, ¶ 3.
On December 18, 2025, petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See generally id. Petitioner brings a claim for violation of
the Immigration and Nationality Act 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (Count 1) and a claim for violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
(Count 2). Id. at 7-8. Petitioner asks the Court to issue a writ requiring that
respondents release petitioner within one day or, in the alternative, release petitioner
unless petitioner is provided a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a) within seven days.
Id. at 8.
II. 	ANALYSIS
The parties disagree on the statutes that control petitioner’s detention. Petitioner
contends that his detention should be controlled by 8 U.S.C. § 1226 because § 1226
“governs the detention of individuals apprehend[ed] inside the United States and placed
in removal proceedings.” Id. at 6, ¶ 34. Because he believes that § 1226 applies,
petitioner argues that respondents must release him or provide him a bond hearing.
See id. at 7, ¶¶ 40-41. Respondents, however, contend that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
applies to petitioner, and petitioner is therefore not entitled to a bond hearing, but is
rather subject to mandatory detention. See Docket No. 11 at 7-12.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) “contemplates two detention regimes
for noncitizens pending removal proceedings,” one controlled by § 1225 and one
controlled by § 1226. Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03094-CNS, 2025 WL
2996643, at *3 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025) (citation omitted). Section 1225 mandates
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detention pending removal proceedings, providing that, “if the examining immigration
officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Unless
certain exceptions are present, as provided for in §§ 1225(b)(2)(B) and (C), § 1225
“mandates detention without the opportunity for a bond hearing for the noncitizens to
whom it applies.” Hernandez, 2025 WL 2996643, at *3. Section 1226, on the other
hand, does not mandate detention, providing that “an alien may be arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United
States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Under § 1226(a)(2), the Attorney General has the
discretion to release a noncitizen on bond while removal proceedings are pending. 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2). “Federal regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a)
receive bond hearings at the outset of detention.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281,
306 (2018).
Respondents argue that Jennings supports the conclusion that § 1225(b) applies
to “applicants for admission,” which encompasses “both those just arriving in the United
States and those who entered without inspection.” Docket No. 11 at 8. “[A] proper
understanding of the relevant statutes, in light of their plain text, overall structure, and
uniform case law interpreting them, compels the conclusion that § 1225’s provision for
mandatory detention of noncitizens ‘seeking admission’ does not apply to someone like
[petitioner], who has been residing in the United States for more than two years.”
Mendoza Gutierrez v. Baltasar, No. 25-cv-2720-RMR, 2025 WL 2962908, at *5 (D.
Colo. Oct. 17, 2025) (citation omitted) (collecting cases).
The Court disagrees with respondents’ contention that Jennings supports a
different conclusion. The Supreme Court in Jennings held that, “[i]n sum, U.S.
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immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission
into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2)” and that “[i]t also authorizes the
Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of
removal proceedings under [] § 1226(a).” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added).
Therefore, Jennings distinguishes between noncitizens seeking admission, who are
subject to § 1225, and noncitizens who are already present in the country, who are
subject to § 1226.
Respondents points to Jennings’s finding that § 1225(b)(2) “serves as a catchall
provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1),”
arguing that “§ 1225(b)(2) is a catchall that is broader than § 1225(b)(1).” Docket No.
11 at 9 (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287). This language from Jennings does not
stand for the proposition that any “applicant for admission” who falls outside
§ 1225(b)(1) must necessarily be covered by § 1225(b)(2). “While it is true that Section
1225(b)(2) is broader than § 1225(b)(1), that does not mean that § 1225(b)(2) applies to
all other noncitizens in the United States who have not been admitted.” Hernandez,
2025 WL 2996643, at *6 (quoting Mendoza Gutierrez, 2025 WL 2962908, at *6)
(internal quotations omitted). Furthermore, Jennings “did not address exactly which
noncitizens are covered by § 1225(b)(2).” Briales-Zuniga v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03439-
NYW, 2026 WL 35227, at *3 (D. Colo. Jan. 6, 2026). To adopt respondents’
interpretation of Jennings would be to ignore “the greater context from Jennings . . .
which makes clear that § 1225(b)(2)’s catchall provision – and, in fact, all provisions of
§ 1225 – apply to noncitizens seeking admission into the country, as opposed to those
who are already in the country.” Hernandez, 2025 WL 2996643, at *6 (quoting
Jennings, 582 U.S. at 289) (internal quotations omitted).
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Respondents’ argument that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to noncitizens already
residing in the United States is contrary to the plain language of § 1225. “The weight of
authority interpreting § 1225 has recognized that for section 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply,
several conditions must be met – in particular, an ‘examining immigration officer’ must
determine that the individual is: (1) an ‘applicant for admission’; (2) ‘seeking admission’;
and (3) ‘not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.’” Loa Caballero v.
Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03120-NYW, 2025 WL 2977650, at *6 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2025)
(internal quotation and citation omitted) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)). Section
1225(b)(2)(A)’s requirement that an applicant for admission be “seeking admission”
“requires that the applicant must be presently and actively seeking lawful entry into the
United States.” Id. Therefore, noncitizens who “have been here for years upon years
and never proceeded to obtain any form of citizenship . . . are not ‘seeking’ admission”
as defined in § 1225(b)(2)(A). Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 797 F. Supp. 3d 771, 781
(E.D. Mich. 2025). While these kinds of noncitizens, like petitioner, “may technically be
a noncitizen present in the United States who has not been admitted [making] them an
applicant for admission,” that does not mean that they are “seeking admission.” See id.
(internal quotations omitted).
Respondents point to § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) for the proposition that mandatory
detention is not limited to noncitizens arriving in the United States. See Docket No. 11
at 8. Section 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) provides:
If an immigration officer determines that an alien . . . who is arriving in the United
States or is described in clause (iii) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(6)(C)
or 1182(a)(7) of this title, the officer shall order the alien removed from the United
States without further hearing or review.
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8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Respondents argue that § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)’s reference to
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii), which in turn references “some noncitizens who have already been
residing in the United States and are inadmissible,” demonstrates that § 1225 is
applicable to noncitizens like petitioner. See Docket No. 11 at 8. However,
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) and (iii) are “better understood as carve outs for the ‘certain other
aliens’ that do not fall into § 1225’s otherwise general application to arriving
[non]citizens.” Hernandez, 2025 WL 2996643, at *6 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)).
Respondents also rely on 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3) for the proposition that “§ 1225
elsewhere recognizes that the status of being an applicant for admission is one way that
a noncitizen may be ‘seeking admission.’” Docket No. 11 at 9-10. Section 1225(a)(3)
states that “[a]ll aliens . . . who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking
admission or readmission to or transit through the United States shall be inspected by
immigration officers.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3). The Court rejects respondents’ argument
that an applicant for admission is necessarily seeking admission. “The ‘otherwise
seeking admission’ language is simply a catch-all provision to describe individuals
seeking admission and subject to inspection who may not fit the definition of ‘applicant
for admission,’ such as a person not currently present in the United States.” Loa
Caballero, 2025 WL 2977650, at *6 n.4.
Respondents argue that § 1226(a)’s “general detention authority, which permits
the issuance of warrants to detain noncitizens for their removal proceedings, must be
read alongside § 1225, which specifically addresses the detention of applicants for
admission.” Docket No. 11 at 10. Respondents contend that § 1226 “does not displace
the more specific provisions in § 1225.” Id. As the Court has already found, petitioner
is subject to detention under § 1226, and a “noncitizen cannot be subject to both
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mandatory detention under § 1225 and discretionary detention under § 1226.” See
Hernandez, 2025 WL 2996643, at *6 (citation omitted).
Congress’s 2025 amendment of § 1226 to add subsection (c)(1)(E) provides
further support that petitioner is subject to § 1226. As respondents acknowledge,
Ҥ 1226(c)(1)(E) mandates detention for a narrow category of noncitizens who entered
the country without inspection.” Docket No. 11 at 10. In January 2025, Congress
amended § 1226, adding § 1226(c)(1)(E). See Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139
Stat. 3 (2025). Section 1226(c)(1)(E) provides that the “Attorney General shall take into
custody any alien who –”
(E)(i) is inadmissible under paragraph (6)(A), (6)(C), or (7) of section 1182(a) of
this title; and
(ii) is charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed, or
admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of any burglary,
theft, larceny, shoplifting, or assault of a law enforcement officer offense, or any
crime that results in death or serious bodily injury to another person,
when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on
parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien
may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). This provision would be meaningless if noncitizens already
residing in the United States were all subject to mandatory detention. See Salcedo
Aceros v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 2637503, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025) (“If Congress
amended Section 1226 to create mandatory detention for certain inadmissible
noncitizens, it follows that those noncitizens were not already subject to mandatory
detention.”).
For the foregoing reasons, “federal district courts have overwhelmingly rejected
Respondents’ broad interpretation of section 1225(b)(2).” See Loa Caballero, 2025 WL
2977650, at *5 (internal quotation and citation omitted) (collecting cases). The Court
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agrees with the weight of the authority finding that petitioner’s detention is controlled by
§ 1226(a) and not by § 1225(b)(2)(A). 2
Accordingly, the Court finds that petitioner is being detained under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a). Because there is no evidence that petitioner has been provided a bond
hearing, his current detention violates § 1226(a). The Court will grant the habeas
petition on Count I and order respondents to provide petitioner a bond hearing within
seven days of the date of this order. 3 See Garcia Cortes v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02677-
CNS, 2025 WL 2652880, at *5 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2025) (ordering respondents to
provide a bond hearing within seven days of the court’s order granting the habeas
petition); Loa Caballero, 2025 WL 2977650, at *1 (same); Hernandez, 2025 WL
2996643, at *8 (same). The Court declines to order petitioner’s release as a remedy
because Ҥ 1226(a) does not require release Рit provides DHS the discretion to grant
an alien release on bond.” Briales-Zuniga, 2026 WL 35227, at *4. Furthermore, an
immigration judge is better suited to consider whether petitioner poses a flight risk or
danger. 4 See id.; Loa Caballero, 2025 WL 2977650, at *9.
2 Respondents argue that petitioner was never admitted or paroled into the
United States and that his release into his father’s custody does not mean petitioner
was admitted into the United States. Docket No. 11 at 12-13. Petitioner does not
respond to this argument. See Docket No 12. The Court need not address this
argument because petitioner never being admitted or paroled into the United States
does not preclude the application of § 1226. Section 1226 is a detention regime for
noncitizens who are pending removal proceedings. See Hernandez, 2025 WL
2996643, at *3.
3 Because the Court will grant the habeas petition on the basis of Count I, it will
not reach Count II, petitioner’s due process claim. See Hernandez, 2025 WL 2996643,
at *8 (“the Court declines to adjudicate Petitioner’s due process claim on the merits at
this time because the Court grants the relief Petitioner seeks based on the applicability
of § 1226(a)”).
4 As for petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees, see Docket No. 1 at 8, the Court
will not consider the request because petitioner fails to comply with the Local Rules of
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III. 	CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that Wilson Rene Garcia-Perez’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
[Docket No. 1] is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that respondents shall provide petitioner with a bond hearing under 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days of the date of this Court’s order. It is further
ORDERED that within five days of petitioner’s bond hearing, the parties shall file
a status report indicating whether the bond hearing was held and whether bond was
granted or denied.
DATED January 13, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
___________________________
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
Chief United States District Judge
the District of Colorado. A motion for attorney fees must be filed in accordance with
D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.3. See D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.3 (“Unless otherwise ordered, a
motion for attorney fees shall be supported by affidavit. . . . The Motion shall include . . .
for each person for whom fees are claimed: (1) a summary of relevant qualifications and
experience; and (2) a detailed description of the services rendered, the amount of time
spent, the hourly rate charged, and the total amount claimed.”).
___________________________________________________________	__	_________________	___	__	____	___	____________________
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