Khubiev v. Baltazar et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 25-cv-03955-STV
ALKHAZ KHUBIEV
Petitioner,
v.
JUAN BALTASAR; et al,
Respondents.
ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Order of Reference [#11],
entered on January 9, 2026, and the parties’ unanimous consent to disposition of this
action by a United States Magistrate Judge [#10]. Petitioner Alkhaz Khubiev is in custody
at the Aurora Detention Center. [#5 at ¶ 7] On December 9, 2025, Petitioner commenced
this action through counsel by filing an Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	[Id.] 	The Court has carefully reviewed the filings to date, the
applicable case law, and oral argument conducted during a status conference held on
February 4, 2024 [#17]. 	For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Petition IN
PART.
I. 	BACKGROUND1
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Russia who entered the United States on July
28, 2021 and was granted temporary humanitarian parole through July 26, 2022. [##5 at
1 Petitioner filed an initial Complaint on December 9, 2025 with exhibits attached. 	[#1]
On December 13, 2025, Petitioner filed an Amended Complaint without any of the
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¶¶ 21-22; 1-2 at 2] 	According to Respondents, shortly after Petitioner’s entry, United
States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), but
that notice was not filed with the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) and
removal proceedings were not initiated at that time. 	[#12 at 2] 	On July 22, 2022, while
still on parole, Petitioner filed an application for asylum based on a fear of persecution in
Russia. [##5 at ¶ 22; 12 at 2] Petitioner resided in the United States for four years after
entry, worked in accordance with his work authorization, filed taxes, and did not incur any
criminal violations during that period. [#5 at ¶ 24]
On July 30, 2025,2 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”)
issued a new NTA and filed it with EOIR, initiating removal proceedings against Petitioner.
[##1-4 at 2; 12 at 2] The NTA classified Petitioner as an “arriving alien” and informed him
that his parole status had terminated. 	[Id.] 	On November 20, 2025, the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) detained Petitioner while he was traveling to work. [#5 at ¶
3] 	Petitioner was charged with being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)(I)
and is currently detained at the Aurora Detention Center in Colorado. [## 5 at ¶ 7; 12 at
2]
Petitioner filed this habeas action on December 9, 2025, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241 [#1], and filed the operative Petition on December 13, 2025 [#5]. Petitioner brings
four claims for relief under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the
previously 	filed 	exhibits. 	However, 	the Amended 	Petition 	and 	the 	Government’s
Response cite to these exhibits throughout as they are central to Petitioner’s claims.
Accordingly the Court considers exhibits ## 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, and 1-5 as incorporated by
reference.
2 Petitioner alleges this occurred on July 13, 2025 [#5 at ¶ 23], but Petitioner’s cited exhibit
includes the date of July 30, 2025 on the NTA [#1-4].
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Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and the APA. [Id. at ¶¶ 71-93] First, he alleges
that Respondents violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by detaining
Petitioner without cause. [Id. at ¶¶ 71-76] Second, he alleges Respondents violated the
INA by detaining him after he was paroled without a hearing. [Id. at ¶¶ 77-81] Third, he
alleges 	Respondents 	violated 	the 	INA by 	revoking 	Petitioner’s 	parole 	without 	an
individualized assessment of his case. 	[Id. at 82-86] 	Fourth, he alleges Respondents
violated the APA by revoking his release without due consideration of his circumstances.
[Id. at ¶¶ 87-93] 	Petitioner seeks an order directing Respondents to either immediately
release him or to provide an individualized hearing. [#1 at 17-18]3
II. 	LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Section 2241 authorizes courts to adjudicate a writ of habeas corpus when a
petitioner is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). This includes “[c]hallenges to immigration detention.”
Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004). 	“The essence of habeas
corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the
traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 	Vizguerra-
Ramirez v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-00881-NYW, 2025 WL 3653158, at *3 (D. Colo. Dec. 17,
2025). 	“The writ of habeas corpus is designed to challenge ‘the fact or duration’ of a
person’s confinement.” 	Ramirez v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-1002-RMR, 2025 WL 1294919, at
*3 (D. Colo. May 5, 2025) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)). 	The
3 	Petitioner’s Amended 	Complaint 	did 	not 	include 	a 	section 	outlining 	Petitioner’s
requested relief. 	[See #5 at 21] 	Consistent with other parts of this Order, the Court
references Petitioner’s initial Complaint on this matter as incorporated by reference. [#1
at 17-18]
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individual in custody bears the burden of proving that their detention is unlawful. Walker
v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941).
III. 	ANALYSIS
This case turns on two related questions: whether Petitioner’s parole remained in
effect at the time of his detention and whether his current detention is governed by 8
U.S.C. § 1225 or § 1226. 	The Court begins with its analysis of Petitioner’s parole then
turns to the statutory provision applicable to Petitioner’s current detention.
A. 	Parole
Under the INA, parole is a discretionary mechanism that permits the temporary
physical presence of a noncitizen in the United States without effecting an admission. 8
U.S.C. 	§ 	1182(d)(5)(A). 	Parole 	is 	granted 	on 	a 	case-by-case 	basis 	for 	urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit and “shall not be regarded as an
admission of the alien.” Id.
Parole may terminate either by operation of law upon expiration of the authorized
period or by discretionary action of the Secretary. 	8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e). 	Where parole
expires according to its terms, it is “automatically terminated,” and no written notice is
required. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1)(ii). If parole does not terminate automatically, it must be
ended when its purpose is accomplished or when a designated official determines that
continued presence is no longer warranted; termination under this provision requires
written notice, which may be satisfied by service of a charging document. 	8 C.F.R. §
212.5(e)(2). A “charging document” is defined as a “written instrument which initiates a
proceeding before an Immigration Judge.” 	8 C.F.R. § 244.1. 	Relevant here, these
documents include a Notice to Appear. Id. Upon termination of parole, the noncitizen is
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“to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the
United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
Respondents argue that Petitioner’s parole was automatically terminated upon the
expiration of the date of his parole—July 26, 2022—which did not require written notice.
[#20 at 7] Even so, Respondents claim they sent written notice to Petitioner in the form
of a NTA on July 30, 2025 that expressly stated that Petitioner’s parole was “terminated
or expired” [id. at 8-9; #1-4 at 2], which Respondents claim Petitioner concedes he
received [#20 at 9]. According to Respondents, Petitioner’s asylum application was sent
to EOIR for adjudication at the same time as the NTA and was closed by USCIS. [Id. at
8-9] 	Petitioner was later detained on November 20, 2025, after the termination of his
parole on July 26, 2022, and after the NTA was issued on July 30, 2025. [Id. at 5]
Petitioner 	argues 	that 	there 	is 	no 	automatic 	expiration 	of 	parole 	and 	the
government may not terminate parole without first making an affirmative determination
that the purpose of parole has been accomplished or that humanitarian or public benefit
justifications no longer exist. [#21 at 2-3] Relying on 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i), Petitioner
contends that such a determination, and corresponding notice, is required even where
the parole period has expired. Id. In Petitioner’s view, the expiration of parole does not
itself suffice to end parole status without this additional justification.
Petitioner’s argument that there is no automatic expiration of parole misreads the
regulation by conflating automatic expiration with discretionary termination. 	Under 8
C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1), parole “shall be automatically terminated” upon expiration of the
authorized period, and no written notice or further justification is required. 	By contrast,
Section 212.5(e)(2)(i) applies only where the government elects to terminate parole on
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notice before it expires, and in that context requires a determination that the purpose of
parole has been served or that humanitarian or public benefit justifications no longer exist.
Despite this plain language, Petitioner relies on the cross-reference in 8 C.F.R. §
212.5(e)(1), which provides that upon automatic termination of parole, the noncitizen shall
be processed “in accordance with paragraph (e)(2),” to argue that DHS was required to
make an affirmative determination justifying termination. 	[#21 at 3] 	The Court is not
persuaded. 	As an initial matter, the plain language of Section 212.5(e)(1) expressly
provides that parole “shall be automatically terminated” upon expiration of the authorized
period and that “no written notice shall be required,” which would be inconsistent with
importing 	the 	notice 	and 	determination 	requirements 	applicable 	to 	discretionary
termination under Section 212.5(e)(2). The more natural reading of the regulation is that
the cross-reference governs the procedures that follow termination, not the prerequisites
for termination itself—that is, once parole is terminated, the government must proceed
with further inspection or a hearing under Sections 235 or 240 of the Act, or execute any
existing exclusion, deportation, or removal order. 8 U.S.C. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). And if such
an order cannot be carried out within a reasonable time, the individual must be re-paroled
unless an authorized official determines that continued detention is required in the public
interest. Id.
In this case, Petitioner was granted parole through July 26, 2022. The record does
not reflect any extension or renewal of that parole, and no outstanding orders were
entered at the time Petitioner’s parole expired. 	Accordingly, the Court concludes that
Petitioner’s parole expired by operation of law on that date, and the provisions of Section
212.5(e)(2) concerning execution of prior orders and related determinations do not apply
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here and do not impose additional requirements on the automatic expiration of parole
under Section 212.5(e)(1)(ii).
B. 	Detention Authority
Although Petitioner remained, in a formal sense, an applicant for admission
following the expiration of his parole, that designation does not resolve the related
question of detention authority presented here. 	The statutory scheme distinguishes
between detention associated with the entry process and detention that arises after the
Government has released an individual into the interior and later elects to pursue removal
through proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. 	The Court thus turns to the issue of
Petitioner’s detention.
The INA governs all aspects of immigration law. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. In
1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(“IIRIRA”) which substantially amended the INA. 	Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 423-25
(2009) (outlining the changes to the statute). Relevant here, IIRIRA added the expedited
removal 	proceedings 	of 	Section 	1225 	as 	an 	alternative 	mechanism 	for 	removing
noncitizens from the United States alongside the existing Section 1226 and Section
1229a proceedings. 	See Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 106-
107 (2020)); see also Aleman Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 1:25-cv-3688-SKC-SBP, 2025
WL 3718159, at *2 (D. Colo. Dec. 23, 2025).
1. 	Removal Proceedings
“The usual removal process—commonly referred to as Section 240—involves an
evidentiary hearing before an immigration judge, where a noncitizen may attempt to show
that he or she should not be removed.” 	Aleman Hernandez, 2025 WL 3718159, at *2
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(quotations omitted). 	“These are adversarial proceedings where noncitizens have the
right to hire counsel, examine the evidence against them, present their own evidence,
and cross-examine witnesses.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A)-(B)). 	“These
proceedings are recorded, often take months to resolve, and upon a decision by an
immigration judge, are appealable to the Board of Immigration Appeals.” 	Id. (citing 8
C.F.R. §§ 1003.1, 1240.15). 	“The BIA order is, in turn, appealable to a U.S. Court of
Appeals.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252).
“The second process provides for expedited removal [pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1)]. Under this provision, noncitizens who satisfy two criteria may be subject to
expedited removal.” 	Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)). 	“Under the first criterion, the
noncitizens are ‘inadmissible’ to the United States because they either lack proper entry
documents or they engaged in fraud or willfully misrepresented a material fact on their
application for admission.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). 	“The second criteria
provides that the noncitizens fall into at least one of two categories: (1) they are ‘arriving
in the United States,’ 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (‘Arriving [Noncitizen] Provision’); and or
(2) they ‘have not been admitted’ or paroled into the United States and have ‘not
affirmatively shown’ to an immigration officer's satisfaction that they have been ‘physically
present in the United States continuously for [a] 2-year period immediately prior to the
date of the determination of inadmissibility[,]’ id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) (‘Designation
Provision’).” Id. “In contrast to the usual removal process, ‘the expedited removal order
is usually issued within a few days, if not hours.’” Id. (quoting Make the Rd. New York v.
Noem, No. 25-cv-190 (JMC), 2025 WL 2494908, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2025)). “In these
proceedings, noncitizens typically have no opportunity to review the evidence against
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them or prepare a defense.” 	Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV); 8 C.F.R. §
235.3(b)(2)(iii)). 	“And there is almost no opportunity for judicial review.” 	Id. (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)).
2. 	Detention Pending Removal
The 	INA 	provides 	two 	options 	for 	detaining 	noncitizens 	pending 	removal
proceedings. Id. First, Section 1225 authorizes the government to inspect, detain, and,
if appropriate, remove applicants for admission. 	Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225). 	“Section
1225(b) requires the detention of two groups of ‘applicants for admission.’” 	Id. (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), (2)). 	“To the first grouping, § 1225(b)(1) . . . applies to noncitizens
who (1) are inadmissible because they lack proper documentation or because they
engaged in fraud or willful misrepresentations in their applications, and (2) fall within the
‘Arriving [Noncitizen] Provision’ or the ‘Designation Provision.’” 	Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii)(II)). “To the second grouping, § 1225(b)(2) applies ‘in the case of [a
noncitizen] who is an applicant for admission, [where] the examining immigration officer
determines that [the noncitizen] seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to 	be admitted.’” 	Id. 	(citing 8 	U.S.C. 	§ 1225(b)(2)(A) 	(emphasis added)).
“Noncitizens detained under § 1225, no matter which grouping, are not entitled to bond
hearings.” Id. (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018)).
Second, Section 1226 authorizes the arrest and detention of noncitizens “pending
the outcome of removal proceedings.” 	Id. at *3 (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289).
Unlike Section 1225(b), Section 1226 generally provides for individualized custody
determinations, including the possibility of release on bond (except where mandatory
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detention under Section 1226(c) applies).4 	A person “cannot be subject to both
mandatory detention under § 1225 and discretionary detention under § 1226.” 	Lopez
Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2025).
3. 	Petitioner’s Claims
Respondents contend that Petitioner remains an “applicant for admission” subject
to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b) after the termination of parole because
Petitioner reverted to the status he held prior to parole, namely, an applicant for admission
who has not been formally admitted to the United States. 	[##12-1 at ¶ 15; 20 at 2]
Petitioner argues that his detention is governed by Section 1226(a) because it arises from
removal proceedings initiated years after his release into the United States. [#5 at ¶¶ 56-
64] The Court agrees with Petitioner.
Again, although Petitioner initially presented as an applicant for admission [#20 at
2], that status alone does not resolve the issue before the Court. Just this month, another
Court in this District rejected Respondents’ argument that a petitioner necessarily reverts
to the initial status after the termination of parole. 	See Rafibaev v. Noem, No. 26-CV-
4 Section 1226(c) “carves out a statutory category of [noncitizens] who may not be
released under § 1226(a).” 	Aleman Hernandez, 2025 WL 3718159, at *5 (quoting
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289) (emphasis omitted). “Under this subcategory, noncitizens who
fall ‘into one of several enumerated categories involving criminal offenses and terrorist
activities’ are not eligible for release and must be detained without bond.” 	Id. (quoting
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289). 	“Importantly, the plain text of section 1226(c) requires
detention for certain noncitizens who are ‘deportable’ (meaning they were previously
admitted to the United States) as well as certain noncitizens deemed ‘inadmissible’
(meaning they have not been admitted to the United States).” Id. (quoting Rodriguez v.
Bostock, No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *17 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30,
2025)) (emphasis omitted).
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00461-PAB, 2026 WL 607559, at *4 (D. Colo. Mar. 4, 2026).5 	“[Section] 1182(d)(5)(A)
does not state that a noncitizen is returned to the ‘status’ they held upon their parole, that
they revert to status as an ‘arriving alien,’ or that they must be detained.” 	Id. 	(citing
Qasemi v. Francis, No. 25-cv-10029 (LJL), 2025 WL 3654098, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17,
2025)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Rather, it states that, following the expiration
of parole, the noncitizen shall (1) ‘forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which
he was paroled’ and (2) ‘thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same
manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.’” (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). 	“Neither of these requirements justify treating petitioner, who
was paroled, as if he is ‘arriving in the United States.’” Id.
As United States District Judge Philip A. Brimmer recently explained:
First, returning petitioner “to the custody from which he was paroled” does
not mean that petitioner's status under § 1225 reverts back to what it was
when he was initially in custody. 	In fact, § 1182(d)(5)(A) “recognizes that
the parole physically happened, because it contemplates that the noncitizen
must be returned to detention.” [Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights. v.
Noem, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 86 (D.D.C. 2025)]. 	Thus, § 1182(d)(5)(A)
recognizes that noncitizens paroled under its authority are released into the
United States. It would be illogical that these noncitizens would revert back
to being detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(1), which governs the inspection of
noncitizens “arriving into the United States,” instead of considering them
detained under another applicable authority. 	This is especially true given
that § 1182(d)(5)(A) does not state that a noncitizen reverts back to the
status he or she possessed before the grant of parole. See United States
v. Handley, 678 F.3d 1185, 1111 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating that courts should
“ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear
on its face.” (citation omitted)).
5 Because the Court agrees with the Rafibaev conclusion and its reasoning, and does not
believe it can improve on that reasoning in any way, the Court quotes extensively from
that opinion.
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Id.
“The second requirement of § 1182(d)(5)(A)—that after returning to custody a
noncitizen's case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as any other
applicant 	for 	admission—also 	does 	not 	make 	§ 	1225(b)(1) 	applicable.” 	“Section
1225(a)(1) defines an applicant for admission as a noncitizen ‘present in the United States
who has not been admitted or who arrived in the United States (whether or not at a
designated port of arrival . . .).’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)). “Thus, an ‘applicant
for admission’ need not be ‘arriving in the United States.’” 	Id. 	“Rather, ‘[a]ll the term
“applicant for admission” requires is presence in the United States without admission.”
Id. (quoting Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, 2:25-cv-6065 (NJC), 2025 WL 3314420, at
*17 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025)). “And, as § 1182(d)(5)(A) specifies, parole is not regarded
as admission.” 	Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). 	“Thus, Section 1182(d)(5)(A)
suggests that rather than reverting to any prior status, a noncitizen whose parole has
expired is treated like the vast majority of undocumented immigrants currently living in
this country who are not subjected to expedited removal.” 	Id. (citing Rodriguez-Acurio,
2025 WL 3314420, at *17).
Accordingly, this Court concludes that Section 1182(d)(5)(A) does not require
Petitioner to be detained under the same statutory status as his original detention.
Although Petitioner’s parole expired in July 2022, DHS permitted him to reside in the
United States for several years thereafter, during which time he applied for asylum and
complied with the conditions of his presence. 	[#5 at ¶¶ 23-24] 	DHS did not initiate
removal proceedings until July 2025, and Petitioner was not detained until November
2025, all while Petitioner was already present in the country. His detention therefore does
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not arise from any ongoing entry or inspection process, but from DHS’s decision to place
him in removal proceedings under Section 1229a. In that posture, detention is properly
understood as detention “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed,”
which falls within Section 1226(a),6 notwithstanding Petitioner’s initial classification at the
time of entry. 	Interpreting Section 1225(b) to apply under these circumstances would
permit mandatory detention based solely on an individual’s historical classification at the
time of entry, even after years of release into the interior of the United States. The Court
declines to adopt such an expansive reading. 	See Rafibaev, 2026 WL 607559 at *2
(“Here, where petitioner has been released on parole pursuant to § 1182(d)(5)(A) for
nearly two years, it is illogical to suggest that his re-detention is governed by § 1225(b)(1),
which . . . governs procedures for the inspection of aliens arriving in the United States
who have not been admitted or paroled.” (quotations omitted)).
Thus, because Petitioner is detained under Section 1226(a), he is entitled to an
individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge.7
4. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED:
6 Further, Section 1225(b)(1) expressly distinguishes between categories of noncitizens
based on whether they have been paroled into the United States. 	Specifically, Section
1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) provides that the expedited removal provisions apply to a noncitizen
“who has not been admitted or paroled into the United States” and who cannot
demonstrate continuous physical presence in the country for the two years preceding the
inadmissibility determination. 	By its plain terms, this language excludes from its scope
individuals who have been paroled, thereby treating them differently from those who
arrive at ports of entry without admission or parole. 	Accordingly, the statute does not
place paroled noncitizens on equal footing with arriving noncitizens for purposes of
applying § 1225(b)(1).
7 Because the Court grants relief on statutory grounds, it declines to reach Petitioner’s
other statutory or constitutional claims. 	If Respondents fail to provide a bond hearing
consistent with Section 1226(a), Petitioner may renew these arguments.
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(1) that the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
[#5] is GRANTED to the extent it seeks a bond hearing;8
(2) Respondents shall provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a) within SEVEN DAYS of the date of this Court's order;
(3) Respondents shall file a status report within TEN DAYS of the date of this
Court's order to certify compliance. The status report shall include if and when
the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was
denied, the reasons for the denial; and
(4) Pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), and to preserve the Court's
jurisdiction, Respondents SHALL NOT REMOVE Petitioner from the District of
Colorado or the United States unless or until this Court or the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit vacates this Order.
DATED: March 30, 2026 	BY THE COURT:
s/Scott T. Varholak
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
8 To the extent Petitioner's Counsel seeks an award of attorney's fees, she must file a
separate motion for fees that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Local Rules of Practice for this District.
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